Justice Committee on Feb. 4th, 2026

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Obviously, there are charter risks in pretty much any legislation. You take those risks from a very low level, to a medium level, to a high level. In this case, I think I understand better what you're articulating.

In previous iterations or in other parts of the bill where you have created a reverse onus, or where we have in the past and now in this bill created a reverse onus, they were all related to the type of offence someone committed. Is that correct? Then basically, the class of offenders would be all of the people in the universe who potentially—because they're charged, but not convicted—committed an offence. The issue here is that it's not everybody in the universe who potentially committed an offence, but it's a class of people, such as all women, all men or all people 18 and under.

Here, we've taken a class of people—all the people who are not Canadian citizens, permanent residents or whatever we call it. We have made it by class of people instead of by offence. For some of the offences we're including in the realm of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act—and I haven't yet had a chance to carefully review the sections mentioned in this amendment—there are other people in the universe who might commit that offence and who may be Canadian citizens or permanent residents. They would not be subject to the reverse onus, having committed the same offence as the person who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident. That's where there's a charter issue. Is that correct?

[Matthew Taylor]

Yes, I think that's a very useful way of describing it, Mr. Housefather. It would be like saying that individuals from a particular part of Canada, who have committed certain offences, are subject to a reverse onus, but individuals from another part of Canada are not subject to a reverse onus for the same offence.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

We don't speak just at will here, Mr. Baber. We have a speaking order. If you want to get on that list, I will put you on that list.

In the meantime, Mr. Housefather has the floor.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

That's what I wanted to understand. It's not that I necessarily believe that people who are not Canadian citizens or not permanent residents should have absolutely the same rights as Canadian citizens and permanent residents in every instance, but I wanted to understand where you felt the risk was. Now I think I better understand it.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you.

Mr. Baber.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

None of this is politics for me, okay. This is a professional discussion, and I take exception to what is happening in this committee right now.

First of all, residency and citizenship is a very important consideration at bail, because we're looking at flight risk. On the distinction that Mr. Taylor is making with respect to a class of people being Canadian citizens or non-Canadian citizens, that differentiation is made at bail court very often already.

That's to your point, Mr. Housefather.

I see Mr. Taylor is nodding in agreement. Thank you. He knows what's coming next.

I very much take exception to your answer to Ms. Lattanzio's question. She asked if there's a charter concern with respect to what Mr. Lawton is bringing forward, and you said yes, but your concern relates to the general concern in the bill, which is reverse onus offences. All of the reverse onus offences that you're expanding here are subject to the same constitutional concern. That has to be clearly understood.

Except, when we're talking about the seriousness of offences and the ability to survive charter scrutiny, what Mr. Lawton is proposing is a more serious class of offences, in fact, the most serious class of offences—treason and organized crime—in that those are more likely to survive charter scrutiny than anything else in this bill. That's a differentiation that Mr. Taylor did not make. All of this is obviously subject to charter concerns, but, if anything, this one would be less, in my respectful submission.

I ask that we remain intellectually consistent and honest about how we would apply the law here as we analyze this bill.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Baber.

I want to remind all members here that our witnesses are here to assist us. When they're asked questions, they answer questions to the best of their ability. If people have different perspectives, they're entitled to share them, but I would do it in a respectful manner. I'll leave that at that.

Does anybody else have any discussion on this?

Seeing none, shall CPC-7.1 carry?

We'll have a recorded vote.

(Amendment negatived: nays 5; yeas 4 [See Minutes of Proceedings)

(On clause 8)

This is from Mr. Lawton. We'll go over to him.

[Andrew Lawton, Conservative, Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, ON]

I will not belabour this. I realize it's getting very late. I'll just make a fundamental point here.

When we are talking about bail and bail decisions, we have to acknowledge what's been spoken to by our witnesses and what we've all observed, which is that there is tremendous inconsistency, even sometimes in interpreting the same laws. One area where we see this is in requirements that non-Canadian citizens or non-permanent residents must surrender their passports. This is a fairly standard, one would assume, bail condition, but it is shockingly not all that standard or uniform in terms of application.

My amendment here is very simply that if someone who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is released, the judge shall add to the order a condition that the accused deposit all their passports. This is to ensure that we do not have, as we've seen in several cases, in particular regarding extortion, people skipping out on bail and leaving the country and evading justice, because they are foreign nationals and have a place to go. This is ensuring that passport retention is a standard part when someone of that nature is released on bail.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you.

Mr. Brock.

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON]

I will start by saying I would be absolutely shocked if any member, regardless of party affiliation, was opposed to this particular clause. When you're dealing with a non-Canadian citizen or permanent resident, the primary ground is engaged. The primary ground for detention under 515(10) is whether or not there's any evidence to establish that the accused would not show up for court. Generally, evidence would easily be adduced if the person were a Canadian citizen, ordinarily domiciled in the jurisdiction in which the bail hearing takes place. If the person had a residence, if the person had a job, if the person had other connections to the community, then it would be very easy to discharge that onus, whether it be a Crown onus or a reverse onus.

When you're dealing with a non-Canadian citizen or a permanent resident, I would put that in the same class as a drifter who just happens to find himself, say, in the Ottawa jurisdiction; he's ordinarily domiciled in B.C. and he's hitching his way across this country. The person is not released by a police service, is held for bail and makes application. Absolutely the primary grounds as to whether or not this person would show up for court would be engaged.

