Evidence of meeting #5 for Justice and Human Rights in the 40th Parliament, 3rd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was intelligence.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Ed Fast
Thank you to all four of you. There have been very divergent perspectives presented, but each one of you has done it in a very articulate manner. I think we'd agree on that. We'll take all of that. That forms part of the record, and then hopefully our committee can come up with some recommendations that will move Canada forward in addressing some of these challenges with organized crime.
Again, thank you to all of you.
We'll recess for 15 minutes.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Ed Fast
We will reconvene the meeting.
We are continuing our study on organized crime. We are glad to have with us a number of witnesses who I hope are going to help us in preparing the report.
We have Inspector Richard Penney and Superintendent Robert W. Davis of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police of the greater Toronto area. Welcome to both of you. We also have with us Peter Shadgett from the Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario. Representing the Toronto Police Service we have Inspector Randy Franks. From the Ontario Provincial Police we have Inspector Bryan Martin. Lastly, representing the Canada Border Services Agency we have Bonnie Glancy.
Welcome to all of you. We have travelled across the country. We still have a couple of cities to go. We're trying to solicit information on organized crime and perhaps a direction our government should be proceeding in to try to address this very critical problem in Canada.
Each organization has ten minutes to present. Then we'll open the floor up to questions from our members.
I will ask Bonnie Glancy to start.
Bonnie Glancy Director, Intelligence, Greater Toronto Area Region, Canada Border Services Agency
Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman and honourable members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting Canada Border Services Agency to participate in this hearing. My name is Bonnie Glancy, and I am the director of intelligence for Canada Border Services in the greater Toronto area.
Although this committee is focused on organized crime, I'd like to take a moment to provide a brief overview of the greater Toronto area region, which I will refer to as the GTA.
This region is responsible for fulfilling the CBSA mandate at over 80 service locations, sufferance warehouses, and ports of entry. These locations range in size from small marinas to the largest and busiest airport in Canada. These locations cover all modes of transportation: air, land, rail, postal and courier, and marine.
Approximately 2,300 employees in the region are responsible for administering over 90 different acts, regulations, and international agreements regarding the movement of goods and people into Canada. Geographically speaking the GTA region ranges from Georgian Bay in the north, from Owen Sound to Parry Sound, and to Lake Ontario in the south from Mississauga to just west of Cobourg.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Ed Fast
Ms. Glancy, I'm going to get you to slow down just a little bit, because our interpreters are having trouble keeping up.
Director, Intelligence, Greater Toronto Area Region, Canada Border Services Agency
Each year our people process over 12.7 million postal shipments, over 9.8 million international passengers, and over 1.7 million commercial shipments.
In the 2008-2009 fiscal year, this region made over 6,400 seizures, approximately 22% of the total number of seizures made throughout Canada. The types of commodities and contraband intercepted within our region vary from agricultural products to watches. The most commonly cited information, however, relates to the interception of drugs.
As these are the commodities most commonly linked to organized crime, I will continue with that trend and relate some information from the 2008-2009 fiscal year. In that period, the GTA region seized over 669.7 kilograms of cocaine, over 139.5 kilograms of opium, over 86 kilograms of heroin, and more than 1,409 kilograms of marijuana, hashish, and hash oil.
Officers working in the region are also successful in intercepting a number of different precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of ecstasy and methamphetamine. In addition to the interception of goods, a number of employees have a role in programs that support immigration inland enforcement. These employees work at various locations, including the immigration holding centre and the Greater Toronto Enforcement Centre, GTEC, and are central to ongoing operations that result in the successful deportation of people deemed inadmissible to Canada.
Some of the core activities include investigations of violations under Immigration and Refugee Protection Act detentions, and removals of persons from Canada. In the 2008-2009 fiscal year, our inland enforcement officers detained approximately 6,500 people and removed 5,081.
Alongside inland enforcement, the criminal investigations division supports the CBSA's public safety and economic security objectives by investigating and initiating prosecutions for criminal offences against Canada's border legislation. They also provide an integrated enforcement capacity, which will detect those who have committed or deter those who would commit breaches of laws administered by the agency by investigating within whatever legal means necessary suspected, alleged, or known misrepresentation, evasions, or commitments of fraud with respect to the international movement of goods and people.
They help their partners by reviewing leads, obtaining research, and gathering crucial evidence to assist the RCMP with their prosecutions. The intelligence division provides support to our front-line officers, the enforcement of inland enforcement, criminal investigations, and other internal areas of CBSA, such as our trade administration. The intelligence officer and analysts work collaboratively on files that pertain to issues such as export control, missing children, fraudulent documents, and smuggling of various types of contraband, including humans, tobacco, illicit drugs, and weapons.
The work done within the intelligence division may be difficult to quantify, unlike counting such actions as a removal or seizure. Valuable intelligence may lie dormant until a catalytic event occurs and calls into action information gleaned from an earlier occurrence. A small detail previously uncovered and developed may only have meaning in the context of other information.
While it may be difficult to measure the myriad of such seemingly insignificant details, they are nonetheless crucial in building a case or project, and minutiae often lead us to make connections to other events or activities, or to come to the realization that an individual is part of a larger group.
It will come as no surprise to the committee that effective sharing of information and intelligence among law enforcement agencies is essential in gaining insight into criminal organizations and their operations. This is the main reason the GTA region is an active participant in a number of joint-force operations, especially those aimed at addressing threats presented by organized crime.
