Evidence of meeting #5 for National Defence in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was henderson.
A recording is available from Parliament.
As an Individual
Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I'd like to go back and perhaps provide some specific information in response to the question about specific capabilities—
Bloc
As an Individual
I will speak loudly and slowly and just hope that the interpretation is sufficient.
Bloc
Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay Bloc Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC
Mr. Henderson, I have to make sure everything is okay for the interpreters.
It's not great, but you can continue.
Bloc
Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay Bloc Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC
That would be fine by me, but it wouldn't solve the problem for the interpreters.
As an Individual
I will do my best here.
In terms of specific capabilities that the Coast Guard has and needs, first on the list, I think, is very robust data links. Satellite communications are difficult in the Arctic. We need broadband and large flows of data from ship to shore and between ships at sea. Uncrewed aerial vehicles for surveillance will be required, as will improved longer-range radars. We need electronic equipment in order to be able to do signals intelligence and to understand what other vessels are out there, using electronic means. We need remote sensing to understand flows of traffic. For example, there's a capability of putting all kinds of sensors on aids to navigation, which is a very good way of monitoring traffic.
Dr. Boutilier referred to the outstanding relationship with Inuit in the north. They are our eyes and ears. That is an excellent relationship that needs to be continued.
I made mention of the national area—
Liberal
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON
Thank you, Chair.
Mr. Lajeunesse, China has been sending more research vessels to the Arctic. What's the underlying purpose of their expeditions?
Associate Professor, Canadian Maritime Security Network
As a quick aside, the Canadian Maritime Security Network is about to publish a very large report on exactly that question. I'd be happy to send it to you in the future.
The quick answer is that there are multiple different objectives for these research missions, which have grown dramatically over the last five years. There is legitimate maritime science focused on climate change research. However, over the last six to seven years, we've seen hydrographic surveying and resource surveying. We're looking at salinity and acoustic studies, including acoustic buoys, which could, in theory, be used to prepare for submarine transits.
The big concern for both Canada and the United States is what's called dual scientific research—research that has a legitimate scientific purpose but could also be used to facilitate military operations in the future.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON
Is there any evidence to suggest that these dual-purpose vessels are armed?
Associate Professor, Canadian Maritime Security Network
No. There's no evidence whatsoever to suggest that.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON
You mentioned “grey zone” tactics. Would they be in a position to sever undersea cables? Are they equipped to do that?
Associate Professor, Canadian Maritime Security Network
Yes, absolutely. There are relatively few undersea cables in the areas of operation where the Chinese icebreakers have been working over the last couple of decades. However, when I talk about grey zone tactics, I'm suggesting that the committee and others look at China's modus operandi elsewhere. How does China work with its maritime militia and its illegal fishing fleet in the South China Sea and its near abroad? Of course, it's not too much of a stretch to extend that pattern of operations into the Arctic in the future.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON
Mr. Lajeunesse, how capable and ready is our Coast Guard to confront a potentially armed dual-purpose Chinese vessel in the Arctic? How would the Canadian Coast Guard expel the Chinese vessel from Canadian waters when encountered?
Associate Professor, Canadian Maritime Security Network
That is less a question of physical capability than it is political decision-making. If we're talking about physically expelling a Chinese ship, whether it's armed or not, that has obvious political ramifications. If we're talking about kinetic warfighting, then that's not the domain of the Coast Guard. That is something that the air force would be responsible for.
I would suggest that it's more of a political question than one of physical capability.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON
How prepared is our Coast Guard if it were to have to defend itself against these dual-purpose vessels should they engage and ram our Coast Guard or naval vessels in the Arctic in the way we've seen in other parts of the world?
Associate Professor, Canadian Maritime Security Network
If we are talking about ramming operations, most of our Coast Guard's heavy icebreakers are polar class 3. They'd be very capable of ramming right back, but once again, if we reach the point where our vessels are ramming one another, then politically we probably have much greater concerns than fights in the Arctic.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON
Do we have units from our regular forces in the Arctic that are armed and equipped to deal with a potentially armed Chinese intrusion if they disembark onto land?
Associate Professor, Canadian Maritime Security Network
We do have the ability to project those forces. However, I would highlight that a Chinese intrusion onto land would be both extraordinarily unlikely and, of course, unlikely to achieve anything. I suspect our most appropriate tactic, were that to happen, would be to sit back while the Chinese froze to death in the stark Arctic environment.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON
The U.S. Coast Guard is currently building new icebreakers. The polar security cutters are expected to be armed with two 30-millimetre Bushmaster Mk44 auto cannons and six crewed Browning machine guns. Should Canada be moving to arm our Coast Guard's icebreakers with similar armaments to better counter Chinese in the Arctic?
Associate Professor, Canadian Maritime Security Network
There has been discussion of adding mounts for heavy machine guns to Coast Guard vessels, which I think is a very good idea. There's no discussion of adding a larger or moderate-sized cannon like what we have on the AOPVs.
Again, if we are looking at the Coast Guard as a constabulary force, which I think is the appropriate response, what they're going to be dealing with will be, as I said, this grey zone, hybrid threat: illegal fishing vessels, which are unlikely to be armed, or maritime militia projected into the western Arctic, which, again, is unlikely to be armed. If we are in a position where we're fighting them with machine guns, then, again, we have a bigger picture, and we have the Canadian navy in the background to manage that.
