Justice Committee on Jan. 30th, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

I call the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to order. Today being Tuesday, January 30, 2007, the committee is continuing its study in this particular case into gangs, gangsterism, and connections to organized crime.

I'd like to welcome the witnesses who are sitting at the head of the table. I really appreciate your attendance here. We have with us Mr. Randall Richmond, from the Department of Justice; from Correctional Service Canada, Mr. Ross Toller and Mr. Luciano Bentenuto; from Maison d'Haïti, Mr. Harry Delva; as an individual, Mr. Claude Bélanger, former principal general counsel, Department of Justice; and Mr. Guy Ouellette, retired sergeant, Sûreté du Québec.

Welcome, gentlemen.

I would ask that we continue as the names appear on the agenda. We'll begin by listening to Mr. Randall Richmond's presentation. Please try to keep your comments, gentlemen, to about 10 minutes. I'll give you some flexibility on that.

Go ahead, Mr. Richmond.

[Randall Richmond, Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Organized Crime Prosecutions Bureau, Department of Justice (Quebec)]

Thank you very much.

My name is Randall Richmond. I have been a lawyer and a prosecutor since 1983, and prosecutor for the Province of Quebec since 1988.

I began pleading organized crime cases in the 1990s and I worked in the Proceeds of Crime Bureau (BLPC) from its inception in 1996. In 2000, when the Quebec Ministry of Justice created the Organized Crime Prosecutions Bureau (BLACO), I was named deputy chief of this office, a position that I still hold today.

In addition to my administrative and supervisory responsibilities, I personally pleaded the cases borne from the shooting for journalist Michel Auger. I also pleaded the trial borne of Operations Springtime 2001 and implicating the Hells Angels Nomad Donald Stockford and his associate, the former Hells Angels national president, Walter Stadnick.

The minutes of proceedings of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights indicate that the committee wishes “to examine the overall effect on gangsterism of Bills C-94 and C-24, adopted in 1997 and 2001”.

As a practitioner specialized in organized crime cases, I can say without any hesitation that the legislative changes brought about by Bills C-95 and C-24 have been extremely helpful and have had a significant impact on our fight against organized crime in Quebec. We have used the tools provided to us by these two bills on a regular basis and continue to do so.

The changes that have been most useful to us can be summarized as follows: wire taps are available more easily and for longer periods of time; infiltration of criminal organizations is easier; pre-trial custody is easier to secure; sentences are longer; and convicts have to serve more time in jail before being released on parole.

Quebec was the first province to apply these new measures and remains the one that has applied them the most. In the Organized Crime Prosecutions Bureau alone, we have charged over 1,000 people since 2001, due in great part to the tools provided by C-95 and C-24 which facilitated the investigations. The acquittal rate in these cases is less than two percent.

Among these people, many were charged with gangsterism, either in its original form as provided by C-95 or in the form modified by C-24.

Since the creation of the Organized Crime Prosecutions Bureau, its prosecutors have secured the convictions of 286 people for criminal organization charges.

Consequently, we have met the following objectives.

First, end the biker gang war that caused 174 deaths and 150 attempted murders.

Second, break up and put an end to the Quebec Nomads chapter of the Hells Angels as well as the puppet club, the Rockers, by securing sentences of 20 years in prison for the Nomads and 15 years for the Rockers, on average.

Third, suppress crime by the Hells Angels across Quebec. Consequently, as of 2005, half of the Hells Angels in Quebec had been neutralized because they were either in jail, on parole, or on the run.

Fourth, break up and put an end to the Bandidos biker club all across Quebec.

Other beneficial effects of our work are worth mentioning: putting an end to biker impunity, putting an end to the climate of fear, and exposing the true nature of the criminal biker gangs. Obviously these results cannot be explained exclusively by the new anti-gang provisions of Bill C-95 and Bill C-24. They must be attributed to the combined effect of the legislative changes with other measures, such as the creation of specialized police task forces, with the participation of different police agencies; lengthy police investigations that targeted whole criminal organizations; the use of civil infiltration agents; the creation of specialized teams of prosecutors, such as the Proceeds of Crime Bureau in 1996 and the Organized Crime Bureau in 2000; the construction of the Grouin Judicial Services Centre; and the renovation of several courtrooms around Quebec, which allowed for the instruction of several mega-trials in different places at the same time.

The results obtained demonstrate that it is possible to prove gangsterism, but one should not conclude that it is easy to do so. On the contrary, it can be arduous. In almost all of the cases where we have charged gangsterism, this came after lengthy investigations of 12 to 24 months, during which wiretapping and physical surveillance were carried out and prosecutors were involved as legal advisers during the investigations.

In addition, in 90% of the cases, the prosecution had at its disposition a special witness, that is, an informant witness or a civil infiltration agent. The special witness facilitates the proof of gangsterism, because he has been a member of that organization and has participated in its activities. He can, therefore, testify to the existence of the organization, its structure, its hierarchy, the identity of its members, and its criminal activities.

A notable exception to this is the recent case of R. v. Aurélius, where 15 people were convicted, including five for charges of gangsterism, without the help of a special witness. In this groundbreaking case, the first to convict a street gang of gangsterism, the prosecution had to rely on evidence from wiretaps, physical surveillance, and about 40 drug purchases made by police undercover officers. It goes without saying that all of these investigative techniques can be expensive.

In conclusion, proving gangsterism with the present legislation is indeed possible, but the necessary resources must be available for investigation and prosecution.

With regard to Bill C-10, it is likely that for most prosecutions of a crime committed with a firearm, proving the use of a restricted or prohibited firearm will be easier than proving a connection with a criminal organization. However, there are cases where long-barrelled guns are used by criminal organizations; for example, see the case of R. v. Rodrigue at the Supreme Court of Canada in 2005. There are other cases where firearms are used in crime, but never found by the police, which can make it more difficult to prove the use of a restricted or prohibitive firearm than to prove the connection to a criminal organization.

So there are indeed circumstances where the connection to a criminal organization can be seriously considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing for a crime committed with the use of a firearm.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

Thank you, Mr. Richmond.

Mr. Toller, please.

