National Defence Committee on April 19th, 2018

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Good morning, everyone. Welcome to defence committee this morning and to the first meeting of our study on Canada's contribution to international peacekeeping.

From Global Affairs we have Mark Gwozdecky, assistant deputy minister, international security and political affairs; we also have Jeff Senior, deputy director, peace operations, stabilization, and conflict policy division. From the Department of Defence we have Lieutenant-General Bowes, commander, Canadian Joint Operations Command; Major-General Meinzinger, director of staff, strategic joint staff—congratulations on your upcoming appointment to chief of the air staff—and Major-General Derek Joyce, director general of international security policy.

We also will have in the back a whole bunch of folks. They're coming from security, but I want to mention them now because we'll be getting into the meeting. We have some folks who will be coming to observe from the parliamentary officers' study program. There are probably 12 or 13 of these from 12 different countries. Maybe on the way out we could recognize them and say hello.

We have a big panel today. What ends up happening is that people like to jump in on individual questions, which is great and fine, but then I start to lose control; it just goes like that.

This is the white flag of graceful dismount. If you see the signal I am showing, it means that you have 30 seconds to sum up and I have to give the time to the next member so that all can get all their questions in. If you would just look at me every once in a while so that I can manage this, I would very much appreciate it.

Having said that, I believe we have two speakers for opening remarks. I'm going to yield the floor to Mark Gwozdecky.

Sir, you have the floor.

[Mark Gwozdecky, Assistant Deputy Minister, International Security and Political Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It's a pleasure to be with you here today to speak about Canada's involvement in peacekeeping. Though my presentation will include some historical context, I'll try to concentrate on what has changed from conventional peacekeeping and how Canada is working to contribute to a new consensus on the way peacekeeping is done in an era of change.

The fundamental question regarding Canadian involvement in peacekeeping is, why do we do it?

There are three main considerations at play here. Firstly, we support peacekeeping operations for reasons of national interest; secondly, as an expression of our values as Canadians; and thirdly, to be a responsible, burden-sharing member of a rules-based international order.

Today's conflicts, even in remote places, have an effect on all Canadians by allowing extremism and violent crime to take root and by creating ungoverned spaces, which generate flows of refugees or displaced persons and disrupt human and economic development. All nations have an interest in the existence of an effective, multilateral response to conflict, and this means that individual nations have to share responsibilities and shoulder parts of the burden. The UN has embarked upon a period of reflection and renewal in this area, which makes it a particularly important time for Canada to be engaged.

The nature of peacekeeping has evolved considerably over the years. Early missions were characterized by interventions in which combatants were clearly identifiable. In general, the parties agreed to the intervention of a neutral force, while diplomatic talks sought to resolve the conflict.

Today's peacekeeping missions take place in a much different context. Belligerents can be numerous and varied, including not only political actors but also criminals and terrorists who have little interest in peace. Consequently, rather than monitoring a ceasefire or peace agreement, peacekeepers often play the role of a stabilization force, with tasks focused on protecting civilians and helping to create the conditions for peace to emerge. The conditions and objectives of peacekeeping today are thus significantly different from those of previous generations, and the tools for dealing with this constant change have not adequately kept pace.

As the Prime Minister remarked:

Discrete offerings and one-off commitments have gotten us this far, but we won't be able to deliver true, transformative change without a real institutional change. Canada is prepared to help lead that charge.

I will speak later about how Canada's new approach responds to the evolution of peacekeeping and our goal of transformative change.

Right now, I'd like to speak about how the UN itself has commissioned a series of high-level reports in recent years. These reports highlight the need to improve peacekeeping skills and readiness in the face of increasing demands and financial pressures. We have also consistently underscored the point that UN interventions should facilitate political solutions to conflict.

With these findings in mind, the UN Secretary-General has launched an ambitious agenda on peace and security reform, which includes a proposal to restructure the UN peace and security architecture and to shift more resources and efforts in the direction of prevention. This agenda reflects the view that peacekeeping does not operate in a silo. It's part of a continuum of actions that includes peace-building and conflict prevention.

