National Defence Committee on April 21st, 2016

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Okay, thank you.

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky]

Apart from the fact that it prefers to make the accommodation.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

I just want to pick up on something that you said at the beginning. I thought it was a very interesting way of phrasing it. You said that Canada participates in defence through engagement. I didn't really get a sense as to whether or not you thought that was sufficient or whether you were kind of saying it in a way that we should be reassessing that. Can you expand on that?

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky]

My view is that, yes, this is how Canada participates in its own defence: through engagement and co-operation, principally with like-minded western allies overseas. The point I was just trying to make is, if you're going to do that, then you can't ignore the fact that state or non-state actors reacting to Canada's participation might strike directly at Canada. Our overseas activities can't be separated from the need to provide for the security of North America.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for that.

I'm going to give the floor to Mr. Bezan. You have five minutes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I want to thank Professor Charron and Professor Sokolsky for being with us again and talking about this important issue. Both of you have expertise in the Arctic. We're hearing about the Russian build-up of their military assets in the far north. Last year we saw them, in the matter of a couple of weeks, put together military exercises that involved over 80,000 troops and also had all three elements of the Russian armed services involved.

Do you see that as a threat and a reason we should be more engaged, from a military measure, in the Arctic?

You mentioned, Professor Charron, that there are a number of other tools than NORAD and the military. Maybe you want to build upon what some of those other tools are that we need to be looking at in the defence of North America.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

I, personally, don't see any advantage to Russia attacking Canada or the U.S. for the purposes of the Arctic, even as an avenue of approach. It's almost as if we have two Russias. When it comes to all things Arctic, they have participated, along with the other Arctic states, in the Arctic Council and so far have respected the UN Convention on the Law of Sea process vis-à-vis the continental shelf.

When you look at their amount of Arctic frontage, they've put all their GDPs in the Arctic basket. They've got three rivers the size of the Mississippi that go deep into Mother Russia. They want the Arctic to be a stable place where they can do business because that's where they're hoping to dig themselves out of a big deficit right now.

Yes, what they're doing in other areas is provocative. Yes, we have to keep attention on them, but just as we're in the process of refurbishing, resupplying, and improving our procurement, so, too, are they. Because of the Cold War, everybody tended to buy things at the same time, so they're all rusting out at relatively the same time. If you're prone to be a realist, of course any time you see an ally with anything military, it's an automatic security dilemma: it must be for nefarious intent. That may be the case, but there are other ways to see that as well.

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky]

I'd agree with Andrea.

Also, if you look at the U.S. comments, as Dr. Charron mentioned, NORTHCOM is the major advocate for the Arctic in the U.S. unified command organization. However, looking at statements, for example, by former U.S. chief of naval operations, it's not that much of a priority as compared to the Asia-Pacific area, and now with the Euro-Atlantic area coming up as a priority.

The United States is currently chairing the Arctic Council, and I think its objectives are in fact to encourage diplomacy in the area. The Russian buildup in and of itself doesn't call for a Canadian or U.S. buildup in the region. I think in the first instance, the United States and Canada, and its NATO allies, will look to diplomacy, but maintaining surveillance in the area is important for both countries.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

If I could add, I think the threats facing the Arctic, if we call them threats, are not of your typical defence sort. They are more about safety and security.

That's a whole other conversation about what we do with the Canadian Coast Guard. With the fact that they are only a safety organization, should that be changing to a security mandate as well, and do we have enough ships and icebreakers? However, that's a different conversation from NORAD and its aerial mandate.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

You have about 40 seconds for a question and an answer.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I'll ask a very quick question then.

The north warning system, of course, is coming to an end: RADARSAT and the constellations, and the possibility of high-altitude UAVs. How should we be investing, and what timelines should we be looking at? My basic concern is that we don't have proper coverage over the Arctic Archipelago at this point in time.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

Yes. Preferably, we need it not just for ballistic missile defence. There are also the cruise missile concerns. Pollution is a big problem.

It's so expensive to operate and to put things in the Arctic. We may need a combination of space, land, and other assets. Hopefully it doesn't do just one thing. We need it to be multi-purposed. I know the U.S. and Canada are starting to look at the engineering options.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for that.

I'm going to turn the floor over to Mr. Rioux.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let's go back to Star Wars. This week I listened to a news report where the capacity of the American anti-missile system was called into question. It was somewhat similar to what you've been saying, Ms. Charron, with regard to the incident in Washington.

First, I would like to ask you if the American anti-missile shield is effective.

In addition, we know that Canada has its own radar detection system, and uses satellites. If our country agreed to take part in the anti-missile program, would we be a real player, or simply a spectator?

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

I think this is where you really need to speak to people who have access to the secret and top-secret information, because that's not necessarily in the public domain.

There are two things. First of all, ballistic missile defence is different from what you need for cruise missiles. They are low flying versus the ballistic trajectory. The JLENS system that went rogue is to deal with cruise missiles, and we're waiting to see whether they tinker it, do things to launch it. Everybody is concerned about cruise missiles because the architecture is difficult.

