National Defence Committee on April 21st, 2016

[Prof. Charles Doran]

Oh, I'm sorry.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I wanted to specifically get to the point of where on the west coast our fighter assets should be located, or where in western Canada.

I'm out of time. I'm going to follow this point up with your colleagues, but I thank you for your presence and your testimony today.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your appearance. Right on time, nine-thirty, so you're off to your next event. Thank you so much for appearing today.

I'd like to move on to our next guests via video conference. From the Royal Military College we have Professor Sokolsky, and in our committee here in the studio—we don't have a green room—we have Ms. Charron.

I'd like to go to you first just in case we lose our feed on the video, Mr. Sokolsky. You have the floor for 10 minutes.

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Professor, Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual]

I thank the committee for the invitation to appear. I'm going to direct my remarks specifically to NORAD, and to ballistic missile defence and to air defence.

First of all, the defence of North America can't be separated from Canada's overall foreign and defence policy, which is largely expeditionary. That is, Canada doesn't provide for its security by so much the direct defence of Canada or North America, but through a global engagement.

In some sense, it's that global engagement that makes both Canada and the United States potential targets. This was so during the Cold War, and I think it's the same thing now. As my colleague Chris Sands said, an attack on North America is not going to come out of the blue. It's going to arise in the context of tensions that are more than likely going to originate overseas, whether in Europe against Russia, or in the Middle East against state actors or non-state actors.

It's our global engagement that makes us kind of vulnerable, and why we need to provide for the aerospace defence of North America. I think that applies, as well, to ballistic missile defence. If we are going to be engaged overseas against actors who have this capability, then providing for a limited ballistic missile defence of North America is going to be necessary. This is I think why the United States has moved to improve its systems in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era.

The next point is that the future of NORAD really doesn't depend on whether we participate in ballistic missile defence or not. I think the Americans have made adjustments. After 2004, when we agreed that information from NORAD could go to the American ballistic missile defence units and, even in 2005, when we declined direct participation, NORAD made the adjustments. It's not the first adjustment that NORAD has made. The United States would prefer, would welcome, Canadian participation, but it isn't a deal breaker as far as NORAD is concerned. The main issue for Canada is the question of the direct defence of Canada. I think here that participation in ballistic missile defence would enhance that.

The other point in terms of North American defence is that while NORAD deals with aerospace defence, and to a limited extent maritime warning, a lot of what goes on in North American defence and security is outside the national NORAD context—the relationship between United States Northern Command, Canadian Joint Operations Command, the myriad of relationships between the two navies, between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Canadian navy, and between all the security agencies.

North American defence and security cooperation is much broader than NORAD, and in some sense NORAD is the exception, in the sense that you have an institutional arrangement unique by national command. Most of what takes place takes place outside of the NORAD formal framework, and traditionally both governments have been comfortable with that arrangement, as well as the United States.

When the United States established U.S. Northern Command—a unified command under the American unified command plan with primary responsibility for the defence of the United States, and other responsibility for its area of operation, which included Mexico, parts of the Caribbean, and Canada—there was discussion of a much larger combined joint arrangement. Canada declined that, and this again was no major problem for the United States.

In terms of the air sovereignty, the point made by the member was something that I think the committee needs to look into. Is our air sovereignty, our fighters, too far from major urban centres? That's a Canadian problem. NORAD cannot dictate where Canada deploys its fighters, but certainly it's something we may want to look into. Again, I think, NORAD can certainly help in this regard, since its air sovereignty and protection was its first mission.

Overall, I think as far as Canada and the United States go—and I echo the comments of my colleagues—NORAD and broader North American security and defence relations are working. They work to the benefit of both countries, and here it's not so much the United States asking Canada to participate, but in the United States welcoming Canadian participation, accommodating it. In fact, the United States and those involved in the direct defence and security of the United States actually enjoy working with Canadians, the highly professional Canadian Armed Forces and the highly professional Canadian security services. It's this relationship that really makes it work.

