National Defence Committee on March 30th, 2010

[Col Paul Drover]

We are indeed. I didn't brief it today, but the last time I was here I talked a little bit about our major air disaster plan. We have the capability of delivering to the site of a ship or an aircraft in distress with a large number of people aboard. We can deliver kits that have tentage, medical supplies, food, and survival equipment. That capability exists, and we maintain that to respond to incidents of the nature you referred to in the north.

The Hercules aircraft is a good example because of its size and range. It has a similar capability, only smaller quantities. So if you're dealing with a small aircraft with 10 or 12 folks aboard, we have the capability in our primary SAR aircraft to dispatch those capabilities and skills to the incident site.

So indeed, to answer your question, we are capable and prepared to respond to those incidents that may happen in the Northwest Passage.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

May I ask the colonel to send me his answer in writing?

Colonel, I'm going to read you another excerpt from the National Research Centre document. You can send me your answer in writing because you won't have time to answer.

This scenario involves an incident at the North Pole with response from Winnipeg via Resolute Bay for refuelling, landing in Alert after one-hour on-station search time. In order to satisfy the limit of 15 hours on duty, the aircraft would have to cruise at 273 kts throughout the transit portion of the flight if the incident occurred during a two-hour standby posture and 238 kts if it occurred during a 30-minute standby period. The NRC concluded that the minimum cruise speed requirement of 273 kts is indefensible, recommending a look at possibly engaging a mixed fleet of new FWSAR aircraft and H-model Hercules for the extreme long range missions to the North Pole and over the Atlantic.

I'm asking you to react to that, to consider the possibility of establishing a base in Iqaluit or Kuujjuaq, which would restrict the time required to go into the High North.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Merci.

I will give the floor to Mr. Boughen.

You have five minutes.

[Ray Boughen, Conservative, Palliser, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It's good to see you again, Colonel.

I have just one question. I'm going to share my time with Mr. Payne.

In looking at the map on page 4 and some of the other illustrations, we see something that we already knew: Canada is a big country. Do we have enough primary and secondary Canadian Forces unit locations ready to assist people in search and rescue, or do we need more? Are they located in the proper places?

I wonder if you could share with us your thoughts on that.

[Col Paul Drover]

I can indeed, sir.

The locations of the bases have been strategically placed to ensure that the SAR resources we have available can respond to the greatest number of incidents in the shortest amount of time. So there's some logic to where they are. It goes back to a previous question of what the dot plot looks like. So if you line up the two, you'll find that our SAR bases are optimally located.

We have done some studies on the bases. I think I gave the committee a copy of the last report we did. It really reinforces the idea that we have them strategically well placed.

[Ray Boughen, Conservative, Palliser, SK]

What differential is there between primary and secondary?

[Col Paul Drover]

The ones I briefed this morning are actually all primary. They are the ones that are on continuous standby--half-hour or two-hour posture. The secondary ones don't maintain a full standby posture. Their primary duty is in support of military flying operations and military activities, but they have SAR capability and SAR techs to respond, and often we will use those resources.

As you may recall from my previous statements, the first responder, the vehicle, the search craft that is closest to the incident site may be the best choice. And in a lot of cases these aircraft participate as some of the front-running SAR resources.

[Ray Boughen, Conservative, Palliser, SK]

Thank you.

Thanks, Chair.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you for coming, Colonel. I have a few quick questions.

You talked about the 406 beacon. I'm not very familiar with that. Could you give me a bit of information? Do all aircraft have this, as well as ships, or are there different types of beacons?

[Col Paul Drover]

First of all, Canada was one of the four leading nations in coming up with an international system for satellite-based detection of emergency beacons. Originally it was on frequency 121.5, which is a radio emergency broadcast frequency. All that it provided through satellite was a beacon detection initially, but no location. With subsequent satellite passage you got some location but it was not very localized. There was no information on the nature of the craft or vessel that had this beacon aboard.

The international community has switched to a designated frequency, frequency 406, which is now the emergency frequency. It's digital and it provides capability to encode information. Now if you have an aircraft and that's your distress frequency, it will go through the satellite to our mission control centre, which is located in Trenton, and give the information about the owner and type of craft. In addition, it will give a precise position of where you are. This is a tremendous advance in technology, and it helps search and rescue.

A number of vessels carry them, and they're called EPIRBs. There's a regulation that requires certain sizes of vessels to carry the EPIRB.

In the aviation community, with the 121, there used to be a regulation requiring mandatory carriage. The regulation is no longer in force because the satellites no longer broadcast or receive on 121. There is legislation, through Transport Canada--I think it's entered into the Gazette, or it will be soon--that will require the mandatory carriage of 406. While it's not yet mandatory, it will be soon, within the next year or so.

We are encouraging that the operators of private aircraft, and commercial operators, become equipped with 406 without delay. This is certainly the best insurance policy they could possibly purchase.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Okay. Colonel, you also talked about the aircraft assets you have, and the ages of those aircraft, which require a lot of maintenance. Could you briefly tell us the ages of each type of aircraft under search and rescue? Do you have any idea what the maintenance costs are on those?

[Col Paul Drover]

I can't answer on the maintenance costs. Certainly if it's important, I can get some information on that.

