Justice Committee on April 13th, 2026

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank all the witnesses here with us. My questions will be directed to Ms. Champagne. I am always pleased to benefit from the insights of my professional body when it comes to working on such important bills.

Ms. Champagne, I have heard you clearly. I think I could discuss this with you for at least half a day, if not longer. There are several issues, but I would like to address the issue of criminal harassment.

Bill C‑16 proposes adopting an objective rather than a subjective standard regarding the concept of fear, namely whether we should consider the fear a reasonable person would have felt or the fear actually felt. We have heard from witnesses who have spoken to us about various aspects of this. For example, some have raised the point that, if the victim of the harassment or threat has a genuine fear, regardless of whether a reasonable person would not have felt such fear, it must constitute harassment. Some disagreed and questioned whether we should really legislate based on individual sensitivity.

I would like to hear your comments on this issue.

[Sylvie Champagne]

I will ask Mr. Marchand to answer your question.

[Michel Marchand, Member, Criminal Law Expert Group, Barreau du Québec]

Thank you.

You raise a very good point.

It should be noted that, in the proposed new definition of harassment, there is clear reference to the intention to harass the person or to the fact of not caring that one might be harassing them. This means that there still needs to be some form of mens rea on the part of the perpetrator.

So, we are very comfortable with the current wording, which states that the complainant or victim must feel that they are in danger because of the actions of the person in question. Even if the victim does not feel that way, if the person intends to harass them, I think we’ve covered it. So, I think that is why the mens rea of criminal harassment is important.

The slight reservation we might have relates to recklessness. Even in the current wording, recklessness is mentioned. In both cases—that is, in the new wording as well as the old wording—a mens rea of recklessness is sufficient. The Supreme Court has recognized that this is a mens rea of a subjective nature. However, we consider that the new wording, which, as you have just mentioned, extends the definition to reasonable cases without the person themselves feeling this violence, is very broad.

I am not sure if I have answered your question.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Yes. Thank you, Mr. Marchand.

I’d like to come back to one point. Ms. Champagne did not have time to discuss this in her opening statement, but she told us that the Barreau du Québec had certain reservations regarding the way in which Bill C‑16 proposes to address the issue of reasonable time limits, which were introduced following the Supreme Court’s Jordan ruling. There are different ways of looking at this. Bill C‑16 proposes a mechanism.

I would like to hear your comments on this mechanism. Does it go far enough? Will we be able to tackle the problem and ensure, ultimately, that individuals who could be found guilty of serious crimes against the person, for example, are not released simply because there has not been time to hold their trial? This poses a real problem for victims and for society in general.

I would like to hear your comments on this aspect, Mr. Marchand or Ms. Champagne.

[Sylvie Champagne]

I will begin, and then Mr. Marchand can add to my answer.

Of course, at the Barreau, we are concerned when proceedings are stayed, and we are aware of these difficulties. However, the Jordan ruling, which was subsequently clarified by the Supreme Court in the Cody ruling, also recognized a fundamental right in our democracy: the right to be tried within a reasonable time. So, it is a balance that we must strike.

What we are saying is that we must be careful with automatic deductions, because they will not necessarily reflect the situation that actually occurred. There are already many details in the Jordan ruling that were clarified by the Cody ruling. Where we are raising concerns is that there should not be too many automatic processes, because sometimes that time frame would be truly unreasonable.

Mr. Marchand, I do not know if you wish to add to my answer.

[Michel Marchand]

Thank you.

I also see two problems.

The government, or rather the state, has appealed to the Supreme Court on several occasions to try to overturn the Jordan ruling, but the judges have refused to do so. I think we need to take note of that and put more resources into the system.

We also need to try to establish perhaps stricter guidelines for prosecutors so that cases that do not warrant prosecution are not brought to court. I do indeed think this is a real problem. When there are a lot of cases that shouldn’t be in court, it clogs up the courts and, ultimately, cases that are even slightly important or more important end up facing longer delays. That is a real problem.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Thank you, Ms. Champagne and Mr. Marchand.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Fortin.