It's working as well in the Arctic. Notwithstanding the long-standing disagreement over the international status of the Northwest Passage, U.S. Northern Command and Canadian Joint Operations Command have engaged in numerous planning and exercises regarding security in the Arctic. Again, it's this sort of approach that has made North American security work.

As far as what priority this should be in the defence review, apart from domestic past and aid to the civil power to which we look to the Canadian Armed Forces, North American security is the one other operation that is non-discretionary for Canada. It's something we can't avoid. We can limit our participation in various overseas operations, in various UN operations, and in various aid missions overseas, but North American security, along with domestic roles, is the other activity that the Canadian Forces cannot avoid and should have a call on our assets for.

For most of the Cold War, even during the height of the Cold War, it didn't demand excessive access because the direct defence of North America really lay in the American atomic deterrent. In the post-Cold War era, in the post-9/11 era, new threats have arisen that I think raise the level of priority for North American security in its military and non-military functions.

I think it is a non-discretionary activity for Canada. Fortunately for Canada, it's also a comfortable activity in that whatever we do to provide for the security of North America has a direct bearing on our immediate national security. The assets it draws are not excessive, and this would include ballistic missile defence. We don't necessarily have to build and develop our own systems; we can contribute to the American systems and make it truly North American, have Canadians at the sites, as we already have in terms of air defence, and thereby make a contribution and bring ballistic missile defence fully under the NORAD umbrella where it should be, because it is an aerospace threat. The other threat we'll maybe have to concern ourselves with now is changes in the cruise missile threats that are coming from Russian development.

It is something that I think should be a priority for us. In particular, if Canada is to continue to engage overseas in activities against state and non-state actors that could threaten North America, then providing for the defence of North America has to go along with that activity.

I'll end it there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much for your comments.

Over to our next witness, Ms. Charron. Thank you so much for your patience. I've saved the best for last.

You have the floor for ten minutes.

[Dr. Andrea Charron, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Thank you, honourable members, for the invitation to speak to you today.

I have divided my presentation into two main sections corresponding to what I think is working in NORAD and what requires review, specifically in three areas: the structure of NORAD, emerging threats, and the Arctic region.

I'll begin with what's working. The binational agreement that is the North American Air Defence Command is incredibly important to both countries, but especially to Canada because of NORAD's global area of operations, it's connection with USNORTHCOM, its 60-plus partnered security agencies, and the training opportunities and information and intelligence Canada receives as a function of its participation in NORAD.

The commander of NORAD is charged with defending North America and he has the power to reach into the highest levels of government on both sides of the border to complete NORAD's three missions: aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. This ensures that threats to North America are deterred, detected, and defeated.

As a result of 9/11, the number of air defence assets on alert has increased, and NORAD now surveys air space within North America in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration and Nav CANADA to counter strategic and asymmetric threats.

The maritime warning mission has matured, as witnessed by the increased domain awareness during events like the ebola crisis. However, more information and intelligence-sharing by all of Canada's security partners via the marine security operation centres, or MSOCs, would ensure a more complete maritime picture for NORAD. There are other issues and areas that need attention as well.

First, I'll consider the structure of NORAD. Very few people understand or appreciate the mission suites, the command structure, or delicate political balance that makes NORAD the trusted brand that has developed over 59 years. The tri-command structure means that there are three military commands involved in the defence of North America—NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and CJOC—each with different mandates and focuses.

NORAD is air-dominant in personnel and focus, as is reflected in its current name. It is most concerned with defending North America against air-breathing threats. This means its maritime warning mission can be overlooked. The very large USNORTHCOM, with its 60-plus civilian agencies as well as air force, navy, and army sub-commands, is charged with defending the U.S. homeland, ensuring theatre security co-operation, and providing defence support of civil authorities, or DSCA, which deal with weathers of mass destruction and terrorism events.

Canadian Joint Operations Command, transitioning from a mainly army to a joint command, is tasked with operations at home and abroad, except for air operations at home and in support of NORAD. These fall to the 1 Canadian Air Division, Canadian NORAD regional headquarters in Winnipeg, which is decidedly air focused.