In terms of age, I flew the Buffalo when I was fairly young, so that goes back a long time. The aircraft is the sixties vintage. The Hercules, depending on what airframe, because we've had a number of models.... Certainly these aircraft are really old, but they are still very capable, and that's because of that higher maintenance cost to make sure they are safe and effective.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Simms.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Bonavista—Gander—Grand Falls—Windsor, NL]

Thank you, Monsieur.

I want to go back to coordination. My colleague from the Yukon touched on this. I want to talk about coordination between the two departments that are involved so heavily here, especially where we are.

One of the added dimensions of Gander 103 Search and Rescue is that unlike other bases—and correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe this to be the case—they also carry out air ambulance service. In doing so, a great amount of coordination has to be attained with the coast guard.

Now through some internal, external reports following catastrophe incidents, there seemed to be, in some cases—I'm not being specific here, and I'm not blaming—a lack of coordination between the two departments, particularly in certain incidents off the coast of Newfoundland. You'll find that when you come upon an incident and someone is in distress, in trying to ascertain how to rescue that person, there are things such as whether it's a vertical lift to a helicopter--a Cormorant--or it's horizontal onto the coast guard ship. That comes down to the joint rescue centre.

When you analyze what may have gone wrong, the level of coordination from the joint rescue centre.... What kind of an analysis, good or bad, do they do after each incident?

[Col Paul Drover]

I didn't spend a long time, but obviously you understand that the Joint Rescue Coordination Centres are co-manned, so you have the coast guard and CF personnel all working side by side.

With every incident that occurs and is reported to the RCC, there is collaboration. There is a determination of how the incident will be prosecuted. Because it's over the water doesn't necessarily make it a coast guard.... A lot of times you'll use an air resource, but the coast guard will muster those vessels that are available as well and coordinate that activity.

Throughout the whole operation they work as a team, side by side, and the coordination at the scene is conducted by an on-scene commander. That on-scene commander may be one of the crew members of an aircraft or they may be on one of the surface vessels.

You referred to a case, and there was a similar case that you probably have the background on.... But normally it's up to the on-scene commander to determine how to execute the rescue operation itself. But that is very coordinated, and they obviously report back to the RCC, which monitors the overall picture.

In SAR cases where there is a reason to believe there are anomalies or something that could have been done differently, if there is a SAR report warranted, it will be conducted. In that case, all the controllers who participated in the exercise will be involved in capturing what took place, and the report is actually built with the understanding that it's designed to look at what the recommendations may be to prevent, or, as you said, sometimes to acknowledge that things actually did work as programmed.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Bonavista—Gander—Grand Falls—Windsor, NL]

Let's say that one of these anomalies, as you've put it, takes place within the coordination centre itself. That's kind of divorced from the on-scene commander. Does that get reported as well? How does that work?

[Col Paul Drover]

As I mentioned, we do 8,000 incidents a year, so not every incident is going to drive a report, because a report is obviously sort of like an investigation. If we do a report on a situation like you've just described, then the on-scene commander will participate in the preparation of that report, similar to those people who were actually in the rescue coordination centre that day. And if there was some misunderstanding or lack of information flow, I would assume that would be part of the findings of that particular report.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Bonavista—Gander—Grand Falls—Windsor, NL]

If you need extra resources for JRCC, how do you go about acquiring that, or at least asking for that?

[Col Paul Drover]

Extra resources in terms of manpower or...?

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Bonavista—Gander—Grand Falls—Windsor, NL]

Sure, or equipment. You talked about EPIRBs. I've heard there have been problems detecting some of the EPIRBs. Now that could be the problem with the actual ship; I realize that. But if there are technical problems within the JRCC and you need an upgrading of resources, how does that get addressed?

[Col Paul Drover]

The RCCs don't actually receive direct communication from satellites. That's done on different systems. They rely on reports from various sources--telecommunications--to get their information.

In terms of the facilities themselves, they're the same as any other capability we have in the military. We provide some funding to renew and upgrade. Also the coast guard and the Department of Fisheries do the same thing.

In terms of manning, again, we share responsibility. The CF provides a level of manning, as does the coast guard. If we determine that the manning is insufficient, then we have procedures to try to increase or go for an increase in manning. But currently the manning works. As with our standby squadrons, that's a 24/7 operation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

I will give the floor to Mr. Payne.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just have one more question, and I will be sharing my time with Ms. Gallant.

On page 4 of your presentation, in the first paragraph, you noted that even with a 30-minute posture, it is highly unlikely that all six lives in the incidents studied would have been saved.

I wonder if you could provide us with a little more information as to why you think, in that situation, those lives could not have been saved.

[Col Paul Drover]

It's very difficult to determine that the time the SARs resources came on scene was the difference between life and death. The assumption is that if they had been there a little earlier, the individual might still have been alive, but whether or not that individual could have been kept alive...maybe there were serious injuries and it was just a matter of time. There is a statement in my brief on this. Sometimes no human intervention can change the outcome. There may be a case where we know the individual succumbed to his injuries within a half hour of the SAR reporting, but whether or not, if they got there half an hour sooner...and that's why there is an uncertainty, there is no question.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you.