Evidence of meeting #12 for Justice and Human Rights in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was medical.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Derek Ross  Executive Director, Christian Legal Fellowship
Cara Zwibel  Director, Fundamental Freedoms Program, Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Thomas Collins  Archbishop, Archdiocese of Toronto, Coalition for HealthCARE and Conscience
Laurence Worthen  Executive Director, Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada, Coalition for HealthCARE and Conscience
Shanaaz Gokool  Chief Executive Officer, Dying With Dignity Canada
Carrie Bourassa  Professor, Indigenous Health Studies, First Nations University of Canada, As an Individual
Angus Gunn  Counsel, Alliance of People with Disabilities Who Are Supportive of Legal Assisted Dying Society
Hazel Self  Chair, Board of Directors, Communication Disabilities Access Canada
Margaret Birrell  Board Member, Alliance of People with Disabilities Who Are Supportive of Legal Assisted Dying Society
Derryck Smith  As an Individual
André Schutten  Legal Counsel, Association for Reformed Political Action
James Schutten  Association for Reformed Political Action
Pieter Harsevoort  Association for Reformed Political Action
Hugh Scher  Legal Counsel, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition
Amy Hasbrouck  Vice-President, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition
Steven Fletcher  As an Individual
Richard Marceau  General Counsel and Senior Political Advisor, Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs
Michael Bach  Executive Vice-President, Canadian Association for Community Living

May 3rd, 2016 / 7:40 p.m.

Richard Marceau General Counsel and Senior Political Advisor, Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My name is Richard Marceau. I am here on behalf of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, better known by its acronym, CIJA. CIJA is the advocacy agent of the Jewish Federations of Canada.

We have no comprehensive formula for dealing with all aspects of medical assistance in dying. We are not proposing an interpretation of Jewish religious law on this question.

We do not represent any particular denomination of our community. We do not claim to be presenting the uniform position of all Canadian Jews.

You might know the old saying, “Two Jews, three opinions.”

We believe, however, that our position accurately represents the key elements of agreement within the Jewish community on this extremely personal and controversial issue.

Some of our members support medical assistance in dying, focusing on the fate of people who have an incurable or debilitating illness for which there is no remedy. Others oppose it, based on traditional religious grounds or thinking that it would precipitate the practice of euthanasia.

Although there are differences of opinion, a broad consensus exists within our community on the fact that, in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Carter case, important measures must be taken: to protect health care providers who object to medical assistance in dying for reasons of conscience; to ensure that eligibility for medical assistance in dying is sufficiently regulated to protect vulnerable individuals; and to provide genuine access to quality palliative care.

I would like to start with the question of conscientious objection. Many health care professionals oppose medical assistance in dying based on their deep professional, religious or moral convictions.

Unfortunately, Bill C-14 is silent at present on the question of the freedom of conscience of the doctors, nurses and pharmacists who could be asked to provide medical assistance in dying. Some health care providers believe that merely recommending medical assistance in dying to a patient is an unacceptable act.

We are encouraged by the fact that Bill C-14 does not force doctors to refer patients directly. If that had been the case, Canada would have been the only country to impose that requirement, which probably could not comply with the Supreme Court's direction to strike a balance between doctors' and patients' rights.

However, I would stress that any accommodation concerning the approach taken by health care professionals should not limit patients' access to medical assistance in dying.

Several models have been proposed to balance these rights. For example, the Canadian Medical Association has proposed a separate central information, counselling, and referral service to which objecting physicians could direct patients seeking physician-hastened death.

Dr. Hershl Berman, a specialist in internal medicine and palliative medicine at the Temmy Latner Centre for Palliative Care in Toronto and an associate professor in the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto, recently proposed another model in The Hill Times. He wrote:

Rather than actively referring patients, all physicians should be required to report any request for assisted death to the provincial Ministry of Health or a regulatory body. Physicians would be required to register if they are willing and qualified to provide MAID, and indicate how many additional patients they are able to take on per year. If the report is from a doctor willing to provide the service, he or she would receive confirmation. If not, the registry would connect the patient with a nearby practitioner.

“MAID” stands for medical assistance in dying.

Dr. Berman noted this as well:

In addition to respecting the beliefs and values of physicians who object to MAID, this process has an additional benefit. Many physicians, especially specialists, have a limited network of colleagues to whom they are accustomed to referring. In isolation, particularly in under-serviced areas, any doctor may have difficulty finding a colleague willing to accept the patient. If the process is managed centrally, a registry can ensure more effective and timely access for patients who wish to hasten their own death.