Some academics have suggested that NORAD is a middleman and that USNORTHCOM and CJOC, the force providers and supporting commands, are adequate to defend the U.S. and Canada. Others, especially those within NORAD, feel it is time for NORAD to expand, adding new missions, domains, and partners such as the marine, submarine, land, cyber environments, and future participation by Mexico beyond its USNORTHCOM connection.

One of the immediate material concerns for NORAD, however, is the modernization of the north warning system, which is vital to NORAD's ability to detect, assess, and track airborne activity emanating from the north. Another, from Canada's perspective, is the replacement of the CF18s, which are the main tool to deter and defeat airborne threats. On the non-material side, NORAD is looking to modernize its plans, policies, and command and control structures to ensure that this system of systems can handle the highest levels of operational tempo.

Second, let's consider emerging threats. The current commander of NORAD, Admiral Gortney has testified on several occasions to the growing number and changing nature of the threats facing North America such as the proliferation of cruise missile technologies and unmanned aircraft systems. Many of the threats emanate from conflicts elsewhere, which fact highlights the importance of NORAD's global area of operation and USNORTHCOM's connection to the other U.S. combatant commands.

For the U.S. and for Canada, homeland defence remains an away game, but the threats are adapting rapidly, which means that homeland defence is now of paramount importance. Budget cuts on both sides of the border have often come from operations and maintenance accounts, which, especially in Canada, tend to affect homeland operations first.

This is felt acutely when Canada's military is deployed overseas. What is more, while considerations are paid to replacement of big assets like planes and ships, costs associated with satellite, land, and/or other forms of communication are rarely discussed.

They are vital to command and control, especially when multiple military and civilian actors are involved across the vast distances of Canada. Communication breakdowns, unreliable technology, and obsolescence of equipment represent an Achilles heel.

Third, let's consider the Arctic. Because of USNORTHCOM's defence support of civil authorities and its department of defence's Arctic capabilities advocacy roles, the Arctic is a region of growing importance for the U.S., especially as an avenue of approach for threats.

While the likelihood of a military conflict is very low, the U.S. is beginning to pay more attention to the region, and invariably this means there will be pressure on Canada to demonstrate the same level of interest by virtue of comparisons between capabilities of the U.S.-Canada and the rest of the world.

Canada's non-participation in ballistic missile defence which, let's be clear, is designed to defend against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and Iran is a USNORTHCOM responsibility, and it is the elephant in the room, especially as the U.S. is on track to deploy 14 new interceptors in Alaska.

Cruise missile defence capabilities have a separate architecture that has not been without its technical issues. A test of the U.S. joint land attack cruise defence elevated netted sensor system, or JLENS, malfunctioned in October 2015, resulting in the fire control system or the balloon detaching from its moorings. The JLENS, however, is designed to defend the Washington, D.C. national capital region. I cannot tell you the state of Canada's cruise missile defence architecture, because as far as I understand, and based on unclassified information, there is very little.

Since 9/11 threats to North America within the purview of NORAD and within the public domain have been detected and deterred. That being said, the costs of such defence are enormous. While the intentions and capabilities of adversaries continue to evolve, NORAD and the North American defence architecture must also evolve to meet these new challenges.

Our military is charged with preparing for all eventualities, but it is Canadians who must set the limits and assess the costs and benefits of this binational agreement, keeping in mind what are the most likely versus the most dangerous threats to Canada and to the U.S., and recognizing that these two states may have very different assessments of those threats.

Finally, NORAD has one outcome, and that's deterrents or defeat of a threat. But what if a legal solution is required or intelligence needs to be gathered? Different outcomes require different responses and different agencies. NORAD is vital for the defence of North America, but it cannot be, nor is it, the only tool to protect Canada.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much for your comments.

Coincidentally, this rolled into round two of our questions, so it'll give everybody a chance.

Before we do that, please indulge us on perhaps some repetitive questions, seeing that we had to do this with the other witnesses having to leave earlier.

Ms. Romanado, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you, and I'd like to thank you both for being here today, whether virtually or in person. It's unfortunate that Professor Doran had to depart, but he brought up a good point, and I want to talk a little about the surveillance question.