CBSA actively participates in a number of JFOs, or joint force operations. Through the agency, we have successfully carried our duties to the greater good and safety of Canadians. Through our participation in JFOs, CBSA has intercepted contraband such as drugs, firearms, and tobacco, as well as prevented various criminals and individuals who attempt to thwart the immigration process.
In many instances, these coordinated efforts have also contributed to enforcement efforts outside of Canada. CBSA intelligence in the greater Toronto area is currently involved in a number of ongoing JFOs, including the Asian organized crime task force with the Toronto Police Service--
Director, Intelligence, Greater Toronto Area Region, Canada Border Services Agency
Sorry.
Also the combined forces special enforcement unit; Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario; the guns and gangs unit with the Toronto Police Service; the provincial weapons enforcement unit; the RCMP GTA drug section, Milton and Newmarket; the Toronto airport drug enforcement unit; and the Pearson International Airport intelligence unit, YYZ.
The Greater Toronto Enforcement Centre is involved in the immigration task force JFO, whose objectives are to apprehend persons who are on immigration warrants with criminal backgrounds, subject to security certificates, subject to extradition warrants, or declared a danger by the minister.
Our criminal investigations division participates in joint force operations with the RCMP, immigration and passport, which investigates organized crime. CID passes on cases and works in conjunction with the RCMP on files with organized elements.
One of the major advantages of working within a JFO is the access to and the availability of information from other law enforcement agencies. Information obtained from all agencies can often make a determination regarding which targets to pursue or the direction a specific project will take.
I will use our experience in partnering with the Pearson International Airport intelligence unit, also known as the YYZ airport intelligence unit, to underscore the value that these partnerships bring. The YYZ airport intelligence unit serves as a primary intelligence contributor to the intelligence and law enforcement community in the Toronto area. The quality of the intelligence reports prepared for dissemination by the unit is possible by virtue of the vast amount of raw information that is gathered by local sources.
The intelligence gathered by members of this unit is essential to the safe operation of Lester B. Pearson International Airport. The YYZ airport intelligence unit determines which intelligence information can be forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement agencies locally and globally for further enforcement action.
Information provided to various local airport security officials, including Transport Canada, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, and the Greater Toronto Airport Authority, has resulted in the dismissal of over 50 airport employees. A number of employees are presently being investigated.
In late July 2009, credible information was received to indicate that the Outlaws motorcycle gang was assembling in Ontario over the August long weekend. This information was promptly disseminated through the province by the GTA region intelligence division. A total of seven individuals, members of an Outlaws motorcycle gang, were denied entry into Canada by CBSA.
In October 2009, intelligence officers, along with GTEC enforcement officers, partnered with the Toronto Police Service's guns and gangs unit and we were successful in conducting raids that resulted in the arrest of nine individuals under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Those arrested were members of a gang known as the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation. This gang came to the attention of law enforcement agencies in Toronto when it initiated a high-profile aggravated assault on a subway station in which four victims were stabbed.
The gang is one of the largest criminal street gangs in the United States and is well established in most Latin American countries. It is believed that the gang opened chapters in Ontario approximately five years ago and is now operating and actively recruiting in the greater Toronto area. Gang membership is estimated at 200 within the GTA.
As a part of the overall collaboration and contribution of all CBSA divisions within the GTA region, along with our numerous external partnerships with other law enforcement agencies, we have had numerous successful outcomes, which have disrupted and dismantled various organized crimes.
I'd like to thank you, and I'd be pleased to answer any questions.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Ed Fast
Thank you very much.
It's helpful for us to hear from you what you are doing, but for us it's just as important that we hear from you what you would like us as the federal government to do. What are the challenges that you face and what are the things within the federal purview that you would like to see us change that will allow you to be more effective in the jobs that you do?
Ms. Glancy, you'll probably get a chance to respond to that from one of the questions. You may want to be prepared for that, because we're really looking for what do you want us to do, what are some of the improvements you're looking for from our federal government, or are there things you don't want us to do, as has been suggested by others.
Inspector Bryan Martin, from the OPP.
Inspector Bryan Martin Drug Enforcement Section, Organized Crime Enforcement Bureau, Ontario Provincial Police
Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to address the panel on behalf of the Ontario Provincial Police.
The Ontario Provincial Police has a mandated responsibility to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle organized crime. In order to accomplish this goal, the OPP developed the Organized Crime Enforcement Bureau, which is comprised of specialized integrated investigative bodies such as the biker enforcement unit and the provincial weapons enforcement unit.
The OCEB is comprised of four main operating centres strategically located throughout Ontario. We operate on an intelligence-led policing model, establishing tactical priorities throughout the province, allowing us to identify and attack the vulnerabilities of organized crime, as per the goals of the Canadian integrated response to organized crime.
The OPP supports legislative amendments and reform designed to combat organized crime as defined by Bill C-14, which received royal assent and came into force on October 2, 2009. Bill C-14 has taken a strong step forward in bolstering existing legislation with a specific focus on criminal acts related to organized crime and revised judicial processes. This new legislation has focused on designating all gang-related murders as first degree murder, addressed increasing incidents of reckless and drive-by shootings by creating a new offence, and defined a new offence for assaults against police.