In an effort to assist the UN's efforts to reform and rethink how peacekeeping missions are undertaken, Canada hosted a defence ministerial meeting on UN peacekeeping in Vancouver in November 2017. This was the fifth such meeting since 2014, focusing on efforts to fill critical capability gaps in UN peacekeeping missions and to discuss peacekeeping in francophone environments. The background of this initiative is increasing demands on UN peace operations, with deployments doubling in the past 15 years and upwards of 100,000 uniformed UN personnel currently deployed.

Frankly, the UN is struggling to keep up. The conflicts with which it is confronted and mission mandates issued by the Security Council are increasingly complex, requiring a wider range of skills, assets, and new technology to get the job done in difficult environments. At the same time, the UN is facing pressure for reform, cost savings, and efficiencies in its operations.

In this context, discussions in Vancouver were focused on performance, partnerships, and effectiveness. Canada's theme for the meeting was “doing peacekeeping differently”, that is, encouraging increasing effectiveness of UN peace operations through support for reform, innovation, and smart pledges. Canada announced its new peacekeeping strategy in Vancouver and here are the highlights and a synopsis of what we've accomplished since then.

In Vancouver we launched the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers, which is now endorsed by 63 countries. Work will begin soon on a Vancouver principles handbook in order to help individual states to develop tailored national training and doctrine, and ultimately, operational guidance on addressing child soldiers in the context of peace operations missions.

Consultations among stakeholders have started regarding another element of our strategy, the Elsie initiative on women in peace operations. Through this initiative, Canada will work with the UN and other member states to develop innovative approaches to overcome barriers to the meaningful participation of women in uniform in UN peace operations. This will include tailored technical assistance packages for one or two police and troop contributing countries. Also included is assistance to select UN missions to which these partner countries deploy to create a receptive environment. Additionally, we're examining a financial mechanism to support the deployment of women peacekeepers. Also, we want to highlight the research, monitoring, and evaluation components to ensure that the components of the pilot initiative are well designed, monitored and evaluated, and adjusted as needed. Canada expects to announce the one or two troop and police contributing countries with which we will be partnering by June of this year.

In Vancouver, the government also announced its intention to support UN operations through the provision, over a five-year time period, of a number of high-value military capabilities as well as through innovative training initiatives. The head of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, Lieutenant-General Bowes, is here with us today and is well placed to elaborate on the nature of these capabilities and their potential uses in a peacekeeping context.

Allow me to set the stage for his remarks by recalling what our government has pledged and by offering some comments about the broader objectives at play. With respect to military capabilities, in Vancouver our government helped to champion a new way of doing business in the provision of military assets for peacekeeping, a smart pledging approach, which means that member states work more closely together to establish a rotation of key enablers, such as aircraft, or to meet collectively a UN training need or an operational requirement. This is meant to improve predictability and planning.

Within this new and evolving construct, Canada specifically offered to provide the following. One is an air task force comprised of armed and utility helicopters and associated personnel. The government announced, on March 19, that it's prepared to deploy this air task force to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, otherwise known as MINUSMA, for a period of 12 months. Tactical airlift support is the second element that was announced. This involves one or two transport aircraft for up to 12 months to the UN's regional service centre in Entebbe, Uganda. Canada has also pledged a unit of approximately 200 personnel and accompanying equipment as part of a quick reaction force. The timing and location of this contribution remains to be determined.

Beyond a provision of specific military capabilities, the government also committed to offer new forms of innovative training, the main objective of which is to meet some of the UN's systemic and specialized training needs, including efforts to augment the role that women play in UN operations. The long-term goal will be to provide training to support the UN, the African Union, and other partner countries including through the use of mobile training teams that can focus on specialized needs in a responsive manner.

Through the Canadian training and advisory team, Canada pledged to work with one or two partner countries before and during a deployment to enhance their contributions to UN peace operations. This will be linked to Canada's Elsie initiative, which, as I mentioned, is designed to overcome the barriers to women's participation in peace operations.

Opportunities to incorporate policing experts into all these activities are also being explored and additional deployments of Canadian police to peacekeeping missions are being examined.