He mentioned that two Russian Bear bombers came within 40 miles of northern California before they could be intercepted by two fighter jets. Interestingly enough, this happened on July 4, 2015. I'm assuming that on July 4 we had a heightened level of alert because it was in fact July 4.

Earlier in the day these same two bombers from Russia flew over Alaska and were intercepted by two F-22s. My question is this. We have ground interceptors. We have satellites and so on and so forth. How could it be that two fighters were able to come with 40 miles of the U.S. coast? The reaction was to scramble jets. We knew that they had flown over Alaska. Now they flew down the western seaboard, went down to northern California, and two other jets were scrambled.

We heard from a witness that in terms of the radar satellites that are going to be deployed in 2018, we're planning on putting in three, and we had heard from a witness that we might require actually five. I'm curious. I know we've talked about ballistic missile defence, but we had planes that came within 40 miles. What is your reaction to that, and what are your recommendations in terms of our surveillance capabilities?

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky]

It reinforces the need for greater surveillance capabilities, but I think this was interpreted as simply a symbolic flight, and the date of July 4 was specifically chosen. The assessment is that it's Russia, Mr. Putin, showing Russia is back in the game. After all, NATO has planes flying close to Russian territory, particularly in reaction to events in [Technical difficulty—Editor] and Ukraine, and this is the way he demonstrates the fact he can do to North America, and particularly the United States, what the United States is doing to him.

For me, it highlights the point that because Canada's contributed to augmenting the air defence of allies in the eastern frontier of NATO, we can expect this sort of reaction we got. The need is to track these to be aware of it. Obviously both countries are showing restraint, but it highlights the need for surveillance and greater capabilities.

It's more symbolic, but it's something that can't be ignored.

What the United States and Canada seek to do is let the Russians know that we know they are there, and they can be intercepted. These sorts of probings of North America are part and parcel of what Mr. Putin is doing, and he's doing it to U.S. ships that are coming close to Russian territory as well.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

I would add that Russian bombers are allowed to be in international air space. The question is, where do you intercept them?

Do you want to create a huge diplomatic incident when you're over international airspace, or do you want to also vary when you detect and deter these Bear bombers? If you do the exact same thing every time, that falls into a pattern, and that can be exploited. You heard from General St. Amand, there are rules of engagement, and they make decisions about when and where is best to intercept them.

The fact that it was 40 miles means people will focus on that, but that's not the point to focus on. The fact is it was deterred, it was detected, and in a statement by Admiral Gortney to the Committee on Armed Services, he said this is not new.

We saw a considerable drop-off of this activity by the Russians in the 1990s and early 2000s, but this is exactly what NORAD is charged to do, and it's doing it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

That's your time.

Mr. Paul-Hus, you have five minutes.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning ladies and gentlemen.

Since we began our work, we have met several people who have all confirmed that there seems to be an obvious threat coming from Russia, China and North Korea.

The relevance of NORAD is increasingly clear, and that is why I am particularly interested in the command and control aspect. We know that several agencies provide information to NORAD. In the case of a real threat, since we are not involved in anti-ballistic missile defence, we do not have access to that information, and it could take a long time before it gets to us.

In your opinion, is the fact that Canada does not have access to that information an important issue?

I would also like to know, regarding command and control, if you think we can react fast enough.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

With your permission, I'm going to answer in English; it will be easier for me.

I'm not sure it's accurate to say Canada's blind. Remember it's not just NORAD that is looking at these kinds of threats. We have access to information from the U.S. Combatant Command, and of course CJOC. The Five Eyes provides information as well.

I'm not sure in what aspect we are blind.

I think you're asking about our response, and this relates to questions that were asked about where our assets should be deployed. In Canada our fighter jets are one of our main tools to respond to these kinds of threats. The impression I'm getting is we think they're sitting on the ground like firefighters waiting for a call to come in to deploy. They're moving all the time. They're doing surveillance, and they're going around Canadian airspace. It's not as if all of our jets are on the ground waiting to deploy. We also have them forward deployed as a result of aid to NATO and other countries.

