National Defence Committee on April 21st, 2016

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Ma'am, I am just going to add to that. I think Professor Doran is right. The French have the ability, through a centralized government, to make top-down decisions and get better coordination than either of us as federations can. That's a structural difference.

President Eisenhower once said that in battle, plans are often useless, but planning proves to be invaluable. That is really the key here. We need our military, law enforcement, and militia to do two things. One, plan together, run joint exercises, do tabletop or actual in-the-field exercises to get to know each other's capabilities and operating culture and to build personal relationships that, in the heat of a crisis, they can fall back on. I think this has worked really well for Canada and the United States on the integrated border enforcement teams in dealing with some of the law enforcement challenges. There's a lot that can be done to foster that coordination through planning.

The second issue, which Professor Doran highlighted, is the importance of getting intelligence to work together, first, knowing what the other side might have access to so that you know, if you need it, where to ask for it; then second, building the trust relationships, the secure relationships for communication in a crisis, to make sure that people get the info they need and we aren't in a situation where something bad happens and later on, after action, the press discovers we did know, we just didn't know in the right place.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Let's go to the issue of real-time communication. In the days and months immediately following 9/11—back then it was the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness—there were several tabletop exercises between Canada and U.S., but the ministers didn't even show up to the exercise. That is an issue that I hope has been remediated and, with the change in government, we will continue to work on.

Where I want to go is on the cyber side. The United States has a cyber command, and there was probably an integration with NORAD, but Canada does not have an equivalent of a cyber command. As we know, and as we have seen in Europe, what often starts as a cyber-attack on a soft target can very quickly become a hard target where military action needs to take place.

Would you see it as useful to have someone from Canada's cybercommunity at NORAD—just as now we have Critical Infrastructure people there—so there can be more seamlessness in terms of communicating at that level?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

I certainly think that would be a proper step, because the cyber-dimension is becoming so much more important. It is also highly sensitive and highly complicated, so how it is going to be handled internationally is still probably in the development stage. For Canada to have the capacity to fully participate in this would be very positive, certainly from the U.S. perspective.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Yes, I agree. I think it is an excellent suggestion.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Would the joint agency that would co-operate at this level...? Would NORAD be a potential proper agency this could work through?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

I am not in a position to say what NORAD ought or wouldn't do, but I would say that in a sense this is more and less than what NORAD is.

It is less, because NORAD is concerned with other matters, such as air-breathing threats, what is happening offshore, and so on. These are very broad things that may not have much to do directly with terrorism.

NORAD is also less, in the sense that these issues of terrorism are about individuals. They are about individuals inside our societies and individuals travelling to our countries.

When this is combined with the cyber-dimension, which is essentially a high-technology aspect of this, maybe the governments are going to have to look at this more carefully to see if this should be handled someplace else. I don't know.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

I do think NORAD provides a place to have this conversation. Just as we don't deal with air defence only in NORAD—we both have air forces, and they operate globally—we don't want to put things in one basket, but we want those baskets to be connected.

I might add that NATO has really invested in Estonia's cybersecurity, cyber-response centre, and there may be something we can learn from the Europeans, especially the Estonians, who have been the victim of an attack and are very much on the front lines.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Garrison, you have the floor for seven minutes.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the two witnesses for appearing today.

Since it is clear that the Government of Canada has now reopened the debate on ballistic missile defence, I want to start with my questions in that area.

We have heard from previous witnesses that ballistic missile defence would respond to threats primarily from state actors, as both ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles are beyond the capacity of most non-state actors. I was interested in the comments Mr. Doran made in the beginning on the changed security environment, and also Mr. Sands' comments on the importance of properly assessing threats.

My question is, does Canada face credible threats when it comes to ballistic missiles?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

I would say that Canada is as much a target in some of these matters as is the United States. What is really important is that this is a changing situation. This is a situation where we have governments now toying with, trying to develop or operationalize, missile capability that simply was impossible a few years ago, and there is no sign that this is going to diminish.

I am thinking of two examples: what is happening in North Korea and what is happening in Iran.

Of course, accuracy and capacity to carry payloads, all those things, are important, but the trend seems to be clear. If one is going to try to deal with those threats, one has to have defence capability.

Then of course if you talk about this in the battlefield context, we are already there, and that is a real problem for soldiers on the ground.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

I would add that I think sometimes we imagine the missile defence system as infinite ammunition, and if a missile is coming in we can just keep firing and knocking those missiles down. Even in the United States the reality is we have a limited number of bullets in the gun, if you will. We have a limited number of shots. Going back to my comment earlier, citing Professor Sokolsky's view that Canada's is, at its best, an easy rider, we don't want a situation where the United States is investing to put in missile defences to protect Americans and Canadians, and they have to make a choice. If Canada doesn't participate in the system, and because Canada isn't adding bullets to the gun, the U.S. has to make a choice between protecting Los Angeles or Vancouver from a North Korean missile.