There are clearly a number of strong initiatives on this legislative agenda to target organized crime. The OPP believes the justice sector community must prioritize these initiatives to ensure the effective and efficient use of our resources as we move forward with strategies to attack organized crime. The Ontario Provincial Police has identified three main priorities.
The number one priority is lawful access. The OPP, the Toronto Police Service, and our regional municipal partners recognize the need for changes to existing legislation surrounding lawful access to communications. One of law enforcement's unrelenting challenges in addressing organized crime is to remain cognizant of emerging trends and to take proactive and effective steps to counter these trends. In a world of accelerating technological developments and society's increasing absorption with technology, law enforcement has been slowly constricted by antiquated legislation and a lack of resources to effectively counter advances in technology.
The Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act, Bill C-46, and the Technical Assistance for Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act, Bill C-47, passed first reading in June 2009. However, they died when Parliament was prorogued. It is hoped that these pieces of legislation will be reintroduced to address the gaps and restrictions previously identified. As such, the Ontario Provincial Police strongly endorses and supports the passage of these bills.
The second priority is e-disclosure. The traditional method of making full disclosure has created an enormous challenge for police and crowns, particularly in relation to organized crime investigations. The impact on resources and personnel is significant and, as such, the Ontario Provincial Police fully endorses and supports current efforts to reform, modernize, and streamline the disclosure process.
An excellent example of this was demonstrated recently in Operation SharQc, a large-scale investigation in Quebec that resulted in the arrests of hundreds of individuals. Investigators utilized a highly effective web-based solution to capture and streamline large volumes of disclosure for this mega-case. The OPP continues to strongly endorse and champion further advancements within this new technology.
The third area is justice efficiencies. In case management, the investigation and prosecution of organized crime cases is very complex and demands significant time and personnel, combined with the collection, collation, and disclosure of evidence. In most major organized crime investigations, there are multiple offenders. However, previous experience has shown us that investigating and effectively prosecuting a large number of accused is very unmanageable, time consuming, and very expensive. The OPP believes this area to be a priority for setting attainable and realistic goals and garnering solid convictions in relation to mega-trials.
On scheduling, having reviewed evidence provided to provincial panels representing the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, I would be remiss if I didn't speak to the proposed scheduling of criminal organizations.
Conservative
Insp Bryan Martin
Sorry.
The OPP acknowledges the complexity of scheduling or proscribing criminal organizations. There are a number of factors to consider in populating such a schedule. However, the OPP also contends that it is an overwhelmingly onerous task to repeatedly prove that a particular group is a criminal organization, despite having been deemed a criminal organization by our own judiciary.
A case in point is the designation of the Hells Angels in Canada as a criminal organization, as noted in a number of rulings stemming from recent investigations across Canada. Despite this designation being rendered in a number of trials, police must not only prove the substantive charge but in each and every case must proffer evidence to support this same group as a criminal organization. This creates a significant burden for investigators in these cases, as it becomes a parallel investigation requiring sufficient personnel and resources to support classification of the gang as a criminal organization.
The OPP is an active participant in examining this issue and remains committed to the process. The OPP also supports recommendations put forward in the 2007 organized crime summit to strengthen cooperation and collaboration, improve information sharing among agencies, and continue the expansion of strategies for an integrated response to organized crime.
Strong partnerships among law enforcement, prosecutors, and supporting elements of the criminal justice network are key to successfully disrupting and dismantling organized crime. The integrated joint force operations model has been particularly successful in attacking organized crime. The OPP continues to lead or participate in the provincial operations centre, the biker enforcement unit, and the provincial weapons enforcement unit. Units such as the biker enforcement unit have been internationally acknowledged as the template for similar investigative units throughout Canada and the world.
Furthermore, in line with discussions stemming from the June 2008 organized crime summit, the OPP fully supports and believes in the importance of maintaining a national intelligence database, ongoing research, and enhanced training platforms.
The intelligence-led policing philosophy is dependent upon law enforcement's collective ability to share intelligence in a timely and integrated manner. This has led to the establishment of a national intelligence database--ACIIS--the automated criminal intelligence information system. We support the continued effort to enhance the system's ability to be an effective tool for law enforcement investigation of organized crime.
We are more effective as a policing community if we continuously research and develop better methodologies, legislation, and best practices, remaining open to learning from our national and international partners. It is critical to this development. Organized crime is mobile, opportunistic, and encroaching, and we must adapt to trends and burgeoning issues with an informed and effective response.
Training is a critical factor in addressing organized crime investigations. We need to develop a centre of excellence to promote and sanction strategies to provide police, prosecutors, and correctional staff with core competencies and training in all facets of organized-crime investigation. Coordinated training and integration of police and prosecutors provides a solid base to launch these complex prosecutions. The face of organized crime is fluid, and in order to remain effective we must provide the vehicle to gain expertise and to retain those experts to provide the consistency needed to investigate organized crime.
In summation, there are great law enforcement investigations and initiatives being conducted throughout the country, as evidenced by multiple cases designating the Hells Angels a criminal organization in Canada. The results have accumulated in an extensive list of strategies to combat organized crime. We believe it is of paramount importance that we prioritize our efforts and set attainable goals and firm target dates to maintain this momentum of reform and modernization, thus giving police and prosecutors the support and tools to effectively combat organized crime.
