Justice Committee on May 3rd, 2016

[Dr. Derryck Smith]

I'd be pleased to do so.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

Now we're going to go to the Association for Reformed Political Action.

Mr. Schutten.

[André Schutten, Legal Counsel, Association for Reformed Political Action]

Thank you very much, and good evening, honourable members.

My name is André Schutten. I'm a lawyer with ARPA Canada. We were intervenors in the Carter case, and we have analyzed the various legislative and policy proposals that have been published since that decision was released in February by the Supreme Court.

I want to emphasize at the beginning that Parliament is not forced to pass a law legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide. If Parliament passes such a law, it does so willingly and cannot wash its hands simply because the Supreme Court made you do it.

In fact, the Supreme Court made an error, and Parliament has a moral duty to correct that mistake. Parliament has a legal option—and I'm not talking about the notwithstanding clause—to fully protect all human life by prohibiting euthanasia and assisted suicide. I would be happy to discuss during the question period how that can done as an amendment to Bill C-14.

If Parliament insists on choosing to legalize assisted suicide and euthanasia, it will put the lives of vulnerable people at unacceptable risk, thus violating their constitutional right to equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court Law Review just published an article that I wrote making that very argument. Again, during the question period, I'd be happy to take questions on how Bill C-14 and the Carter decision actually violate section 15 constitutional rights of men like James and Pieter, who are sitting beside me.

Now I'm a healthy, able-bodied Canadian, as are all of you, including the doctor you just heard from, but I don't think we fully appreciate the disadvantage that Bill C-14 puts on some of our fellow Canadians who courageously face many obstacles that we will never face. Instead of me trying to convince you of those types of things, I've asked two such Canadians to share their perspectives directly with you, to comment on how Bill C-14 affects them, and then to share changes that they believe are necessary in order to make them feel a little more secure living in a post-Carter Canada.

I'm going to turn it over to James first, and then to Pieter.

[James Schutten, Association for Reformed Political Action]

Hi. I am James Schutten. Thanks for the opportunity to speak to you about this important issue.

When I was two years old, I was diagnosed with spinal muscular atrophy, which has left me with serious physical disabilities. I require someone to set up my feeding tube, suction my trach, turn me over in bed, take me to the bathroom, and scratch my head. I am not telling you this to make you feel sorry for me. I don't feel sorry for myself. However, you need to know that these professionals and family members need to care about my life and whether I live or die.

This is why I needed to talk to you about your draft law legalizing doctor-assisted death, and how that law will affect me and others like me.

I've gone to the hospital because of illness, and medical staff questioned whether extreme measures were worth it. This makes me very nervous, because I feel as if I am not worth the trouble. Thankfully, my family has my back to speak with the doctors on my behalf. If I have anxiety now, how much more if Bill C-14 comes into effect?

What if society started from the perspective that I do have value? What if people didn't view me as a burden for others to carry? I am one of those people who the Supreme Court of Canada thinks should have this right to doctor-assisted death. What if, instead, I had the right to palliative care or resources to help me continue to be a productive member of society?

I believe others like me feel the same way, but this right to die makes me feel as if society thinks I should choose to die.

Therefore, I urge you to add to proposed subsection 241.2(3) the requirement that palliative care is meaningfully made available to the patient.

Look past my wheelchair, and see that I am an asset in my community. I volunteer at a nursing home a few days a week and help out at an elementary school, all of which I really enjoy.

I don't believe that anyone has the right to choose exactly when to die. God alone decides, and he does not make mistakes. He has a purpose for everything. My faith and family add value to my life. Instead of investing money into a bill which normalizes the choice of death, our country should invest time and money into giving people with illness, disabilities, and old age a will to live.

I have one last thing to say. I want you to know that I am not a public speaker. I was very nervous to come here, but I feel that this goes far beyond just me and my insecurities and limitations. I need to speak up because this is so important. Please remember me when you make your decision.

Thank you.

[Pieter Harsevoort, Association for Reformed Political Action]

I thank you all for allowing me to come here and for the privilege of speaking to you, members of the committee.

I'd like to echo James's concerns and add my own two cents. I do have concerns with Bill C-14, including it's lack of linguistic precision.

