National Defence Committee on Oct. 9th, 2025

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

You also talked about having to have a national defence strategy before we even think about a national security strategy, which is already 20 years old. Are you saying that the government's defence policies of 2017 and 2021—no, it was 2024 when we had the defence policy update. Are you saying those aren't actual strategies?

[James Fergusson]

No, they're not strategies. A lot of the update is a shopping list, or a wish list of what we need.

With regard to 2017, when you look at what's in there in the context of the threat environment, there are references to things. Modernization gets referenced, but nothing is going on. They're not doing anything. The change environment after 2014 with regard to Russia and Ukraine and events in the East China Sea and South China Sea with China—they were basically absent. There were more in 2024.

I understand the difficulty and time it takes to put these together, particularly because you have to marry all different sets of interests internal to national defence itself. They have to come to an agreement relative to what they think the government wants.

We don't have one. I don't see one. We have pieces but no coherence.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

All right.

Would the national defence strategy also include a defence industrial strategy—

[James Fergusson]

Yes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

—to ensure that we have some sovereign capabilities?

[James Fergusson]

Yes, rather than just simply record.... I understand why we don't want to spend all our money overseas, but rather than simply saying we're going to have defence industrial and technological benefits and we're going to advance all this stuff, we need a proper strategy.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Dr. Rivard Piché, knowing that you worked at National Defence and are now working for CDAI and have that inside knowledge, and knowing that you're working with a great organization that's populated with some of the strongest commanders that Canada had, who are now veterans, would you agree with that? What are the shortfalls within the department and within the government thinking on how we move forward with a strategy that looks at the threats we're dealing with and the shortfalls we have? How do we get from here to there and protect our sovereignty?

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

As I said, I think we're in a moment now where we can achieve strategic maturity, but it has to come from the political level. We need to have very clear signals sent to the Department of National Defence and to the Canadian Armed Forces that this is the way to go.

I actually disagree with Dr. Fergusson. I think we need a national security strategy. The problem we're facing is not strictly about national defence; it's about the security and the prosperity of our country. We need a real strategy that brings ends, ways and means together about how we're going to defend and advance our national interests and our strategic interests.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

Mr. Malette, you have five minutes.

[Chris Malette, Liberal, Bay of Quinte, ON]

Thank you. My question is for Dr. Fergusson.

You alluded earlier to an enhanced satellite array as a key component of our defence capabilities. Can you elaborate on our existing infrastructure on that front, both physical and intellectual, please?

[James Fergusson]

I can't comment a great deal on the intellectual side, but there is a lot of intellectual power sitting in university engineering departments that are working on space. The University of Manitoba is one of them; it is working on this and has contracts.

In terms of our capabilities—and I'll put RADARSAT aside for now—we have one satellite: Sapphire. That's it: one. I know it's on the books that we're going to expand, but I see nothing clear about exactly what we are going to do with this. It observes geosynchronous orbit, and it contributes to the United States space surveillance network ; it is very valuable and very highly thought of, as far as I know, in the United States.

If you want another layer of sensor—and I talked to people about this years and years ago—if you turn it, I'm not sure how well it can look down into the realm of the hypersonic tracking, but it does potentially have that capacity to track missiles in ballistic trajectory in the mid-course phase. It can do that; it has to have the technology because it's moving at a different speed from geosynchronous orbits moving at a different speed. It has to be able to adjust speeds.

This is an ideal potential capability, which we already have the technology for. I'm not sure why this is not a priority if our priority is to enhance our sensor network for the defence of North America.

[Chris Malette, Liberal, Bay of Quinte, ON]

Thank you.

Dr. Lackenbauer, given that the North Warning System is reaching the end of its operational life and needs to be replaced, when are Canada and the United States expected to replace the system, to your knowledge?

This would go to Dr. Karako, as well: How will the new surveillance system enable further detection and identification of potential threats to North America from a pan-domain perspective?

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I was fortunate to be on an operation up at the BAR-2 site on the north slope of Yukon back in February, and I learned there that there were enhancements going on, and some modernization of some of the systems. Again, it's within those wonderful geodesic domes that are the signature of the NWS sites, so I'm going to assume from what I picked up there that there are ongoing enhancements. As the balloon incident demonstrated, those terrestrial-based radar systems still do have a use. They turned up the fidelity on them and were able to detect every bird that was flying in North American airspace. I think I'd see the North Warning System as one in this system of systems, in this nested series of sensors.

An earlier question was about over-the-horizon radar and whether that was able to achieve certain types of detection or tracking. I think we also need to look at other announcements that have been made that still remain in the classified realm, like Crossbow, for which no information has been released. I understand that it's something we're doing in partnership with the United States, and to my mind, it may actually be part of that suite of different sensors that are complementary.

Mr. Malette, to answer your question directly, I hope that the NWS, although somewhat obsolescent, is still being seen as part of this whole suite of strategically redundant sets of sensors. All of them play a role, some more modest than others, but having that existing footprint throughout the north provides us with something that I think we'll continue to maintain as part of this overall package.

[Tom Karako]

I'll just jump in briefly to say that the radars in the North Warning System are very old. Radar technology has improved dramatically over the past several decades, so there's the opportunity to replace them and also, by the way, to fill in some gaps.

