Yes, Madam Chair. Here it is:
A person who requests medical assistance in dying is, until the moment that medical assistance in dying is provided, entitled to the same palliative care that they would be entitled to had they not made the request.
I'll try to address the key issues in our discussions.
When a patient chooses to request medical assistance in dying, they should be entitled to palliative care. Stakeholders came and told us that, in palliative care, sometimes people change their minds because they're well treated. I'm talking about optimal palliative care. It would be a shame if a patient or a dying person who has requested medical assistance in dying were deprived of palliative care at home, in a hospital or in a hospice because of a lack of resources. This possibility exists.
Proponents of palliative care told us that people who receive optimal palliative care, which constitutes support until death, don't seek medical assistance in dying or they change their decision. The dying individual is faced with a choice. However, to make that choice, the individual must have access to both options. Therefore, I think that it's important to make this clear.
Of course, the provinces and territories are responsible for managing end-of-life care. However, within this exculpatory measure that gives a person the right to receive medical assistance in dying, whether or not their death is reasonably foreseeable, it would be worthwhile to establish at the outset Parliament's intent in terms of a continuum of care, given the reality on the ground, all the concerns and the polarization seen during this debate. That's the purpose of the amendment.
I fully understood the explanations given earlier. Our debate regarding Mr. Garrison's amendment led to a good procedural clarification. If we hadn't had a debate and rejected your decision, we might not have received all these clarifications right now.
I hope that I've clearly explained the purpose of the amendment.