Justice Committee on March 29th, 2010

[Jan Fox]

I do. It's actually something I'm really passionate about. You're not wrong on this. I think that for quite a long time we did have a disconnect between the institutional side of the business and the parole and supervision side.

We've tried to make some inroads in that regard. I think you're aware of the report that was called a road map for public safety, that transformation. In the work that was done, that is one of the things that the committee pointed out to us very clearly. We need to do a better job of that.

The problem is not unique, but one of the things I can say is that we have the Edmonton Institution for Women here in Edmonton, and because of our proximity, we've been able to do a better job of making those linkages. So in this region, it has been a little bit about geography.

For example, we have institutions in Drumheller, Red Deer, and Grande Cache, but we don't necessarily have community parole offices there. We've had to come up with some creative ways to reach out to our institutional counterparts. We have the technology; as I say, there's video conferencing and there are telephones and all of those kinds of things.

It's something that is top of mind for me, and it's on my performance agreement and those of other wardens and district directors across the country. There are only eight district directors across the country. We meet regularly and that is one of the things that we're working very, very hard on.

So you are correct, but I think we're starting to make some inroads in that regard.

[Stephen Woodworth, Conservative, Kitchener Centre, ON]

That's good. The reason I ask is that it comes through very clearly to me this morning that, as I think Mr. Foss said, disaffiliation is not an event; it's a process. Therefore, it should be one that begins in custody and continues seamlessly out of custody.

I do have one other question, if I have time. We've talked a lot about the street gang problem here. I differentiate that from the problem of the larger national organized crime groups coming into a community, which I think Mr. Dechert was referring to. I wonder if we could have any idea about how those larger national organizations are operating in Alberta, if at all, if anyone knows.

Mr. Rice, I'll put you on the spot. Do you come into that? Do you see prosecutions against the Hells Angels and so on in Alberta? Or is it all mainly street gangs?

[Greg Rice]

Yes. The one I referred to was a Hells Angels prosecution. My understanding is that there are clubhouses, or certainly chartered clubs, in Edmonton, Red Deer, and Calgary, at the very least, and that perhaps there are fingers going into other outlying communities such as Fort McMurray and Grande Prairie. But probably Mr. Foss and Ms. Fox would have a better understanding of the exact amount.

[Jan Fox]

I can speak to the numbers in my district. I think I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks that we have 92 gang-affiliated offenders. Of that number, 64 of them are in aboriginal or Asian gangs. The remaining numbers are small.

For example, for Hells Angels under parole supervision--and this is only parole supervision--I have four, just to put it into perspective. With respect to that, I don't know if that is due to them being from different places, so that when they end up being convicted of crimes, they're incarcerated in different places. I can't speak to that, but I can tell you that the parole supervision numbers are very, very small in Alberta and the Northwest Territories.

[Stephen Woodworth, Conservative, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Brian Murphy]

Everybody has had a fair chance.

We'll let the fourth party have a second question for five minutes.

[Joe Comartin, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Cenaiko, I was interested in the point you were making on the difficulty you have of considering evidence and holding it back from people who are looking at being eligible for parole. Has the board looked at any recommendations for amendments?

I can think of any number of acts that might be amended to include the authority to the board to take that into account but hold it back from the individual because they are associated with gangs. The Supreme Court has been I think fairly lenient at allowing those types of exemptions from the charter.

Has there been any discussion by the board members or any recommendations for amendments?

[Harvey Cenaiko]

No, there haven't been any from the board. Again, as I mentioned earlier, if the minister or the government asks us for our advice to them on legislation, we'll respond. We don't go to government and say to change the laws for us to do this or that. We basically follow the laws that are in place under the CCRA, the CRA, and the Criminal Code of Canada. That's what's happens there.

We've had third party information come to us. We have a strong working relationship with police agencies across the country as well as the CSC. With any information that comes forward regarding an investigation that may be critical to this offender and/or other individuals who may still be in the community, and/or the victims, a gist is drafted up, which will be very brief and will state that there is an ongoing investigation on this offender by the RCMP.

That's provided to the offender and to us. That's all the information we get. It would have nothing to do with what type of an investigation it is. It wouldn't have anything to do with whether it is a homicide or a sexual assault or whatever it is. It's just a very brief gist saying that he's still being investigated for an additional or a new offence. That has to be provided to the offender. That's sensitive third party information.

As well, that includes other offenders within the institution who may provide information that the offender we are going to be reviewing or assessing risk on is trafficking in drugs within the institution or is an enforcer for a group. Again, that's third party information. In order to protect the offender, who obviously doesn't want his name going before the hearing in regard to saying that this offender told on that offender--again, that's third party protected information--a gist or a brief summary is provided to us through CSC, so that we also have some knowledge that he is part of the drug subculture within the institution.