By way of conclusion I'd emphasize several general points about the commitments announced in Vancouver. First, the new Canadian strategy on peacekeeping or peace operations, as it is now more commonly referred to, is about doing things differently, doing things better, and doing things together. All the elements of the Canadian approach respond directly to the findings from high-level reports commissioned by the United Nations.

Second, the pledges made in Vancouver are meant to be mutually reinforcing. We're delivering a number of highly effective operational capabilities to support UN missions, but at the same time we're promoting change in how UN peace operations are conducted, with a particular focus on the participation of women and the issue of child soldiers. Our hope is that Canada's credibility as a direct contributor to UN missions will help to amplify our efforts to shape the evolving norms and practices of peace operations.

Third, Canada's contributions fit with broader international trends in the evolution of peacekeeping, with a greater focus today from nations like Canada on contributions that capitalize on national strengths in relation to what the UN needs as peacekeeping evolves. The days when Canadian peacekeeping was viewed as boots on the ground have largely passed, in part because the UN has been successful in recruiting a broad range of new countries, largely from the global south and China. In part because of the changing nature of conflicts, UN mandates and mission requirements call for a broader range of new capabilities well beyond the boots on the ground.

The strategy and pledges announced in Vancouver reflect and respond to these evolving needs and open a new chapter in Canada's peacekeeping history. The result is both a sophisticated and a pragmatic response to new challenges, and we look forward to continuing to work with the UN and its member states to improve the success of peacekeeping operations.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you.

Lieutenant-General Bowes, the floor is yours.

[Lieutenant-General Stephen Bowes, Commander, Canadian Joint Operations Command, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chair and committee members, good morning.

My name is Lieutenant-General Stephen Bowes, commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, and it is my pleasure to be here today to discuss Canadian Armed Forces contributions to international peace support operations.

As commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, I am responsible for the preparation and conduct of Canadian Armed Forces operations, both in the defence of Canada and around the world. I am accompanied today by MGen Al Meinzinger, director of staff for the Strategic Joint Staff, and MGen Derek Joyce, director general of International Security Policy.

These general officers are respectively responsible for the strategic military and policy dimensions of the planning and sustainment of all Canadian Armed Forces operations, including peace support operations.

My colleague Mr. Gwozdecky has described the complexities associated with modern peace operations and the efforts under way at the UN to meet these challenges.

Unlike the traditional missions of the past, today's peace support operations are multi-dimensional, with broad mandates that can range from supporting political and electoral processes, to protecting civilians, promoting human rights, and assisting and restoring the rule of law. These missions require not only well-trained personnel but also critical enabling capabilities to ensure they are able to carry out their complex mandates, such as strategic and tactical airlift, specialized engineering capabilities, field hospitals, communications, and information systems.

Today though there are approximately 120 Canadian Armed Forces members deployed on these complex operations across the globe, including both UN missions and those led by other organizations. Canadian military personnel participating in UN missions in Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Middle East serve vital functions in the domains of logistics planning, military liaison, and training, as well as surveillance and monitoring of demilitarized zones. Canada also participates in non-UN operations that make equally important contributions to regional peace and security, including the multinational force and observers in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, the Office of the United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the NATO Kosovo Force.

The Government of Canada has recently announced initiatives aimed at further enhancing UN peace support operations. This effort is consistent with Canada's defence policy “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, which states that the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to make concrete contributions to Canada's role as a responsible international actor, particularly through participation in UN peace operations.

As my colleague has described to you, Canada made a series of military pledges at the Vancouver UN peacekeeping ministerial last November, in addition to the two key pledges on the Elsie Initiative and the Vancouver Principles. These pledges look to leverage the expertise and enabling capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces, and include pledges for a specialized training initiative and a Canadian training and advisory team, the deployment of a quick reaction force, a planned contribution of tactical airlift support for the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, and the deployment of an air task force in Mali in response to a request from the UN.

Canada announced its intent to deploy an air task force to MINUSMA last month in response to a request from the UN. Work to implement this operation is under way and will continue to move very quickly in order to replace the German contingent this summer for a period of approximately one year. The task force, which will consist of Chinook and Griffon helicopters to be located in Gao, northern Mali, will provide MINUSMA with a critical capability for tasks such as forward aeromedical evacuation, transportation, and logistical support. We are currently planning on the basis of up to four Griffon and two Chinook helicopters, as well as approximately 250 Canadian Armed Forces personnel. The details, such as the number of personnel and capabilities for the deployment, will be refined as our planning evolves and our discussions with the UN on its requirements proceed.