What we need is for Canada to contribute in this way, so that it's able to hold up its own. With limited defence resources, even with the U.S. defence budget, we're not investing foolishly, but getting the best defence we can by sharing the burden a little.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thank you for that.

Mr. Sands, you talked about the coordinated use of assets, and you just made reference to having sometimes to prioritize. I guess, from a Canadian perspective, that's the question I'm asking.

Given the limited resources in Canada that have been devoted to defence over the last 20 years, and the clear limits that are in our present government's budget, the questions would be, how do we prioritize threats here, and where would ballistic missile threats rank on that list of priorities?

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

I think ballistic missiles have two functions that will matter. The first is for an out-and-out attack. We want to prevent that. It seems unlikely short of a state of war, that Russia or China, being relatively responsible states, are going to launch a missile intending to hit a Canadian city. We don't know about the sort of more unreliable governments like North Korea's, and even to some extent Iran's, and because those governments aren't entirely trustworthy, we do have to worry about what the risk is of them taking a strike.

The second issue is the threat. I think that ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles, as Professor Doran highlighted, have the ability to be a threat, and to put people in a vulnerable position in negotiations, etc. It hangs over a population and creates a sense of anxiety. It may be that Canada's investment in missile defence is circumscribed. It's relatively limited. The advantage you have is the systems have already been developed. There are things you can buy off the shelf now that had you done this in 2005, or earlier, you might have had to invest in R and D and develop the systems. Now you're in a position to be able to make a relatively modest investment to deter threats. I don't think it has to displace the need to recapitalize the Canadian navy or purchase fighters, but I think a modest investment here would pay good dividends.

[Prof. Charles Doran]

I would like to make one quick point. I would say it is important to keep in mind what's happening to technology, and how fast technology is changing, both on the offensive and on the defensive side. When you do that, the action you're taking now is an action that is only going to have an effect maybe five to 10 years out, but if you don't take it now, then you're behind in terms of what's going to happen over that period of time.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

You raised an interesting topic that was followed up by Mr. Sands. I would say NORAD was established at a time when the harmony of interest and threats between Canada and the U.S. was relatively great. We talked about the changed security environment. There's also a changed political environment. Mr. Sands made reference to certain possible outcomes of the U.S. election, but there's an area that has now become increasingly important where Canadian and U.S. interests increasingly diverge, and that's the Arctic. To me there's a potential problem here in our relationship and our partnership over NORAD that comes about from the failure of the United States to recognize Canadian claims and Canadian territorial waters in the Arctic.

How can NORAD bridge that difference of interests now?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

I think this issue has existed for a very long time, and I am impressed with the way in which the two governments have dealt with it. They've said they have a difference of interests here, but they are going to try to provide the security that both of their peoples demand without resolving this issue.

That's called diplomacy and it's been done effectively. I think the real truth is that the United States takes very seriously Canada's sovereignty concerns, but as I mentioned, everything that's done on these issues, publicly and overtly, is going to have an impact on global politics, especially in the South China Sea, and not only there, but now in the larger Arctic, in terms of our respective interactions with Russia.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Let me add, sir, that the divergence of interest has been there for a while. I think it was more difficult at a time when both countries saw the potential for energy resource development in the Arctic. That's less crucial now, not only because of new supplies of oil and gas, but because the Arctic is an expensive place to operate, so it's not a priority for our energy companies.

Where we are actually sharing concern relates to the environment. Certainly, the Obama administration and the Trudeau government have taken up a great concern over climate change and the effect it has on the Arctic, among other regions, so perhaps this can bring us together in ways that may help us resolve some of these territorial claims.

I know that this issue has been around a long time. It seems to me that Canada and the United States are reasonable countries. We ought to be able to come to some accommodation here. The longer we bicker over these territorial disputes, the more we create an opening for Vladimir Putin to put us at odds with each other, and we end up making redundant and sometimes foolish expenditures on Arctic capabilities when we could be coordinating and co-operating. I think that's exactly what our rivals in the Arctic might want.

There was the story just this morning that China is planning to do shipping through the Northwest Passage in the coming year. I think that's a dramatic change that should wake both of us up to the fact that we need to resolve these disputes. Yes, they're serious disputes, but we've resolved serious border disputes, whether it's the Georges Bank or the Alaska boundary dispute going back 100 years ago. We can do this. I think we just need to make a bigger effort to get those things resolved, exactly as you say, to prepare to defend the Arctic and co-operate in that region.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your remarks.