[Joe Comartin, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Louis, when I was on the public safety committee a few years ago, I did a fair amount of work on witness protection. There are major problems with our witness protection system in Canada, but I have to admit that we didn't take into account, with regard to street gangs, individuals who did come out of the first nation, Métis, and aboriginal communities.

Have you had any experience as to whether that can be used as a methodology to combat the street gangs? Are there particular problems for our first nations in terms of going into witness protection? I don't know if you've had any experience, but if you have, I'd like your comments.

[Roy Louis]

No, not at all.

[Joe Comartin, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Okay.

Mr. Rice, do you have any comments in that regard?

[Greg Rice]

That's sort of out of my bailiwick. I think the police officers would probably have a much better.... But I've certainly dealt with witnesses who were in witness protection. That's all I can really say.

[Joe Comartin, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Okay.

Ms. Fox, I have one last question. We've had this experience, and I think particularly in Quebec, where correctional officers were targeted, and by the Hells Angels in that case. Without disclosing specific cases if they're not public, have you had any experience of attempts to intimidate correctional officers in Alberta or within your region?

[Jan Fox]

I have personally not heard of any of those situations. I did understand from a colleague that this may have been a concern in one particular area in British Columbia, but to my knowledge, not that we've been made aware of.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Brian Murphy]

Thank you.

I want to thank all of the witnesses.

Mr. Louis, you in particular mentioned that there were some documents you would like to table with the clerk. That goes for anyone else who might have further documentation to follow up on your testimony and help us in our study on organized crime.

I thank you very much for coming.

We'll suspend now for about five minutes.

[The Chair, Conservative, Ed Fast]

I'll reconvene the meeting.

This is the sixth meeting of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. As you know, we're continuing our study on organized crime across Canada. We're just winding up the study. We hope to issue a report in the next couple of months. In the meantime, we're still hearing from witnesses here, as well as in Winnipeg.

I want to thank all of you for appearing.

For the record, we have with us today Michael Boyd, chief of police, representing the Edmonton Police Service, and Rick Hanson, chief of police, representing the Calgary Police Service. We also have with us Mike Skappak, director, criminal investigations, prairie region, Canada Border Services Agency; Staff Sergeant Terry Kohlhauser and Inspector Clemens Imgrund, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and finally, Brian Gibson, chair of the board of directors, Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada. I welcome you here.

I think you know what the process is. You have 10 minutes to present and then we'll open the floor to questions. By the way, thank you for appearing on such late notice. We were scrambling to try to set up these dates, and you were so gracious to accept our invitation to appear.

Why don't we start with Mr. Boyd?

[Chief Michael Boyd, Chief of Police, Edmonton Police Service]

Thank you, Chairman and members of the committee.

Today I am speaking to you in my capacity as vice-president of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and president of the Alberta Association of Chiefs of Police.

Canada's justice system has two overall responsibilities: protection of the public and ensuring justice for all those charged with committing crimes and those who are victims of crimes.

In the last several years, there has been great focus on ensuring justice for those charged, as a result of the judicial and public attention to those cases where offenders have been wrongly convicted of crime. That attention was warranted and strongly supported by the police chiefs in Canada.

The focus of my address today deals with the latter: changes that are needed in legislation and in system practice to ensure that the public is protected from further criminal victimization or crime by people who are known as chronic offenders, prolific offenders, or repeat offenders.

To provide you with some background, during the 1970s, Parliament passed into law the Bail Reform Act. In essence, the act established principles such that those alleged to have committed crime would be free from custody until the court established their innocence or guilt. If the court determined that a person was guilty, then further consideration was given to determining whether or not the disposition of the case meant incarceration or jail time for the offender.

The act also established exceptions to the general rule or principles. The first exception dealt with offenders where there were grounds to believe that the offender, if released from custody, would fail to appear in court in answer to the charges against them. The second exception dealt with offenders charged with a crime or multiple crimes where there were grounds to believe the offender would continue to commit crimes while out on bail awaiting their trial.

In the first exception, an accused person could face a bail hearing during which the court would hear evidence relating to those grounds. The law permits the court either to hold offenders in custody until their trial or to release offenders on strict conditions of release that they must adhere to or be in breach of their conditions, which is another criminal offence for which they may be charged.

In the second exception, where there are grounds to believe that an offender will continue to commit crimes while out of custody on bail, the offender can face a bail hearing where the court can hear what those grounds of belief are. Either a judge or justice of the peace can commit the offender to pretrial custody, which incapacitates them entirely from committing more crimes, or the court can release them from custody on strict conditions of release, which ideally prohibit their ability to reoffend.