Sadly, I feel the bill is dangerously dependent on euphemisms. Throughout, “medically assisted dying” is used to describe what is, in reality, physician-assisted suicide. This is problematic in the way that it undercuts palliative care. After all, what is palliative care if it is not medically assisted dying? I urge you to please use accurate terminology so that termination of life is not confused with palliative medicine.

Furthermore, the proposed law necessitates that, in order for someone to assist an individual with suicide a medical professional must be of the opinion that the person meets all the criteria, including the opinion that they have a grievous medical condition. Since the term “grievous” is vague, an attempt is made to make that definition more specific in proposed subsection 241.2(2).

However, even here, Bill C-14 runs into problems. How is one to define “intolerable suffering” as opposed to “tolerable suffering”? The reality is that intolerable suffering is relative. Suffering is modified by many diverse factors. Therapies and treatments are readily available to address all of these factors. Not only is unendurable suffering relative, but it is too much to ask a physician to judge whether or not someone is indeed experiencing intolerable suffering.

In order to ensure that physicians don't approve euthanasia for vulnerable persons like James and myself in moments of weakness, specifics must be added to clause 3. This means including the need for reasonable proof, rather than mere opinion, in proposed paragraph 241.2(3)(a), and the addition of a specific prognosis in proposed paragraph 241.2(2)(d) to replace the phrase “natural death has become reasonably foreseeable”.

Proposed subsection 241(5) provides an exemption for aiding an individual to self-administer a substance for the purpose of ending their life. In an attempt to respect autonomy, the key checks and balances put in place elsewhere in the bill are hereby bypassed. We cannot just assume that people will be protected by the safeguards outlined in proposed subsection 241.2(3).

Most importantly, there must be oversight to ensure that patients are given the opportunity to revoke the request as outlined in proposed paragraph 241.2(3)(h). We must be careful that the appropriate balance mentioned in the preamble to the bill is not skewed too far towards autonomy, at the expense of vulnerable persons in need of protection, such as James and me.

The only true protection of the sanctity of life is a ban on euthanasia, but barring that, these recommendations will improve the situation for the disabled and ill.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Schutten and Mr. Harsevoort, I just want to tell you how much we all appreciate you making the effort to come here today. Your testimony was very touching and meaningful. We will all take it under advisement. It is very much appreciated.

Now we'll move to the Euthanasia Prevention Coalition.

Mr. Scher.

[Hugh Scher, Legal Counsel, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My name is Hugh Scher and I'm the lawyer for the EPC. I'm a constitutional lawyer with over 20 years experience. I was counsel before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Carter v. Canada decision, and I've been engaged in almost all end-of-life cases, including Rodriguez v. British Columbia, R. v. Latimer, and Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, at the Supreme Court and other levels of court.

EPC seeks to raise four fundamental points for the attention of the committee. First, we seek to address the concern about blanket immunity relative to any person who participates in acts of assisted suicide or euthanasia under the bill. Such examples would include proposed subsections 241(3) and 241(5) which state that no person is subject to “an offence” if they assist with, or otherwise engage in, such actions pursuant to the things...provided they are doing so in a manner that does not expressly violate...but again, the language is not clear. There is no such meaningful blanket immunity in any jurisdiction in the world where euthanasia or assisted suicide are legalized. I would simply put out there that the blanket immunity that's applied for those who assist or otherwise engage in this conduct is not something that is found around the world in those jurisdictions where it is in place. Ms. Hasbrouck has other suggestions in that regard.

The second point I would address is the concern related to the limited safeguards that are contained in the bill, and the fact that they are, in many respects, woefully inadequate in terms of addressing the kinds of concerns other witnesses have here testified to today. The limitations are extremely narrow in scope. They are the same kinds of limitations that would apply in the context of a health care decision-making process, such as voluntariness, consent, capacity, and then the need for a doctor or two to sign off. These are not adequate safeguards and they will become, and have become, illusory in those jurisdictions that have them in place, in Belgium for example.

In the Flanders region of Belgium, based on the death certificate studies that were conducted, we know that in 32% of cases of euthanasia, people were killed without request. They were killed without consent, despite a legal requirement for those things to occur. In 47.1% of those cases, not one of the doctors who engaged in these actions, contrary to the law, was prosecuted. These statistics are found in the documentation that was before the Supreme Court of Canada, and indeed, in the Supreme Court's reasons themselves.

