Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on July 21st, 2020

[Iqra Khalid, Liberal, Mississauga—Erin Mills, ON]

Thank you.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

This question is for anybody who wants to answer it. It may be for the ambassador, but it's for all who are comfortable answering it.

Before 2019, we were just hearing anecdotes. We know that Chinese papers were revealed in 2019. According to New York Times reporting and an independent consortium of journalists, those leaked government documents exposed a program.

Can you talk about that? Earlier it was anecdotal, but now we have concrete information from the centre showing that this program is in force.

[Guy Saint-Jacques]

Let me start.

Yes, indeed, this was an important revelation, and in fact it's linked to what I was saying earlier: that there is no unanimity among Chinese people. A lot of Chinese intellectuals decry what's happening in Xinjiang and in Tibet.

I think that in this case, this was a very well-kept document with limited circulation. You must assume that it was someone in the Communist Party who decided to leak a copy. In a way, once you know that and after all the reports that have been produced, I think it's impossible to remain ambivalent on China.

[Dr. Elise Anderson]

If I could jump in and address that as well, I absolutely agree. I think it was remarkable that the leak came from within the Communist Party itself.

I also think it bears saying very clearly that so much of what we know about what is happening we know from government documents. Researchers are analyzing government data, analyzing government documents. We are analyzing records that are there on the Internet and being circulated on social media.

Every now and then we get.... There have been three very high-profile leaks. There was this one to The New York Times. Then, I believe in November of last year, we saw the China cables from the ICIJ, and then in February we had the Karakax document with the Karakax list.

There is ample evidence, and it comes from the mouths of Chinese government officials themselves.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you.

That's very substantial, because we oftentimes think it's anecdotal. It's not anecdotal. That's the point I'm trying to underscore here.

[Dr. Elise Anderson]

Agreed, yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

Ms. Khalid, do you have anything, or should I go to Ms. McPherson?

[Iqra Khalid, Liberal, Mississauga—Erin Mills, ON]

Do I have time?

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

There's about a minute, but we'll have another round.

[Iqra Khalid, Liberal, Mississauga—Erin Mills, ON]

Okay, no. Go ahead.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

We'll go to Ms. McPherson. After Ms. McPherson's five minutes, we'll have a final round with a question or two from each party and an opportunity for our witnesses. If something has not been asked that you want to bring forward, we'd ask that you share that in our next round during that time. Thank you.

Ms. McPherson, you have five minutes.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have a few questions for Mr. Saint-Jacques.

Again, to all the panellists, thank you for your interventions. They've been very helpful.

Mr. Saint-Jacques, I was intrigued a bit when in your opening comments you talked about CIDA and our international development funding, which I believe ceased in 2013. You wouldn't be recommending that we reinstate any funding for civil society within that framework again, would you?

[Guy Saint-Jacques]

Thank you for the opportunity to expand, because I had a lot more to say than I could in the six minutes.

At the time, the situation was quite different. I think the Chinese government had not embarked on its campaign of assimilation, of destruction of the Uighur culture. In fact, there was support from the Chinese government to help Uighur women get into business to develop small trade.

Apart from CIDA's official programs, I should add that at the embassy we have the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, which can be used to support small projects. When I was ambassador, we would use these projects and sometimes give a grant of $20,000 or $50,000 to help people organize a co-operative or to fight discrimination based on gender. We got quite good results. We had a few projects in Xinjiang.

I must say that once the Chinese government changed the law on NGOs in China, preventing them from getting foreign funding, it became almost impossible to fund any of these projects. The Chinese government was very concerned that some of these projects would lead to social instability.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you for that answer.

To follow on that, you had spoken of the idea that many of the Muslim countries are not speaking out against this atrocity and that this silence is a bit of a problem.

One of the things we've also seen is some deep movement by China into sub-Saharan Africa. Obviously they have huge ambitions to continue to colonize and expand their influence within sub-Saharan Africa.

Is there an opportunity, or could there be an opportunity, to work with allies within countries in sub-Saharan Africa, to push that? Is that another avenue for us to develop allies to work to work with?

[Guy Saint-Jacques]

Yes, I would agree with that. In fact, let's remember that Canada used to have a very important presence in Africa. It's too bad that this has been substantially reduced over the last 10 years. We still have an important capital of goodwill. People remember all the good projects that were undertaken.

Let's remember also that in sub-Saharan Africa there are countries with a large Muslim population. In fact, there are initiatives that have been started. There's one that involves the U.S., Canada and Japan to create an international fund to compete with the fund proposed by China.

