Justice Committee on May 10th, 2016

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Yes, of course.

[Colin Fraser, Liberal, West Nova, NS]

I would propose for discussion purposes that rather than “seven clear days”, the amendment read, “10 clear days”. I agree with what Mr. Bittle is saying, but “10 clear days”, I think, would be satisfactory for achieving the proper reflection period that we would want. In looking at other jurisdictions, I know that in American states it's 15 clear days for a reflection period when the request is given orally, and in written form it's 48 hours.

I do believe we should move off the 15 days to allow that person not to suffer as long as that. I think 10 strikes the right balance, and that's why I would propose that subamendment.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

We're now debating the subamendment. For clarity, the subamendment is to change “seven days” in the amendment to “10 days”. We're not debating—

[An hon. member]

It's “10 clear days”.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Yes, “10 clear days“. We're not debating the principal amendment right now, only debating whether to change “seven” to “10” in this amendment.

Mr. Rankin.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

On the issue of “10 clear days”, “seven clear days” or “15 clear days”, I'm just wondering whether we need to introduce the concept of “clear days” at all. I wonder whether it would make better sense to an individual, for plain language reasons, to know how many days the reflection period is.

As you know, determining clear days requires looking at the Interpretation Act and figuring out whether there's a holiday or a Sunday, or whatever. I'm just wondering why, with a patient who's suffering this kind of pain, we should care about things like “clear days”. I think it complicates it unduly. I would be prepared to suggest “10 days”, which may not be that different from “seven clear days”, and provide some much needed certainty in this area.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Right now there's an amendment, and we can't subamend the subamendment. Right now it's “10 clear days” unless Mr. Fraser changes his subamendment. Right now that's still on the floor, to change “seven clear days” to “10 clear days”.

Is there any further debate or discussion on this subamendment?

Mr. Casey wishes to intervene.

[Sean Casey, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

I'll be very brief: the government supports this subamendment.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Okay.

I go to Mr. Fraser, because it's his subamendment.

Mr. Fraser, do you want to close on this?

[Colin Fraser, Liberal, West Nova, NS]

I believe the words “clear days” should be in there. I understand Mr. Rankin's point, but I do think we need certainty with regard to what a day is. If you do it at 11:50 p.m. and then just past midnight, it actually closes the time to eight days. So I do think we need to be clear and precise that it is clear days.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

There being no further debate, the proposal is to change “seven clear days” to “10 clear days” for the purpose of debate of the amendment.

(Subamendment agreed to)

Now we're going to go back to the principal amendment. Any debate on the principal amendment?

Mr. Falk.

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

I heard Mr. Fraser's explanation for making the adjustment from seven to 10 days and, with the practice in the United States, I can appreciate that. However, we also heard testimony about the practices in the European environment, which most people would consider to be within very liberal regimes for this. They indicated they have a 30-day waiting period or time for reflection and consideration. I would still support the wording that's found in the original drafting of Bill C-14 and recommend that it remain at 15 days.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Just to reiterate Mr. Falk's point, I really don't understand what the basis is for reducing a relatively short 15-day period to an even shorter 10-day period, when the subsection provides the medical practitioner with flexibility to deal with situations where the person is clearly consenting and in a situation where they're suffering intolerably. The legislation doesn't say hard and fast that it would be 15 days under any circumstances. It leaves that in the hands of the medical practitioner, but applies a general rule of 15 days, so I think it should be left as is.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

I'm going to let Mr. Bittle go last, if that's okay.

Mr. McKinnon, Mr. Fraser, and Mr. Bittle.

Mr. McKinnon?

[Ron McKinnon, Liberal, Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, BC]

I'd just like to respond to Mr. Cooper's comment that the latitude in the current language is that it can be reduced from 15 days if the medical practitioner believes that the death is more imminent than 15 days. It's not a blanket discretion to reduce it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Mr. Fraser.

[Colin Fraser, Liberal, West Nova, NS]

Just to build on that, it also allows abridgement if death or loss of capacity is imminent. It's not a blanket provision. It doesn't deal with the situation, as we heard from Mr. Fletcher's testimony, where the person who is suffering intolerably but they're not about to die, they're not about to lose capacity. Why would we prolong that? I think it's appropriate to reduce that time to 10 days.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Mr. Genuis had one, and then I'm going to close with Mr. Bittle if nobody else wishes to intervene.

Mr. Genuis.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I agree with my colleagues on the issue of the waiting period. I think it protects an individual's autonomy to ensure that they have thought the decision through fully. Of course, most will do that, but there is still the risk that someone will rush into this in the midst of a psychological valley.

I do want to encourage some debate on the other part of this amendment that allows the request to be signed on behalf of a person, which presumably commences this waiting period. As I understand, the effect of the now-combined amendment is that somebody else can start the clock. It means that somebody else can say that grandma wants this assisted suicide and then sign to begin the process.

That doesn't negate the other consent provisions, of course, but it does create a further problem for deciding that there should be some process of deliberation if we, in fact, see that the initial request can be made by a person who is not the person receiving it. On that basis, as well as on the basis of the concerns raised by my colleagues, I think this amendment should be defeated.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

To close, Mr. Bittle.

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

Just to respond to Mr. Cooper's question as to why we're doing this, I look back to Mr. Fletcher's testimony that if you're in a state of enduring physical or psychological suffering, 15 days could be 15 lifetimes. I think this strikes an appropriate balance.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

We're now going to move to the vote on LIB-4, but LIB-4 as amended by both the subamendment and, as proposed by Mr. Bittle today, which reads differently than it did originally. It would now read:

ensure that there are at least 10 clear days between the day on which the request was signed by or on behalf of the person

(Amendment as amended agreed to)

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

We now move on to amendment BQ-7.

Mr. Plamondon, you have the floor.

[Louis Plamondon, Bloc, Bécancour—Nicolet—Saurel, QC]

We are proposing that the clause be amended by deleting lines 27 to 36.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

I must tell you that one of the items on my list indicated that a number of amendments concerned the same lines of the bill. Unfortunately, I think amendment BQ-7 is now out of order since we've already amended line 27.

I'll confirm it all with the clerks.