As mentioned earlier, today's peace support operations are multi-faceted and frequently call on missions to serve as a stabilization force in order to help set the conditions for political settlements. MINUSMA falls into this category. It's a chapter VII mission, which authorizes the use of armed force to protect civilians and address threats to and breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Challenges to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Mali have made it a safe haven for transnational threat actors, and this certainly increases the risk to the mission. Risks can come from other sources as well, such as the physical environment in which the Canadian Armed Forces are operating, and this is also the case in Mali.

The Canadian Armed Forces are accustomed to operating in high-risk environments, which makes risk management and risk mitigation critical to the military planning process at all levels. We do this in a number of ways, including by ensuring our personnel are highly trained for the mission and are enabled by the right capabilities, that they are given the appropriate rules of engagement in order to defend themselves, and that they are supported by the necessary arrangements with the UN and our partners. As we prepare to deploy to MINUSMA, as we do with every Canadian Armed Forces operation, we will take each and every step to mitigate the level of risk to the men and women deploying.

I've spoken about the upcoming deployment in Mali in greater detail given it is our current focus for future planning. However, I believe it is important to recognize the many contributions the Canadian Armed Forces already make to increase peace and stability around the world. Earlier in my remarks, I mentioned a number of UN and related operations. In addition, our members are deployed in operations designed to help build capacity in the armed forces in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Niger to maintain stability within their countries and regions. We are doing this bilaterally, in coalitions, and as NATO allies, through activities ranging from instruction on how to counter improvised explosive devices in Iraq to providing winter-capable patrol equipment to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In the Sahel region, Canadian Armed Forces members are already providing capacity-enhancing instruction to forces in Niger, in niche areas such as marksmanship, effective patrolling, and combat first aid, thereby increasing their ability to independently, and in coordination with the G5 Sahel force conjointe, effectively control their borders and combat the ever-increasing threat of violence of extremist organizations. These efforts, combined with our current and future contributions to UN peace operations and the initiatives we will conduct with our government partners on child soldiers and women in peace operations, leverage the expertise and the effective capabilities Canada can bring to bear.

In conclusion, the Canadian Armed Forces are working as part of an integrated, whole of government approach to deliver on Canada's commitment to increase its support for UN peace support operations, and help the UN respond to the complex and broad challenges it is facing in its missions around the world.

Thank you for inviting me to appear today, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you.

MP Spengemann, the floor is yours for seven minutes, please.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this morning, and thank you for your service. I have many questions, any one of which will gobble up the time very quickly, so I'll try to be as succinct as possible and then look forward to the remainder of the discussion.

I think one thing that both opening statements made reference to is the complexity of the subject matter at hand. I think that's one aspect in which this committee could add tremendous value.

Just to give you a bit of a flavour of my own perspective, I had the privilege of serving in the UN mission in Iraq from 2005 to 2012 at a time when there were still active coalition combat operations going on. The complexity inside the green zone involved the coordination of multiple fragmented government departments within the Iraqi apparatus, dozens of UN agencies that all had very different interests in the reconstruction and development agenda, and dozens of UN member states that had their own interests, political, economic, and otherwise. That exercise alone, of coordinating the complexity of interests, was monumental and explains in some respects the outcome we saw in Iraq.

I wanted to start with Mr. Gwozdecky. Just to add another layer of complexity, you spoke about the values. We're doing this from a Canadian perspective because of national interests, our core values, and our interests in burden-sharing. What I'm concerned about are your views and those of colleagues on the panel on what I see as an emerging fragmentation of values internationally that would even get us to an effective starting point in peacekeeping operations.

You mentioned the challenges the UN is facing, and I'm wondering if you could elaborate on your views on what the current constellation of values is with respect to peacekeeping globally.