The third point I would address is the question of oversight. I would submit to you that, contrary to what you heard earlier about the concerns around legal oversight and adjudicative oversight, the reality is that what the Supreme Court of Canada has now put in place in terms of judicial oversight is what is required in order to ensure a level of independent assessment and adjudication by a third neutral party, to determine that the criteria, whatever they may be, established by the Parliament of Canada are, in fact, addressed and adhered to.

We have serious concern about the notion of simply leaving these oversight measures in the hands of the doctors and nurses who are themselves engaging in and carrying out the acts that are the subject of the legislation. What the Supreme Court of Canada has put in place, by way of an interim measure, is to provide for a level of judicial oversight. That seems to have been working fairly well and relatively unobtrusively. I would urge this committee to seriously consider implementation and continuation of the measure that the Supreme Court of Canada has itself put in place in order to ensure a level of independent oversight that the Supreme Court itself felt was appropriate to the circumstances.

The fourth point I would address is a question around fraud and transparency. The bill, to some extent, addresses this, but we know in other jurisdictions, in the province of Quebec for example, that death certificates are effectively falsified by doctors not to reflect the actual cause of death as being euthanasia, but rather relating back to the underlying illness of the person. It is impossible to have reasonable and meaningful transparency and oversight on a system predicated and based upon a fraud. I urge this committee to bear that in mind, and to implement measures that will ensure that that kind of fraud and transparency are addressed expressly in the context of the legislation itself.

The failure to do that makes it almost impossible to monitor and oversee these practices, both on a present level and on a go-forward basis, in which case it becomes impossible to meaningfully assess and to actually in fact address the kinds of abuses that may well be a concern and may well actually take place. How can you do so based on a system that doesn't allow for proper, effective, adjudicative oversight?

I'm going to turn it over to Ms. Hasbrouck to continue and to address you further in questions.

[Amy Hasbrouck, Vice-President, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition]

Thank you very much, Hugh.

My name is Amy Hasbrouck, and I'm the director of Toujours Vivant—Not Dead Yet, and I'm also here in my capacity as vice-president of the Euthanasia Prevention Coalition. I've been a disability rights activist for over 30 years, and I've worked on this issue, opposing euthanasia and assisted suicide, for 20 years. I was a lawyer in the United States and I have worked in health law and mental health law as well.

My major concern about this law is that it does not provide access to palliative care, while it provides access to death on demand. Palliative care is what people need to answer the question, “Why am I suffering?” Most surveys in which people are asked if they want palliative care, people say yes, but people are often confusing the concepts of palliative care and medical aid in dying. When people are asking for death, they're asking for help. Not providing adequate palliative care—which is the case in this country, where only about 30% of people have access to palliative care—means that people are dying needlessly. We should put the horse before the cart and put the palliative care before the death.

I have submitted proposed amendments, in English and in French, that would address that. You can read them at your leisure.

The second concern I have is that in the Carter case, the court expressed very specific concern about vulnerable persons, and not wanting vulnerable persons who might be induced to commit suicide in a time of weakness to be victimized by this law. Yet, there's no provision in this statute, other than some nice words in the preamble, to protect people who are vulnerable. That is the subject of some other amendments that I have included in my submission.

Third, the safeguard section includes several subjective criteria against which physicians and nurses would determine whether somebody was eligible for assisted suicide. That kind of subjective determination might not be such a problem but for the fact that most medical professionals view a disabled person's quality of life as being lower than a disabled person does. This kind of disability discrimination is rampant in the health care system, and when someone's quality of life is underestimated, the idea comes straight to mind that the person might be better off dead. I don't know a disabled person, myself included, who's never been told that they'd be better off dead. That kind of thinking is really what's at the bottom of this law, that non-disabled people fear so much being disabled, fear so much, as Mr. Smith said, being incontinent, that they would rather be dead.

These are the kinds of things we are battling against, using small amendments to try to rectify the language in the face of this law, a law that is going to go into effect, and that is going to present some worse depredations. Our concern and our hope is that some of the priorities could be changed so that palliative care and vulnerability assessments become part of the law and that judicial oversight provides more structured and more effective guardianship over the lives of people with disabilities who are subject to these laws.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much. We very much appreciate that intervention as well.

We're going to move to questions.

Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you and I want to thank all of the witnesses, in particular Pieter and James for your courageous testimony here this evening.

