Thank you for that, Madam Chair.
My understanding is that when we go back in the medical assistance in dying regime to when we enacted Bill C-14, we find there was a subsection added to the Criminal Code. We added subsection 241(5.1) to section 241, and that sets out the offences of counselling and aiding a person to die by suicide. We did that under Bill C-14 in 2016. What that subsection does is clarify that it's not an offence for various health care practitioners, including some who cannot provide MAID, such as social workers, to provide information to a person about the lawful provision of MAID. This amendment seeks to specify that no offence is committed when such information is provided to a person who didn't ask for that information in the first instance.
What I understood is that because Bill C-7 doesn't propose to amend section 241 of the code, as such it is likely outside the scope of the bill. That is, I think, what you were driving at with your ruling. However, given that your ruling has been overturned by the members of the committee, I'm happy to debate the substance of it.
Welcome to the Department of Justice officials and the Department of Health officials. I'll make some submissions, but I'll also invite the lawyers from the Department of Justice to opine on it as well.
The first point is simply that we all understand the important work that all of the practitioners are doing, be they nurses or physicians. That should be stated on the record. We appreciated the submissions from the Canadian Nurses Association in that regard. Medical regulators or colleges are the ones to turn to when reconciling the competing interests from a medical practice point of view. That's the first point.
However, here we're dealing with the criminal law, and that's what Bill C-7 is all about. From my perspective, there's currently no current problem to address because when you trigger the criminal law, it's not actually the providing of information but the intention of the person who is doing the providing that is at issue. Merely providing information about MAID one way or the other doesn't amount to counselling or abetting somebody to die by suicide. Counselling or abetting somebody to die by suicide requires an intention to encourage or persuade someone to die by suicide or MAID, whether or not they actually carry it out, which is important. Whether or not a patient requested information about MAID is not directly relevant to the guilt or innocence of somebody who provides that information. The intention of the person who provides the information is the critical factor.
On that basis, I don't think this amendment is addressing an issue that arises properly under the scope of the criminal law as it is currently constituted, because it is about the action of the individual as opposed to the intent of the individual. The intent of the individual is also critical to the evaluation of the crime, if a crime is deemed to have been committed, and that crime can be committed independently of whether the person actually passes or not.
Those would be my perspectives. I'm wondering if Ms. Klineberg or Ms. Quesnel might want to weigh in on this from a departmental perspective.