I'm not sure if that helps.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

That information comes from the deputy commander of NORAD, Lieutenant-General St-Amand. He stated that at the Colorado Springs base, Canadians do not have access to information on ballistic missile defence because our country does not participate in the program. Lieutenant-General St-Amand provided that information to the committee.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

Are you talking specifically vis-à-vis the ballistic missile defence information?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Yes.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

Yes, because that's USNORTHCOM. That's why in the command centre the J3 positions, the operation positions, are separated. It's simply because of that, but that doesn't mean that the U.S. is going to say that there's something incoming but they're not going to say anything and they'll just laugh at us. That's not in their interests. An attack on the U.S. is an attack on Canada as well.

Yes, technically we are not looking at the screen, but we are protected. Most of Canada is protected within the ballistic defence shield that the U.S. provides. I'm not sure that having us actually looking at that screen is going to change the response that's made, especially when things have to be decided quickly, of course. The commander of NORAD is not just the U.S. commander; he is the Canadian commander as well. His task is to protect both Canada and the U.S.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

You say that the Americans are there to support us and that they will ensure our protection. However, this committee has to analyse the status of Canada's sovereignty. Some witnesses have stated that our military air capacity is sufficient to provide us with minimum protection. We have also had discussions about the ballistic missile defence program.

The important thing to my mind is to understand NORAD's real importance; we should not decrease our commitment to it, but on the contrary, maintain and increase it.

What are your thoughts on this?

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

NORAD is working. There are some who want to give NORAD more missions, more domain awareness, etc., and that may happen, but this all comes at an incredible cost. That's where we may have to make some tough decisions. As Dr. Sokolsky said, we're obligated to defend Canada and to defend North America. Anything else is after those two missions have been achieved.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much.

We'll move on to you, Mr. Gerretsen. You have the floor for five minutes.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to both of you for being here today.

Mr. Sokolsky, I can appreciate why you wouldn't want to leave the most beautiful part of Canada to come here, but thank you for participating by video conference. I'm going to be sharing my time with the parliamentary secretary, so I'll ask you one quick question.

I got the impression from the previous witnesses that they didn't seem to demonstrate that there was much concern with the fact that Canada was not participating in the ballistic missile defence system. I'm curious as to whether you can comment on that and provide some insight.

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky]

That was a correct assessment, because once Canada agreed in 2004 that information from NORAD could flow into the ballistic missile defence organization, it solved the U.S. problem, and also because, as Dr. Charron has indicated, Canada is not totally blind.

You also, I think, have to put this problem that Canada and the United States have had in the context of overall American national security policy. It's not at the top of the U.S. national security agenda. On the things that bother the United States, that threaten the United States, and that make it difficult for the United States, Canada's unease over BMD is not right up there. It's not one of them.

In the tradition of Canada-U.S. relations, accommodations are made because in many other areas of our security the United States and Canada are participating. For example, the United States Southern Command asked Canada for support with counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean, and Canada provided it.

When the United States looks out over its allies, at which allies are giving it difficulty and which allies are a problem, Canada is not one of them. This BMD issue can certainly be resolved.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Should we be concerned, then, that we're not participating in this? In what way do you see that contributes to our ability to defend our sovereignty or autonomy?

[Dr. Joel Sokolsky]

I think it's a piece of North America that we are not fully participant in. From the standpoint of our own sovereignty and security, it would be preferable to be integrated because I don't see a reason why not to be. It's a question of attitude and altitude. For some reason we're willing to participate in the air-breathing protection, but not in protection from a weapon which, because of its trajectory, exits the atmosphere. We're willing to support a ballistic missile defence for allies in Europe, but not participate fully in our own defence.

The other thing to remember about BMD is that the North American part is the terminal part. The United States has forward-based Aegis cruisers, particularly around the Korean Peninsula, and would hope to intercept the missile early on. Again, from the American standpoint, Canada's unease over this is not something that either puts America at risk or gets in the way of the United States handling the problem.