My first question is to Mr. Smith. In your testimony, you talked about the legislation needing to go back to the language of Carter. You then went on to cite advance directives. In the Carter decision, the Supreme Court set out certain parameters. The parameters that the court set out were that persons suffering from a grievous and irremediable condition who were suffering intolerably and gave their clear consent met the criterion for physician-assisted dying.

How does the language of Carter square with advance directives where you would not necessarily have a grievous and irremediable condition but the anticipation that you may have a grievous and irremediable condition, and you wouldn't necessarily be suffering intolerably?

You would be anticipating that you would suffer intolerably and there would be no clear consent, certainly no clear contemporaneous consent as contemplated by the court.

[Dr. Derryck Smith]

You're quite correct that the advance directives were not in Carter. They were in the report of the special joint committee and that's what I was referencing. As I said previously, we already have advance directives in Canadian medicine. We can agree to not be tube-fed, not be resuscitated, and all manner of other things.

I am suggesting to the committee that we need to follow the advice of the special joint committee and make it available generally to Canadians who can consent to something when they are competent anticipating that two or three years down the line, they are going to be living in misery and condemned to that state for an extended period of time until they finally die.

I would agree with you. It's not in Carter, but it is in the special joint committee which is a committee of Parliament and the Senate of Canada.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

I'm certainly well familiar with it as I served as a co-chair on that committee and thank you for your acknowledgement that it doesn't square with the language in Carter.

My next question is to Mr. Scher. You talked about the issues of abuse in the Benelux countries. You noted that evidence was before the Supreme Court in Carter, I believe, from Professor Montero's affidavit and perhaps there was other evidence as well.

One of the recommendations that you brought forward here was judicial oversight. I must say that in many ways judicial oversight makes a lot of sense. However, every time the issue comes up, as counter-arguments to it, there are issues related to cost for applicants, for access, ensuring access for persons who meet the criteria, and also timeliness to physician-assisted dying.

How would you respond to those three primary objections, cost, access, and timeliness?

[Hugh Scher]

The first thing I would note is that the Supreme Court of Canada itself has implemented this regime as a desirable regime in terms of assuring effective oversight. That's number one.

To respond to your points, in terms of access, I would suggest that if there is an expedited application process to the Superior Court of the province, that would then allow an expedited mechanism to proceed. You'd have a panel of judges within the court who would build up a level of expertise over time in addressing the issue. There would be a streamlined process. It would largely be dealt with based upon affidavit evidence from experts, from clinicians, and from family members and the individual. To the extent that those can be dealt with without the need for expressed oral argument, that could be addressed. Or, there are other ways it could be dealt with, through video conferencing or otherwise in appropriate cases. Where there's a challenge, then it may well be appropriate and necessary to have testimony called in order to assess.

The whole point of oversight is not simply to rubber-stamp these kinds of determinations, but rather to ensure an effective process—not an obstructive process, but an effective process—to ensure that the criteria set out either by the Supreme Court or by this Parliament are in fact respected and adhered to.

I think that can readily be done. The Supreme Court of Canada certainly felt it could be done. They've done it. I think for Parliament to simply implement what the Supreme Court has indicated would be to ensure the level of effective oversight that the court had in mind, number one; and, number two, enable the process that is now in place.

I'll note that in British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario, there are specific guidelines that have been established by the courts that provide for processes in terms of addressing these applications. I would also note, on a different level, that in Ontario, for example, we have the Consent and Capacity Board.

The Consent and Capacity Board has very tight timelines. It has counsel appointed for the individuals in question where there's a consent to treatment question in dispute. The doctors attend before a tribunal member, and the witnesses attend, and these are dealt with on the kinds of determinations that Mr. Smith was talking about in the health care setting.

Now let me be clear. What we're talking about here, in my respectful view, is not health care. The intentional killing of patients by doctors is not and should not be considered to be health care. What we are talking about is a carved-out exception to the Criminal Code of Canada, as endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. We're not even talking about a constitutional right to die. That's not what the Supreme Court said. We're not even talking about a constitutional right to euthanasia or assisted suicide. That's not what the Supreme Court said.

What we need to do is twofold. Number one, we need to ensure an expedited process to allow for effective judicial oversight, modelled perhaps off the same model as the Consent and Capacity Board model under the Health Care Consent Act in Ontario. Number two, we need to differentiate and to carve out, if you will, the federal jurisdiction from the provincial jurisdiction.