I would now like to talk about eligibility. We sympathize with patients who have not reached the age of majority, who have a health problem and would like to have recourse to medical assistance in dying. We also have to consider the serious difficulties that would face both the minors who would make such a serious decision themselves and the parents who would make the decision on behalf of their child.

Considering the finality of medical assistance in dying, we believe in the need to take a cautious approach to the criteria relating to consent. We believe the government has struck a fair balance in Bill C-14 by limiting access to medical assistance in dying to competent adults aged 18 and over. This approach is consistent with the laws on medical assistance in dying in Quebec and other jurisdictions in North America. We believe, as Bill C-14 provides, that if medical assistance in dying is allowed, it should be limited to adult patients on the brink of natural death.

We acknowledge those within our community who would prefer that medical assistance in dying be available more broadly, along the lines of the situation in some European countries, and we empathize with their motivations. However, these concerns appear to be beyond the scope of what the Supreme Court intended in its decision, which stated:

...high-profile cases of assistance in dying in Belgium...would not fall within the parameters suggested in these reasons, such as euthanasia for minors or persons with psychiatric disorders or minor medical conditions.

Many members of our community believe that Canadians should be able to give consent to medical assistance in dying before suffering physical or mental deterioration, and give advance instructions in the event they were to become incapable of acting. Some people consider this to be a fundamental component of any effective scheme. Others, however, have expressed concerns.

After diagnosis, a patient might justifiably not want to continue to live during the terminal phase of their illness. However, that does not necessarily mean that they will continue to want medical assistance in dying when they become eligible, when they are no longer competent to revoke their consent. If the committee chooses to amend Bill C-14 to include advance directives, we believe they should adhere to the same rigorous guarantees defined in the bill to ensure informed consent. Patients will have to meet those requirements when they are capable of giving informed consent, and their directive will be respected once they meet the eligibility criteria.

In conclusion, I would like to discuss a matter on which there is broad consensus: the need to provide high quality, universally available palliative care as an end of life option. Medical assistance in dying cannot be a substitute for palliative care, home care or support for patients in the terminal phase and their caregivers. It is essential that medical assistance in dying not be the only option or the default option available to Canadian patients.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will be pleased to answer questions in the language of your choice.

7:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather

Thank you very much, Mr. Marceau. We can ask questions in the language of your choice.

We're going to go to Mr. Bach.

Mr. Bach, welcome. The floor is yours, sir.

7:50 p.m.

Michael Bach Executive Vice-President, Canadian Association for Community Living

Thank you, and good evening honourable Chair and members of the committee.

On behalf of our association, I'm pleased to present our brief outlining specific proposed amendments to Bill C-14, a brief we title “Medical Assistance in Dying: A Private Request, a Public Act”.

Let me begin why we chose this title for our brief. Our membership has been struck by the reactions to our proposals and efforts to advance robust safeguards for vulnerable persons, often with the following comments. “This is someone's private decision”. “What business does the state have being involved?” “It's a matter of choice; why should that choice be questioned?” “The focus has to be on enabling people to get what they need, so they can die in dignity”. We appreciate the depth of the concern, the first-hand experience, the desperation, and the frustration that motivate these kinds of reactions to proposals for robust safeguards.

One of the main difficulties in the debate is that it is actually not as straightforward as some commentators seem to suggest, to design a public service to respond to people's request for what Bill C-14, calls medical aid in dying. After all, we are talking about a public service designed to end people's lives, not to provide palliative care or other supports. The Minister of Health has made clear that's for future conversation and consultation with the provinces and territories.

We're now engaged in building a new public service in Canada designed to make people dead. I put this starkly, not to be provocative but so that we can bring as much clarity as possible to what it is that we are actually doing with eyes wide open, about what is at stake.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in paragraph 2 of the Carter decision, made the stakes clear. On the one hand stands the autonomy and dignity of a competent adult, who seeks death as a response to a grievous and irremediable medical condition. On the other stands the sanctity of life and the need to protect the vulnerable. It goes on to say people who are vulnerable to being induced to commit suicide.

We think there are two main policy questions to answer in order to deliver on these policy goals. Who is the service intended for, and how can we best ensure that delivering the new public service will only be to those who are truly autonomous and not to those who are being induced to die by suicide?

