International Trade Committee on June 11th, 2021

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

So it is part of a continuing process and is consistent with the intentions expressed orally. I believe this bill puts the election promises into concrete form.

You said that this might carry risks in the negotiations.

Whenever we enter into negotiations with a country for a free trade agreement, is there not always precisely such a risk, given that we need to be vigilant and protect our key sectors?

[Doug Forsyth]

Yes, any time we enter into negotiation, we would have both offensive and defensive interests, and on the defensive interests side, it's absolutely about protecting and defending key sectors like, for example, supply-managed sectors.

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Forsyth.

Some opponents of the bill argue that a change would not be prevented, because any act can be amended at a later date. So a government that had its negotiating mandate limited could always come back to Parliament to change it.

Is that correct?

[Doug Forsyth]

Thank you for the question.

Yes, that is my understanding. If this bill were enacted, if they wanted to make changes to it, they could do that.

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Perfect, thank you.

If I understand correctly, a government that came after and wanted to make concessions would have to assume the political responsibility and have the courage to include it in its mandate and seek the permission of the House first.

So the power is delegated to the members of the House. That is the aspect that I find interesting. I don't think it conflicts with our interests.

There have been several references to the agreement with Great Britain. I would like to point out specifically that the market shares that had been allocated to Europe had also been allocated to Great Britain. It was obvious that we could not have expected new concessions on its part. Unfortunately, the agreement signed with Great Britain is temporary. There is therefore still a risk of fresh demands.

I would like to bring this point to the attention of the committee members, because I think it is important.

You spoke earlier of the negotiating mandates. When a representative of the government participates in negotiations, they have a mandate from the government. Would the law proposed in Bill C-216 not simply be part of the mandate? Would it not impose a limit to prevent the representatives from touching supply management?

Would that not have the same impact?

There seems to be a desire to dramatize the fact that it is a law, but it could simply be set out in the government's instructions. On the other hand, if it is in a law, we are sure it will be there, regardless of what government is in office.

[Doug Forsyth]

If this bill were enacted, I would not see a need for it to be in the negotiating mandate. I mean, you would probably put it in anyway, but it would be to remind negotiators of what is in the legislation. However, I think it would be clear—

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

You agree with me that it would be more or less equivalent, right?

It is simply defining a future government's negotiating mandate in advance, no matter what party is in power.

[Doug Forsyth]

I think all governments of the day, as I mentioned in my earlier answer, have supported supply management since its inception. It has been part and parcel of Canada's trade negotiations and Canada's agriculture policy. I don't think that's anything new.

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Thank you. I will move on to my next question.

You say that all governments have expressed their support for supply management. That's true, but in the recent agreements, all governments, regardless of stripe, have made concessions, except in the case of the agreement with Great Britain, obviously, that we spoke about earlier.

So the goal of this bill is to cement that.

Someone cited the danger that other groups will be asking to have their interests entrenched in law. Is that not a slight exaggeration? We know that the other groups are not governed by supply management.

It must be understood that if we grant more concessions, then at some point, the supply management system will no longer be able to function. In order for a supply management system to function, supply has to be controlled. That is the very foundation of the system.

I would like to hear your thoughts on that subject.

I am putting the question to Mr. Fowler from the Department of Agriculture.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Mr. Fowler, could we could get a somewhat short answer?

[Aaron Fowler]

I will endeavour to do so, Chair.

It is true that supply management rests upon three legs. One is on import controls, because we need to know the volume of product that's entering the country in these sectors in order for us to do the domestic administration and allocation of the system to ensure it continues to operate. It is important that we preserve import controls to ensure the smooth functioning of supply management.

I would say, though, similarly—

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you, Mr. Fowler.

We will go on to Mr. Blaikie for six minutes, please.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I suppose I might start by expressing some sympathy for Mr. Forsyth, who has been sent here to defend the government's right to ultimately betray supply-managed producers in trade negotiations on what I think are frankly some specious grounds.

I don't think the bill was presented in ignorance of the fact that Canada's trade negotiating teams receive mandates from cabinet, but one has to wonder—and perhaps you could answer for the committee—whether the negotiating mandates for either CETA, the CPTPP or CUSMA included a prohibition on conceding market access in supply-managed sectors.

[Doug Forsyth]

Thank you for the question. Maybe I can answer it in a more general way, given that the mandates are for cabinet purposes.

I think it's very clear that each trade negotiator understands well his or her mandate. Whether it was under the CETA or CPTPP or CUSMA, that's where we started from. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, it was deemed necessary to reach agreement on those three key trade agreements, and those decisions were not made lightly. Those decisions were not made by just the chief trade negotiator at the time; they were done in close consultation with the government of the day, including the minister and beyond. Those were important decisions. They were made in the economic interest of Canada, and they were not made lightly.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

That's fair enough, although I think that the concern of supply-managed producers has less to do with the feelings of government decision-makers in respect of their decision to betray them and more to do with the substantive consequences for their industry.