My concern, in part, with this bill is that it's blurring the lines between federal jurisdiction over criminal law and provincial jurisdiction over health care. Care must be taken to ensure and safeguard that the acts of euthanasia and assisted suicide contemplated by this bill are deemed to be exceptions to the Criminal Code of Canada as reflected by this bill, and in fact are separated out from other health care measures that are otherwise the responsibility and purview of the provinces.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

We're now going to move to the Liberal side.

Mr. Hussen.

[Ahmed Hussen, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all of the panellists for coming in.

I have a number of questions, and I'll start off with Mr. Schutten.

In your submission, you indicated that you'd like to have removal of the words “or psychological influence”, and add to the subsection 241.2(2), the following: “(e) a mental illness or psychiatric disorder is not a grievous or irremediable medical conditional for the purposes of this section.”

The rationale is that you say psychological suffering on its own cannot qualify a person for euthanasia, assisted suicide. My question has to deal with the actual subsection. The illness, as I understand, is illness, disease, or disability, or that state of decline causing the person undue physical or psychological suffering. My reading of it is that the psychological suffering is emanating from the underlying disease, illness, or disability.

Do you have a comment on that? In other words, is the psychological suffering in my readings not occurring on its own?

[André Schutten]

I think it's not clear from the reading. The language is not straightforward. The fact that a Criminal Code provision is vague and open to interpretation would suggest to me that someone who is suffering from purely a psychological condition might also qualify here. That being said I think that the psychological impairment that comes from intense or chronic pain automatically puts into question whether that individual is able to give informed consent and has the capacity to do so. Psychological impairment automatically lowers the ability of that patient to be able to give a clear consent that is not inhibited by psychological factors.

[Ahmed Hussen, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Staying with you, the same question I have is with respect to your submission, item number 6, “unable to sign”.

Again, my reading of the section says if the person requesting medical assistance in dying is unable to sign and date the request another person who is at least 18 years of age and who understands the nature of the request for medical assistance in dying may do so in the person's presence on their behalf.

There is emphasis on who understands the nature of the request. I don't think you've addressed that in your submission. I'm giving you an opportunity to do so.

[André Schutten]

My concern there is that there is nothing built into the code as it's drafted, that is, Bill C-14. There's no oversight for somebody else signing for another individual. Both James and Pieter are unable to sign for themselves. Under this provision as it's written somebody else can sign on their behalf. James and Pieter would both testify that they have very supportive families so it wouldn't be an issue for them. Perhaps there is a family where they see a family member such as James or Pieter as a burden. They could sign on their behalf possibly without Pieter or James being fully aware or possibly under coercion and there are no checks or balances. There's no clear oversight to test whether that signed statement is then voluntarily being given by someone like James or Pieter.

If you're going to get consent through written means then there are other ways you can get that from someone like Pieter or James. I would recommend that this committee consult experts in this field. You could find different ways so the consent comes directly from the patient involved, not some other proxy.

[Ahmed Hussen, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Mr. Scher, you've expressed concerns about the limited safeguards in the bill and you would like judicial oversight to be in place under Bill C-14.

I question the practicality of that in terms of the backlogs in our court system, the costs involved, and the time. What additional safeguards would satisfy you to keep this with the medical professionals and move away from judicial oversight? In other words, medical practitioners in the bill's view would be the ones who would carry out the procedure.

[Hugh Scher]

I think it's fundamentally important to have an independent level of oversight. I don't think that the doctors or nurses, the ones carrying out the acts of euthanasia and assisted suicide or otherwise engaged in that system, are able to provide the level of effective, independent, neutral oversight that the importance of these decisions requires.

A lot of resources and costs are to be put into the whole process of having a euthanasia-on-demand system. Clearly, if one's going to go down that road one should want to put in place the most stringent and rigorously monitored and enforced levels of safeguards that are appropriate to ensure effective oversight. Indeed, those were the words used by the Supreme Court of Canada and they were the basis upon which they agreed to strike down the Criminal Code of Canada relating to this issue. It was only based on the premise that Parliament would implement a level of rigorously enforced, monitored, and effective safeguards and oversight that the Supreme Court went that next step, agreed, and overturned its earlier decision in Rodriguez to strike down the Criminal Code prohibition.