Thank you.
Conservative
Inspector Randy Franks Organized Crime Enforcement, Toronto Police Service
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the panel. My name is Randy Franks. I'm an inspector for the Toronto Police Service, and I work in organized crime enforcement. I'll speak about some of the issues facing Toronto.
Recent enforcement successes have had a profound impact on the behaviour of organized crime in Toronto. Between 2005 and 2009, a number of large-scale enforcement projects and initiatives have focused on the disruption of street gangs and other organized groups. Intelligence analysis of the enforcement initiatives indicates that displacement of criminal organizations throughout the GTA has been accomplished. This of course presents law enforcement with another challenge: properly identifying the relative success and failure of these operational initiatives and adapting these for greater future success.
The adaptation of these disrupted groups, as well as their evolution into more disorganized entities, also presents various challenges. Groups no longer act alone, are more fluid, with the subjects of interest playing a larger role in other criminal enterprises. With any illicit trade, groups strive to gain or maintain a competitive edge. Intelligence indicates that organized crime has embraced outsourcing and cooperation as the means to gain that competitive edge.
Recent enforcement initiatives undertaken by the Toronto Police Service and the OPP provide an example of the outsourcing and cooperative relationship between outlaw motorcycle gangs and more traditional crime groups. The biker groups appear to act as enforcers for debt collection. As recently as five years ago, organized crime groups tended to be self-sufficient, whereas now these groups are more likely to work with competitors in the presence of an attractive market.
One of these attractive markets is of course the United States of America. Increasing demand for ecstasy in the United States has prompted ecstasy producers in Canada to increase their production. Prices for ecstasy in the U.S. are double or triple the price that is received in Canada. As such, Canadian ecstasy distributors and producers profit greatly from selling the drug in the U.S. Due to this increase in production, divisions in Toronto previously impacted by ecstasy are finding greater risk due to wider availability in downtown Toronto, and that is one area that's been consistently impacted by ecstasy and related illicit drugs in 2008 and 2009.
The recent increase in ecstasy prices in Toronto has coincided with the increase and rise in the seizure of a drug called benzylpiperazine, commonly known as BZP. The effect of this drug is believed to be similar to MDMA, which is ecstasy, and the effects produced by BZP are comparable to those produced by other amphetamines. This past month 700 pills of BZP were seized by the Toronto police, and it is expected that future seizures may be larger due to an increase in the price of ecstasy. This drug is currently not a controlled drug in Canada, despite the identical appearance and effect to the more prevalent ecstasy.
Gang violence, especially firearms-related activity, is one of the bigger threats facing Toronto. Recent trends have shown violent crime migrating to the more heavily populated downtown core. Most alarming is the apparent infiltration of gun crime and gang violence in every neighbourhood across the city. However, the majority of gun deaths are still in the inner suburbs where gun culture is ingrained.
We find that street gangs are involved in drug trafficking, street and commercial robberies, home invasions, break and enters, firearms handling, shootings, and murders. The increase in gang-related homicides and shootings over the past decade can be attributed to the increase in the availability of restricted and prohibited firearms stolen from domestic sources and those imported illegally.
A review of the historical and current data systems have identified thousands of domestic firearms being illegally possessed at this time. The Toronto police initiated a project called safe city last March 1, 2009, and this was developed to address this issue. Since the safe city initiative commenced, there have been a total of 1,620 firearms seized. Of these firearms, 58% have been prohibited and restricted.
To quantify the success of this initiative simply by the number of firearms seized would not be an accurate measure of its far-reaching impact. It is unknown how many lives just one seized firearm can ultimately save and how that single seizure will impact the quality of life for individuals living within the city.
The safe city initiative has, at a minimum, identified a need within our city for the continued monitoring, education, and enforcement of the non-compliance of legitimate firearms owners. If left unchecked, illegal firearms will be left in these homes, where they could quite possibly be stolen and diverted to the illicit firearm market. For individuals who have chosen to ignore the provisions that exist within the Firearms Act, the Toronto Police Service will assist them in disposing of any unwanted firearms or in advising them how to obtain a valid firearms licence. Fewer firearms on the street will only prove to enhance community safety and assist in gun-related incidents.
One of the most important aspects of intelligence gathering and enforcement is in identifying the how, who, where, and why criminal groups and individuals should be targeted. This must be followed by an assessment of the effectiveness of the police response.
For the Toronto Police Service to be successful in disrupting organized criminal activity, it must adapt to the evolving criminal landscape. As the world shrinks socially, economically, and politically, criminal networks can become more diffuse, generating more linkages between criminals from different ethnic, social, and cultural groups. As previously seen in both social and environmental movements, law enforcement officials must continue to act locally. However, they must learn to think globally where enforcement initiatives are being developed.
Illicit markets often mimic those in such traditional commodities as gold, silver, oil, and minerals. One of the examples of that is metal thefts that occur when the price of metal goes up.
Market demands in foreign countries can often have influences over local drug markets. Producers of illicit drugs no longer have to adapt to changes on their street corners. They can instead look to new opportunities in cities south of the border or across the oceans.