[Ross Toller, Assistant Commissioner, Correctional Operations and Program, Correctional Service Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of Correctional Service Canada, I would like to thank you and the committee members for inviting us here today. It's my understanding the committee is interested in getting an overview of organized crime and criminal gangs within the context of the federal corrections, and I therefore thought it might be appropriate for me to be accompanied here today by our national manager for the portfolio of organized crime and criminal gangs for CSC, Mr. Luciano Bentenuto.

As you are aware, all levels of government are committed to addressing the challenges posed by offenders affiliated with gangs and organized criminal groups. The effectiveness of legislation to combat organized crime, along with a proactive approach adopted by law enforcement agencies, including the increase in successful prosecution of such cases, has resulted in an increased number of gang members or affiliates receiving sentences of two years or more, which, of course, the federal corrections is responsible for.

I've taken the liberty this morning of providing the committee with copies of our policy on the management of organized crime, and more specifically, our CD 568-3. In addition, you will find within your package a series of graphs that I'll be referring to as I walk through this presentation, which I hope will assist you this morning.

If you look at our first page here, on section 467-related offences, you'll see that since 1997, 303 federal offenders were admitted on a warrant of committal for an offence under section 467 of the Criminal Code. Of those inmates, 224 are still serving their sentences--151 are incarcerated, 72 remain under some form of supervision in the community, and one is in temporary detention.

In regard to the increase of 85 in 2003, as shown in the chart, I would add that, as Mr. Richmond pointed out, one of the prosecution's operations in the springtime of 2001 led to a successful number of prosecutions in that year.

It's to be noted that these 224 federal offenders represent 13% of our current offender gang population, and actually 1% of the overall offender population currently within the Correctional Service. For example, someone belonging to a criminal organization may be serving a sentence for offences other than the ones found under section 467 of the Criminal Code, and that's an important point for us in a correctional context in terms of the management of gangs.

As of December 10, 2006, there were 1,752 offenders who were identified as members or associates of a criminal organization in accordance with our commissioner's directives on the identification and management of criminal organizations. If you take a quick look at chart 2, the one titled “CSC gang population”, you'll notice that 64%, or 1,119, of those offenders are incarcerated, and 633 of them are under some type of community supervision at present.

In the past few years much attention was given to the outlaw motorcycle gangs and traditional organized crime entities; however, with the emergence of the street gangs and other similar groups such as the aboriginal gangs, CSC has seen quite a change in its offender population, more specifically with the gang demographics. As a matter of fact, the aboriginal gangs now represent the largest type within our service. As of December 10, there were 540 offenders identified as members or affiliates with aboriginal gangs. This is the gang group with the largest number of people; 90% of these members, or 485, are serving their sentences within the prairie region.

Street gangs have also increased to such numbers that they now represent a larger group than the traditional organized crime groups. The new reality is that street gangs are getting involved in illicit activities that were historically held by other organized crime groups. In addition, we're now starting to see a second generation of street gang members. They are older and get more involved in violent offences, resulting in convictions for more serious offences, warranting, of course, longer sentences.

One of the consequences is that the number of offenders affiliated with street gangs has increased by 74%, from 213 members in 2000 to 370 in 2006. The growth of gang members inside our penitentiary has created a number of challenges and has required us to make investments in a number of areas to stay on top of this issue at a time when other issues related to our offender population grow as well, such as mental health, hostility, and the more youthful offender that we seem to be receiving within our facilities.

Our response to this is basically found in a multi-pronged approach, which includes the development of policy that I submitted to you earlier. The key objectives of this policy are to recognize that criminal organizations pose a serious threat to the safe, secure, orderly, and efficient management and operation of our institutions and community operation units, and to ensure all actions are based on approved correctional policy and affirm our intolerance of acts of violence and other criminal activities committed by criminal organization members and their associates in our institutions or in the community while on conditional release.

We have launched, in all of our institutions, a secure network for storing and sharing information on: gangs; suspicious or illegal activities occurring in correctional penitentiaries and in our community; and threats to the safety of our staff, offenders, and the public. Next year we are scheduled to extend the secure network to the operational sites in the community.

The goal is to improve efficiency in responding to security threats by giving institutional security intelligence officers and their counterparts in the community increased intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination capabilities. This will allow us, of course, to safely share classified information with our law enforcement partners, including the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, the RCMP, the National Parole Board, and other stakeholders. On an even larger front, the network will be linked to the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, ITAC, which liaises with foreign intelligence organizations right now.

We also developed a certification course for our security intelligence officers, in collaboration with many of our justice partners, such as the police and CSE, justice and law enforcement agencies, in order to enhance our capacity to respond to criminal gangs within this correctional realm. Since 2004, 95 officers have successfully completed this specialized training program. These officers work in various institutions throughout the country and act as the primary professional resource for our front-line staff in regard to the issues of gangs.

In addition, specific gang information sessions have been developed to allow other staff who work with offenders an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the basic features of gang dynamics that they may have to face in their day-to-day duties. This includes a two-day program specifically designed for our parole officers who work directly with our inmates.

Currently a pilot project is under way in the prairie region, which includes Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, and where our security intelligence officers have been trained to deliver gang information sessions to all front-line staff. A further expansion of this program will be dependent on the outcome of this pilot.

Notwithstanding all of our efforts, our capacity to respond remains somewhat limited. The ratio of our security intelligence officers is approximately 1:250 inmates, or one per institution. The reality is that there are currently no security intelligence officers in the operational community settings. While our SIOs monitor illicit activities that could potentially compromise the safety and security of our institutions, community SIOs would work in close collaboration with our parole officers to enhance the intelligence component within our community setting. That's why we are vigorously pursuing this avenue.

Finally, to address the increasing complexity of threats facing CSC, we need to develop a multidisciplinary approach that would allow for a coordinated integrated gang strategy within our setting to be inclusive of our law enforcement officers and key stakeholders. We decided to incorporate this approach within the premise of the intelligence-led risk management model.

You might be aware that police have coined the term “intelligence-led policing”, which involves the collection and analysis of information to produce intelligence products designed to inform police decision-making at both the tactical and strategic levels. It's a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations rather than the reverse. It's innovative and, by some standards, even radical, but it is predicated on the notion that a principal task of the police is to prevent and detect crime rather than simply react to it.

At corrections we focus on managing the risk within the realm of corrections. We are now in the process of finalizing our national gang management strategy, which will be based on this intelligence-led risk management model that I just referred to. It's a model in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations focusing on preventive- and proactive-type initiatives.

