Mr. Chair and members, thank you for inviting me to speak here today.
I am Alexander Rudolph, a doctoral candidate at Carleton University and a Canadian Global Affairs Institute fellow. I am researching how and why countries develop the institutional means to conduct cyber-operations. As part of this research, I look extensively at Canada.
I'll divide my comments between two themes today: the cyber-threat domain and current trends in cyber-conflict; and Canadian cyber-defence.
The cyber-threat domain can best be described as existing in a perpetual state of conflict and tension. This is a result of its long-standing architecture, which, although improved over the years, is still very much present and can produce vulnerabilities and exploits. These vulnerabilities and exploits ultimately form the basis of malware in cyber-operations that we view as cyber-conflicts or cyberwarfare.
Right now, there are a few major trends to keep in mind.
The first is that no norms or international laws currently exist to address cyber-conflict and cyberwarfare. To be clear, this is not the stance of Canada and many NATO allies. Presently, there's no international regime or consensus on how to address international law in cyber-conflict.
The second is that ransomware has completely revolutionized how adversarial states and non-state actors view cyberspace. As an example, North Korea has been very prolific in using cyber-operations, particularly ransomware, to find ways to evade international sanctions, but this also overlooks how Russia and many other actors use ransomware in cyber-operations as well.
There's also the commodification of “zero days”. Zero days are unknown vulnerabilities in a system, computer or piece of software. The commodification of zero days and exploits has significantly contributed to the proliferation of cyber-capabilities and the ability to conduct cyber-operations. In particular, China mandates that all new vulnerabilities or zero days be reported to the government within two days. This is the first type of law of its kind, tending to go against existing norms in an industry that has generally favoured maximum protection of users.
I would be remiss if I did not mention Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and utilization of cyber-operations with near-simultaneous joint kinetic military operations. I want to echo the comments made at the previous meeting, but I also want to highlight the type of operations that have been most numerous. While the Viasat attack is quite noteworthy, there have also been at least 16 wiper malwares deployed into Ukraine to specifically target Ukraine to date. These are viruses that destroy data completely to prevent recovery. This is novel because it's not what most criminals do. The way they gain money is by holding data for ransom and extorting individuals. Wiper malware has the sole intention of destroying data in systems. It's noteworthy that 16 have been deployed, which is more than there have been in the past 20 years.
I'll now move on to Canadian cyber-defence and what all these trends mean for Canada.
In particular, Canada needs both a whole-of-government cybersecurity response and a very targeted cyber-defence response. Cyber-defence, in particular, includes the CSE and Canadian Armed Forces. Today, I'm going to focus on the Canadian Armed Forces.
The CAF is, in no way, prepared to face cyberwarfare in the event of a conflict. I further question to what degree they are able to even co-operate and work interchangeably with allies, including the United States.
The reasons for such are numerous, but I'll go over a few today.
At best, Canadian cyber-defence policy can be described as incomplete, ad hoc and inconsistent in strategy and definition with Canada's allies, particularly the United States. I will use CSE's definition of a defensive cyber-operation as an example. The way that CSE in Canada uses it, it generally refers to a purpose—to attack back or to respond to an active threat to Canada. This isn't traditionally how defensive cyber-operations are discussed or explained. They're generally not about an active response back.
While this is maybe just legal language, it creates difficulty in speaking with allies on the exact same topic when you're talking about defensive cyber-operations, which are traditionally just on one's own networks, similar to cybersecurity in many ways. If you're talking about offensive actions, it is a big disconnect between thinkers in Canada and allies on how cyber-operations are conducted and understood.