The first question, who is the service intended for? We fully support the definition of eligible persons for this service as laid out in Bill C-14. We concur with the conclusions of constitutional law expert, Professor Dianne Pothier, who wrote, in a piece published in Policy Options just last week, that the Supreme Court's silence on the particulars of the definition of grievous and irremediable should not be taken to tie Parliament's hands. Indeed, the court was very clear that it was up to Parliament to define this term and the parameters of the system.

As Professor Pothier notes, the trial judge actually defined the term and she did so quite clearly. The Supreme Court neither rejected the definition nor added to it. The trial judge defined the term to include only those conditions that left the person in an advanced state of weakening capacities, with no chance of improvement, and specifically excluded those whose source of intolerable suffering was psychosocial in nature. In granting the constitutional exemption to Ms. Taylor, the criterium was that she would be terminally ill and near death, and there was no hope of her recovery.

Although the Supreme Court of Canada did not define grievous and irremediable, the fact that it adopted the trial judge's terminology, without comment, offers a strong inference that it found the trial decision definition and the criteria valid, otherwise, the court would likely have altered the criteria or rejected the terminology. We also support, very clearly and for reasons the Professor Pothier has laid out, the inclusion of a criteria of reasonably foreseeable natural death.

Second, and we can get into a discussion on that later, how can we best ensure that we're delivering this new public service only to those who are truly autonomous and not to those who are vulnerable to being induced to die by suicide?

A main challenge in designing this service is to identify and respond to people who may be induced to use the new system to die. One of the challenges is that it's not a straightforward exercise to identify who, in fact, is vulnerable to being induced.

What do we mean by being induced to die by suicide in such a system? There's a large body of clinical research on inducement to suicide, and recent evidence and case examples from Oregon, the Netherlands, and Belgium. We've recently undertaken a review of this research, which points to five main ways in which people can be induced.

First, there can be distorted or disordered insight into one's condition and options available to a person as a result of the mental health issue.

Second, there can be hopelessness arising from self-stigma associated with negative cultural messages and stereotypes about one's condition.

Third, there can be direct coercion, and there are many examples in the Oregon and Belgium-Netherlands systems of direct coercion. One that we've shared is of a caregiver in Oregon who said to her husband, you either use the system to die or you go into long-term care. He didn't want to go into long-term care, so he chose the system to die. Given that 40% of elderly persons in long-term care in Canada are either clinically depressed or show symptoms of clinical depression this should be a real concern for us, and given also the lack of family supports.

A fourth form of inducement is through what the psychiatric literature calls the psychodynamics of the relationship with health care professionals, where physicians may feel a sense of guilt from not being able to heal a person and a person comes to feel like a lost cause. This is called in psychiatric terms transference and counter-transference.

A survey of psychiatrists involved in consulting on request for physician-assisted death in the Netherlands indicated that such dynamics influenced 25% of the requests in which they had provided psychiatric consultation and 19% of cases they consulted on physician-assisted death went ahead to be authorized by physicians, even though the psychiatrist had advised that issues of transference and counter-transference appeared to be influencing the decision.

A fifth way of people being induced is because of a lack of access to needed support or information about what options might be available, meaning effectively that people are not making informed decisions.

Our proposed amendments to address these concerns are laid out in our brief and include, in summary, an expansion of the preamble to include a study on independent prior review. We believe that a system for prior review is essential to guard against the very real risks and complex nature of the reality of inducement that is pervasive in the systems that exist and to ensure that the legal criteria Carter laid out are met.

Second is a clearer standard for informed consent. The bill only references external pressure. The Supreme Court was clear that people who were induced to die by suicide needed to be safeguarded. The standard should include reference to inducement, undue influence, and coercion.

As well, there are only five provinces and territories that actually have statutory standards of informed consent across the country, and colleges also have varying guidelines.

A proposed additional safeguard is that before medical assistance is provided, the medical practitioner or nurse practitioner must confirm that a qualified clinician has provided the person with a palliative care consultation, outlining the full range of treatment, technology, and support options and provided written confirmation that the person had the capacity to refuse those options.

Fourth, we believe that until further study is done, either the current system of superior court prior review should stay in place or proposals advanced for putting a tribunal system in place should be incorporated into the bill.

Here are a couple of final ones. The bill provides that the Minister of Health may make regulations related to information to be gathered. We believe that should be amended to say the minister must make those regulations and those regulations should come into force on the day the law comes into force, so that we can be assured that information is being gathered about requests, the socio-demographic information, the reasons people are refusing options, and the reasons they are requesting this service.