The foregoing is what the legislation provides for in section 515 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The concern is not so much with the legislation needed to protect the public. We have it, and when it is used properly, for the most part it works. The concern is that the legislative processes are not being used to the extent that they should be, especially with prolific, chronic, or repeat offenders, and because of that, the public is not being properly protected from further victimization.

The justice system is made up of the police, crown attorneys, the defence bar, judges and justices of the peace, and, of course, corrections. While these different participants of the justice system are constitutionally independent of one another, on a practical level they are interdependent on one another to make the system effective. This is important to fulfill both responsibilities of the system: to ensure justice for victims and offenders and for protection of the greater public.

Through 2006 and 2008, studies looking at criminal offender backgrounds were done in Edmonton and Halifax. Canada's police leaders wanted to establish that this was not happening just in one area of Canada.

The studies revealed patterns of offending up to and beyond 100 arrests in a five-year period, where offenders were arrested and released dozens of times, where they breached their conditions of release multiple times, and where they reoffended, harming the public. Hence my focus and my remarks on the protection of the public.

In fact, it is not uncommon to see offenders out of custody on the streets of our cities on multiple bails when their background suggests that they should be incapacitated through pretrial detention. Often, chronic offenders are those who are addicted to or dependent on alcohol or drugs. They're most often locked into the cycle of committing crime to get the money to buy the drugs to feed the habit and so on and so forth.

Most experts agree that the offender's concern is a health problem, primarily, and I believe the Canadian police community would agree. However, when someone crosses the line from harming themselves to criminally victimizing other people, that is a problem for our justice system and for the Canadian public, given the system's responsibility to protect the public from those committing crime.

Although the terms “chronic offender” and “prolific offender” are often used to mean the same thing, the term “prolific offender” can be used to describe offenders who live a lifestyle of crime and victimization and have no lawful means of support. Although for the most part the legislation is in place to address offenders who commit crime, there are legislative changes necessary to strengthen the effects of the justice system in this 21st century.

Allow me to give you some ideas and try to make those tangible. Today I have specific recommendations for change that the committee might wish to consider.

Number one: changes to legislation are needed that make certain actions by justice participants mandatory.

Number two: Parliament must recognize in law the prevalence of alcohol and drug dependence and its influence on crime in today's society.

Number three: Parliament must make changes to the legislated “conditions of release” options, making them more reflective of today's realities and more effective in controlling an alleged offender's conduct while on release.

Let me begin with number one, please: making actions mandatory. When the police prepare evidence for a bail hearing showing the likelihood of an offender reoffending if released, this information amounts to a risk assessment or threat assessment for future criminal victimization. This information is very often disregarded, with no explanations given. This puts the public at risk, and the system is therefore not accountable.

With respect to number two, the legislation makes no mention of Canada's drug problems and the impact of drug dependence on crime and those who are trafficking in crime. I believe this is necessary. It would also link Canada's anti-drug programs to those most affected and causing the most criminal harm to others in our society.

On number three, changing conditions of release, the conditions of release options written into law in the 1970s and 1980s do not contemplate technological advances now available to the justice system. Electronic monitoring may well be an option the courts could consider for offender release, but that option in law does not currently exist.

Another example is the condition to “keep the peace and be of good behaviour”. The example is often used, but it seems to count for nothing in today's system. That expression seems to really mean nothing.

There are many more examples I could provide to you, but the point is that we need to modernize the conditions of release options and ensure that they are effective in limiting the opportunities for criminal behaviour.

Here's the payoff, though: more focus on prolific, chronic, or repeat offenders will without doubt make our communities safer and without doubt reduce crime. I also believe that it will reduce the strain on our justice system, make justice more effective for all, and have a deterrent effect on offenders as well.

In conclusion, while the existing legislation is very much upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, it needs to be modernized to reflect today's reality. The system needs to put more focus on the harm to Canadians from repeat offenders and the system's responsibility for protection of the public.

In the short term, I believe the only way to accomplish that is by making certain actions mandatory. Making changes to this area of criminal law will help bring about the changes that are needed to protect the public and reduce criminal victimization.

Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee this morning.

[The Chair, Conservative, Ed Fast]

Thank you.

We'll move on to Mr. Hanson.

You have 10 minutes.

[Chief Rick Hanson, Chief of Police, Calgary Police Service]

Thank you very much.

I have reviewed some of the previous submissions and it would be repetitive of me to reiterate the history of organized crime in Canada and how we got here, so my comments will be relatively brief.

But there is one particular point that I feel compelled to make. Those people who are involved in the mid-level and upper level of organized crime are in for one reason and one reason alone: profit.