The Toronto Police Service recognizes that criminal intelligence information only becomes vital when properly analyzed and shared. Intelligence-led policing, to be successful, must assist in identifying and prioritizing targets so that resources are used to the best effect. This is a model of policing in which an intelligence product serves as a guide to police operations. Since all organized crime groups are fluid and operate across jurisdictional boundaries, law enforcement must do the same. Sharing of information is key, and with current systems not being used to their full potential, it is recommended that a new national data warehouse be established to share all timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence information.
Bryan spoke about ACIIS. I'm sure you're aware that ACIIS is being enhanced, and any support from this committee to that effort would be appreciated.
Finally, all law enforcement agencies, including the Toronto Police Service, must adapt to the increasing sophistication of organized crime. Criminal groups use the latest technology not only to further their enterprises, they also use this expertise to evade law enforcement. Something as simple as the use of social networking sites is one facet of organized crime communication that is not fully exploited by us in law enforcement. When virtual digital means of money laundering come into the equation, police agency initiatives are almost non-existent at the local level.
That's the Toronto Police Service.
Conservative
Superintendent Peter Shadgett Director, Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario
Good afternoon. I'm Peter Shadgett. I am pleased to be here to talk about organized crime issues in the province of Ontario from the perspective of Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario.
I received a call from the director of Criminal Intelligence Service Canada on Tuesday. He asked me to talk specifically about the uniqueness of CISO in relation to all the other criminal intelligence services across the country, so I thought I would start with that today. If you're following along in my document, you'll see, a couple of pages in, “An Integrated Response”. That is where I'll begin.
Public safety in Ontario does not depend primarily on federal agencies but upon the actions and activities of local municipal, regional, provincial, and federal police and on those public sector agencies responsible for enforcement and investigation. This is particularly true in the current intelligence-led policing environment.
CISO is the critical element in the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services efforts to address organized crime at the local, provincial, and national level through participation with other provincial bureaux through CISC. It's the oldest criminal intelligence service in Canada, and due to its partnership with law enforcement and its reporting relationship to the Government of Ontario, it is also the most flexible and unique. Created in 1966 as a partnership between the Government of Ontario and the provincial law enforcement community in response to concerns expressed in the Ontario Royal Commission on Organized Crime, CISO was established to ensure central co-ordination of intelligence data on individuals and organizations involved in organized crime.
The mission is to promote intelligence-based unified action on organized crime in Ontario. Its vision is to promote a unified intelligence enterprise across the province and ensure safer communities for all the citizens of Ontario.
Our strategy is to unify and transform police, regulatory, and special interest group information into intelligence products and services that promote knowledge-based action by policy-makers, police leaders, investigators, and intelligence personnel.
CISO is the conduit by which criminal intelligence pertaining to serious and organized crime in the province is shared, analyzed, and communicated through its various databases and among its 120 partner agencies.
Mandated by a constitution, CISO is composed of a governing body, representing the executive decision-making level in the form of chiefs of police or managers of various member agencies; an operating body, representing the various intelligence unit commanders or their designates; and a provincial bureau, which is in effect a dedicated all-source fusion centre from which it strives to provide to its 120 partner agencies a strategic situational awareness on organized crime and other serious criminal offences.
In order to facilitate this free flow of criminal intelligence information, the CISO provincial bureau is positioned within the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services. The director reports to both the assistant deputy minister for public safety for administration and to the governing body operationally.
The provincial bureau is uniquely situated because of its ability to apolitically analyze and disseminate criminal intelligence based on information forwarded to it by various member agencies at the federal—both Canadian and U.S. agencies—provincial, and municipal levels.
The provincial bureau administers a number of program areas on behalf of CISO and the government dedicated to the continuous evolution of intelligence-led policing across Ontario. These include but are not limited to a dedicated intelligence training program, which facilitates the development of a cadre of professional intelligence officers, technical officers, and covert operatives and analysts for all police agencies in Ontario; a technical resource program dedicated to assisting partner agency collection efforts through the provision of highly sensitive, highly technical, and highly expensive surveillance and collection equipment; the Ontario-based administration of the ACIIS system; the provincial undertaking to digitize historic and current operational intelligence files; the only dedicated joint forces funding program in Canada, a program that oversees the delivery of annual funding to organized crime investigations and related joint forces projects, by which CISO funds up to 50% of all operational expenses related to organized crime investigations, with at least two other funding partners from the policing community funding the rest of the operating expenditures, as well as salaries for investigators, analysts, et cetera. Also, there's the integrated analytical services program, designed to provide a tiered, strategic, all-source analysis to partner agencies on provincial and national priorities relating to organized crime.
The public policy objectives of the government are enhanced by providing for a province-wide coordinated response to community safety and security matters arising from organized crime. The local and provincial policing priorities and needs are best met through joint and cooperative action developed throughout the CISO partnership.
As one example of how this partnership works, I would like to draw your attention to the CISO training program. The Government of Ontario's contribution to this program, its investment in this program, is the funding of three full-time equivalent employees to manage it. These FTEs are positioned at the CISO provincial bureau and deployed to the Ontario Police College. However, the human resources required to stay on top of critical and emerging training priorities, including significant expansion of the number of intelligence training courses and the implementation of a province-wide outreach program that provides training for 300 students annually, could not be handled by these three FTEs alone. The partnership supports the training by providing instructors and/or lecturers free for each course as it is delivered. It also commits to mentoring and developing newly trained police officers upon their graduation from the training.