Finally, we believe that the bill should include a requirement that the ministers of Justice and Health table a report in Parliament on an annual basis based on analysis of the information that is collected under the regulations.

Thank you.

8 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather

Thank you very much, Mr. Bach, for your very informative presentation.

I encourage all the members of the committee to look at the very detailed amendments that were proposed in the submission.

Now we're going to go to questions. Before we go to questions I want to say what a pleasure it is to have Ms. Vecchio here with us today.

I'm going to pass it over to Mr. Falk.

8 p.m.

Conservative

Ted Falk Conservative Provencher, MB

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of our witnesses for your presentations.

To my friend, Steven Fletcher, I want to congratulate you on your election victory in Manitoba. I want to start off by asking you a question.

You talked about the need for empirical data in developing the law further than what it is. You've got lots of experience, having been a member of Parliament for many years, in how legislation works and how reviews work and what typically happens during the review and which direction usually legislation goes after a review.

My question is, would your opinion be that we should take a conservative approach? I don't mean that in a partisan way, but should we take a less liberal approach to expanding the parameters of the legislation in your view at the outset with the review that is mandated to start at the beginning of the fifth year?

8 p.m.

As an Individual

Steven Fletcher

Well, Ted, I thought we were friends, but after a question like that....

Look, I think collecting empirical evidence is important. If the empirical evidence shows that maybe some of the assumptions that have been made are wrong, it could go both ways. This is not a normal issue or a normal piece of legislation. This is about morality, autonomy, and charter rights.

I think the most important part that we're discussing is what the Canadian Association for Community Living mentioned, and that is, are we talking about “terminal” or not? They make the argument that it's not terminal or it is terminal. I'm making the argument that the Supreme Court intended it under any circumstance, and that there are situations where people can live for decades while meeting the criteria of the Supreme Court.

My suggestion to the committee on this question is to refer it to the Supreme Court. See what they say. We did that with the marriage debate. The Liberals did that on the marriage debate, and we did something very similar on our democratic reform legislation. We got the Supreme Court to tell us what they meant.

8 p.m.

Conservative

Ted Falk Conservative Provencher, MB

Thank you for that.

Part of the Carter decision also referred to, as I think you've rightly noted, how this is also a moral decision, and Carter references “the sanctity of life”. In your opinion, Mr. Fletcher, have we adequately addressed the sanctity of life inside the legislation?

8:05 p.m.

As an Individual

Steven Fletcher

The sanctity of life.... Wow, that is a very profound question, and way above my pay grade. I think that's between an individual and their Maker. We just hope that as legislative people we make the best decisions possible.

Life is precious, but life can be terrible too. You'll recall that a few years ago I had fairly major surgery. It was a dire situation. I told the doctor, “If I'm going to have to get a brace or if I'm going to end up with anything that affects my cognitive function, walk away from the table.” Though the Liberals would argue that I have had cognitive impairment since then—

8:05 p.m.

Voices

Oh, oh!

8:05 p.m.

As an Individual

Steven Fletcher

—the fact is that there wasn't any and I was able to move on.

I'm disabled enough. Life is tough, and I know it can be a lot tougher. I'm lucky relative to many other people. I thank God every day that I am a Canadian and live in a great community that supports someone like me, but that isn't always there, and there are people who suffer much more than I do. Talk to them.

8:05 p.m.

Conservative

Ted Falk Conservative Provencher, MB

Thank you, Mr. Fletcher.

I'll defer to Mr. Cooper.

8:05 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather

Mr. Cooper.

8:05 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

Thank you, Chair.

I'll direct my question to you, Mr. Bach. With respect to your recommendation of judicial oversight, I for one see a lot of merit to judicial oversight, or at least the serious consideration of the same, yet there seem to be at least three common criticisms from those who do not support judicial oversight. They cite cost, timeliness, and access. I guess also a fourth consideration is taking it out of the medical realm and putting it into the judicial realm.

I was wondering how you would respond to those critiques.

8:05 p.m.

Executive Vice-President, Canadian Association for Community Living

Michael Bach

I appreciate the concerns about cost and timeliness. However, the Supreme Court saw fit January 15 to impose judicial oversight rather than turning it over to two doctors to make this decision, so the Supreme Court must have felt a lot was at stake in terms of ensuring the constitutional protections of the right to life of vulnerable persons. That's how I think we could understand that decision.