I would add, too, that there was the case of a drone landing at the White House. That's again because it was low flying, low speed, and our detection is for high-flying, high-speed airborne threats, so that's something that everybody is looking at.

On the ballistic missile defence, I just want to say two things. First of all, we do contribute via our Sapphire satellite, so it's not like we're doing nothing.

There is also no guarantee that even if Canada says we want to go into ballistic missile defence that it will be a NORAD mission. Right now, it's a USNORTHCOM mission. It's working really well. To then give it back to NORAD is going to require considerable thinking about how that would function. I just share that with you.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Ms. Charron, you said earlier that the number of interceptors was kept secret. However, you mentioned that there are 14 covering Alaska. If Canada wanted to join the defence program, do you have some idea of the number of interceptors we would need?

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

On that I have no idea; for that you need engineers. I simply don't know enough about the spacing of them. The one thing that we as political scientists could speak to is we always have to keep in mind plausibility, credibility, specificity, and imminency of threat. Without access to all the information, I cannot help you except to urge that having those interceptors may or may not make us safer if we don't understand where the threats are coming from, how they're going to change, etc.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Sokolsky, you spoke about non-military activity.

What did you mean when you referred to non-military activities? Do you think that Canada should have more reservists, and get citizens more involved in the defence of the country?

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky]

I was talking about civil organizations, police forces,

the relations between the RCMP and American security agencies; between agencies such as, on the American side, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the border security agencies. It would also include, as is the case in counter-terrorism now, relations among financial agencies that track money laundering and movements; relations among local police. This is all part of it. As Dr. Charron noted, at NORTHCOM headquarters there are I think 60 to 80 U.S. agencies that are involved in U.S. Homeland Security as well as Defense. In the Canada-U.S. context, the linkages on security tended to be agency to agency because we don't have an overall architecture. We don't have a command on the Canadian side that exactly mirrors NORTHCOM, so this co-operation goes on all the time at a bureaucratic level. It's what characterizes Canada-U.S. relations.

For example, in the 2006 renewal of the NORAD agreement, the maritime warning mission was added to NORAD. Prior to that, you already had co-operation on maritime domain awareness between the two navies, and because of the nature of the U.S. Maritime Homeland Security structure, between the United States Coast Guard, which is an armed forces and a law enforcement agency, and the Canadian Navy and Coast Guard. So NORAD is just a part of an overall Canada-U.S. defence and security organization, and as I suggested, it's actually atypical because it's a formally institutionalized, binational command structure when other aspects of co-operation are done on an agency-to-agency basis.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for that.

Mr. Garrison.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

I'll start with Ms. Charron. You raised the question of costs and benefits of various defence investments and the necessity of prioritizing threats. Given the major capital investment Canada really requires now to replace fighters and recapitalize the navy, and possibly also the Coast Guard, where would participation in ballistic missile defence fall in terms of prioritizing threats and investments?

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

I would say fairly low, but then again I'm not an engineer. One of the questions I have is, even if we, for instance, put a lot of money into interceptors, they would help with the threats now, but threats evolve, so are we just spending money for the sake of spending money? For me, Canada's main security threat is always when that border closes. Many things can close that border so that's where I would...protecting Canada and protecting our border. Because we saw on September 12 that it hurt us.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thank you very much. I know my time is very limited.

Mr. Sokolsky, you said that participating in missile defence is not essential to NORAD, and then you went on to talk about the advantages of participating in ballistic missile defence. I guess I am asking you a double-ended question. Could you say a bit more about how you feel NORAD could continue to function well without Canadian participation, and secondly, what are the threats to Canada that would justify participation in ballistic missile defence?

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky]

Since 2005, NORAD has already adjusted to Canada's position on ballistic missile defence. The information is already going to the ballistic missile defence organization, and Canada is just not involved in that aspect of ballistic missile defence that would release the interceptors. As long as the Americans are happy to co-operate on this basis, and they simply are, I think it could go on, unless there is some sort of change in the American unified command plan that would move aerospace defence somewhere else or change the nature of USNORTHCOM, but they have just gone through a review of the Goldwater-Nichols arrangements, and I don't see that happening.

As for Canada's participation—certainly it would not build interceptors of its own and deploy them—it could mean a financial contribution to the American program, or it could mean having Canadians directly involved at some of the sites in Alaska. If new sites are put up, on the U.S. east coast in particular, you could have Canadian presence there, just as you have Canadian exchange officers at various commands in the United States. You have Canadians operating at some of the U.S. air defence bases. It would not involve Canada [Technical difficulty—Editor].

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much for that.

That brings us to the end of round two. We have some time left. We have some committee business to do at the end, with regard to our trip. That leaves us enough time to do three more questions. I would like to give each party representative four minutes, to be fair.

I am going to start with the Liberal side. I know one person had a question. Does the parliamentary secretary want to weigh in? Does anybody here disagree with that?