National Defence Committee on April 21st, 2016

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I'd like to call our meeting to order and welcome our guests.

We have Charles Doran and Chris Sands from Johns Hopkins, and in-house we have Andrea Charron.

Thank you for coming.

Via video conference, from the Royal Military College, we have Joel Sokolsky.

Due to the limitations on time, our friends from Johns Hopkins, I believe, have to go at 9:30, so I'd like them to go first with their opening remarks. I would ask them, please, to focus their remarks on the defence of North America and aerial readiness.

We'd like to ask questions at the end, so if you could keep your remarks as brief as you can, I know it's difficult, we would appreciate it.

Mr. Doran or Mr. Sands, either one of you has the floor.

[Professor Charles Doran, Professor of International Relations (Andrew W. Mellon), Johns Hopkins University, As an Individual]

First of all, I would like to thank the members of this distinguished committee for once again inviting me to participate. If we keep doing this, eventually I may get it right.

What I would like to do is not read the comments that I've submitted, but rather to make three points. These three points have to do with what I think involve the changes that are taking place in the security environment in which Canada and the United States must operate.

First of all, it is apparent to me that NORAD is once again—it was always important—increasingly important as an institution that is providing the security for North America.

Twelve years ago, there was some doubt as to whether NORAD should continue to exist. And those of us who were defending it had somewhat of a challenge. I think today there is absolutely no doubt that the role that it originally had is now once again important, and that is dealing with the air-breathing threat. For example, as recently as just a couple of months ago, a Russian Bear bomber approached within 40 miles, unannounced, of the U.S. coast before the U.S. fighters were able to meet it.

I think this is also a problem as far as Canada is concerned. These are tests, probes, whatever you want to describe them as, but in fact, they're real, and the role that NORAD plays is just as real.

I would also say that its maritime dimension established in 2006 is also increasingly invaluable for the security of North America.

Second, I'd like to emphasize what I think Canadians and Americans, as I perceive this, are very sensitive about in terms of their political attitudes and their anxieties regarding their own security, and that involves terrorism. Terrorism is something that is, of course, more prominent since the advent of ISIL or ISIS, in the Middle East. It is the case that terrorism is partly a problem because of the effort that others are making abroad to create difficulties in North America.

I would just like to put it in these terms to try to convey how significant this is in the perceptions of Canadians and Americans. Suppose that, this is an impossible situation, but just suppose that Canadians for a moment thought that the United States could be described as a country that was exporting terrorism to Canada. Think about what the response would be. The same is true unfortunately in the other direction. It's very easy to neglect the significance of this.

A recent cache of information became available here based on 4,000 recent recruits to ISIS. It's a fascinating real world discussion, and what we saw was that there weren't as many candidates from Canada or the United States as from some other countries in the west. But nonetheless, there still is a potential problem, and there's also the problem, as we know so well, with imitation. I would just like to emphasize that we should not, in my estimation, underestimate this even though in some larger context this problem for security might be regarded as less important.

Finally, I'd like to try to put this into a global strategic and security context. I think there's no doubt at this point that China would like to make clear that the South China Sea and East China Sea are Chinese waters and not international waters. Half of the world's commerce and commodities by weight pass through this area. So Canada and the United States are implicitly affected. It is also the case that although these are part of the waters of the high seas, there's an effort to constrain the movement of navies, and that would make it very difficult to help provide security for countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. That issue is of concern.

Now, closer to home, what is also clear is that Russia has decided to expand the number of its stations. It's in the process of building them or establishing some 12 around the Arctic Ocean. It's pretty clear strategically what is intended here. Whether that would ever be achieved is another matter, but what is intended is that this would close off the choke points entering and exiting from the Arctic Ocean. Even though there's no very established transit yet through this area, and even though the preferred route is probably going to be along the Russian coast rather than on our side because of the way the ice flows and other factors, nonetheless this is a concern because increasingly access to the Arctic Ocean for provisioning to some 400 planned or operational installations throughout the North American region.... This is going to become a considerable concern. Inasmuch as the proximity in particular to cities like Toronto and Chicago is very immediate in any strategic kind of context, neither Canada nor the United States can afford to take this matter casually. In fact, I think it is central to the security of Canada and the United States and of its peoples.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your comments.

Mr. Sands.

[Dr. Christopher Sands, Director, Center for Canadian Studies, Johns Hopkins University, As an Individual]

Certainly. Thank you.

I first would like to echo Professor Doran's thanks to the committee for having us back.

I want to just say a couple of things, some of which you already know, but I think it's important to add to the record. There's been a lot of stir among U.S. allies following President Obama's interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic Monthly, where the president complained about free-rider allies, who weren't pulling their weight. I think it's important to clear the air.