Unlike other types of crime in Canada where addictions or stupidity may be the primary motivator, organized crime is motivated by greed and profit, and it relies on the continuous victimization of the naive and the innocent. Therefore, the government and the justice system must recognize that serious crime requires serious sentencing.

A criminal involved in serious and organized crime must be treated far more severely than the young, foolish male who finds himself in trouble with the law for a few years. Organized crime has serious social and economic consequences and we can't ignore the increasing impact on the Canadian economy and on Canadian society.

I want to speak to recent trends and some of the solutions I would suggest.

The first issue is diversification of organized crime groups, geographically and commercially. Whereas in the past organized crime tended to stick to one market, this is no longer the case. Groups will now be involved in any enterprise that makes money: human trafficking, prostitution, auto theft rings, debit card fraud, and mortgage fraud. Organized crime groups are no longer restricted to geographic areas or neighbourhoods and will cross all borders to pursue profits.

Organized crime groups are actively trying to corrupt and infiltrate police, the judiciary, and legitimate businesses. They are also actively working to unmask police sources.

The implication for law enforcement? As organized crime groups broaden their networks, they increasingly interact with each other, causing conflict and violence. Multi-faceted layers of criminal enterprise make it difficult for police to investigate, not only in terms of resources, but also in terms of in-house expertise. For instance, a simple drug file will lead to a complex fraud investigation requiring commercial crime expertise, tech crimes, etc.

Cross-jurisdictional crime trends make it necessary for different agencies--rural, municipal, corrections, CBSA, and sheriffs--to work together and share information. There are few processes and systems in place to facilitate information sharing.

There are some potential solutions to that particular issue. One is to facilitate exchange of information and intelligence between agencies through support to development of shared intelligence databases, analysis, and other resources. Another is to develop and support workable technology within the province and the country. The majority of law enforcement agencies use different technology and systems, which makes sharing of current information difficult.

To combat mortgage fraud, government needs to compel banks to discontinue their present desktop appraisal technique and develop new techniques that are designed to discourage mortgage fraud as opposed to facilitating it.

A second issue is disclosure. Two issues are associated with disclosure. One is that the Stinchcombe requirements use an excessive amount of police and judicial resources. Second, disclosure packages themselves are being used by criminals to uncover the investigative tactics of police.

Local intelligence reveals incidents of organized crime groups using disclosure laws to identify and respond to police investigative tactics. There have been instances of disclosure packages being disseminated in jails. Organized crime groups have also been known to hold what they call “heat meets”, in which they discuss recent trends in police surveillance and the means to counter them.

There is a heavy onus on police and crown, such that it's virtually impossible to run an organized crime trial of any complexity in a province like Alberta. You virtually cannot try more than four people at once.

The implication for law enforcement is that counter-surveillance is becoming a huge issue. Counter-surveillance is their ability to identify the police and how they're responding to their particular crime issue. Traditional police investigative tactics are no longer as effective as they once were because they've been distributed to all the criminal elements, especially in organized crime, so they can study it and figure out a way to get around it. It significantly limits our ability to conduct large organized crime trials.

Potential solutions include: a review of the Stinchcombe decision for the purpose of simplifying disclosure for police and, where appropriate, masking police techniques so criminals cannot study them and develop counter-investigative strategies; the promotion of technological tools that address issues around the volume of disclosure; and increased federal prosecutorial capacity and experience by increasing positions and staffing levels.

The third issue is that organized crime groups have become increasingly technologically advanced. They are increasing their use of sophisticated techniques to communicate with each other and increasing their use of the Internet to facilitate the commission of crimes such as prostitution, money laundering, etc.

What are the implications for law enforcement? Again, counter-surveillance is becoming a huge issue. Organized crime groups are using anti-surveillance techniques such as RF or signal monitors to find police covert surveillance equipment and are using jammers to block the communications.

Both of these create safety concerns for officers and operational impediments to the running of a successful operation. There are many examples of police officers conducting traffic stops who have had their phones and, in some cases, their police radios made non-functional because of the application of these jamming devices. Traditional investigative techniques are becoming less effective.

Among potential solutions, the first is to have a cybercrime centre for Canada. We need a national centre for combatting online Internet crime to address spamming, viruses, and botnets, etc., but also to allow local law enforcement to have an investigative body to gather evidence of money laundering, frauds, etc. Moreover, under lawful access legislation, we need to be able to monitor crime groups in online chat rooms and in areas that are currently untouchable, such as game box online sites, MSN, and PIN to PIN communications on a BlackBerry, etc.

Lawful access legislation needs to be passed to enable police to monitor communication devices more effectively. Telephone companies and Internet service providers must be compelled to provide a back door for law enforcement to intercept private communications when we come to them with a judicial authorization for such interception.