[Mark Gwozdecky]

Let me begin by saying that, while you were in Iraq, I was ambassador to Iraq in 2010 to 2013, and I certainly noticed the same dynamic, the political complexity that you referred to. This reminds me, and I would like to make the point to the committee that, fundamentally, all of these peace missions live or die, succeed or fail, based on the political dialogue and the political peace processes that are at play. They do not depend on the kinds of military inputs. Military inputs are very important in terms of providing an opportunity to create a space and enough stability for these political processes to move forward, but ultimately, these are political challenges and not military ones.

In terms of values, if we use Iraq as example again, this is not a case of Canada trying to impose on another country values that are foreign to it. In fact, as you will recall, in Iraq there's a firm appreciation of the need to build an inclusive, pluralistic, democratic, free society. We, as a country that also embraces those values, are well equipped to support it, particularly as it is a country with a number of regions that each want to see their own autonomy reflected in an ultimate political arrangement.

As I say, we have our values. We think our values are shared around the world, particularly in places where we will be deployed, and our job is to try to support countries as they seek to embed those values in their political arrangements.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you very much; that's extremely helpful.

I'll stay with that theme but extend it to domestic politics and the interests on the part of the Canadian voter or any voter whose country is involved in a coalition to sustain the effort—to expend continued blood and treasure, as the phrasing sometimes goes—to see a peacekeeping operation through but also to engage in the tail ends of post-conflict reconstruction and to not withdraw too early.

You'll have been part of the deliberations and the decision ultimately reached by the lead member of the coalition, the Obama administration, to withdraw the troops at the end of 2011. In the minds of some, looking backwards, that may have been too early.

How do we decide when to withdraw peacekeeping equipment and capacity, and then how do we devolve onto an emerging nascent rebuilt society that can then carry that apparatus on its own?

[Mark Gwozdecky]

Well, first let me say that our commitment to a country like Mali or Iraq isn't defined by a period of time when we may have military or police deployed. Our commitment stands a much longer period of time, and in the case of Mali, we've been a major development assistance contributor for a number of years. I think we're the second largest. We also contribute all kinds of other supports through capacity-building, training, and now through our military contribution.

That commitment, a partnership, will be an ongoing one. There is a period of time when military contributions, peace operations, are required to stabilize it as it goes through a peace process, but that is almost always longer than most countries would like it to be, because these processes are complex. I would say this is one of the virtues of this smart pledging concept that the United Nations is asking us to adopt. The smart pledging allows us to give the United Nations, over a longer period of time, a rotation of these assets that allows them to sustain their peace operations. Even when individual countries may decide that they will cease their contributions, others will be allowed to step in, in an organized and predictable manner.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you very much.

In my remaining minute, Mr. Chair, I would like to open the discussion on the military side to Lieutenant-General Bowes, perhaps, and colleagues. I'm sure colleagues will pick up as it continues.

Non-state actors threaten peace across multiple nation-states. What is the challenge there? What's different very specifically with respect to Daesh and potential future iterations of it, and how has our response changed to those kinds of threats?

[LGen Stephen Bowes]

In asking that question, sir, you are asking beyond the context of the mission in Mali—

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Yes, absolutely.

[LGen Stephen Bowes]

—and you're looking at other regional....

There is no doubt that the mission itself in Mali is a complex operating environment, and you can extend that to the Sahel. Geopolitical developments of the last half-dozen or 10 years have certainly changed the equation in terms of the variety of radical groups that are operating in the region, and that part is very clear. What it speaks to is the internationalization of every effort going forward. Mr. Gwozdecky talked about the multi-year coordination and commitment.

For me, even being part of the military is recognizing the prominence and the importance of an intergovernmental, international approach to the region sustained over time; it's not focusing on one unique capability just because we are there. Success will be in defeating these organizations. If we look in the context of Iraq, much attention has been given to the activities of the coalition wearing the uniform.

I tell you that I continue to be impressed by the other agencies that were part of the coalition, that were interdicting the flow of foreign fighters both ways, counter-financing, counter-messaging, and all of those critical capabilities as well as what the UN team is doing on the ground in Iraq. It's very impressive. Those are the areas that need to be highlighted going forward, and it's more than just one organization like the UN. It's a broader international effort.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

MP Bezan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I want to thank our witnesses for being here.

