Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, members of the committee, for inviting me here today.
I have been a federal prosecutor for about 10 years. Before that, I was a provincial prosecutor for approximately two years. Federal prosecutors generally deal with drugs, and drugs mean organized crime. As mentioned, I'm the team leader at our Edmonton office for organized crime cases, so not only do I handle organized crime cases, but I am apprised about any organized crime cases that are ongoing in our office.
I'm sure that in these hearings you'll hear at length about the incredible amount of time and resources required to investigate and prosecute these offences, which usually have a wiretap, a component that is really the expensive component of these investigations. Of note is the fact that the reason for a wiretap is to go up the chain to catch the top-level criminals. Because they are so insulated, it is necessary to intercept a conversation. In a drug context, for example, a member of the Hells Angels is not going to get caught with a quantity of drugs on him. He will not touch the drugs, so it is necessary to tap his phone.
I want to share a couple of experiences with you. These experiences tend to underscore the length of time and the resources required for these prosecutions.
On our experience with disclosure, I will say that disclosure in organized crime prosecution tends to be our Achilles heel. Our experience with disclosure is not great. In an extremely large drug conspiracy, for example, an information was laid charging up to 39 accused, I believe, and that information hit the prosecutor's desk unbeknownst to them. Disclosure was non-existent, and ultimately this matter collapsed under its own weight, as our disclosure obligation could never be fulfilled. Unfortunately, it took several years and incredible resources to get to that point.
We learned a lot from that. For example, we now have charge approval on big cases. We separate the accused, if there are many of them—and in most of these cases there are many—into smaller separate trials, with perhaps four or five accused each. When we are aware of a large investigation taking place we task a crown and a paralegal, usually, with attending upon the police and commencing the disclosure and charge approval process prior to the wiretap even being taken down. Sometimes due to resources, this is not as complete a process as it should be.
That said, despite our best efforts and the best efforts of the police, disclosure continues to be problematic. I have two examples. I think that both of these cases should be viewed by the panel as what should take place.
Police took down a number of accused in a large, complex prosecution. This was organized crime and there were some organized crime charges laid. The wiretap ended in February 2006. To facilitate disclosure and charge approval, the individuals were not actually arrested until late November 2006. Even with that, a disclosure disk—and of course with computers, most of the disclosure is put on hard drives and disks nowadays—was not provided to defence until late January 2007. The remainder of the disclosure was not out until much later. The fastest of the matters, which went to trial, went initially to preliminary inquiry in February 2008 and ultimately to trial in February 2009. There were some convictions and sentencing took place in December 2009.
As I mentioned, pieces are broken off. Two other trial matters continue today, and disclosure issues are still arising. Additionally, the matter I've just related was my first real experience with a trial matter, with all of the surveillance calls and seizures, etc., also encompassing a full IPOC workup. IPOC, of course, relates to the proceeds of crime, and IPOC's raison d'être is to try to take the profit out of organized crime.
IPOC seized a number of assets of these individuals. The difficulty on the disclosure front is that IPOC matters usually continue well beyond the wiretap stage. Also, their investigations tend to be as big or bigger than the original prosecution. In this particular case, IPOC disclosures, particularly reports, were still being made on the eve of trial.
The other matter I wish to relate to you is in regard to a current prosecution. The takedown was done in the summer. At that point in time, a prosecutor and a paralegal were working with the police prior to takedown.
Fast-forward to today. Some disclosure has been made, but not of some of the most important parts of the investigation. The IPOC investigation continues and documents are still being scanned into the database. My point is that disclosure problems, despite the best efforts and lessons learned, continue.
I also want to talk briefly about another aspect that is a drain on time and money. If it goes unbridled, it can cause a prosecution to spin out of control. That's the issue of proper notice and the Garofoli hearing. In the project I just related to you, where the wiretap ended in February 2006, as we approached trial there was much sabre-rattling over the Garofoli hearing. In the Garofoli hearing, the wiretap affiant may have to testify. Of course, the main concern for any affiant on a wiretap or a warrant is the identity of confidential informants.
I'm sure you will hear at length about this issue so I won't say too much about it except to say that if an affiant is on the stand, it always has a very chilling effect on the prosecution, especially if the court allows any leeway concerning questions about informants. Particularly in the case of a wiretap where there could be as many as 10 to 20 informants, with as many individual informant handlers, the affiant is put in a tough position if they are to answer any types of questions in this area. If the identity of an informant becomes an issue, it may ultimately force a stay of the case.
As I mentioned, there was much sabre-rattling. In the scheduling of the trial, the defence indicated they would need four months for a Garofoli hearing. That was before the trial; that was just the charter hearing. Then we would break for summer and would need another four months to conduct the fall trial. Now, pursuant to a Supreme Court of Canada case called Lising-Pires, we insisted upon the defence seeking leave to cross-examine the affiant. We also insisted that the defence provide a written brief outlining exactly what was wrong with the affidavit. As it turned out, there wasn't much.
We responded to the brief. Ultimately, the Garofoli opened in front of the Court of Queen's Bench and closed in one day, with the defence not being granted leave. So instead of conducting four months of Garofoli, we conducted the trial instead.
The point is the court was on board with this process, and because of that, we saved significant time and resources and also protected confidential informants. That being said, all too often courts allow defence fishing expeditions--and we see this all the time--creating trials that continue on and on, with the safety of informants often swinging in the balance.
Those are my comments with regard to this morning's proceedings.
Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.