Evidence of meeting #8 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was putin.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:55 p.m.
Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
Russian citizens are very resilient. They lived through a really deep economic depression in the nineties. If his propaganda works domestically, Russian citizens may be willing to take on a lot of economic hardship.
I think it is more likely that for the sanctions to be effective, it will take some combination of protests and elite action. Elite action against Putin is more likely to stop this war.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
3:55 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you very much to both of our witnesses.
I would like to start with a review of the information that we have discussed in various places, including the Standing Committee on National Defence and the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association.
I remember that, in December, we were barely talking about what was going on in Ukraine. We knew that troops had gathered along the border, but it was as if no one was really paying attention.
Over time, the Standing Committee on National Defence started questioning whether aggression could occur, but the consensus seemed to be that Russia might use rebels in the Donbass to indirectly annex Luhansk and Donetsk. In the end, we were all caught off guard to see Russia launch an outright attack on Kiev.
That said, I wonder how crazy it is to think that there could be a scenario involving a direct attack against a NATO member country.
I would also like to know Canada's state of preparedness to participate in a joint effort with other NATO countries.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
3:55 p.m.
VAdm (Ret'd) Darren Hawco
Thank you.
First, the calculus would have what we call conditions-based elements to it. Putin would look at what the situation looked like. When Russian Federation military action is contemplated, they do a very thorough red teaming, as they call it. There are a lot of layers of assessment about what the probability and outcomes are going to be. It's multi-departmental. It's not just a military calculus, speaking to our point about sanctions that a previous questioner had raised.
The question is, was it foreseeable in some way? I think the answer is yes. I would wager that those who had the intelligence were well aware or were reasonably aware of the increased probability. Of course, you never know when they're massed on the border, because they've been massed on the border on many other occasions, during snap exercises and the like, which, arguably, is what they do these snap exercises for in the first place.
To the thrust of the question about whether it's possible that they would attack a NATO ally, it is hard to imagine, except in some sort of in extremis situation or miscalculation, that something like that would happen. If you just look at the Baltic countries, pretty much every ally has people there. If people were killed in that situation, everyone would respond. Everybody would, without a shadow of a doubt. That kind of situation only has one or two endings, and neither of them is really good for Mr. Putin, as an individual, or for the country, the Russian Federation, writ large.
Would Canada reply? Have we ever not replied? Yes, we would reply.
4 p.m.
Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
If I could jump in here, in terms of the predictability of this attack on Kyiv, everybody who is familiar with both Russian and Ukrainian politics knew and was trying to say early on that an attack only on the Donbass region makes no sense to Putin. He does not need the Donbass; he already controls it. It was clear a long time ago that the calculus is whether they attack or do not attack. If an attack was going to happen, it was going to be on Kyiv.
That's related to the likelihood of an attack on NATO. I agree with the vice-admiral that an attack on a NATO country is not likely, because he has bigger problems to solve with controlling Ukraine. Even if he manages to take over, it's going to be really hard to control a very hostile Ukrainian population. He would just not have the political or manpower capacity to immediately turn to a NATO country. The chances of an attack on a NATO member are very low right now.
4 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
The “right now” scares me a bit.
Professor Popova, on the issue of sanctions, since you spoke about them, we are seeing that the Russian oligarchs are starting to rant and complain about the sanctions.
How much impact can their involvement have? To what degree is this an indication that the sanctions are working?
4 p.m.
Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
Sanctions are the goal. That's the hope, that oligarchs—one of the pillars of Putin's regime—could be his downfall if they calculate that not only sanctions but a longer-term, cold war, iron curtain type of situation will basically cut them off from their assets in the West. This is, right now, the goal.
The problem, though, is that the second pillar of the Russian regime right now is the security service, the former KGB. That pillar is less affected by sanctions because they don't have the sizable assets. I'm sure they have mansions abroad as well, but their loyalty to the regime has a different source. It's not the regime allowing them to enrich themselves, which is the source of loyalty for the oligarchs.
It would be harder to break and to crack that part through sanctions. The conditions—
4 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there.
I apologize for cutting you off, Professor.
4 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
It seems I have a talent for cutting off professors.
Madame Mathyssen, you have six minutes, please.
4 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
I want to ask, again, about sanctions. We know, and we've been told, that Putin has quite a lot in reserve. As we've put forward all these sanctions, how long do you think he can survive on those reserves?
The question is for both witnesses.
4 p.m.
Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
The reserves are there, but we are already seeing the effects of the sanctions. As I mentioned, the ruble is in free fall. The stock market didn't open because of where it would be and how hard the crash would be.
I think he cannot last very long. He has diversified his economy somewhat and tried to make it less reliable on the dollar, probably thinking that the U.S. would be pushing him the hardest, but he diversified into euros, and now the EU is pushing him very hard.
I don't think he can last a very long time.
4:05 p.m.
VAdm (Ret'd) Darren Hawco
I'll defer to the specifics of time, but I completely agree with Maria. What I will add is that, generally speaking, a more integrated economy exists today than existed 15 years ago, and that causes greater issues.
Germany's decision about Nord Stream and then its decision in relation to diversifying its energy needs base are things long discussed. Germany only imports roughly 15% of its energy from Russia, but it's still notable. Those are long-term concerns.
The Russian Federation would have gamed what they thought the sanctions would be, what they could do and what they could withstand, but these are another level that we're seeing than what maybe had been predicted.
4:05 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
The Ukrainian Canadian Congress has asked for Putin to be named as a war criminal. The International Criminal Court has now said that there will be investigations.
It doesn't necessarily stop Putin at that stage, but in a longer-term thought process and in the conversation we had about targeting Putin himself, he is the one. If he's removed internally—I think you talked about this—he is simply replaced by yet another oligarch and we have the same situation, potentially. If he's replaced externally, could you talk about the ramifications of that, either in criminal court or what have you?
4:05 p.m.
Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
To be honest, I cannot imagine a scenario in which he can be removed externally, because of Russia's nuclear capacity. Even if he is removed internally, I very much doubt that Russia would be willing to send him to the International Court of Justice. I cannot see that happening either.
In terms of the question of whether he is replaced internally by another figure who does the same thing, I think we have to be realistic that if he is replaced by another figure, we don't expect that Russia will suddenly become a democracy, become friendly, and co-operate with the west. The goal is to replace him with someone who has a more realistic view of the neighbourhood, who realizes that countries are now attached to their independence, and who switches to a policy where they attempt to influence the neighbourhood through other levers, not by taking countries over.
I think that's a realistic chance. He could still be replaced within an authoritarian coalition and a largely authoritarian government, but with someone who does not have such expansionist goals.
4:05 p.m.
VAdm (Ret'd) Darren Hawco
I would just offer that the GRU, the SVR and the FSB have a different loyalty complex in play than others, so they're the internal security apparatus that is directly responsive to Putin. The likelihood of an external change, absent some sort of a “colour revolution”, is less likely because of those entities. It's more likely that it would just get really complicated for Putin, and he ultimately gets replaced for all the reasons that Maria outlined.
4:05 p.m.
NDP
4:05 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
What you were talking about, Dr. Popova, in terms of the KGB stance as well, goes hand in hand with what Mr. Hawco just said in terms of that loyalty, that transition to somebody else. It doesn't just happen that way. That's not how you get at them. Is that correct?
4:10 p.m.
Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
That's right. But I think it is still possible that at some point the KGB, the FSB, the security services will just come to a conclusion that he is now a liability and may replace him with someone from their circles as well. Think of the defence minister, Shoygu. He's not going to be a dove, but we can go back to dealing with the Russia of the late 2010s rather than the current Russia.