Thank you for the opportunity to advise the committee.
Let's be clear: This is not the approach Canada wanted. The government was forced into it by American and Chinese trade barriers, and the challenge now is to make the best of a difficult situation regarding China's exports of electric vehicles to Canada.
In that context, I broadly support the government's defence, economic, industrial and trade-diversification strategies. The intentions behind the Prime Minister's January arrangement in Beijing appear legitimate, but importing PRC electric vehicles will at best complicate and at worst endanger those strategies.
My remarks today will focus on the implications of importing electric vehicles under a quota and will build on my testimonies to the Standing Committee on International Trade and the Standing Committee on Science and Research.
China's Communist Party has decided that manufacturing is the key to doubling economic output by 2035, deepening a second China shock that's already displacing industry in other countries. Its 15th five-year plan prioritizes building a modern industrial system, with new energy vehicles being a designated emerging industry. The PRC would rather upgrade overcapacity than eliminate it, but it also depends on exports to grow, which gives Canada leverage.
Further exposing Canada to China's distorted industrial gravity risks warping what remains of our advanced manufacturing. There is a trifecta of risks. First, structural dependence disrupts or co-opts key sectors such as automotive. Second, unfair competition erodes industrial capacity, technology and employment. Third, systemic pressure compels Canada's government to respond with major industrial and protectionist policies.
Batteries and electric vehicles are the thin end of the wedge. The 49,000 vehicles allowed in are less than 3% of the Canadian light vehicle market, that's true, but they're 40% of 2025 battery electric vehicle sales. State-supported Chinese electric vehicle companies sacrifice profit for market share, and squeeze suppliers with price cuts and delayed payments.
In Mexico, Chinese battery electric vehicles went from a quarter of the BEV market to nearly 90% in two years. Mexico ran the experiment, then reversed in January with a 50% tariff. Canada should not repeat that mistake. Once Chinese electric vehicles arrive, networks form around them: dealers, servicing, financing, software and data. What begins as a capped quota becomes a ratchet that only expands.
Concentrated sectoral economic dependence also constricts federal policy-making autonomy. The PRC weaponizes technology, supply chains and market access to coerce acquiescence to its geopolitical agenda. China's ambassador just demonstrated this when he pressed Canada to weaken the long-standing policy on Taiwan. Importing Chinese EVs means importing predatory monopolistic behaviour that our companies can't survive, labour conditions that our workers won't tolerate and infringements of sovereignty that our nation shouldn't accept.
Our submission to Global Affairs Canada's consultation on the import quota recommends making it temporary, non-automatic and reversible. The quota is a tool to safeguard economic security, not a scheme for cheaper cars. It should function as a ceiling to be maintained, not a target to be met, and expand only if it builds Canadian capacity and reduces Canadian vulnerability. Balance it with faster access for EVs from trusted partners.
We propose six essential measures to manage the quota.
First, publish a threshold and exit strategy before further allocation. Define acceptable exposure, what triggers suspension and what happens if promised investment fails.
Second, tighten eligibility. Before allocating quota share, screen for ownership, subsidies, forced labour, supply chain traceability, connected vehicle security and risk of circumvention.
Third, reward verified Canadian capability, not announcements, sales offices or arrangements like the Stellantis-Leapmotor proposal at Brampton, where Chinese kits would be assembled with little domestic content.
Fourth, have annual allocations in quarterly tranches, with no automatic increases. Count vehicles assembled from complete knock-down kits or in Chinese-controlled, third-country factories toward the quota.
Fifth, align with the United States on connected vehicle security.
Sixth, snap back. If Beijing renews coercion, the quota suspends automatically. That's risk management, not retaliation.
In conclusion, arguments touting short-term consumer and environmental benefits are understandable, but the benefits of Chinese EVs are negated by broader harm to Canadian industry, employment, values and independence. The real question is not “Don't we want cheaper EVs?” It's whether Canada wants to be a producer in the future auto economy or merely a consumer market for vehicles produced by China's industrial system. The decision window is now.
Thank you.