I completely agree with the comment that was made earlier: We're blind today. A sophisticated adversary would know how to fly and where to fly to go in between the gaps. It's worse than it sounds, I think. Unlike Professor Lackenbauer, I have not visited one of those radars in the north. I would love to do so with the Department of National Defence. I would host an event, for instance.

I'll say as well that in addition to those radars, we want lots. I've said before that we need a 21st century DEW Line, which was the old Cold War expression. We need a 21st century DEW Line with better 21st century radars, OTHRs. I believe he was probably alluding to passive sensors, with lots of different phenomenology, lots of different bandwidths. Of course you need the S-band and up for fire control quality tracks, but lots of sensors of different types are, I think, paramount.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

We'll go now into our last round. Given the time, we may be able to get three more of our members in.

We'll start with Mr. Kibble. You have five minutes. We'll save time for the budget at the end.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Dr. Piché, as an expert on hybrid threats, what's your interpretation of Russia and China using scientific buoys to monitor and surveil the Arctic, and what should Canada's response be?

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

I think we're already responding to them, but we see the sheer size of the challenge, the Arctic Ocean. Our Arctic waters are extremely difficult to monitor and to navigate. This is really a tremendous challenge, I would say.

I think what those buoys are for and what they are used for has been a bit overblown, but overall I think it just shows the sheer challenge of maintaining domain awareness in our own Arctic.

There are different ways it can be done, and I think this is where maritime sensors are going to come in, and it's very important. The idea that we'll have all-domain awareness at all times in our high north is not realistic. It's really about what we want to focus on and where we want to focus.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you.

I'll throw this out for anyone.

We discussed the end of the operational life of the North Warning System earlier. As we're moving towards a golden dome type of system, is it anticipated that it's going to have advanced BMD capability—as you, Dr. Fergusson, alluded to—to deal with the different types of drone types, the whole range of those types of threats from small to large, slow to fast, etc., or smuggled in, as in the Spiderweb operation? With all these different types of threats, is it realistic to assume that golden dome-type technology is going to be able to integrate and deal with all these types of threats?

[James Fergusson]

I would say that it is realistic, because I think we have to remember—and General Coates knows this better than I do, and I can't remember the number that's usually thrown out in the public domain—the number of civilian and military sensors that fade into NORAD headquarters ever since 9/11, when those were integrated. It's making sure that the civilian sensors we need, which of course come under Transport Canada's responsibility, or NavCan's, are there.

You're now talking about a new piece. Tom mentioned the Aegis SPY-7 capability, which brought to my mind right away, in the Czech Republic, that capability on the ground for Aegis Ashore, which is part of the NATO missile defence.

This is already being done in NATO and in Europe. I do not know whether Tom would agree, but the ability to integrate that missing layer beyond the reliance on the ballistic missile early warning network at Clear, Thule and Fylingdales.... There's a need for backup deeper in North America. Of course there's Beale and Cape Cod, but somewhere in Canada I think would make a significant contribution for integrating, truly integrating, from 1,000 feet to outer space, with the command and control capabilities and AI, etc., that are already partially in place, in my view, in NORAD, and would give NORAD a more modernized role.

That's important. NORAD needs a modernized role, because if it doesn't get modernized, it's going to sit in the corner.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Mr. Fergusson.

Mr. Kibble, I'm sensitive to the time. I'm going to try to give Mr. Savard time in there too.

We'll go over to you, Ms. Lapointe. I'm going to give you four minutes.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I have one question that I'll ask all the witnesses to respond to, but I'll start with Dr. Rivard Piché.

What has become very apparent from the testimony we've heard today is that Canada is seeing more attempts to gain access and more attempts at disruptive effects against the networks we rely on for warning, tracking, and command and control, as well as against civilian critical infrastructure like finance, cellular systems and even remote water systems. I think we can agree that Russia and China are moving beyond espionage and toward disruption, and the Arctic is especially exposed.

Within the NORAD modernization, what must be built in from the start, technically and procedurally, so that availability can be assured and the early warning and command picture remains available during the disruption?

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

To me, what is required is already part of the plan. It's the pace at which it's going to be delivered that's the problem.

We have a solution. A technical solution is there. The plan is there. It's how fast we deliver on this so that we can actually close the gap that's been growing between our own, I would say, inability or unwillingness to adapt quickly and the fact that our adversaries have been advancing really fast. To me, it's really about how fast we can deliver.

To me, what is required is already part of the plan. It's the pace at which it's going to be delivered that's the problem.

We have a solution. A technical solution is there. The plan is there. It's how fast we deliver on this so that we can actually close the gap that's been growing between our own, I would say, inability or unwillingness to adapt quickly and the fact that our adversaries have been advancing really fast. To me, it's really about how fast we can deliver.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Dr. Karako, I have the same question to you regarding what must be built in from the start in our NORAD modernization.

[Tom Karako]

I would agree with everything that was just said there, and I would foot-stomp that the urgency is, no kidding, what stands in the way.

I feel a bit bad about saying this to folks in the high north, but winter is coming, and just how bad it could be has not sunk in.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Dr. Lackenbauer, would you comment?