This method of sharing and integrating the cost of training across the CISO partnership is the cornerstone of success of the CISO program. It is but one example of how CISO has maintained a high-level rating for service delivery, consistently achieving a 100% satisfaction level, based on the provincial customer satisfaction survey results.
CISO endorses three main priorities, which are key to the effective and efficient disruption and suppression of organized crime networks.
Similar to the OPP practice in terms of lawful access, the Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act, Bill C-46, and the Technical Assistance for Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act, Bill C-47, passed first reading in June 2009. These are important developments in the area of lawful access and are integral to the success of ongoing police efforts to combat organized crime.
Intelligence-led policing requires police agencies to work together at the operational, tactical, and strategic levels and to share responsibility, authority, and accountability at each of these levels. It requires a strategic approach to anticipate, prevent, deter, or efficiently respond to routine front-line policing requirements and to more sophisticated threats, such as an escalation in street violence and organized crime. Making sound decisions on the basis of incomplete information is inherently problematic, and the more imperfect the information, the more difficult it will be to make good decisions. Sharing of information in this environment is an imperative critical to the success of police efforts.
Accordingly, CISO strongly endorses the ongoing use of the automated criminal intelligence information system, or ACIIS, as an interim measure. The platform supporting the system is antiquated, which leads to data entry, support, and retrieval difficulties. The proposed Canadian criminal intelligence model and the newly proposed Canadian criminal intelligence system as a national intelligence base with ongoing research and development are very welcome initiatives. However, funding is always an issue, and as this is inherently a national police service initiative, it is CISO's position that it should be funded appropriately at that level.
Additionally, there are still-valid arguments that suggest that the institutional model under which police services operate is too compartmentalized and has proven to significantly hamper the flow of information from federal police agencies such as the RCMP to other federal, provincial, and municipal partners. Specifically, matters of federal security clearances, national security databases, and restrictive reporting structures inhibit true integration and effective information sharing. This needs to be remedied to ensure that full intelligence sharing takes place.
Finally, CIROC, the Canadian integrated response to organized crime, was established in 2007 as the operational component of the Canadian law enforcement strategy to combat organized crime. The mandate of the CIROC program is to coordinate a strategic plan for fighting organized or serious crime through the integration of Canadian police efforts at the municipal, provincial/territorial, regional, and national levels. The goal is to operationalize intelligence produced by CISC in partnership with the CIS provincial bureaux.
A key objective of the CIROC program is to increase inter-provincial cooperation as it relates to intelligence sharing and operational coordination in Canada. CIROC is building the foundation that will enable law enforcement agencies across the country to share information in a more timely, reliable, and efficient manner. It is expected that this improved communication will translate into enhanced operational success.
The Ontario pilot project took place over the past year. This project is part of a joint undertaking between Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, CISO, and the CIROC national committee. As with any new initiative, operationalizing the Ontario CIROC project has been a dynamic learning process, requiring the fine tuning of original concepts along the way as stakeholders adjust to the new ways of doing business.
The pilot has revealed a number of key findings that have pointed the way to critical steps to be taken. Among these lessons are the need to establish a communications strategy that reflects the complex nature of the CIROC project as it unfolds; the need for a greater number of police services to adopt intelligence-led policing as an all-encompassing operational strategy, as opposed to strategy utilized by simply an intelligence unit; and the need to clarify and expand the role of the local CIROC liaison officers, who are integral to the success of the project, and any other staff or officers involved in the process.
CISO fully endorses the continuation of the pilot in Ontario, with continued support from CISC, and suggests the development of further pilots in other provinces across Canada.
In summation, informed decision-making is the ultimate goal of intelligence. Combined efforts in Ontario continue to work toward bridging not one single intelligence gap, but rather multiple intelligence gaps. A more comprehensive picture of the impact of organized crime and the development of strategies to disrupt it requires that law enforcement achieve a more complete understanding of the criminal actors involved, the connections between and among criminals and their organizations, the activities carried out by those criminal actors and their organizations, as well as the social and economic conditions that motivate them and create opportunities for offences to be committed.
CISO is a model for alternative service delivery that should be viewed as a potential model for other government and policing operations and recommended as a partnership prototype for other provinces in the battle against organized crime.
The focus of CISO is centred on a number of activities central to combatting organized crime, and if you implemented this across the country, you would include analysis and interpretation of organized crime enforcement operations; exchange of intelligence information at the operational level through program delivery and electronic databases; funding and specialized support for joint force multi-jurisdictional criminal investigations; ongoing development of expertise and best practices through a centralized intelligence training program; undercover operations support; proactive development investigator knowledge as it pertains to legal developments, trends, and methods pertaining to lawful access; and providing a coordinating mechanism for the police community and the government to work together to address organized crime problems.
Thank you.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Ed Fast
Thank you.
We'll move over to Superintendent Davis, who I believe is presenting on behalf of the RCMP.
Superintendent Robert W. Davis District Commander, Greater Toronto Area Region, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Robert Davis, and I'm the district commander for the RCMP's federal and international operations service delivery here in the greater Toronto area. On behalf of the RCMP and specifically O Division, I thank you for providing Inspector Penney and me with this opportunity.
The committee has invited us to discuss the state of organized crime. I will be directing my remarks principally in the context of the GTA. I would like to begin by taking a very brief moment to highlight relevant information regarding the GTA.