We're going to go into the second round, which is five minutes each. Given the time on the clock, I'm going to propose that we shorten that to four minutes each, except for Mr. Fortin, of course, who will get his two and a half minutes. That way, we'll get the full round in.

I'm seeing no objections to that.

Mr. Lawton, I'll give you four minutes, starting now.

[Andrew Lawton, Conservative, Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, ON]

Thank you very much, witnesses.

Mr. Copeland, you alluded, in your earlier comments to Mr. Baber, to some proposals for ways to beef up the mandatory minimums in Bill C-16. You also cited other jurisdictions. If you could send that to the committee for us to review while we're amending this, I would greatly appreciate it.

I want to talk to you about mandatory minimums and this one tool that parliamentarians have, and that my Conservative colleagues and I have been very clear we think is needed on justice legislation, and that is the notwithstanding clause.

You have spoken and written about ways that this government is trying to basically neuter this power that all legislatures in this country have and, in doing so, to defer a lot of discretion to the judges who have actually been the ones trying to weaken, in some cases, some of these protections. I'm just hoping you could speak about whether, in your view, the notwithstanding clause is a legitimate tool to ensure that mandatory minimum sentences, which reflect the will of large swaths of Canadians, can continue to have a place in the criminal justice system.

[Peter Copeland]

Thank you for the question. I'd be happy to send some of those specific proposals. The United States is one jurisdiction. One can establish numerous objective criteria to create a kind of gating situation wherein if these factors are met, plus the judge considers the punishment to be grossly disproportionate or cruel and unusual punishment, then it could be levied.

With respect to the notwithstanding clause, it's very clear that this is part of the charter and not something that is some sort of exception to it. In fact, constitutions are not straightforward. The text does not exhaustively define and prescribe all features of a right or how it's to be balanced with other rights or laws or policy objectives. It's very much a back-and-forth between the legislature and the courts in terms of how to interpret, define and operationalize laws to ensure their protection of the right in question, and even to operationalize the right itself. It's very much a legitimate part of the law. I think it reflects our Westminster parliamentary system that gives great deference to Parliament for enacting laws, and—

[Andrew Lawton, Conservative, Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, ON]

Thank you. If I may, Mr. Copeland, as time is limited here, I'd like to move to this. Even before the mandatory minimums were struck down on child sexual exploitation and abuse material in the Senneville decision, the investigative journalism bureau did an analysis where they looked at 100 cases between 2020 and 2025. They found that one in three had not adhered to the sentencing minimum. That was before it was struck down. These are judges already finding ways to minimize and weaken these protections.

What could be done to stop that and to ensure that a minimum is actually being adhered to by judges in the sentencing of these egregious sexual predators?

[Peter Copeland]

Yes, it's a good point. There are many ways in which, at the level of prosecution or even police, someone could bring forward a lesser charge, for example. Sometimes that's warranted. Sometimes it's, yes, to avoid, so to speak, the full effect of the law. Things like Crown Prosecution Manual amendments to make certain practices the default would be an interesting way of addressing that.

Realistically, just returning to the use of the notwithstanding clause, it's no surprise that we've seen its use increase across the country in recent years. It's because the courts have been departing in really serious ways from the clear intent of the legislatures in their creative rulings. I think it is entirely legitimate to be used in these settings. I do think that the bill makes some improvements here upon the status quo, but it could be strengthened further. We'll have to see how the courts use and interpret the law.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Copeland.

Thank you, Mr. Lawton.

Ms. Lattanzio, you have four minutes.

[Patricia Lattanzio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question will be addressed to Mr. Copeland.

Mr. Copeland, you are absolutely right to raise concerns about the mandatory minimum penalties being struck down by the courts. That's precisely why Bill C-16 takes a smarter, durable approach. It reinstates those mandatory minimums with a judicial safety valve that reflects clear guidance from the courts to ensure charter compliance. This isn't a partisan experiment. It is pragmatic. It is a solution that has earned support across party lines. I will remind the member opposite, Member of Parliament Baber, that Frank Caputo, his own Conservative colleague, has long advocated for the inclusion of the safety valve to ensure that severe punishment of an offence is upheld.