The complexity of the gang dynamics and the variations in their actual structures do not allow for a one-size-fits-all gang management strategy. Although we promote integration among offenders so that they learn to live within the same living quarters—this also replicates the challenges they will face when they reintegrate society at large—we are aware that existing gang rivalries and incompatible issues may force us at times to resort to strategies that tend to segregate certain types of gangs. Therefore, our gang management strategy is one that is flexible enough to accommodate this reality, and one that also focuses on the individuals as much as on the groups they belong to. This means we have developed multiple strategies on prevention, intervention, and repressive models.

Also it's often necessary for us to mirror corresponding activities in the community. It wasn't too long ago that there were significant biker wars going on in the Quebec region. We had to respond accordingly within our population to make sure there was not a spillover within the correctional context. We worked closely, of course, with the police and with our managers in terms of sorting that process through.

For those offenders who are not affiliated with any criminal organizations or who have disaffiliated themselves from such a group, the focus will be on preventing them from engaging in activities that will predispose them to possible recruitment or initiation into a gang. Even though we aim to provide all gang members an opportunity to disaffiliate from their gangs, we understand that the more immediate objective in a correctional context is to get them to not continue their illicit activities once they are under our jurisdiction. Additionally, appropriate measures are taken to prevent them from exercising influence and power in institutions and in the community, and to prevent actions and circumstances that would serve to enhance or look at the image of the status of criminal organizations.

There have been some situations where opposing gangs must be separated, as I just referred to, in order to effectively manage our operations. When this occurs, gangs are housed in separate cell blocks to minimize and prevent contact and avoid potential gang-related situations. However, separation is not always a realistic approach to dealing with gangs. We assess each situation individually and develop approaches and interventions at the local level that would be most effective at ensuring the safety in institutions within our community.

There's no question that the issue of gang management within a correctional realm is a complex one, and the implications of it are certainly broad. The expected increase in the number of offenders identified as belonging to or being affiliated with criminal groups will continue to put pressure on our current resources, as these offenders pose various challenges to our direct operations. As an example, we have already seen an increase in the number of offenders with gang affiliations admitted with CSC for weapons-related offences. If you refer to chart 3, you will notice that there has been an increase of almost 50%. In addition, there has been an increase in federal offenders identifying themselves to criminal groups during the intake process at admissions at a federal institution. If you have a quick look at chart 4, again, you'll see an incremental growth that continues to move into the future years.

Some of the challenges we have, of course, are the power and control issues that gang members will sometimes exercise through intimidation, extortion, and violence within the incarcerated and supervised community populations; incompatibilities and rivalries among various groups; drug use and distribution within the institutions; continued criminal links with outside criminal organizations; recruitment of new gang members and individuals to pursue extremist ideologies; the potential for intimidation, infiltration, manipulation, and corruption of staff, which is becoming a concern of ours; infiltration of CSC and our partners and service providers; gang leaders, through financial resources or external networks, attempting to interfere with correctional operations; and our maximum security capacity to address growing numbers of convictions for serious crimes that are gang-related, including weapons-related charges, which are beginning to create operational difficulties for us.

As you can see, it's very much a complicated matter for correctional settings that require future investment for us to better be able to effectively manage this issue.

Again, I thank you very much, Mr. Chair and committee members, for my being able to speak here today.

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

Thank you very much, Mr. Toller. We appreciate that report of yours too. There's good information there.

Mr. Delva.

[Harry Delva, Representative, Maison d'Haïti]

Good morning, Mr. Chair, and thank you for inviting me.

As a result of my role as coordinator of youth projects at Maison d'Haiti, I'm mainly going to address the historical aspect. We deal directly with young people, at the street level. Here we're talking about the situation within families, which we find in the streets and subsequently in the various systems.

In Quebec, the history of gangs began when youths wanted to defend themselves. They told teachers they were being bullied and attacked outside the school, but the teachers couldn't believe them. Those youths therefore decided to call on cousins and big brothers to protect them. Teachers at school told them they could do nothing for them, since the incidents were taking place outside the school. It was really starting in the 1980s that a number of groups emerged. Those groups were initially formed to protect young blacks and young rockers.

The rockers subsequently realized that young blacks very often hung out in large numbers. They concluded from that that those groups were forming very quickly and they decided to withdraw. Understanding that the group gave them a certain strength, young blacks decided to continue. The first group broke off, some of its members settled in Montreal North and others stayed in the neighbourhood around Bélanger Street. There were the Bo-Gars, in Montreal North, and the Family, in the neighbourhood near Bélanger Street. The latter subsequently took control, became the CDP group and moved to the Saint-Michel neighbourhood.

We saw this group grow during the 1990s. On the one hand, there were the guys from the Bélanger Street neighbourhood, and on the other hand, the guys from Montreal North. I believe that's really the street gang stronghold in Montreal.

Our work was to understand exactly what these young people were experiencing and what was going on in the families. We very quickly realized that, in the families in general, the parents had to leave home very early in the morning to get to work, sometimes around 5:00 a.m., and returned home very late in the evening. During that time, the youths needed a place to meet, people to identify with. From that point, the gangs really took control of these youths. The phenomenon continued to evolve in the 1990s. The American dream became an important thing. There were the Bloods and the Crips, which are an exact model of the American experience.

What about the parents of these young people? At the time, we were talking about the youths of the Haitian community because that's really where things began. The youths became disconnected from reality. Their parents didn't exactly understand what they were going through. In addition, the youths were having a very hard time adapting. The parents gave up and said to themselves that, if their children were arrested by the police, the system would take charge of them. In general, we observed that the parents disowned their children.

As for the present situation of these youths, they're living in a threefold culture. They're required to be Haitian at home, Quebeckers in the street and Americans in their dreams. Their vision of the world doesn't enable them to understand exactly what's going on. In addition, they're dealing with a lack of jobs, activities and recreations. In a number of places, no recreational activities are available to them. As a result of all that, they have grouped together in gangs.

Today, in 2006, we see there are three levels in street gangs. There are these youths who hang around the schools; these are the juniors. There are also gangs that really identify with the Bloods and the Crips, the Blues and the Reds. Lastly, there are those who do business. In fact, these are people who commit criminal offences of all kinds. We've moreover heard a lot about them recently.