According to recent census figures, the GTA represents less than 1% of the geographic expanse of Ontario, yet it is home to more than 5,500,000 people, and these figures are three years old. Over 140 languages and dialects are spoken here, and approximately 44% of the population lists a language other than English or French as a mother tongue. In addition, the GTA is Canada's largest immigrant receiving area; more than 70% of residents over 15 years of age are either immigrants or the children of immigrants.
The GTA contains the seat of the provincial government and is the industrial and financial capital of Canada. It contains the country's largest and busiest airport, which in 2008 saw passenger traffic of over 32 million people and processed some 45% of all of Canada's air cargo. It is also within one day's drive of 135 million people in two countries.
In short, our immediate field of play is a comparatively small piece of real estate containing the financial hub of the country, close to 20% of the population, enormous domestic and international political influence, and a community that is a tremendous mosaic in terms of culture, heritage, education, business, religion, and common interests. In other words, there are an enormous number of variables, which in turn present an abundance of opportunity to criminal organizations and at the same time significant challenges to law enforcement and the community as a whole.
The RCMP's policing environment in the GTA--and in Ontario and Quebec, for that matter--is different from what it is in most other areas in the country. City, regional, and provincial police services have primary jurisdiction, while the RCMP in these non-contract provinces is primarily responsible for the enforcement of federal statutes and national security matters. Our GTA district federal policing is predominantly project-based and focused on criminal organizations. Typically these investigations are long-term, multi-jurisdictional, and costly. Fortunately, we enjoy close informal and formal working relationships with our policing partners.
Within this environment we have seen, and continue to witness, the evolution of criminal organizations in both number and variety. From historical secret societies--which still do exist--to the vast array of more recent criminal enterprises, adaptability is the cornerstone defining their survival and success. Our enforcement initiatives have identified a move from traditional heritage-based organized crime groups to multicultural criminal organizations forging alliances that are fluid in both duration and scope. The basis of these alliances is a common purpose and the requisite criminal capabilities.
Regardless of the illicit commodity, the sole purpose of any criminal organization is the acquisition and legitimization of wealth. To accomplish this goal, they have studied and embraced many of society's legitimate approaches to the 21st century. They outsource, they apply the latest advances in technology, and they consider law enforcement response as well as potential legal sanctions in the context of their undertakings. They also seek vulnerabilities and co-opt individuals from all sectors who have influence or knowledge that would further their goals. Examples range from government employees with access to passport documentation or knowledge of internal security processes to personnel within banking and related businesses, such as the money service businesses used to transfer money around the world.
Criminal organizations take active steps to mitigate risk. An example would be the compartmentalization of organizations active across the country or across countries. Many investigations directed at criminal organizations are commenced locally, yet take on a national or international dimension in short order. In one instance, the lead criminal organization was formed in one country and the commodity in a second, while the movement of the commodity between a third and fourth country was outsourced to other criminal enterprises. Canada was the third country in that scenario. This creates numerous issues relating to jurisdictions, the various systems of law, and sovereignty.
I understand you have spoken to a number of other sources across Canada regarding today's subject matter, and from what I have read, many of those discussions have focused on drugs. The drug world, with its rapid and high return, and its high sanctions, routine violence, and tremendous visible human carnage, is a universal subject when discussing organized crime. There is no doubt in my mind that drugs are one of the mainstays for organized crime. We see the illicit drug trade as an underlying influence across almost all federal programs here in the GTA, from identity theft to counterfeit currency to airport security.
Inspector Penney has been good enough to accompany me today, and he can address any questions on organized crime that are specific to drug enforcement.
Organized crime is involved in many activities and commodities other than the drug trade. It is an area I would like to take a few minutes to speak about, as it is all too often overlooked.
Human smuggling, counterfeit pharmaceuticals trafficked through the Internet, market and securities frauds, insurance fraud, tax fraud, tobacco smuggling, mass marketing schemes, counterfeit DVDs and electronic games, counterfeit banking instruments, and identify theft all generate great wealth at dramatically reduced risk to criminal enterprise when compared to drug trafficking. In some of these cases, profits can be just as high as in the drugs cases, tobacco smuggling for example, but the risk of prosecution and the criminal sanction upon conviction is considerably lower.
These crimes are not victimless, and they are extensive. Criminal groups that engage in these activities recognize that police resources are limited and that communities expect their more serious threats to be addressed first.
Legal sanctions associated with many other related federal statutes should be refreshed in order to provide real deterrence to current big criminal organizations. In some instances, the legislation itself should be reviewed and expanded. For instance, copyright offences are specifically excluded from proceeds of crime legislation, thereby limiting the ability to restrain assets derived from illegal activity. Also there is a lack of parity between current legislation and the speed of evolution in communications technology. Lawful access must be realized, as current technology permits criminal organizations to virtually hide in plain sight. I believe communication technology companies, including Internet service providers, should be guided by legislation that facilitates our lawful accessing of the information we need to bring criminal organizations before the courts. This speaks to encryption and the ever-changing digital communication platforms.
I am aware that Assistant Commissioner Mike Cabana appeared before the committee in March of last year and spoke to the issue of lawful access, as well as the challenges to law enforcement associated with disclosure. I will not belabour the point, but I will say that the current applications of disclosure weigh very heavily on all police operations. Disclosure reaches back in time and across jurisdictions, but it must be relevant disclosure. When already stretched resources are further encumbered in responding to no more than a subjective interpretation of a prosecutor or the delaying tactics of the defence, our capacity and capability are unnecessarily diminished. In the absence of defendable standards, it can be a tool to frustrate and exhaust legitimate enforcement. It can also cause crucial international partners to view us with considerable reticence.