The question to you, Mr. Copeland, is simple: If this model directly responds to judicial concerns, strengthens the law and has cross-party support, what exactly is your objection to it?

[Peter Copeland]

Thank you. That's a great question.

As I said, I think it's a considerable improvement. I think we have to wait and see how the courts end up interpreting and using it. If they do rely, as they have been wont to do in many aspects of law, upon other factors to exempt—to basically operationalize the concept of cruel and unusual punishment, such as referring to the race or the migrant status of the offender—then this would...because what the safety valve does is it narrows the application to just the facts at hand. However, it still leaves all the discretion with the judge, and many judges are activists.

[Patricia Lattanzio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Thank you. I need to move on to the next panel.

Thank you, Ms. Champagne and Mr. Marchand, for joining us this morning.

I wanted to quickly ask you a question regarding the balance between, on the one hand, strengthening victim protection through Bill C‑16, particularly in the context of intimate partner violence, and, on the other hand, respect for the fundamental principles of criminal law and constitutional guarantees.

What are your thoughts on this?

[Sylvie Champagne]

As I said at the outset, at the Barreau du Québec, we welcome the objectives pursued by Bill C‑16.

However, we see that there are some areas of concern that could be improved, such as the three distinct offences of harassment, coercion and femicide.

So, we really welcome the objectives, but now we need to look at the details. As lawyers often say, the devil is in the details. That is why we have comments to make. We believe that Bill C‑16 could be improved if our comments were taken into account.

[Patricia Lattanzio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Mr. Chair, if I have a little more time, I would like to focus specifically on the concept of minimum sentences with Ms. Champagne or Mr. Marchand.

What do you think of this approach? Do you think it reconciles the objectives of punishment and deterrence with constitutional requirements?

[Sylvie Champagne]

I will yield the floor to Mr. Marchand.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Very quickly, we'll have Mr. Marchand.

[Michel Marchand]

In our view, essentially, the new clause on minimum sentences amounts to a complete reversal of everything the Supreme Court has said from the outset. It is almost the adoption of a derogation provision under section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

So, if the clause is adopted as it stands, it is certain that the first legal challenge will go before the Supreme Court. Can Parliament rewrite section 12 of the charter? Essentially, that is the question.

I think Parliament could have responded differently, simply by redefining aggravating circumstances and setting clearer criteria for determining in which cases the minimum sentence could be imposed, rather than starting from scratch and having a short clause stating that, from now on, we simply look at whether, in the specific case of the individual, the punishment is cruel and unusual.

It’s a bit like class action lawsuits. That allowed the Supreme Court to issue a binding ruling for everyone. Now, issues will have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. We talk about relieving the burden on the judicial system. However, we won’t relieve the burden on the judicial system if every case has to be argued. That really seems counterproductive.

We are very firmly opposed to this clause as it stands.

Furthermore, the minimum sentence will have to be a minimum term of imprisonment. That means that, in all these cases, there will no longer be suspended sentences or the possibility of an acquittal. So, I feel that this does rather undermine section 12 of the charter.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Ms. Lattanzio.

Mr. Champoux, you have two and a half minutes.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Champagne, I’ll turn to you briefly. When you replied to Ms. Lattanzio, you spoke of the details and the fact that the devil is in the details. God knows that, in the field of law, no detail should be left to chance. As Bill C‑16refers to femicide, I think it is very important to have this conversation.

Do you feel that, as things stand, the concept or term “femicide” in criminal law is sufficiently well defined and framed, and that we would be able, thanks to the proposed definition or framework, to navigate it effectively?

[Sylvie Champagne]

No. In fact, there is no definition of femicide. So, in our view, the objective has not been met.

What we are proposing is that, if this is the legislator’s intention, there should be a definition that provides very clear guidelines defining what femicide is. We believe that, at present, it is far too broad and could include the killing of a man.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

I’d like to speak to the concept of coercive control, picking up on your response. I wonder if you share the same view regarding the concept of coercive control, which is also proposed in Bill C‑16. Do you think the discussion has been sufficiently thorough?