Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It's a pleasure to be here. I understand I'm one of your first non-Zoom witnesses in a while. If you're as sick of Zoom as I am, I am particularly pleased to be here.
I'm going to base my remarks on my experiences as the deputy of defence, but also as someone who has had some involvement in emergency planning and the machinery of government, because I think that's relevant to your order of reference. I want to start by making a couple of relatively general comments, which, I think, should form part of your deliberations.
The first one deals with time. I believe the past practice of the CF assisting with domestic disasters after the war, during the Cold War and afterwards should be set aside. These practices may or may not have been appropriate for the time, but the environment today is different. You must consider both the domestic environment—which you're mandated to do—and the international environment, because both will have an impact on what the Canadian Forces can and can't do. I think there's virtual unanimity today—think tanks, governments and everybody else—that crises and disasters will occur more frequently in the future than they have in the past. You have to accept this as a given. The last four or five years have demonstrated this in spades.
What does that mean in practical terms? That's something we have to talk about. I want to be clear that I'm talking about natural disasters in Canada, but also geopolitical and natural disasters around the world. The three of them are relevant to what the Canadian Forces could and should do in the context of your review.
If I can make a “machinery of government” point, the Canadian Forces are a specialized and closed organization. That's not a negative comment. It's a reflection of reality. Boys and girls join at the bottom and stay until they go at the top. It's a relatively specialized organization. They have their own culture.
One important thing, I believe, about organizations like that is unity of function. Asking the Canadian Forces, for example, to run a railway would be a mistake. Asking the Canadian Forces to become overly involved in disaster assistance, in my view, is also a mistake, because it affects the culture, but also because—as you know as well as I do, or better than I do—it affects their capabilities in an operational sense. Unity of function, I would argue, is very important. I think adding more natural disaster assistance, or confirming it, is problematic, at least. The idea of formally adding this kind of responsibility, or creating an appendage to the CF to do this....
I saw a press conference the other day. I think it was the CDS saying that a new sort of organization, attached to the defence portfolio, was under consideration to do this sort of thing. I think this would be a significant mistake. The Canadian Forces, right now, are under all sorts of pressures. They're not doing as well as they could be. Adding another function or organization to the portfolio would be a real mistake.
This is not to say the Canadian Forces shouldn't be the tool of last resort. The issue is that we're defining “last” rather loosely. I was saying to the chair, before he convened us, that it is becoming too easy for prime ministers—not this one, in particular, but prime ministers, generally—to simply say, “I'm going to send in the army.” We do this without talking to the provinces, municipalities and civil society about what they could and should do. I'll come back to this in a minute.
Having said all of this, what can the Canadian Forces do when dealing with disasters? I think, logically and intellectually, you have to divide this into three real components: logistical support, administrative support and manpower—manpower being the most immediate draw these days.
This is a really large country, and moving emergency supplies across the country is something the Canadian Forces can do. However, even if they can do it in the context of disasters, using attack helicopters to move bedding supplies across the country is not the best possible use of that very specialized resource. You have to do it in the absence of another capability, and that's something I want to stress. In this country, right now, we probably don't have another tool. I think this is problematic for a sophisticated, complex government like the Government of Canada today. When a disaster occurs, the only thing available to prime ministers....
I want to repeat it again: This is not a partisan comment. I would say the same thing under Mr. Harper or anybody else. If a prime minister only has one tool in the context of dealing with disasters, it's a problem, because I profoundly believe that we're going to have more of these issues over the course of the next little while.
In looking at your order of reference, it occurs to me that it's very difficult for you to deal with this holistically in the absence of knowing what Canada's broader emergency capabilities and plans are. How can you advise the government or how can you advise the House on what the CF should do in the context of disasters if the country doesn't know what the provinces have available to them and if you don't know what municipalities have available to them?
I was saying to the chair just before I came to the meeting that I was listening to the news. The Premier of Nova Scotia was very politely rapping the federal government on the knuckles for not making 1,000 troops available right now in Nova Scotia. I think he has 400.
To my mind, that should give rise to really serious consideration of the relationship between the responsibilities of the provinces and the federal government. To use the vernacular, I ain't arguing against using the Canadian Forces as a tool of last resort, but it's becoming far too easy to make use of them.
I think you need a general review of emergency capabilities in this country. It's something that we should have done 10 to 15 years ago. Again, it's not a partisan comment. Governments move on after disasters, and they don't often take the time to deal with these sorts of reviews. At a minimum, if you can't get such a general review, careful consideration, I think, should be given to the impact of increased Canadian Forces disaster assistance on its operational capabilities.
I am not a military person, but I don't think you need to be the chief of the defence staff or the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to realize that there is not enough operational training. There are not enough exercises right now. It is short of criminal to send our troops into potentially harm's way if they're not as trained as we can possible make them, and I don't think they're doing enough today. If they're chopping wood, which they may well need to do, and doing other things to fight forest fires and whatnot, they're not doing operational training.
If many of us who believe that the geopolitical environment in the world is going to get worse are correct, these troops are going to have to be used internationally. I'm not saying that there's going to be a world war, but we already have a considerable number of people in Latvia. We have troops hither and yon across the world. They are susceptible of being attacked. They need to be trained. They need to be exercised. If we don't look at all of this in the context of disaster planning, then I think it will be a mistake.
I mentioned that it's sometimes too easy for prime ministers to say, “We're sending in the troops.” I think that's true. I've noticed recently that when the Prime Minister has made these kinds of announcements, he has said, “I'm going to send in the troops and the Canadian Red Cross.” It seems to me that somebody somewhere needs to look at what the Canadian Red Cross and other civil society organizations can do or should do in the context of disaster relief to relieve the Canadian Forces from having to do what they're doing today.
Lastly, I think every policy file in this country has a federal-provincial component. This one is no exception. The principle here is that municipalities, provinces and then the federal government involve themselves in disasters. There is not enough coordination. There's not enough understanding. Also, it's too uneven between the provinces as to what can be done.
In summary, I think you should take into account the median domestic and international environment. Look for as much unity of function as you can with the Canadian Forces. Break down CF assistance into manpower, admin and logistics. Look at how this fits into the Government of Canada's broader emergency planning capabilities, and on desirability, look at the desirability of a national review of emergency planning, of which the assistance of the Canadian Forces in disasters is but a relatively small component. If we don't know what is available or what can be made available, then it's not reasonable to ask the Canadian Forces to train or not train for this function.
Thank you, Chair.