In that respect I would suggest that the need for an independent level of oversight, through a judicial body or a tribunal that's independent from the medical profession, is essential. Absent that, I don't think it's possible to have the doctors who are themselves the ones administering the processes to be the ones effectively overseeing the process. It's effectively leaving the fox in charge of the henhouse.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Rankin.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Thank you.

I'll start with a question for you, Dr. Smith. I would like to acknowledge your leadership, sir, not only at the joint Senate-House committee, where your testimony was invaluable, but in your presidency of the B.C. Medical Association and your work with the CMA. I want to thank you for your testimony.

You acknowledged in an answer to a colleague's question that advance directives were not identified in Carter but were recommended as part of the medical assistance in dying by that Senate-House committee. We were told by the Dying With Dignity witness earlier today that a majority of Canadians have spoken in favour of this in polling.

I'd like you to talk about your experience with this. You talked about advance directives in the context of do-not-resuscitate orders. I'd like you to speak more as a leading physician on how this would work in practice were we to implement it.

[Dr. Derryck Smith]

You're quite correct. It was the special joint committee that recommended advance directives that could lead to physician-assisted dying. Now, to me, the issue always comes back to patient autonomy or, in other words, our ability to make meaningful decisions over how we live our life and how we die. I see no reason why, simply because I happen to become demented, I should lose my ability to have an advance directive to choose not to live in a state that I know is coming down the line in a number of years. I would encourage members to visit any ward that houses demented people to see how horrible a situation that is for the individual, in spite of the best possible care.

I think there's a strong appeal there for Canadians, many of whom are going to die from dementia. It's estimated that there are going to be a million people suffering from dementia.

I for one, and family members and many of the people I know, do not want to live in that state. We need a pathway to get from where we are now so that we can make decisions later on. We do this with wills. We do this with advance directives. There are many ways of allowing Canadians to have a say in what's going to happen to their lives when they become old and demented.

The risk of not doing something is this, in that absent from these discussions is what has happened in Switzerland. In Switzerland, you can have physician-assisted dying. In fact, Kay Carter, the person referenced in the Supreme Court case, died in Switzerland. The risk is that what we're going to be doing is leaving a two-tiered system, whereby those Canadians who have means are going to be able to fly to Switzerland and receive medical aid in dying, and those who are impoverished or of modest means are not going to be able to do that. That's another dimension that I think parliamentarians need to seriously consider in this weighty matter.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Thank you. That's a perspective we haven't heard yet, to my knowledge.

As well, I want your comments as a physician on the definition of “grievous and irremediable” that appears in the bill. You'll know that it includes a number of things that were not found in Carter—you indicated you were an expert witness in Carter—one of which is this controversial proposed paragraph 241.2(2)(d) that talks about how “natural death has become reasonably foreseeable”. I'd like your comments on whether that's workable from a physician's perspective.

[Dr. Derryck Smith]

Well, I don't know what those words mean. When I spoke to the minister last week on this, I said that it was reasonably foreseeable that I would be back in my office within an hour, and it was also reasonably foreseeable that I would be dead in 50 years. That's a huge time frame, and I don't think doctors are going to be comfortable with seeing something as “reasonably foreseeable”. I don't like that language, and I think we should take that out of the bill.

One of the senses I'm getting from this whole hearing, though, is that many of the arguments that are being put before the committee are the very same arguments that were put before the courts in British Columbia and Canada, and the arguments were found wanting. Having lost the battle, if you like, with Carter, the case is trying to be retried here in front of a parliamentary committee, and I simply don't like that. I think we already have had a judicial body give due thought and consideration to these matters, and it has passed a 9-0 decision, and now we have people trying to undo that and to place a huge burden on the suffering Canadians who are going to have to go to judicial reviews at great cost to themselves and families, with huge time delays.

As I mentioned, just yesterday the Attorney General of British Columbia intervened, and a woman who was seeking death now has to wait for a court adjournment, an open-ended court adjournment. This is not a good thing to happen when you're at the end of your life and suffering grievously and irremediably and you have to fight the Attorney General and the Government of British Columbia and have an adjournment in your case. I think this is cruel and unusual punishment for individuals.

I think we need to have an easy way for Canadians to express their autonomous wishes to have a timely and painless death, because, after all, suicide is legal in this country. We're not talking about an illegal act here. We're talking about giving Canadians autonomy over ending their lives at a time and a choosing that they want.