I would add also that the attitude of some African countries has started to change as a result of the way China managed the COVID-19 pandemic and the fact that there were reports of African nationals being badly treated, especially in Guangzhou in southern China.

We should pay attention to what China is doing in Africa, because again, they are forcing these countries to support their positions. That's an area where we should invest a little more to offer more choices to these countries.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I'm a big believer in increased overseas development assistance and I can only imagine that would put us on a better footing to do push-back on some of this movement with the CCP.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

Thank you.

Now we'll go into our final round. As I mentioned earlier, each party will have an opportunity to ask a question, maybe two. At the end of the questions from all the members from the different parties, the witnesses will have an opportunity to give some parting remarks for the last 30 seconds or minute.

With that, we're going to go to Ms. Khalid.

[Iqra Khalid, Liberal, Mississauga—Erin Mills, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I have a small question, and I believe Ms. Vandenbeld also has a question.

Monsieur Saint-Jacques, in your remarks you spoke a little bit about the history of terrorism within China in 2013 and 2014, which led to increased surveillance on the Muslim community within China, especially within Xinjiang province.

Can you expand on that for us a little bit? My understanding—and please, I would hope for clarification if I am incorrect—is that the surveillance was going on before these incidents had occurred as well.

Could you please comment on that? Thank you.

[Guy Saint-Jacques]

You're right. In fact, there was increased surveillance. What happened after.... There were four attacks that took place.

Of course the genesis of all of this was the very important riot that took place in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, in 2009. After that, in 2013 and 2014—I was in China at the time—there was the first attack on Tiananmen Square in October in Beijing, and then a very gruesome attack, using knives, at the Kunming train station on March 1, 2014. Then there was an explosion at the Urumqi train station, and then finally a suicide car attack in an open market in Urumqi on May 22, 2014.

I had a discussion with Chinese officials in the Communist Party of China after those events to tell them that the policy they were following was the reason they were generating those attacks and that in fact they had to change the attitude. I recall saying to people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Look at the example of Canada. Here I am, a French Canadian, as ambassador in one of the most important countries in the world. Can you point out to me a Uighur ambassador that you have anywhere around the world, or a Tibetan who occupies the function of ambassador?”

I said, “You have to give better opportunities to your people while letting them protect their culture.” I said, “There is a sense of despair for what you are doing. You are creating for yourself a lot of resentment, and this will come back to haunt you.”

Of course this led to very difficult conversations, but they were not in the mood to follow any advice.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

We turn to Mr. Genuis for a question.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I have one observation and two questions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think Ambassador Saint-Jacques' point about the forceful response of African leaders to the racism directed at African nationals during the COVID situation, especially in southern China, provides a powerful example that even countries that are potentially very vulnerable to Chinese efforts of colonialism were able to stand up and push back, and it had a real impact. I think that's a model for us to follow.

My first question is for Dr. Anderson, again on the issue of colonialism.

You spoke about colonialism, and we see those colonial efforts inside the territory of the PRC as well as beyond it. It seems to me that it's important for other countries to, at a minimum, refuse to be partners in that colonialism. However, we see many nations, including Canada, that are members of, for instance, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is part of the broader belt and road initiative.

I wonder if you can speak to the AIIB, what you think about countries being members of it, and the degree to which maybe that provides the appearance of legitimacy for the belt and road initiative.

[Dr. Elise Anderson]

That is a big, thorny, and of course very important question.

For me and for my organization, it fundamentally comes back to this issue: When are we, collectively, globally, going to actually act on the values that we say we hold? When are we going to prioritize human rights, not even necessarily over economic gain, but at least to the same extent?

So many of us pay lip service to those values, and so many of us pay lip service to human rights, and meanwhile we are not actually practising those values in the way that our country makes policies and in the way that we interact with countries like China. I do understand there are a number of countries and a number of governments that are in a tough bind and that see they have things to gain from China, but my question is, at what expense?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I guess one of the arguments that we've heard back from the government about membership in the AIIB is, “Well, it's better to have a Canadian voice at the table.” We represent less than 1% of the voting shares of this neo-colonial vehicle. It seems to me that having a voice at the table in a so-called development bank whose modus operandi is spreading Chinese state colonialism misses the point entirely of what the objective of that entity is. I would love to hear your response on that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

You have less than a minute.

[Dr. Elise Anderson]

Right, and if you have a voice but you never actually say anything, or you have a voice but you only nod your head in agreement with what's happening, then what good is that voice?