On that point, those three agreements were clearly failures to protect the supply-managed sector in a way that the government has indicated it would like to or that it would. It seems to me that there is a stark difference between legislation that takes making those concessions out of the purview of government and a mandate that restricts the government but that the government can change from day to day.

In your opening remarks, you said that Parliament has the ultimate say because it can pass or decline to pass the legislation that enacts these agreements, but I think you also know—and you can correct me if I'm wrong—that by the time enabling legislation comes to Parliament, the deal is already signed. If Parliament declined to pass enabling legislation for those agreements, Canada at that point would be in default of very serious international commitments already made on behalf of Canada by the government. Is that not true?

[Doug Forsyth]

I would say it's mostly true, but I think it is Parliament that votes on the final text, and if Parliament deemed it necessary to make those changes, we would have to return to the negotiating table based on that, absolutely.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

But to be clear, typically Parliament doesn't actually get to vote on the text of the agreement except in appendices to the enabling legislation, perhaps, and Parliament can't actually alter the wording of those agreements. It can change the wording of the enabling legislation, but it can't in fact alter the wording of the agreements. Is that not true?

[Doug Forsyth]

That is true. That's correct.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

I think there's a bit of a deception in saying that Parliament has the final say when the agreement has already been signed, sealed and delivered. What Parliament is studying and making decisions about is how to enact that agreement within Canadian law, not whether to enact that agreement within Canadian law. That is why I began my remarks by expressing some sympathy for your having to be the ambassador of those arguments, because I don't think they really hit the nail on the head, frankly.

I think what we have here is a dispute. While I always appreciate the kind of information that officials can provide in the context of a debate, what we have here is actually a political debate. It is first and foremost about the role of supply-managed industry within Canada and the extent to which there is and ought to be political will to properly defend it within trade agreements, notwithstanding what appears from time to time in the mandate that can be changed by a particular government.

We also have a debate—I think a good one and an appropriate one, but not one that can be solved by technical expertise—about the role of the legislature in determining what kinds of international commitments Canada is going to undertake in respect of trade. This bill promotes a view that would have the legislature take a far more active role in determining what governments can and cannot do within a trade negotiation.

I've been clear many times before that this is something I support, so I don't agree with so-called principled objections to the legislature weighing in on these things. I think the treatment of the supply-managed sector in the last number of trade agreements—I'm thinking particularly of the three I mentioned earlier—shows there is a need for the legislature to get more involved, because we clearly can't trust the word of government, even when it has said that this is a priority for them. Even on the Canada-U.K. trade deal, we can talk about how there was no market access ceded under that agreement, but that's because there continues to be temporary market access for U.K. cheese makers under existing agreements. That's going to expire. In fact, the expiration of those agreements and the U.K.'s desire for Canadian market share has been cited by the government as a reason that the U.K. would be interested in coming to the table to negotiate a future agreement, so—

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much, Mr. Blaikie. I'm sorry to cut you off, but your time is up.

We have Mr. Berthold for five minutes, please.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I am very grateful to the people from the departments for being with us today.

Mr. Forsyth, you said just now that the mandates assigned to the negotiators concerning the protection of supply management are reflected well in the intent of Bill C-216.

Can you explain what happened in the case of the Canada—United States—Mexico Agreement, CUSMA, not just so that we would concede another market to the Americans, but also so that we would permit them to limit Canadian exports, in particular for powdered milk?

How is it that at some point, despite those intentions on the government's part, the negotiating teams go even further than concessions that are not provided in BillC-216, as we have it before us today?

[Doug Forsyth]

Maybe I can start and then turn to my colleague from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.

As I mentioned in my remarks, the intent of the bill is consistent with the long-standing Government of Canada policy to defend the integrity of the system. As I mentioned in my previous answer, whether it was with respect to the CUSMA negotiations, the TPP negotiations, the CPTPP negotiations or the CETA negotiations, it was deemed necessary by the government of the day to provide some concessions to our various trading partners in order to finalize each free trade agreement. It was not—

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Excuse me for interrupting you, Mr. Forsyth.

What happened for those concessions to have been made at the last minute? We have seen that this was done at the very end. Did we not draw attention to supply management by saying at the outset that there would be no concessions? Is that not one of the points on which Canada had to give in, at the very end of the negotiations?

[Doug Forsyth]

Thank you for the clarification.

In any negotiation, whether it's a trade negotiation or anything, the tough issues are really left until the very end. Nobody wants to concede any of the difficult issues up front, because your trading partner will just continue to ask for more. It was at the very end that these issues did get decided under the CUSMA. Again, those decisions were not taken lightly at all.

Maybe I'll turn to my colleague from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada to follow up on that.