It's always good having General Bowes at the table. When I sat in your seat, Mr. Chair, he reached out to the committee to make sure we were engaged in understanding military doctrine. Getting out to Wainwright and watching our troops train has always been a great asset the committee here.

I appreciate all the work, and I wish you the best of luck as you move forward in your career over at Veterans Affairs. I know that appointment is going to be a challenging one in itself in providing assistance that's needed.

I also want to extend our congratulations to General Meinzinger in taking over as commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force. We're wishing you great success in carrying out that command going forward.

I want to get down into our experience with the UN missions, particularly in Africa. Mr. Gwozdecky talked about the challenges that are there, but have we learned from our past experiences in places like Rwanda and Somalia? Have things like the UN chain of command and the rules of engagement improved enough that we can have confidence that our troops will be used appropriately? Every mission has its risks, but how do we properly mitigate those risks, especially with the multiple players we'll be dealing with in an adversarial fashion?

General Bowes.

[LGen Stephen Bowes]

We have certainly learned over the 20 years. It's one of our great sources of pride. From our time in our engagements a few years ago, I was leading for the army the organization that was fundamentally responsible for taking those lessons learned and kicking them back into the system.

The thing, though, that we need to remember about risk mitigation is that the chief of defence never relinquishes full command of our forces. I have a responsibility to the chief of defence as we deploy into any theatre to address risk. It is the first thing I think about in the morning when I get up, and it is the last thing I think about when I go to bed at night.

We look and work very hard at the array of challenges that face our people, and we alone are responsible. They will get Canadian rules of engagement. They will have the authority to defend themselves, and we work within the context of a coalition of MINUSMA.

In this particular case in MINUSMA, we are flying helicopters. We will be judged against the aeromedical task logistics and sustainment. We take the matters, everything ranging from flight safety, which General Meinzinger will be responsible for very soon, all the way through the threat environment that we'll be dealing with in Mali to the environmental. It's a harsher environment than we have previously experienced.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I understand that the environment's been responsible for a couple of helicopter crashes already.

[LGen Stephen Bowes]

I'm only tracking one incident, but....

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

When we're looking at the rules of engagement, the chain of command, are we allowed to have caveats in place when we deploy troops on UN missions? I thought the UN didn't allow any member-states to have any caveats.

[Mark Gwozdecky]

The UN discourages it. In fact, our policy is to discourage caveats. We are allowed to have them, and we do from time to time insist on them.

I'd like to add one more thing. One of the important things we've learned has to do with child soldiers. One of the most challenging things any Canadian or other UN uniformed peacekeeper faces is coming face to face with a 14-year-old carrying a weapon, and knowing what to do. That's one of the reasons why we're rolling out this Vancouver principles doctrine: to try to engage an international coalition of countries to better address those issues.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

We've talked about the counterterrorism operations there, that there were multiple terrorist groups at play in Mali, and that it's kind of narrowed down to two players. As stated in the UN report at the end of March here on MINUSMA, on January 15 the Islamic State and the Greater Sahara issued a threat that they'd work jointly with al Qaeda in the Maghreb to counter the deployment of the G5 Sahel joint force. We also know that in the UN Security Council resolution from December 8, resolution 2391, paragraph 13, essentially the UN Secretary-General can assign UN assets, especially for medevac and casevac, for the G5 Sahel in operations in Mali. Our guys could potentially be going into hot conflict. Will we have the right force protection and the ability to defend ourselves as we go into those dangerous situations?

[LGen Stephen Bowes]

The mission is primarily for our aviation task force. Think about it that way: air medical evacuation, logistic support, and transportation. The Canadian task force commander still works for the chief of the defence staff, and we accept missions that are consistent with the UN mandate. The force commander has the authority to ask Canada to fly helicopters in support of the MINUSMA mission, so long as those missions and those tasks are consistent with the mandate of MINUSMA.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

But the G5 Sahel has nothing to do with MINUSMA.

[LGen Stephen Bowes]

Yes, I said MINUSMA. But MINUSMA.... The United Nations has agreed by the Security Council resolution that MINUSMA can provide support to the G5 Sahel.