In order to respect your time constraints, we have one final question for you that's going to go to Mr. Spengemann.

You have the floor for seven minutes.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you, Professor Doran and Mr. Sands.

Mr. Sands, it's good to see you again. You and I intersected briefly over a decade ago on smart regulation here in Ottawa.

I want to take you to the second paradigm that you mentioned in your introductory remarks, Professor Doran, and that's the threat of domestic terrorism. Let's go right back to that terrible day of September 11, 2001, which my colleague Ms. Gallant referred to. We still all remember where we were on that day, and it has forever changed our perceptions on peace and conflict, and indeed, on human civilization.

I wanted to hear from the two of you—and I'm hoping to follow up with Ms. Charron and Professor Sokolsky in a second round—on where you see the threat of domestic terrorism. This committee has received evidence that it ranks prominently among the threats we're currently facing, if not as the highest. I want to ask you if you agree with that. Maybe you could outline briefly for the committee some of the factors that would go into an assessment and an understanding of the level of that threat and perhaps its future evolution.

[Prof. Charles Doran]

Thank you very much, sir. I have had the opportunity to comment on some of these things hereto in a way that addresses exactly the same issues.

There's a paradox that underlies all of this. The paradox is that there are more deaths by far caused by the automobile worldwide than have ever been caused by terrorism and probably ever will be, but that doesn't mean that the respective publics, Canadians and Americans, are less interested in terrorism. Terrorism for them is up front and close. The problem is, they expect perfection. In other words, they want our governments to be able to stop everything—no incidents to take place—and that is virtually an impossible action.

I am just amazed at how successful the two governments have been in dealing with this issue. The problem is, it's not going to get less.... There are still going to be problems of this sort. It is becoming more complicated, in the sense that we in the United States, for example, have had this problem of imitation. It's not just a question of finding out who's doing what abroad and impacting on us. It's a problem we have internally. I think this is a problem that is shared.

The worst part is this. If in fact an incident occurred that would somehow convey to the publics that the other side was responsible, that's just the kind of event we don't want to see, so the close coordination between Canada and the United States on anti-terrorist activity is paramount. So far, I think it's been remarkably successful. I think—

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I'm sorry to cut you off there, but going perhaps to some of the factors that would underscore the assessment that domestic terrorism is the pre-eminent threat we're facing, or at least one of the most pre-eminent, how would you consider the work that we're currently doing abroad against ISIS as a coalition?

You know that Canadian participation is very significant; we've ramped up our mission over in the Middle East. Is that a factor in terms of the domestic threat we're facing in North America? If so, how significant a factor is it?

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

I think it is a significant factor, sir.

I think one of the problems that we're facing now is that young people, especially young men, are always idealistic and can be swayed by the romance of a great cause, whether it was the beginning of the 20th century when anarchism or some other cause had young people involved in terrorist activity. We see the same thing now.

You mentioned that you, and certainly we remember 9/11, but 9/11 is now 16 years ago, and the reality is that there are young men who don't remember 9/11. They've seen it maybe on television, but it wasn't something that happened to them. It's their ability to see what's going on against the Islamic State now, to be touched by cyber-conveyed propaganda on the Internet that says, “Oh, this is the world beating up on good Muslims,” to get caught up in that cause and then, foolishly, but understandably decide they're going to either go overseas to express their frustration by joining the fight, or do an attack in the United States because we are pressing the fight against the Islamic State, or in Canada because you are. They turn their frustration on us. They don't remember how 9/11 changed things.

I think we have to be very concerned, and there's great room for co-operation now.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Let me zoom into something very specific, building on what you've said, and in the context of NORAD and air defence, and that would be the threat against Canada emanating from within Canada, conducted against a Canadian target. I'd like to zoom in specifically on the west coast and take you to the deployment of our current fighter assets in terms of geographic location, not in terms of the quality of the asset. Would you agree that proximity to a potential threat, or proximity to the potentially highest threat is important in our ability to interdict airborne threats against Canadian civilian targets?

[Prof. Charles Doran]

Can I respond to that?

I think the answer is absolutely yes. In fact, this is exactly at the heart of strategic discussions certainly between the United States and its allies, and a rising actor in Asia, and a restless actor in Eurasia.

They are trying to deny this capacity to be close up and to follow with great reliability any potential threat that would in fact provide security for us, and so I think this issue of being able to be close to the source of difficulties and problems is what is really at stake in this debate involving China, on the one hand, in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and Russia in the Arctic—

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Sorry to cut you off. Time is limited.

I'm talking about the Canadian domestic context, locating our own domestic assets within the NORAD umbrella, where our domestic threat is greatest.