In addition, law enforcement needs to be able to access subscriber information for cellphones and Internet IP addresses without a warrant. Legislation to make it illegal for citizens to sell, possess, use, or import signal jammers is also critical.

Finally, there is education. Organized crime relies on its ability to prey on the naive and the vulnerable. We have to do a far better job of educating the public. This has to include kids as early as elementary school so that they get the proper message on drugs and cyber-predatory behaviour that leads to approaches for prostitution and gang involvement. We need to continue this right through to high school.

How else does one explain the continuing success of some Internet frauds that are continually perpetrated on the public with great success when, to law enforcement and the educated, it's just ridiculous to think anybody could even be victimized by these types of approaches? There needs to be a national commitment to education to reduce the levels of victimization.

Thank you for this opportunity today.

[The Chair, Conservative, Ed Fast]

Thank you.

Mr. Skappak, you have 10 minutes.

[Mike Skappak, Director, Criminal Investigations, Prairie Region, Canada Border Services Agency]

Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting the CBSA to participate in the hearings today.

The prairie region of the Canada Border Services Agency is responsible for securing prairie, Northwest Territories, and Canadian borders at our ports of entry, which consist of 37 border crossings, 5 airports, and 2 marine ports. Of the 1,216 CBSA employees in the region, 682 are border services officers. Since 2009, nearly 3 million air passengers, 460,000 commercial trucks, and nearly 1.3 million vehicles carrying 2.8 million travellers came into Canada through the prairie region ports of entry.

The CBSA region has seized drugs worth approximately $26 million in the last five years, $17 million of which has been seized in the last 12 months. The majority of the drug seizures in the past two years have involved cocaine from South America, doda from the United States, and khat from Africa. Other drugs seized to a lesser degree are heroin, hash oil, and, of course, marijuana.

Although the majority of the drug shipments that have arrived by air enter Canada through the major ports of entry in the east and through Vancouver, there have been increases in the number of drug shipments at our airports, Calgary International and Edmonton International. One of CBSA's challenges in identifying suspect containers and shipments through air mode is the use of legitimate companies by organized crime to conceal their drug shipments.

The enforcement mandate of the CBSA is delivered through the efforts of the port-of-entry operations and three enforcement divisions of our agency. The majority of our officers work at our ports of entry and are managed through a network of five district offices throughout the prairie provinces and the Northwest Territories. These front line officers, who are the first point of contact for the traveller's entry into our country, perform inspections on their goods and conveyances.

Complementing the front line staff are officers from the criminal investigations and intelligence divisions, as well as the inland enforcement division. The majority of these officers are located in Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Regina. In addition to those centralized units, officers are also located in offices in Coutts, Alberta; North Portal, Saskatchewan; and Emerson, Manitoba.

Criminal investigators are responsible for investigating, for the purpose of prosecuting, individuals who are purposely contravening the act we administer. In the prairie region, investigators prosecute a number of offences, including Immigration Refugee Protection Act-- IRPA--violations, handgun and firearms smuggling, child pornography, and currency violations. Our criminal investigators conduct criminal investigations into suspected cases of evasion or fraud with respect to over 80 federal acts that relate to border legislation.

Our inland enforcement officers locate and remove foreign nationals who enter Canada illegally or individuals, including permanent residents, whose admissibility status changes after they have entered Canada. This activity involves investigations in cooperation with other law enforcement agencies, which include the RCMP and the Canadian municipal police departments. Many of the people removed from the prairie region have been deemed inadmissible due to criminal activity committed in Canada or overseas. Some of those individuals have been, or are currently, members of various recognized organized crime groups, including the Afrikan Mafia, MS-13, the Clippers, Fresh Off the Boat, and Fresh Off the Boat Killers.

Finally, our intelligence officers and analysts are responsible for anticipating illegal activity that has not yet occurred and for providing tactical intelligence to all program areas so that our interdiction efforts are more effective and our officers' safety is protected. Many of the indicators used by BSOs--border services officers--to identify suspicious behaviour were developed within the intelligence program.

More directly related to your deliberations here today is the fact that our intelligence program is most frequently and directly involved in the gathering, analysis, and sharing of information related to organized crime.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Ed Fast]

Thank you very much.

We'll move on to the RCMP.

Inspector Imgrund, I believe you're going to be presenting. You have 10 minutes.

[Insp Clemens Imgrund, Officer in charge, National Security and Criminal Intelligence, K Division, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I am the officer responsible for the RCMP criminal intelligence program in the province of Alberta.

Alberta's organized crime landscape has changed rapidly in the last 10 years, in part due to our prosperous economy. The economy has also resulted in a population influx from across Canada and around the globe.