As for us, in the Saint-Michel and Montreal North neighbourhoods, we now have to focus on the problem of youths who are members of the Bloods and Crips. These two groups are really confronting each other in the streets, around the schools and in the parks.

The Bloods and Crips are two groups that detest each other. This is somewhat a copy of what's going on in the United States. For example, when a youth leaves Montreal North with a red bandanna and goes to Saint-Michel, he'll definitely be beaten up by the Blues. Most of the juniors in the streets monitor the road. They're there to monitor what goes on and to see who enters their territory. Then there are the veterans, who we know well. The veterans are still working in drug reselling, prostitution and all kinds of businesses. Sometimes they're affiliated with other groups now called the businessmen.

What must be understood about these different groups, and why the Bloods and Crips are the most important groups for us in the street, is that they have a major influence. Today, we have to start doing prevention with youths who are perhaps five or six years old, because these groups are doing a very good job. With the American dream, the rise of hip hop music, gangsta rap, if you say street gangs, in 2007, you're talking about youths who are five or six years old who have this in their minds. All they see is what's conveyed in the media, what they see on television. They want to be like the rapper 50 Cent, for example. These days, that's their idol, and they want to be exactly like him.

We're talking about prevention with five- and six-year-old children because they often find themselves in the following situation. A youth sees his big brother or his mother, who's 16 or 17 years of age, who has a friend at home who is maybe 17 or 18 years old; he belongs to a gang, has is bandanna and puts it on the table. That same youth will see that the older youth—say, his mother's boyfriend—is watching 50 Cent on TV and it's extremely violent. That's how he's being formed, and we really have to focus our efforts on these youths because it's they who will soon be in the secondary schools and will become the king pins of the Bloods and Crips street gangs.

Why is there so much talk about the Crips and the Bloods? It's obviously understood that these youths, through what's conveyed in the United States, through music, think they've found a way to settle matters. Since they've already been excluded, they figure they no longer have anything to lose. Since they have nothing to lose, even when they wind up in prison and other systems, their threefold culture enables them to get through the system, return to the community and continue doing what they have to do, unfortunately. That's why it's important for us to see how we can reduce the number of youths who head in that direction.

Now let's talk about weapons. Last week, I was talking to a 15-year-old youth, and I asked him how he managed to find weapons at his age. He told me that it was easy, that he just had to go downtown, that he could find a weapon for $50. It can take maybe 10 minutes for a guy to bring one back.

We recently intervened near a school. One youth had been injured by another in a fist fight. He was 13 years old. In talking to another patroller who spoke Spanish as he did, he said that, in any case, he was going to settle the matter himself, that he was going to get his brother's weapon. That means that, today, from what youths see and experience, it's easy and entirely normal for them to have a weapon in their hands. We have to explain to them, because they don't yet know that it's prohibited to have a weapon. In their minds, everyone has one, so it's cool, and they're also going to try to get one. That's why I can say that we have an enormous job to do in terms of prevention, to make these youths understand the consequences of the various acts.

An act was recently passed. Now when we talk about a street gang, we know it's a criminal organization. Once again, the youths who have gotten involved in the Bloods and Crips groups aren't aware of this fact. The only thing they're going to understand is that, when they're arrested because they've acted in a certain way, they're going to fall under that act. We absolutely have to enable them to learn exactly what the law is and what it means. The same is true for weapons.

Yes, it's true that we can have acts that will enable us to protect the public, but it's also true that most of these youths, if they aren't aware because they're living inside their heads and in their dreams, can't understand that it isn't right to own a weapon, since they regularly see it on television and their idols carry them and have fun with them. If you go to 50 Cent's Web site, you'll see that a weapon opens the site. So a youth who wants to get onto the site knows he has to go “bang, bang” to get in, and that's a situation we experience every day with our youths.

Getting back to prevention, yes, I think we have to work very hard to do it. For a very long time, we've been trying to work with youths in the Saint-Michel and Montreal North neighbourhoods doing prevention. Unfortunately, we don't have the resources to fight this phenomenon, this plague. This phenomenon has been promoted on TV with billions of dollars, with hip hop music and artists like 50 Cent and others, but it's unfortunately very difficult for the various community groups, which are in the field, which every day experience what the youths are experiencing and exactly report their day-to-day experience to us.

Unfortunately, we can't find the funding to be able to keep caseworkers who can continue working with these youths. Today, we've definitely realized that we have to start earlier. Unfortunately, we have to start in kindergarten, with children five or six years old, because they already have a red bandanna or a blue bandanna in their pocket and they already know... I don't mean these youths belong to gangs, but they already know their allegiance. That means that, if they belong to the Bloods, they know they have to hate and detest the Crips, and if they belong to the Crips, they know they have to hate and detest the Bloods, and when these youths meet in the street, they're going to shoot each other or they're, in a way, going to continue the same fight.

Will we manage to stop all this? I tell you right now no, unfortunately, but we'll have to be able to work upstream with a new generation with whom we can make contact and make a difference. I say quite often that we have to be able to give these youths something to lose because, for the moment, they have absolutely nothing to lose. When they wind up in the prison system, they still have nothing to lose, and it snowballs, because all they know is that, in the street, they'll find a way to make hay, as it were.

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

Thank you, Mr. Delva.

Mr. Bélanger.

[Claude Bélanger, Former Principal General Counsel, Department of Justice, As an Individual]

Good morning, Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen of the committee.

My name is Claude Bélanger. First, I'm going to note that the Bélanger Street neighbourhood Mr. Delva referred to in his presentation has nothing to do with me.

For a little more than 32 years, I have acted as Crown attorney or permanent Crown prosecutor in the federal Department of Justice. During those 32 years, which I've spent before virtually all the courts of all jurisdictions, I've followed the trail of a very large number of members of organized crime. Unfortunately, when I began my career, the organized crime act had not even been conceived of, and I'm not sure anyone felt the need to do so.

The legislation concerning organized crime and the proceeds of crime are indissociable in my mind. They cannot be separated from each other because the purpose of the crimes committed by organized crime is to appropriate material property, money, and all that entails.

In 1989, when the new act on the proceeds of crime came into force, I established the Mont-Joie ski resort case, which you may have heard about. This involved individuals who, through narcotics imports in southern Florida, had acquired enough money to build a ski resort in North Hatley, in the Eastern Townships, in Quebec.