It's only logical that we impose a reasonable condition where primary grounds are at stake. We do not want any individuals facing criminal charges in this country to pack their bags and flee this country to avoid criminal responsibility. One way to safely guarantee that this person is going to remain in Canada, not necessarily guarantee their attendance in court but that they remain in this country, is to remove their passport. I circle back. I would be absolutely shocked, dismayed and concerned if any member of this justice committee was not in full support of this amendment.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Mr. Baber.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

I have a 15-second comment. Every time you leave bail court, the judge or the justice of the peace leans over. What do they say in the province of Ontario? They say, don't you leave Ontario. Don't you leave your given province. This amendment gives teeth to one of the most important conditions that bail magistrates impose every day.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Does anyone else want to comment?

Mr. Fortin, go ahead, please.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Mr. Chair, when I read CPC‑8, I find it very similar to CPC‑5, which you stated is beyond the scope of the bill. I'm trying to understand why the same reasoning doesn't apply to both amendments.

There are other things that bother me about this.

Clearly, under the Criminal Code, a judge can order the seizure of passports or request the surrender of passports when releasing an individual. Paragraph 501(3)(f) of the Criminal Code already provides for this measure. The idea now is to make it not an option available to the court, but rather an obligation. Instead of being allowed to demand that individuals surrender their passports, the court would be required to do so. That bothers me a bit, because it takes the privilege away from judges, whom we trust, to decide what is appropriate on a case-by-case basis.

I would not agree with that in principle, but, moreover, if CPC‑5 was found to be beyond the scope of the bill, I suspect that CPC‑8 should be, too. If not, then I would question why CPC‑5 was found to be beyond the scope of the bill, because I think the two amendments are very similar.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

To your first point, Mr. Fortin, CPC-5 was ruled out of scope because it wouldn't have amended a provision that's dealt with in this bill. This one is slightly different.

Is anybody else on the speaking list?

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

I understand that removing passports may be important in some cases, but that's already provided for in the Criminal Code, except that it's up to the court to decide. If CPC‑8 passes, however, it would no longer be possible to decide on a case-by-case basis. It would be mandatory. That bothers me a bit. I tend to trust our courts, even though they didn't always rule in my favour when I argued cases before them. Nonetheless, generally speaking, they are quite trustworthy, and I would rather have a humanized justice system that takes the distinct nature of each case into account.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Fortin.

Go ahead, Mr. Lawton.

[Andrew Lawton, Conservative, Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, ON]

This amendment deals with people who have been charged, who have already been granted bail and who are not Canadian citizens or permanent residents. It simply ensures that we have uniformity and are protecting the integrity of the bail system and the justice system by requiring that passports be surrendered. I think most Canadians would probably be shocked to learn that this isn't in the law as it is. This should be very easy and, to Mr. Brock's point earlier, I expect it will be.

I have no further submission.

The laughter I just heard from one of my Liberal colleagues suggests that may not be accurate. I'm baffled as to why.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

I heard laughing in the room, Mr. Lawton, but I don't know that you can attribute it to anything in particular. I don't think that's necessarily fair.

Is there anybody else on this? No. Okay.

(Amendment negatived: nays 5; yeas 4 [See Minutes of Proceedings])

We're on CPC-9. Go ahead, Mr. Brock.

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON]

This amendment rewrites the just cause on the tertiary grounds factor list in paragraph 515(10)(c). It specifically replaces subparagraph 515(10)(c)(iv) and expands the list of what can count towards the term “just cause” on tertiary grounds. Right now, just cause is not properly defined in the Criminal Code.

This would now explicitly include ensuring safety and security of the public, preventing physical or psychological harm to victims, including child victims and their families, preventing interference with the administration of justice and maintaining confidence in the administration of justice.

Wherever possible, I think it's incumbent upon us at the justice committee to strive to improve legislation. Definitely, improving the language in the Criminal Code is always deemed to be a good thing. We don't want multiple interpretations of any provisions in the Criminal Code. I'd love to take a look at our criminal justice system as black versus white, without looking at the colour grey.

To do that, we require clarity and certainty and, where necessary, we need to expand on what could be interpreted differently, depending on an accused's interpretation, the Crown's interpretation or a judge's interpretation of what just cause actually means. It's silent. It's been silent for a number of years. I invite the Justice officials to correct me otherwise, but I don't believe there's been any case law—I stand corrected—in this country that provides any sort of guidance as to what the term just cause actually means.

Where we can provide clarity, certainty and consistency, it can always be seen as a positive, forward step.

I invite Justice officials to weigh in, if necessary.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

He said “if necessary”.

[Matthew Taylor]

I'll just start while my colleague is pulling something up. I will reiterate some of my previous points around the grounds for detention being seen as examples of just cause by the courts: flight risk, public safety and confidence in the administration of justice.

Mr. Grbac, do you have anything?

[Peter Grbac]

No. That's echoed in the Supreme Court's decision and in Antic as well. That's what I was looking up.

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON]

Just for clarity, has the term “just cause” been defined by any court in any province or territory?

[Matthew Taylor]

I don't know if I can answer that. I think the concept of just cause is open to interpretation, to your point, Mr. Brock, and the courts have interpreted “just cause” as including those concepts I've outlined in my previous answer, but it could include more.