In closing, Mr. Chair, the RCMP, particularly the GTA District Command, is committed to effectively challenging organized crime. This requires an ability to address gaps between the evolving capabilities of criminal organizations and the capabilities of law enforcement to respond to them.
Thank you.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Ed Fast
Thank you to all of you for that input.
We'll begin our questioning.
Mr. Murphy, you have seven minutes.
Liberal
Brian Murphy Liberal Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, witnesses.
It seems we could all agree on a number of things that can be done here by us in recommending things to the government like reinstating Bill C-46, Bill C-47 and lawful access, sorting out the funding challenges to ACIIS, and the general resourcing of policing in Canada. There is some work to be done by all stakeholders on disclosure.
I consider many of those things as things that are either under way or should be under way. I don't want to concentrate on them. I think they're real issues, and you brought them up. I'm glad to hear Superintendent Davis speak about technology. He used some wonderful phrases we'll use again in compelling the telecommunications companies, the Internet service providers, and the device manufacturers to use devices that are susceptible to surveillance and therefore, as we would say, allow a discretion-based judicial interference. If you can't get hold of it, it's hard to say a judge can control access to it. I'm not worried about the civil liberties aspect as long as there's judicial discretion. We can't even get in the door. That's stuff we all agree on.
I have observed three things that I'd like brief comments on. First, in places like Winnipeg, youth seem to be used as pawns in organized crime for various crimes. It doesn't matter if it's Winnipeg, it's all across the country. We're looking at new youth legislation amendments to the YCJA, the Youth Criminal Justice Act. I'd be interested in your comments in general about youth and how they play a role in organized crime.
Second is civil forfeiture, getting at the proceeds of crime and getting at the money. It seems to me we learned in Vancouver that there must be a heavy civil network of civilians who aren't involved in organized crime but who nevertheless provide the support for it, building supply companies, etc., who must know or must be made to know they're supporting organized crime. I was interested in your comments on that.
Finally, especially as it pertains to the Canada Border Services Agency, we have a huge border. We routinely have a problem with gun violence. We have little debate going on about that in Ottawa, by the way, on how to attack that. It's routinely the case that a lot of these weapons aren't from Canada in any way. They get over the border somehow. We talk about money, drugs, guns, and technology. If you can get a handle on those four things through federal instruments, we'd all be helping each other.
I'd like some comments on those things from anyone.
Insp Bryan Martin
I'll comment on the guns. As far as firearms, we're making better efforts. In the police community, we recognize the problem. Coming from a drug background, currently, we know that a lot of our Canadian-produced marijuana—Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec—our outdoor marijuana is going south of the border into the United States and coming back. Other commodities such as cocaine, guns, and firearms are coming north of the border. We've seen that in partnership with CBSA.
We are working in partnership with our American colleagues in ICE, through the Department of Homeland Security. We now have officers with the Ontario Provincial Police, the Toronto Police Service, and other agencies imbedded at the Buffalo border in Ontario and at Windsor. They are title 19, which means they are sworn in as peace officers in the United States of America. They are working with our American officials to try to combat this thing.
Working with these two major borders in Windsor and Buffalo, we are in agreement that we are seeing a lot of the contraband going south and coming back. It's something we have to actively investigate. Of course, any support from our federal legislators in making stronger legislation and tougher penalties, or giving us more resources, education, or support in that area, would be greatly appreciated.
Insp Randy Franks
As far as youth involved in crime and being used by organized crime groups, yes, we see that in Toronto. I'm sure that is recognized in the GTA. In addition to that, the intimidation of youth witnesses is a critical problem. In Ontario, for criminal offences, we have a witness protection system that is funded by the province. But for federal offences--and many of our organized crime cases involve drugs--we're required to reach into the federal system for witness protection funds. That's a lot more difficult to access and make use of in the short term: to get witnesses the protection to allow them to feel protected and not be intimidated before a trial.
Supt Peter Shadgett
In terms of civil forfeiture and proceeds of crime, the issue has been dealt with rather creatively in Ontario with provincial support and federal support, and some funds have come our way and we have been able to do things.
For example, we have this provincial electronic surveillance in the province where CISO has funded electronic interception rooms at six strategic locations across the province through proceeds of crime funding. We have had to get creative on the finances behind that, in terms of allowing literally a government agency like CISO to maintain a bank account beyond fiscal years, so that the funding required for the technical support and the upgrades to the wire rooms can be paid when the invoices come due.
It's tricky to do, but we have been successful in doing it for the last five years, and we are looking at expanding the program to three additional locations to have nine.
So my question back to the federal government would be.... I think the province is going to get a few million this year from proceeds of crime, so I don't think you need to necessarily look at expanding the proceeds or the civil forfeiture legislation as much as you need to find out where the rest of the money goes, because I don't think it is coming back to the organized crime enforcement officers.
Supt Peter Shadgett
The question is, we don't know where it goes, because every few years we might get a couple of million dollars in support of it. We don't know in Ontario where the rest of it goes.
Liberal