I don't think it's a long-term solution, but because of the risks and because of the duty of Parliament to ensure the constitutional protection for the right to life of vulnerable persons, from our perspective the options are to do that or to put in place the tribunal option that has been proposed in extensive detail by Gilbert Sharpe and David Baker.

In terms of the critique that it makes it a legal decision, well, I think it is. The court said it didn't strike down a ban on assisted suicide. It provided that, in very specific circumstances, there could be legal exemptions to that ban. So there is a legal determination to be made. One half of the equation is a medical equation: Does someone meet the medical criteria? The other half of the equation is whether they meet sufficiently the criteria for the exemption to the Criminal Code prohibition on assisted suicide.

That's why from our perspective, certainly reasonable foreseeable natural death is not a medical category. Don't expect physicians to be trained in assessing reasonable foreseeable natural death. Reasonable foreseeability is a legal term, and so it should be, because we're providing an exemption to a ban on assisted suicide.

8:05 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather

Thank you very much.

We're going to pass it over to Mr. Fraser.

8:05 p.m.

Liberal

Colin Fraser Liberal West Nova, NS

Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, we appreciate each of you appearing and giving your evidence before this committee. It's very helpful for us in considering all sides of the issue.

Mr. Fletcher, I'd like to begin with you. You talked about the reasonably foreseeable death clause in the bill. Are you saying you would like to see that term completely taken out?

8:10 p.m.

As an Individual

Steven Fletcher

Yes. That is what I'm saying. I'm saying use the wording of the Supreme Court decision. Then you know for sure you're in coherence with the Supreme Court decision and the charter.

If there's a question about any of the definitions, kick it back to the Supreme Court and get a definition from it. We've done that collectively many times.

8:10 p.m.

Liberal

Colin Fraser Liberal West Nova, NS

Thank you.

With regard to the 15 clear days' waiting period between when consent is given and when medical assistance in dying is actually carried out, and I recognize that can be abridged in cases where there are good reasons and the medical practitioner agrees with it being abridged, can I have your thoughts on the 15-day waiting period and whether you think that's reasonable?

8:10 p.m.

As an Individual

Steven Fletcher

As I mentioned before, the government bill in many ways mirrors the private member's bill I introduced, including in terms of this 15-day waiting period.

My thoughts have evolved since introducing that to say that advance care directives should be allowed. So it should be 15 days at a minimum, but there's nothing to say that it couldn't be 20 years or 30 years, on one hand.

When you're in pain, unable to breathe, and in terror, 15 days might as well be an eternity, so I think we need to reflect on the pain and suffering that could be incurred over that time, so I would be fine with it being reduced.

8:10 p.m.

Liberal

Colin Fraser Liberal West Nova, NS

Can you suggest what it could be reduced to that would be reasonable?

8:10 p.m.

As an Individual

Steven Fletcher

Maybe 4.25 days. I don't know. It depends on you all.

There should be a delay, but two weeks plus a day is probably too much, and 24 hours is probably not enough, so somewhere in that range.

For the pain and suffering, when you're in pain, and there's no hope to come back, and there is the terror of drowning in your own phlegm, and there's no hope, why would we wait? Why would we prolong suffering?

In many cases, we don't. That's why we increase the morphine drip a bit. People starve themselves to death. People destroy themselves in violent ways because they don't want to be faced with the prospect of a horrible death, even though in most cases that's probably not what's going to happen.

8:10 p.m.

Liberal

Colin Fraser Liberal West Nova, NS

With regard to another provision, I'd like your thoughts.

One of the bill's safeguards is the necessity of consenting twice. You consent initially, but then immediately before the medical assistance in dying is carried out there's a final opportunity for you to withdraw your consent. We've heard it may result, for example, in someone who's on a morphine drip being taken off that medicine in order to regain capacity or have capacity at the time they give that final consent.

What do you think of that?

8:10 p.m.

As an Individual

Steven Fletcher

I'm okay with that because that creates doubt in the person's intent, and if there is significant doubt you'd probably have to err on the side of life. It's situational and very dependent, but if someone indicates they do not want the procedure to take place, even at the last moment, the procedure should not take place.

8:15 p.m.

Liberal

Colin Fraser Liberal West Nova, NS

Mr. Bach, thank you very much for your presentation.

One thing you talked about was with regard to judicial oversight. You mentioned the Carter case in that regard, where the court saw fit to have judicial oversight in place, but you'd agree with me that's in the context of course of not having a legislative framework in place, and that's what we're trying to do here today.