Since the act was new, this case went on for four years. I worked on it full time and managed the police investigation. I wasn't a police officer, but we had to train the police officers who were starting this type of investigation based on an act that had previously never existed. The case ended in 1993 with, among other things, the confiscation of the ski resort.

In 1994, I managed the prosecution — I wasn't the one who established this case — in all the proceedings instituted by the Attorney General of Canada following the RCMP operation designed to operate a currency exchange desk in the Montreal business centre. Police officers played the role of clerks there. The purpose of that police operation was, first, to identify individuals likely to make use of this type of procedure to erase any traces and mask the origins of money and, second, to determine where that money went.

Some individuals appeared with hockey bags the size of those that Ken Dryden used to transport his goalie equipment. They put these bags filled with money on the counter and told the clerks, whom they obviously did not know were police officers, to send the money to given locations. The officers then immediately knew where the money was going. However, they didn't know what happened from that location. That was the purpose of the operation. This was another case that we established. The police investigation started in 1990, and the trials ended in 1997.

It was probably for these reasons that, in late 2001 and early 2002, at the RCMP's request, the Department of Justice assigned me, as legal counsel, to the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit, or CFSEU, that the RCMP had just established.

That unit consisted mainly of veteran investigators mainly from the RCMP, but also from Sûreté du Québec and the Montreal and Laval police departments. The RCMP spearheaded the investigation. The unit's first target was what the RCMP calls traditional organized crime. That's the organized crime that you don't see and whose existence you generally don't suspect, in other words, the mafia.

At first, working on that investigation, I very soon saw that it was an illusion to think that the federal Department of Justice alone, within its jurisdiction, could make a complete, qualitative contribution to the investigation. It wasn't because the investigation was generally conducted by federal police officers that the members of organized crime were going to be content with committing “federal” crimes. I therefore requested the assistance of the provincial Ministry of Justice, which assigned a very experienced lawyer to the role. We both started supervising the CFSEU investigation from a legal standpoint.

What did we do together? The way you investigate definitely varies with the type of organized crime concerned by the investigation. In 2001, a new act had just been amended. To a certain point, the organized crime criteria had been changed, and it was in that context that we started working on the new investigation.

The lawyer René Domingue and I first had to consult in order to agree on the definitions and interpretation to be given to the new act. Then we spent a fair amount of time training the investigators, not because they lacked experience, on the contrary. In virtually all cases, these were veteran investigators, but what they had to investigate was entirely new to them. Why? Because, under the new act, elements that absolutely had not constituted evidence at the time the investigators had conducted the investigations and acquired their experience now did constitute evidence. We had to investigate.

To obtain our investigation tools, we supervised the required affidavits. These were affidavits for wire taps, search warrants and installations of GPS systems in vehicles. There was also the affidavit pertaining to what I call the special warrant, provided for in the Criminal Code, which is quite recent. It's a warrant used by police officers and allowed by the law in cases where the investigation procedure or the anticipated invasion of privacy would constitute an illegal or abusive search, were it not for this provision of the Criminal Code, in section 487.01. We also supervised the affidavits required to force the institutions to provide documents, applications for retention of seized articles.

The government amended the Criminal Code and facilitated the use of certain investigation methods, including wire taps. Unlike Randall Richmond, I don't think it's easier to obtain permission for this. On the contrary, the time it takes can be longer than that originally provided for by the Criminal Code. You can even listen to private conversations for a full year with legal authorization.

However, if you install a GPS in a vehicle, legal permission to do so is valid for only 60 days. In other words, when the Criminal Code was amended, they forgot to amend certain provisions. As simple as it may seem, this causes quite particular problems.

With regard to seized articles, we're normally required to return them following the seizure. We can obtain extensions of up to one year, the same period as for wire taps. However, for an organized crime investigation like the one at that time, the period, whether it be three months or one year, isn't enough. Police officers spend a considerable amount of energy preparing all the documentation, affidavits and explanations required to obtain an extension of the time for retaining seized evidence. The more the number of these procedures is increased, the more the investigation is jeopardized. Each action police officers take requiring court authorization requires documentation filed at the court house, and that involves risks. It's a bit like lottery tickets: the more you buy, the more chances you have of winning. The more necessary actions must be taken to conduct the investigation, the greater the chances of jeopardizing that investigation.

Having spent nearly four years judicially supervising the investigation, I can tell you without hesitation that the police officers spent almost as much energy protecting the investigation's existence as they did obtaining the evidence that ultimately led to the arrest of 70 or 90 individuals in Montreal.

Another problem — and this is what I've been asked to talk to you about — was endorsing the warrants. Let's simply take the example of a search warrant. In the kind of investigation we're talking about here, despite the fact that the centre of the investigation is in Montreal, the area concerned is Canada as a whole and, very often, foreign countries. That was the case of this investigation. Consequently, a warrant may be issued in Montreal, but have to be executed in another province. In many cases, quite extensive documentation accompanies the warrant application. Under the Criminal Code, if it is anticipated that the warrant will have to be executed in another province and the execution of that warrant will require entering a house or domicile, the warrant must be endorsed by the local judicial authority of the place where the warrant must be executed.

Despite the fact that there are two official languages in Canada, warrants drafted in French were also a problem, and I can understand that. In very small municipalities where warrants had to be executed, we had to go before the local judge, who didn't understand the documentation because it was drafted in French. Here again, I'm telling you about problems we faced every day.

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

Mr. Bélanger, I'm going to interrupt for one moment. We do have one more presentation. I know you haven't finished giving your information, but I'm going to encourage you, during our question period, to bring forward some of these other concerns that you have about how these warrants and the investigations are hampered by whatever.

I find your information very interesting, as does the rest of the committee, but I'm going to go to Mr. Ouellette. We have to get through the presentations. We'll have approximately one hour for questions. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ouellette.

[Sgt Guy Ouellette, Retired Sergeant, Sûreté du Québec]

I realize I'll have to be very concise in the next 10 minutes, Mr. Chair.

I was a police officer with Sûreté du Québec for 32 years. I've been retired for six years. I'm highly specialized in organized crime, both biker and Aboriginal organized crime. Most of the case law that was prepared for this committee, whether it be the Leclerc decision, the Carrier decision or the Lindsay-Bonner decision, concerns trials in which I had to testify as an expert witness.