With this, we have seen an increase in the ethnic diversity, complexity, and numbers of criminal organizations in Alberta. As part of the globalization, there has also been an increase in organized crime's scope of operations, with national and international connections being the norm. There are presently 83 organized crime groups identified in the province of Alberta.

Organized crime was once found mostly in major centres of our province. As a result of enforcement pressure and economic opportunity, they've expanded into rural areas and communities across the province, including areas such as Brooks, Lloydminster, Fort McMurray, and Grande Prairie. An example is a group of central east Africans who moved from Toronto and elsewhere to establish themselves in Alberta communities. This group has been involved in a range of offences, including assaults, weapons offences, drug trafficking, and murder.

The majority of organized crime groups have some level of involvement in the production, distribution, and importation and exportation of illicit and controlled drugs. This includes the movement of precursors, grow operations, and clandestine labs. They also are involved in a multitude of other criminal offences, including: counterfeit goods and pharmaceuticals; money laundering; prostitution; firearms trafficking and importing; vehicle theft; counterfeit currency, payment cards, and travel documents; diamond smuggling; human trafficking; illegal gaming; frauds; commercial thefts; and corruption and intimidation of officials.

When it comes to organized crime, our policing challenges are many, with sophisticated approaches to corruption of law enforcement, border personnel, corrections staff, lawyers, clerks, regulatory agency staff, airport staff, couriers, truckers, private security agencies, and whoever else can gain them an advantage. Also, there's the intimidation of those involved in the criminal justice system, primarily witnesses, but including prosecutors, judges, police, and corrections officers. Then there's technology, which is used to thwart investigative efforts and to have the ability to facilitate crime from great distances anonymously, as is often the case in mass marketing frauds, counterfeit payment cards, identity theft, and travel documents.

The lag time in passing legislation to keep pace with the criminal trends and new technology is exemplified by the need for the proposed lawful access legislation, the increased complexity of investigations, the length of time required to investigate, the volume of evidence required, the need of highly specialized skill sets, the onerous judicial requirements, and the lengthy, complex prosecution of organized crime.

Organized crime groups conduct operations and move between multiple jurisdictions, using the different laws to impede law enforcement's ability or to create difficulty in obtaining evidence, sharing information, and conducting investigations. Organized crime recognizes no borders and exploits territorial models. There's also the disclosure of police investigative techniques through the court process and, subsequently, the sharing of these techniques among the criminal element.

How do we deal with these challenges? We start by ensuring that our limited resources are strategically focused on the criminal organizations that are doing the greatest harm and are vulnerable to enforcement activity. This requires a robust and timely intelligence process to identify the threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities to assist in establishing the enforcement priorities, including common national platforms for the information and the ability to share and access the needed organized crime information.

The ability to share information must include government agencies and industry, both domestically and internationally. We need to ensure that we utilize appropriate enforcement strategies and partnerships. We must integrate police resources with other enforcement entities and prosecution personnel, and we must strengthen partnerships with government, industry, and communities, utilizing trans-jurisdictional partnerships and non-territorial enforcement models to reduce duplication and overcome jurisdictional challenges.

We need the appropriate police resources--namely, capacity, specialized skill sets, and experience--to deal with the complexity of these investigations. This includes the right equipment and legislation to be able to exploit technology, capture evidence, minimize the risk to investigators and the investigation, and reduce wasted effort. We need to be innovative and ensure that we are employing best practices in our investigative and prosecution strategies. We need the appropriate prosecution team with the right skills, experience, and equipment, and the capacity to support the investigation and manage lengthy and complex trials through the court system.

Police alone cannot tackle organized crime and gangs. We need more engagement and commitment from all levels of government and the public. I can't say enough about the strong engagement and commitment of our provincial government in Alberta to deal with these issues.

Examples of this support include: the creation of several new integrated enforcement initiatives over the past five years that are directed at giving police additional capacity to focus on organized crime and gangs; provincial legislation to facilitate enforcement, including civil forfeiture, soft body armour and armoured vehicle regulation, and provincial witness protection; a law enforcement framework where police, in conjunction with government, are identifying non-territorial models to reduce duplication and leverage resources through integration and sharing of common services; and the development of a multi-pronged cross-ministry gang strategy to reduce the impact, membership, and prevalence of gangs.

Within the RCMP, we've been involved in developing a province-wide aboriginal gang strategy and the creation of the Hobbema Cadet Corps, both of which are designed to reduce the impact, membership, and prevalence of aboriginal gangs.

We have integrated border enforcement teams working with partners in Canada and the United States.