There's certainly no one in Washington who considers Canada a free rider. In fact, Canada is a great contributor around the world to fights that the Americans take quite seriously, whether it's Afghanistan or the fight against the Islamic State. Nonetheless, as one of our other witnesses this morning, Joel Sokolsky, has said, Canada usually can manage to be an easy rider, that is to say a country that doesn't put an undue burden on American resources but is a net contributor. Getting that right I think is the most important thing to come out of your current defence review: to make sure that you have the capabilities to contribute, in a way that doesn't mean you don't rely on the United States' support in key areas, but it means that you're not putting a burden on those resources that are most in demand in the security environment in which we now fit.

There are three ways I think we can focus our efforts together. One is to increase our domain awareness in the United States, Canada, North America generally, to know better what's going on, where we're vulnerable. This includes everything from satellite surveillance, drone surveillance, and good intelligence on the ground with law enforcement as well as our traditional intelligence agencies. There's a lot that we need to do to make sure that we know where the threat lies and we're prepared to respond.

The second thing I think we need to prioritize is making sure that the resources and assets that we do have today are working well together. NORAD is an excellent example of the way in which U.S. and Canadian assets in air defence can work together, coordinated, to provide the best coverage possible. On the Navy and Coast Guard side, we need to make sure that we're as good, if not better. And I think, increasingly, as we respond to the potential not only for natural disasters, but also for—we hope not—a terrorist incident in North America itself we need to make sure that our national guard, militia, and military operations on the ground are able to better coordinate. This is something that the governments have been working on, in terms of disaster relief, in the past, but we need to make sure there's good coordination there.

I will say that what I'm talking about on the second point is really going to war with the assets we have. We do have very good military and law enforcement capabilities, but as we look forward, my third point is we need to improve procurement. This is something that both the United States and Canada can learn from each other on. The United States suffers sometimes from having so much money to invest in defence capabilities that we're not always as prudent as we could be. Systems come in very expensive, but maybe not offering the bang for the buck that we would like them to. Similarly, Canada struggled, as you know, with procurement in the past, whether it's the Sea King maritime helicopter replacement or, as we now are debating, the future of the F-35. I think getting procurement right is going to be crucial as we move forward.

That leads me to my last point. I think it's going to be very difficult for you, as a committee—and I have great sympathy for all of you in your deliberations—in trying to plan now without knowing the outcome of the next U.S. election. This is an interesting election here, as you know, and one in which national security and foreign policy have not played a particularly prominent role on either the Democratic or the Republican side. The most predictable candidate who we have may be Hillary Clinton, on the Democratic side, but we also know that it's likely that we have 15 years or so of her emails that may be compromised to Russian and Chinese intelligence, making it a very awkward situation for her, as president. For the rest of the leaders we have a very wide, varied, and in the case of Donald Trump, unpredictable, foreign policy stance. Yet the United States is embarking on, as it usually does, an important recapitalization of its military. This is going to make it very hard for Canada to plan without knowing where the U.S. is going. I think it means in the next year contingency planning has to be part of what you're thinking, and I think you won't want to finalize plans for Canada's defence fully until you know where the United States is going. I wish I could offer you a better prediction of how that's going to work out, but I think it's a very important factor. The Canadian defence review absolutely can't be rushed because you'll need that information from the United States before you're really sure where you need to go.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much for your comments and your compliments at the beginning. They're much appreciated.

I'm sensitive to your time constraints, so we're going to move into questions for you two gentlemen right away.

The first question is going to Mr. Fisher.

You have the floor for seven minutes.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

My line of questioning is going to be on ballistic missile defence, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here.

I appreciate all the different perspectives that we are going to hear from today. I thought we were going to be hearing from four different witnesses before.

Is this something that's possible because that's the way we usually do things?

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

We will have very little time for these gentlemen. They have to leave at 9:30.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Should I pass my time on to another member or go ahead with ballistic missiles and am I able to ask the other witnesses?

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

It's completely up to you. It's your seven minutes. You can repeat your questions.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

All right. Are you gentlemen okay if I talk about ballistic missile defence and get some of your opinions and your perspectives on that?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

Absolutely.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Yes.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you.

Again, looking for some perspective and some of your opinions, how do you feel that the U.S. regards Canada's 2005 decision to not participate in BMD?

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

I think it was a disappointment, although consistent with where Canada has been in the past. I think the biggest problem in 2005 was the raising of expectations with the Bush administration that Canada might be making a different answer to this question, after which the United States simply proceeded as it had done expecting that Canada would not be involved.