The first anti-gang law was passed 10 years ago on May 2. I followed it, and I'm still very much involved at all levels because I still have to testify regularly across Canada in various cases.

I would have liked to tell you about the opportunity I had to write a book, which unfortunately is only available in French. It concerns the president of the Hells Angels, Maurice Boucher. By the way, those who read the Journal de Montréal this morning will see that picture on the front page. They say the Revenue Department will be seizing Mr. Boucher's houses. I want to tell you that the day we think about seizing their assets, we'll have understood that that's their life blood.

Bill C-53, which parliamentarians passed on November 25, 2005, hasn't yet been used by any police force in Canada. Why? I'd like to tell you right off the bat that organized crime very often takes advantage of the fact that the system is disorganized. It's disorganized because police officers don't talk to each other, because federal agencies don't talk to provincial agencies, because Bills C-95 and C-24, which have become the anti-gang laws, were passed because there were gang wars in Quebec. The rest of Canada didn't care; they were killing each other in Quebec.

We have a bill, Bill C-10, on firearms. Why? Because people are shooting guns in Toronto. And last year in Toronto, 52 murders were committed with firearms, including that of a young girl, Jane Creba, on December 26. Now there's pressure, and we're going to amend the Criminal Code of Canada because, I'm telling you and I repeat, it's the Criminal Code of Canada, not that of Quebec or Ontario.

We've had quite extraordinary results — Mr. Richmond told you about that — with regard to convictions for gangsterism in Quebec. I'd like us to do the same thing in Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta.

You'll be hearing from someone from the Vancouver police department two days from now. Do the same thing for Vancouver, and you'll see that there have been very few gangsterism convictions there. You'll realize that, in the other Canadian provinces, when charges are laid for offences under Bill C-24 and C-95, they are withdrawn in exchange for a guilty plea on drug trafficking charges. That's what's called plea bargaining. It has a harmful effect.

I have two examples to cite on this point: one occurred in Ottawa and concerns the Hells Angels Nomads, who are based in Ottawa, in your beautiful city; the other one occurred in Oshawa, another project of an Ontario police department. The guy is going to be sentenced to six years for drug trafficking. But we have the Canadian Conditional Release Act. On a first sentence for drug trafficking, an individual is eligible for parole after serving one-sixth of his sentence; that's called accelerated parole review. As a result, a guy who is sentenced to six years can get out of prison after one year.

What's been done? If he had been convicted on gangsterism charges, the penalty would have been longer, harsher, but we could have asked that he at least serve half his sentence. That would delay his conditional release by the same length of time and would send a message. However, the message we're sending right now is this: we're charging you with engaging in gangsterism, but someone in British Columbia, the president of the Hells Angels, is filing an application to challenge the wording of section 467.11 because it isn't clear. Oops! Another trial is being held in Quebec in which lawyer Benoît Cliche is also challenging section 467.11. And now the blows are coming from everywhere. If you need information that the Vancouver police department has gathered as part of their investigation, I can't give it to you.

It's very, very hard to exchange information. That goes as far as it went in the Lindsay-Bonner case, which you have in your case law report. The Ontario Provincial Police was required to go and execute a search warrant in the exhibit vaults of a British Columbia police department to obtain evidence that would help it convict criminals on gangsterism charges.

We have to stop making up stories, splitting hairs and believing that we're good and nice. We'll be able to deal with organized crime if we talk to each other and if everyone in the system works together.

You parliamentarians have to decide on the fate of Bill C-10. You're leading the parade. You'll have to decide, to conduct a clause-by-clause consideration of a bill on firearms. Thank you! You're giving police agencies tools. Now they have to use them. Thank you! You're giving Crown attorneys tools. Now they have to use them.

Before Bill C-10, section 95 of the Criminal Code contained a provision stipulating that the minimum penalty for possession of a firearm was one year in prison, if the holder was charged with an indictable offence. But only a fine is provided for if the individual is found guilty on summary conviction. I'll tell you that, in my 10 years of fighting organized crime very closely with the units in the field, in a number of cases, people are charged under the summary conviction procedure in order to avoid work, save time and avoid a trial. So the criminals pulled up, took out their little case and paid the clerk their little fine. And we had to start all over again!

As regards gangsterism charges, subsection 515(6) of the Criminal Code provides that it is up to the accused to provide evidence in order to obtain his release, to give the system guarantees. It wasn't normal that there was an extensive operation in Toronto in which 125 individuals related to street gangs such as Jane Finch and another, the Jamestown Crew, were arrested. It wasn't normal that, for the vast majority of these people, it was the third time this year that they were arrested because they hadn't been charged with gangsterism and that the justice system had released them for all kinds of reasons.

For the majority of people who are charged in Quebec, there are automatic release investigations, particularly as regards organized crime. Moreover, I would say that, in more than 60 or 70 percent of cases, people will be detained following their release investigation, which is conducted with the assistance of police officers, experts and so on.

We have another problem in Canada. We want to have laws, we want to have a lot of things, but we have a big file on the Italian mafia. I checked with Claude a little earlier: we don't have an expert witness who can testify in order to prove gangsterism.

I've been retired from the Sûreté du Québec for six years, but I don't have a successor. I'm retired. When you retire, you're supposed to be at home in a rocking chair watching the cars go by your house. But they call me regularly because they have a problem and have to provide evidence of gangsterism. It takes an expert witness who is able to tell the story. So organizations have to provide for that.

It's not normal for a guy like Harry Delva, who, as he told you, is in the field in Montreal North and Ville Saint-Michel to tell you that, every day, in the pool of emerging street gangs, he sees youths of five, six, nine, 10 and 15 years of age, which corresponds to the real police definition of street gangs. However, every six months, he's forced to fight with various departments in order to authorize a program to train a successor. There's nothing permanent in his work, and he has no security. However, it's announced that there will be 2,500 police officers or more and $10 million to invest in prevention programs. Bu, every six months, he is forced to fight for $90,000 in funding. And yet he's the one who has them in his face every day.

I'll conclude by telling you that, in the few minutes you've allotted me, organized crime has fought the disorganized system. The day we manage to regularize the situation and work together just a little bit, there will be no more criminals. I wrote in my book that I find it hard to understand why 15,000 police officers can't control 150 bikers. The answer is simple: we all have to work on the same side and stop fighting over details. Give us the tools we need, and the police officer in the street will make his observations, the investigator will investigate, the attorney will do his job, the judge will decide, the conditional release guy will manage the sentence, and you'll pass laws to help those people. You have a social responsibility toward the citizens of Canada. But there won't be any difference between a gangsterism crime committed in Quebec and another committed in British Columbia, and no one in British Columbia...