Police in Alberta are using intelligence to lead their enforcement activities and it has been shown that we are working on the right priorities. The police members in Alberta are integrated in a number of areas, including under the auspices of the Alberta Law Enforcement Response Teams, ALERT. They have built strong partnerships with enforcement agencies across the province, country, and internationally.

In addition, we routinely work with prosecution services, both federal and provincial, to ensure that strong investigative and prosecution strategies are in place.

One aspect that is outside of our control and requires the engagement and commitment of government are the enhancements to legislation that are needed to ensure that law enforcement will be effective in dealing with organized crime.

There are some areas that create challenges in the investigation and prosecution of organized crime.

One is the need for lawful access legislation to allow police to keep pace with changing technology and criminal use of technology. Another is enhancing the ability to share with police information from government agencies and industry, domestically and internationally. The current environment is one of fear of sharing information, due to either legislative restrictions or human rights concerns.

Another area is the facilitation of access to financial records and complex testimony from non-accused in complex financial investigations. The current legislation creates significant investigative barriers and results in extremely lengthy investigations.

The current low threshold for disclosure creates a significant burden on police and prosecution in the way of costs, resources, and time. Disclosure law is used to identify police investigative techniques to the criminal element, compromising investigations and safety. There's a need to establish a well-defined and consistent threshold for relevant disclosure and for the courts in embracing electronic technology. This could be accomplished through enacting disclosure requirements and procedures.

We work closely with government, industry, and other law enforcement to create safe homes and safe communities in Alberta and across Canada. I am pleased to have been provided this opportunity to present to you. I'm confident that the work of this committee will be of benefit to all Canadians.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Ed Fast]

Thank you.

The last witness in our panel is Brian Gibson.

Mr. Gibson, I understand there was some confusion over who you're representing and who you'll be speaking for. If you could, please clarify that. Then you'll have your 10 minutes to speak.

[Brian Gibson, Chair of Board of Directors, Alberta Law Enforcement Response Teams, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada]

Yes. I'm the chair of the Edmonton Police Commission as well as the chair of the Alberta Law Enforcement Response Teams.

Good morning. Today I'm privileged to provide testimony on the state of organized crime in Canada on behalf of Mayor Stephen Mandel and the Edmonton Police Commission. Additionally, as the board chair of the Alberta Law Enforcement Response Teams, I will speak from time to time from a provincial perspective.

There are three themes that I will address today: emerging trends in organized crime; working together to disrupt and dismantle organized crime; and the need for national leadership. Organized crime is complex, multi-faceted, and, most importantly, ever evolving. It poses a threat to public safety, security, our economy, and the overall health of our communities. This issue is far-reaching and indirectly affects all Canadians.

In Alberta, we know that 83 criminal organizations were operating in our province and the Northwest Territories last year, according to the Criminal Intelligence Service Alberta 2010 provincial threat assessment on organized crime. Seventeen of these organizations are new to Alberta's threat assessment since previous years.

While crime organizations have branched into many new markets, the primary activity of most groups operating in Alberta remains drug trafficking, with cocaine being the commodity of choice. In 2009 the Edmonton police alone seized 25 kilograms of cocaine, an increase of 8 kilograms over 2008. Marijuana is the second most popular drug trafficked by organized crime groups, with 47 kilograms seized by the Edmonton Police Service in 2009. These are considerable increases over previous years.

In addition, ALERT green teams, made up of investigators who specialize in dismantling marijuana grow operations, last year seized approximately 65,000 marijuana plants with a street value of $78 million. To put this quantity in perspective, these plants, if grown to maturity, had the potential of producing nearly 33 million marijuana joints.

Criminal organizations operating within Alberta also profit from drug production, money laundering, prostitution, human trafficking, firearms trafficking, importation and exportation of vehicles, counterfeiting, drug smuggling, illegal gaming, and fraud.

During 2008 and 2009, information was received from various law enforcement agencies in Alberta suggesting that there had been an increase in the number of groups involved in financial crimes, including counterfeit payment cards, point-of-sale skimming rings,the production of false ID, and gift card schemes. What our police are attempting to dismantle are multinational criminal enterprises with a multitude of business operations and sources of revenue. When police disrupt or dismantle one revenue stream, another emerges.

While the severity of crime index and the crime rate declined in Alberta in 2009, they remained the fourth highest in Canada. The Alberta homicide rate was the second highest and our drug crime rate the fourth highest in Canada in 2008.

The criminal element is becoming more sophisticated. They use technology exceeding the capabilities of our police agencies to track and unlawfully access information. Technology such as police scanners, GPS devices, and encryption communication devices is being commonly utilized by organized crime groups to evade police and conduct counter-surveillance.