The U.S. is operating for now as if you're not coming back into the program.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Okay. There is lots of current discussion and debate now as to whether we should jump in at this particular point. What are the risks, do you think, specifically to Canada but also to North America, if we don't participate?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

From my perspective what is crucial is what's happening to technology. How good are the systems and what evidence do we have of this? I think the evidence is that they're getting better and better, so they're more significant as a factor in security.

As far as Canada is concerned, I think there are advantages to being in earlier rather than later, and that there are advantages throughout to having information, however it's acted upon, which is available if one is a participant and it's less available if one is not.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Okay. The current BMD is nearing maturity. The defence system is about 12 years old since we chose not to enter. In your opinion what would be the implications to Canada if we were to jump in now into a fairly mature defence system? Do you have any knowledge on what that might cost us to get in?

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

No specific cost information, sir.

I think at this stage some of the benefits that had been talked about during the Martin government, potential industrial benefits from getting involved and helping to build the systems, those have largely passed, although there are always new technologies coming forward, as Professor Doran has said, that may give you a second opportunity at some of those benefits.

I would say what's really past are maybe some of the economic benefits for Canada, but on the security side getting involved now still allows you to be part of the system and part of the development of the next generation of that system.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

I appreciate a couple of comments that Mr. Sands made. He talked about free-rider allies and easy rider. I also appreciate your comment that our defence review can't be rushed, that we need to wait until we see what the environment's going to be like in the U.S. I don't think there's any danger of us moving that quickly.

This is somewhat similar to a question I already asked, but what repercussions to Canada-U.S. relations might there be if we choose.... Short of asking your opinion on whether we should participate, do you see whether there are any potential repercussions that we might have if we chose not to participate?

Mr. Chair, I am assuming that there will be a couple of minutes left. I'd be happy to pass on a couple of minute to another member from this side once the gentlemen answer.

[Prof. Charles Doran]

I would simply say that, first of all, relations are close and good, as exemplified by how things work in NORAD, but it is the case that to the extent that there is more coordination and co-operation there's going to be more participation and people will be happy about that here.

If there is not an ability to move forward, or if there's not a desire to move forward on the Canadian side to participate more closely, my judgment is that things will go on about as they have here. It's a bit ironic because, after all, the security that we're talking about is joint security and the people here don't understand why Canada wouldn't want to be fully involved in all aspects of this. Probably this is because they don't understand enough the full Canadian perspective.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Do you have an opinion on this, Mr. Sands?

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Only to say that I think Professor Doran is right. The United States is going to react favourably to Canada. You're a good ally. If Canada exempts itself from one program, I think it's a strange lacuna to put into the relationship. It's frustrating, but it doesn't mean that the fundamental relationship between United States and Canada breaks down.

Think about missile defence not only in terms of the defence of the continent, particularly with a more aggressive Russia, an uncertain North Korea, and China, which has increasingly good ballistic missile capabilities, but also in terms of protecting the troops on the battlefield. Canada's in a forward position against the Islamic State. There are other battlefields in which even relatively unsophisticated allies, like the Islamic State, are able to get access to missile technology, maybe not full ballistic missile, but still the ability to attack our troops. Having battlefield protection is also increasingly important. That's technology Canada could contribute, whether it was from the navy or for protection of its troops in the field, if it were willing to participate more fully in these defences.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much for those comments.

Mrs. Gallant, you have the floor for seven minutes.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Gentlemen, I was particularly interested in your raising the issue of terrorism and how we had to have better integration between our military and law enforcement agencies. I know in France, where they've had direct attacks from ISIL, they have found a way to find the best practices of both the military and law enforcement and merge those best practices so they are working as one when it comes to ISIL.

Here in Canada, we seem to have these silos with the defence people saying, “We go on the expeditionary. Anything at home is civilian authority, and we don't deal with that”, and vice versa.

You mentioned that we need better integration. What sorts of recommendations or on-the-round types of actions could we take in Canada to better integrate our law enforcement and militaries as they pertain to terrorism?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

Well, first of all, you're not alone in having problems with silos. We have them within departments here and between departments. Of course, that's why we created Homeland Security, to try to overcome that. Even that is not perfect. Don't underestimate the degree of problems we have of the sort you're referring to.

Yet your argument, as far as I'm concerned, is very central. What is of most concern, it seems to me, is that there be a real, on-time—whatever the term is—communication between the two governments regarding the identity of participants and what, in fact, they're doing. This requires a degree of surveillance that many of us find awkward in terms of our own societies. Internationally, it becomes even more difficult, yet that kind of information is crucial to coping with this particular problem. I know the governments are working hard at this. I know that sometimes these things are handled best informally, in terms of the context that the government people have back and forth. We should have the formal channels open and close, to the extent that we can, so there are no slip-ups. If there is a slip-up, both governments are going to pay a big political price for this, I think, because the public is so sensitized to this issue of security.