Only three years ago, in 2003, the Hells Angels did a big national run in British Columbia. Quebec police officers who went to help their British Columbia colleagues were told that, if one of them was seen monitoring a Hells Angels member, he'd be put back on an airplane and sent home. Such is the fight against organized crime in Canada. I don't want to be very negative, because I still like doing what I do, and I still say yes when I'm asked to go and testify, but I think we have to stop thinking that we're good, that we're nice and that everything is going to solve itself. We all really have to work together.

You represent different ridings in Canada. Apart from Mr. Bagnell, from the Yukon, where the British Columbia Hells Angels go from time to time, all of you have horror stories to tell, whether it be about the Hells Angels in Windsor, the Bandidos in London, street gangs and bikers in Moncton, or about Asian street gangs that do drive-by shootings in Calgary. The same thing is going on in Montreal with the Haitians. The same is true anywhere else in Canada.

So from the moment we work together, we'll achieve good results. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

Thank you very much, Mr. Ouellette. I think that was very informative--I dare say reflective of a police officer.

I have a point that I would like the committee to have maybe a little bit more clarification on, brought up by Mr. Bélanger. Mr. Richmond made some comment in reference to wiretaps, as did Mr. Bélanger, on the effort put in to acquire a wiretap warrant. I know there are slight differences of opinion there, but I'm curious as to the position of a prosecutor. I am a former police officer myself, and I know that wiretap information usually involves a lot of time and effort.

So I'm just curious if you could clarify that point for the committee.

[Randall Richmond]

The reason I said that the anti-gang legislation made it easier for us to get wiretaps in criminal organization investigations is that prior to 1997, the general rule, which still applies to all other cases, is that before you can get authorization to do wiretapping, you have to prove that the police officers in their investigation have exhausted all the other investigative possibilities. What the 1997 legislation did was that it said you don't have to exhaust all other investigative possibilities when you're investigating organized crime.

In that sense, that was one criteria we had to meet before that we didn't have to meet starting in 1997. So that has been very useful in terms of our requests for authorizations to do wiretapping. However, I understand why Mr. Bélanger says it hasn't become easy, because it's still a very lengthy process.

One other improvement with the 1997 legislation, which Mr. Bélanger did mention, is that it's possible to get authorizations for a longer period of time. Before 1997, the general rule applied, and that is that you had a maximum of sixty days where you could do wiretaps. After that you had to get judicial renewal of your authorization. The 1997 legislation allowed us to get an authorization right from the start to do wiretapping for 12 months, which is very appropriate, because these investigations that we do in criminal organization investigations, they tend to be very lengthy—as I said, from 12 to 24 months.

So it is better, I would say, than it was before 1997, and it is easier, but it's still a lot of work. I know that people like Maître Bélanger spend a lot of time preparing those wiretap requests.

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

Mr. Bélanger.

[Claude Bélanger]

The only reason I say it isn't easier is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. If the courts that have to rule eventually find that the criteria that were in effect before the organized crime law was passed — that is to say the old criteria for obtaining wire taps — are the basic criteria consistent with the Charter, there are risks that certain courts may find that if these basic criteria that have been in existence since 1974 aren't met, wire taps will constitute an abusive seizure.

Earlier I told you that we started the investigation that has just wound up in late 2001 or early 2002. We haven't gone to court yet; only the investigation is complete. If the courts find that the application for wire taps does not meet the basic criteria established by the Charter, because the organized crime law goes beyond the basic requirements under the Charter of Rights, wire taps and their results will be ruled inadmissible.

Do you have any idea of what that represents? We're talking about a four-year investigation that risks being thrown out. I'm not saying that's the case. That's why I'm saying that it isn't necessarily easier to obtain wire taps because, in the statement of grounds for seeking wire taps, authorities indirectly ensure that the initial criteria that were set are met.

It's in that sense that I'm saying that it's not more difficult to obtain it, but that it isn't easier either, because authorities ensure that the minimum required by the Charter is met.

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bélanger.

We'll go to Mr. Lee.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

After Monsieur Ouellette's remarks referring to Mr. Bagnell, Mr. Bagnell just whispered to me that he was in fear of biker gangs resorting to Ski-Doos up in the Yukon. So you never know what the future will bring.

I'd like to address a question to Mr. Toller. I was going to ask how the heck you manage to actually ID someone who has an organized crime connection if the court hasn't already found that. Of course, your documents today have included the commissioner's directive, which shows how CSC does that. I've had a look at it. It looks very good. I should commend CSC for doing just that. This was issued in 2003. I'm sure it's a very useful procedure.

The only question that lingers--and I don't want to be seen as going to bat all the time for the alleged bad guy here--is if, in the scheme of things, an offender in an institution is wrongly designated. The procedures here would seem to preclude that. There's a very fair system of investigating and vetting and designating. But in the event, if there would be a problem with that, the protocol here doesn't identify it.

Would it be the offender's procedure that he, or perhaps she, would go to the ombudsman or the correctional investigator if there were a problem? Is there any escape from being wrongly designated, other than the de-designation that's mentioned here?

[Ross Toller]

Yes, there always are a number of avenues to which an inmate can have recourse. Certainly we have an internal grievance system that could be used. There is a possibility for an inmate, if evidence can be provided to the contrary of what's been recorded, to make alterations to the file in terms of the case management record. A correctional investigator is certainly another avenue. The court system is another avenue.

What we have found in our experience, though, in general terms, is that we have had a number of inmates who have come in with almost the opposite. They have made claims to be at some sort of level an affiliate, I think in some way to try to have in their own minds a sense of stature or a sense of importance. What we have done in our policy, as you've seen here, is look at the verification of that with the respective police forces. We have a number of wannabes--but they're not really at all associates or affiliates--who like to use that claim.

Our tendency is more the opposite. The information we have when the person is designated is shared with the inmate. It forms part of his or her plan. It often then addresses what we're going to do in terms of the person's need to move it.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

So there are avenues, and that's good.