There has been a noticeable increase in the use of cellular phones and the BlackBerry by criminal groups to conduct their operations using e-mail and text messaging. Law enforcement agencies are challenged to keep up with the new technology. Without enacting legislation that allows police agencies to lawfully access information contained by third party providers and communication networks, criminal organizations are continuing to evade police detection.

Organized crime has no boundaries and frequently spills beyond municipal and provincial boundaries. We recognize the need for police beyond the boundaries of our municipality. The federal government has to play a more significant role in facilitating this on a national level. I'll provide you with a practical example of how the province of Alberta has addressed this issue.

It is leading the way with the most ambitious example of integrated policing in Canada. The Alberta Law Enforcement Response Teams, ALERT, were established to bring together Alberta's most sophisticated law enforcement resources under one umbrella to strategically tackle serious and organized crime.

This model allows teams of highly skilled municipal police, RCMP, and sheriffs to work together in an integrated environment to disrupt and dismantle serious and organized crime such as drug trafficking, gang violence, child exploitation, and organized crime.

Since ALERT's inception in 2006, ALERT units have arrested more than 2,500 criminals, have seized nearly $8 million in cash, and have taken 800 kilograms of drugs and 350 firearms off the street. Today, ALERT comprises 400 seconded police officers and personnel. Funding is provided by the Province of Alberta, with municipal police and RCMP contributing a number of positions.

Investigation of organized crime is resource-intensive, costly, time-consuming, and complex. The ALERT model provides a strategic provincial focus to battle against organized crime, allowing for a coordinated, integrated, cross-jurisdictional response.

Intelligence is the cornerstone for targeted, effective law enforcement. A modern, standardized, real-time approach to gathering and sharing intelligence is critical to better identify crime hot spots and criminal movement and to direct enforcement activities.

Recognizing the sophistication of criminal networks operating in the province, the Alberta government is developing a provincial records management system called the Alberta Police Integrated Information Initiative, API3, to better share information among provincial agencies. In addition, a province-wide emergency radio network is in current development.

On a national level, intelligence systems need to be modernized. The development of the next generation of criminal intelligence systems for Canada must be fast-tracked. Good information that could be used to track criminal organizations moving between jurisdictions needs to be better collected, analyzed, and disseminated.

Aside from this, the work of the Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime, CIROC, a division of Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, has been recognized as a successful information sharing forum among member agencies. It provides a balanced, intelligence-led approach to combatting organized crime throughout Canada, and it is an excellent example of leadership at the national level.

No community is immune from organized crime and no one jurisdiction can combat organized crime on its own. The federal government has a responsibility to provide leadership on a national front. The Criminal Code and the proceeds of crime and witness protection legislation could and should be strengthened to address issues our police are facing in fighting organized crime.

In Alberta, police agencies have moved to civil forfeiture through the Victims Restitution and Compensation Payment Act, because the federal proceeds of crime legislation is too cumbersome. The burden of proof is too high on police and prosecutors. The reverse onus should be put on the defendant.

Additionally, the witness protection program is not responsive to the needs of police informants and sources. Our police would be able to disrupt and dismantle more organized crime if we could offer witnesses short-term protection and temporary relocation during the investigation and trial. The threshold for witness protection needs to be revisited and the current program needs to be streamlined, modernized, and better funded.

Our National DNA Data Bank is a powerful tool in combatting crime. It helps to link crimes without identified suspects with previous entries in the database, eliminates possible suspects, and identifies prolific offenders.

Significant gains have been made in the area of DNA ballistics analysis and other forensic identification; however, funding issues need to be resolved and federal resources need to be devoted to forensic testing in order to reduce wait times for analysis of evidence.

Edmontonians have expressed concern to city council and the Edmonton Police Commission about the severity of crime in our community. Edmonton City Council and the Province of Alberta have responded by adding 314 new police officers to the Edmonton Police Service and more than $33 million in funding since 2005. We've also brought together 400 highly skilled police officers under the ALERT umbrella to tackle serious crimes from a strategic, intelligence-led, cooperative front.

The federal government has a significant role to play in better coordinating provincial crime-fighting initiatives, strengthening legislation to assist police officers, and providing more funding to municipal police agencies. In the throne speech, the Governor General stated that “our Government will introduce legislation to give police investigative powers for the twenty-first century”. She further acknowledged that “Canada's police officers and chiefs have asked for these vital tools to stay ahead of the tactics adopted by today's criminals”.

On behalf of the mayor and the Edmonton Police Commission, I am hopeful that this promise will translate into changes that: better track criminal movement across jurisdictions; allow for coordination of directed enforcement activities; provide lawful access for intelligence gathering; lower the threshold of proof for proceeds of crime; offer improved witness protection; and devote more resources to the National DNA Data Bank.

Thank you for the opportunity for us to provide this testimony today.