Industry Committee on Jan. 30th, 2023

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Can you tell me again when my parliamentary secretary met with Motorola?

[Sébastien Lemire, Bloc, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

It was on August 15, 2022.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

I will look into the results of that meeting.

However, I would like to point out that we have very good ongoing relations with industry leaders who want to offer their technology services to support the work of our public safety agencies.

I also remind you that there is a process in place, which was followed in this case and which we will continue to follow.

[Sébastien Lemire, Bloc, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

On June 9, 2022, Rob Jamieson, a senior advisor in the Office of the Minister of Public Safety, also met with Motorola. Could you tell us more about what was discussed at that meeting?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

It was about checking on the state of the relations and making sure there was very good communication between industry leaders and government. This was necessary to understand the business opportunities, while respecting regulations and protocols.

[Sébastien Lemire, Bloc, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Joël Lightbound]

Thank you.

Mr. MacGregor, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My questioning is along the same lines as what was just asked.

Concerning our allies in the United States, the FCC did list Hytera, and it has a list of its banned equipment to the extent that it's used for the purpose of public safety, security, government facilities, physical security, surveillance of critical infrastructure and other national security purposes. I understand clearly that the equipment in this particular case came nowhere near our secure communications, and that was confirmed and verified by the RCMP.

That being said, the RCMP does work very closely with United States' law enforcement agencies. Would our business contract with Sinclair, which is owned by Norsat and then by Hytera, have ever given them any sort of pause or was any kind of concern ever raised?

The United States probably has a vested interest in making sure that our national security is up to par. I understand that you've defended that, and I do agree that it does work, but have there ever been concerns raised cross-border because of the collaboration that exists between our two countries?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

I can assure you that I work very closely with my American counterpart, Secretary Mayorkas, in a variety of forums. We are consistently finding ways to collaborate in the sharing of intelligence and the understanding of the risks that are posed by foreign actors who are hostile towards us and other democracies and the like. We collaborate in the Five Eyes. We collaborate in the G7. We collaborate in the cross-border crime forum, which I hope to be convening alongside our American allies in the very short term.

I can assure you that there is a very sustained effort to collaborate. As we are acquiring equipment, services and technology, we are applying a very rigorous standard when it comes to national security so that we can protect the Canadian interest in national security. By extension, that also has the net-positive impact of also protecting our allies, including the United States.

[The Chair, Liberal, Joël Lightbound]

Thank you very much, Mr. MacGregor and Mr. Mendicino.

Mr. Minister, thanks for joining us this afternoon and for our first meeting in this Parliament. Thank you very much. You're free to go.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Joël Lightbound]

We still have a few questions to go for Mr. Larkin and Madam Hazen, so thanks to them for sticking around with us.

I will now turn the floor over to Mr. Perkins for five minutes.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to follow up, Ms. Hazen, on something you said. You said that you weren't informed, or that the RCMP wasn't informed, of the charges. The charges against Hytera in the U.S. were levelled in February 2022—21 charges of espionage.

I'm curious about how the RCMP, as one of our primary security agencies, in doling out a contract, would be dependent on another department that is not our security responsibility to tell it that a company it was engaging had been charged with 21 counts of espionage, signed in a letter by President Biden, and banned from doing business in the United States.

[Samantha Hazen]

The existing processes that are in place with regard to contracting for the federal government.... The departments rely on verifications that are performed by our colleagues at PSPC, Public Services and Procurement Canada. In this case, we did do a validation with the RCMP with regard to the integrity regime, which ensures that the government does business with ethical suppliers. That validation came back indicating that there were no flags; therefore, the standing offer was let, with Sinclair Technologies, by PSPC.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

No, I understand that. Those are the notes and stuff that you read in the last answer, but my question isn't that.

My question is this: As one of our primary security forces for this country, why is it that you do not have your own knowledge and intelligence in the work that you do with our other security agencies, to know and be aware of all companies that pose a threat, particularly when they've been charged with espionage in the United States?

I find it incredible that you have to rely on Public Services and Procurement Canada to tell you that. Isn't that your job and the job of CSIS and some of the others? Do you not talk?

[Samantha Hazen]

As the chief financial officer at the RCMP, I don't have access, myself, to a listing of all suppliers abroad. That is why, in my capacity at the RCMP, I rely on the processes put in place by the federal government. I validate these transactions with my colleagues at PSPC.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

I'll ask your colleague the same question, then.

As a senior RCMP officer and a deputy commissioner, are you not aware of Chinese-state national companies that have been charged with espionage by our closest ally?

[D/Commr Bryan Larkin]

Deputy Commissioner Mike Duheme, who oversees our federal policing and national security file.... This is of interest and concern. One of the reasons for the due diligence review in the internal audit is to look at how we enhance these processes.

What I want to re-emphasize is that the piece of equipment that was procured through our radio subject matter experts—

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

We've heard a lot of testimony on that already, but I'm trying to get at the process issue that led to the decisions around that, because it's not the only one that's happened in the Government of Canada. It happened with the Canada Border Services Agency. Again, that was with a company that's owned by Hytera. These are serious issues.

The U.S. public safety and homeland security bureau has published a list of communications equipment and services that are deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States. Has the RCMP, with your security counterparts, produced such a list for Canada?

[D/Commr Bryan Larkin]

Not to our knowledge. No.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

The FCC was referenced earlier by my colleague from the NDP. The FCC in the United States has put out a list of radio and telecommunications equipment that pose a national threat or need national protection, I guess, for security issues.

Has the RCMP or the security intelligence establishment, that you're aware of, done the same thing in Canada and made a list of those things?

[Samantha Hazen]

I'm not aware of such a list at the RCMP.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

I guess this is why we see that these relatively small procurements for the size of the Government of Canada can slip through the cracks. It's when agencies don't have that kind of help and assistance to figure this stuff out, even, surprisingly, in our security intelligence agencies.

The minister referred to standards. We don't know what those standards are. First of all, some standards clearly aren't adequate, because these kinds of procurements keep happening. Also, standards are changing.

Which standards did the minister refer to that need to be updated, as he's informed the whole RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency and all of these agencies responsible for security that report to him? What are those standards, which failed and needed the updating that he referred to, that have been updated?

[Samantha Hazen]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the question.

I can share that there are two verification processes that are run by PSPC with regard to procurements. The first one is the integrity regime, which I already spoke to the committee about.

The second one is a foreign ownership, control or influence verification, or a FOCI. In this particular case, due to the low risk associated with this particular equipment, through internal discussions between RCMP, security, procurement and radio technology experts, it was deemed to be a low-risk piece of equipment. Therefore, a FOCI was not requested by the RCMP.

[The Chair, Liberal, Joël Lightbound]

Thank you very much.

That's all your time, Mr. Perkins.

We'll go to Nate for five minutes.