Now, this business of tackling organized crime and gangsterism is something that's been developing for 50 years now, if not longer. I know that 30 or 40 years ago there was an informal way for police and other community representatives to communicate with the parole board. If you have a career criminal in there who's 35 years of age, it's dollars to doughnuts that when he leaves, he doesn't have an occupation; when he's back on the street, he's going to go back to his original occupation, which is not a good thing.

The parole board has been mentioned here, but they're not a witness. To your knowledge, when the parole board is considering a release at one-third or two-fifths or whatever sentence the mathematics take you to--even at mandatory supervision, at two-thirds--are they in a position to receive from CSC, from police, and from other public institutions information with respect to this gangsterism category that would allow them to alter the period of detention or the conditions of release?

[Ross Toller]

They are, absolutely. Every piece of information we have with inmates is shared with the National Parole Board. We actually have, in many circumstances, actually joint shared printers. Police reports are received, crown attorney reports are received, reasons for sentencing are received. Those form part of the actual package that is reviewed by National Parole Board members.

In relation to what you've said in terms of identification of lack of employment, obviously part of the other side of the correctional approach is to look at those particular needs. It might be possible to learn some employment skills that could be used out in the community.

That's all a matter of record. That all forms about the capacity to manage the risk inside the community, but police information from our security intelligence networks is completely shared with the parole board, as is the contact made in the community before a person is being presented for release. We'll do community assessments. We'll talk to the local area police force of jurisdiction where they're going. We'll cross-reference all our material. The documents that go to the board for their decision-making processes are actually very comprehensive.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Have you seen circumstances in which CSC or other parties have concluded in the offender's case management file that the guy is absolutely going back to his gang, almost beyond a shadow of a doubt, and that's the recommendation to the parole board? If you know the gang owns the guy, and he's going back to his occupation, has that been the clear recommendation to the parole board? Is CSC able to be that clear about it and give those kinds of recommendations to the parole board?

[Ross Toller]

Yes, there are certain circumstances like that.

We even have the capacity, if we believe that the risk is heightened in a number of areas, to actually detain the person from the mandatory supervision date to the period of the warrant expiry date. In cases such as that, if we believe the risk to the public remains high, the likelihood of a negative recommendation on getting parole is extremely strong.

Yes, I have seen cases like that.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Art Hanger]

Go ahead, Monsieur Ménard.

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

I'd like to ask three questions. I'm obviously very pleased with the quality of the evidence heard today. When I tabled my motion before the holidays, I didn't know that Judge Bonin would render the decision he rendered. But I'm a bit concerned.

First of all, I'm always pleased to see Guy Ouellette and to see his aplomb. I say to myself: the progress we've made. In 1995, I remember meeting Allan Rock with the mother of the young Daniel Desrochers. Senior officials at the Department of Justice told me at the time that we didn't need an anti-gang law, that they would dismantle that with the conspiracy provisions contained in the Criminal Code. I don't need to remind you of the whole battle we had to wage, all parties together, to get provisions to that effect.

Here's the subject of my concern. When I read the Bonin judgment in the Aurélius case, I was very pleased. Now I ask you the following question. In the Criminal Code, when it's defined what a criminal organization is...

Mr. Ouellette reminded us that, in British Columbia, section 467.13 — not section 467.11 — was challenged. As it is at the trial stage, it's binding only in British Columbia, but that's not important. As the legislator, shouldn't we immediately say that, when we read section 467.1 and talk about criminal organizations, there should be express wording referring to street gangs? I ask the question because, of the 70 pages of the judgment rendered by Judge Bonin, there is only one where he states that, yes, the two gangs that he's talking about — the Pelletier Street gang and the other one — are street gangs, but he doesn't justify the elements that constitute that offence in relation to section 467.1. I'm afraid that won't stand up to a court challenge. I hope I'm mistaken. If we don't need to amend the Criminal Code, I'm very much afraid this will go to the Supreme Court. As Judge Bonin, at the trial stage, described the evidence and relied on the evidence without explaining why street gangs were now included in criminal organizations, I fear there will be subsequent challenges.

I'm going to ask my three questions at the same time; you may then answer them. My first question is for Mr. Richmond.

I now have a question for the Correctional Service. First, when a person is assumed to belong to street gangs or organized crime, how is he treated within the Correctional Service? Mr. Toller, give us some examples in which, as you said, gang leaders intervene in the management of the Correctional Service. Perhaps there are some things that should be amended in the Criminal Code. I'd like you to give us some examples on the subject.

Lastly, can you tell us, Mr. Ouellette, with supporting examples and your pedagogical sense, how investigation techniques differ for street gangs and organized crime? Are any elements missing in the Criminal Code that would help investigators be more effective?

Let's start with Mr. Richmond. Am I wrong to be troubled or not? Do you think we don't need to amend the Criminal Code?

[Randall Richmond]

In my view, the question whether a specific reference to street gangs should be added to the Criminal Code was answered last week in the context of Judge Bonin's decision in the Aurélius case, in which, for the first time, we saw that the present definition of a criminal organization could be applied to a street gang.

If he had decided that it did not apply, we might perhaps be asking ourselves the question, but I think we got a positive answer, to the effect that it's not necessary to amend the act to add the notion of street gang. In the office where I work, no one is demanding that this specific notion be added to the Criminal Code.

In my opinion, there's another reason not to include it. I observe that I've never really heard a very good definition of street gang. I've heard certain attempts to define a street gang, but every time I hear those definitions, they seem inadequate to me.

In his decision in the Aurélius case, Judge Bonin used the definition that had been submitted to him by the police. But you'll note that reference is made in that decision to adolescents or young persons. However, if you consider the individuals who were convicted by Judge Bonin, you can calculate that the average age is 34, and the average age of those who have been convicted for gangsterism is 31. Consequently, this shows, as one of the witnesses mentioned this morning, that we're seeing a second generation of street gangs. The members of the street gangs of the 1990s are getting older and are still involved in crime. So the definition that refers to young persons is no longer valid. These individuals are still engaged in criminal activities. So we shouldn't have a definition that's based on age.

All the other definitions that I've heard are essentially similar to the definition of a criminal organization in the Criminal Code. It should also be kept in mind that, in 2001, with the adoption of Bill C-24, the job was greatly facilitated by expanding the definition of criminal organization: it's now required that only three persons work together for the purpose of committing crimes involving money.