Natural Resources Committee on May 25th, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Good morning, everyone. We are here today to continue our study of the status of emergency response to offshore oil and gas drilling and the adequacy of the current regulatory regime.

We have two panels today. The witnesses for the first panel are from the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board: Max Ruelokke, chairman and chief executive officer, and Jeff Bugden, manager, industrial benefits power and regulatory coordination. Welcome.

From the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board, we have Diana Dalton, chair, and Stuart Pinks, chief executive officer. Welcome to both of you.

And by video conference from Aberdeen, Scotland, we have Stuart Greer.

Mr. Greer, could you introduce the other gentleman with you today, please?

[Stuart Greer, Rig Manager, Stena Carron, Stena Drilling Ltd.]

This gentleman is Mr. John Banks, the chief operations officer of Stena Drilling.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

All right.

We're going to hear from the witnesses in the order they appear on the agenda, so we'll start today with the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.

Go ahead, gentlemen, with your presentation. You have around seven or eight minutes.

[Max Ruelokke, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'd like to begin my comments to you by expressing the heartfelt sympathy of all of us at the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board for the families and friends of those who were killed or injured in the April 20 explosion on the Deepwater Horizon. Our hearts and prayers go out to them, and to the victims.

Our board was established in 1985 under the Atlantic Accord, to regulate offshore oil and gas activity on behalf of the governments of Canada and Newfoundland and Labrador. We have 69 staff, with approximately 600 years of combined experience in offshore oil and gas operations.

Our mandate encompasses four key areas: worker safety, environmental protection, resource management, and industrial benefits. The board's mission statement confirms that worker safety and environmental protection will be paramount in all board decisions. The board has no part in the establishment or administration of royalties or taxes for any offshore activity. We do not promote the industry, that is the role of governments. Our role is one of regulatory oversight of operator activity, and when I say “operator”, we refer to companies that hold operating permits authorized by the board.

The Atlantic Accord legislation defines a chief safety officer with broad powers and responsibilities for worker safety, as well as a chief conservation officer with powers over resource management. The legislation stipulates that an order made by the chief safety officer cannot be overruled by the board, and it prevails over a decision of the chief conservation officer.

The Atlantic Accord legislation therefore already accomplishes what the United States is proposing to do now with respect to separating some of the responsibilities of the Minerals Management Service. In short, our legislation provides that in matters of safety versus resource management and production, safety is paramount.

Drilling for oil and gas in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore area began over 40 years ago in 1966. Since that time, some 355 wells have been drilled, including 144 exploration wells, and 15 of those wells have been in deep water, which is considered to be 500 metres or more. Production of oil from our offshore area started in 1997. At the end of March 2010, 1.1 billion barrels of oil had been produced from three projects: Hibernia, Terra Nova, and White Rose.

Since the beginning of production, 1,100 barrels of crude have been spilled in our offshore area, one barrel for every million barrels produced. There have been no blowouts in our offshore area. Obviously, we would prefer to always have no injuries or no spills, but we believe that the record for our offshore area is quite respectable.

Currently there is one exploration drilling program taking place in our offshore area. Chevron Canada Ltd. is drilling the Lona-055 exploration well some 430 kilometres northeast of St. John's, in a water depth of approximately 2,600 metres. I will speak to this project in further detail shortly.

The board's mandate is to interpret and apply the provisions of the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act and regulations to the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore area. In addition to the legislation, the board provides guidance to industry, which is developed on the basis of experience and expertise here and best practices from around the world.

The Gulf of Mexico incident is a reminder that accidents can happen. Regulations and regulators are designed to require that the risk of an offshore incident occurring is reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable. This is a reality that safety regulators deal with as part of our responsibilities. It is precisely for this reason that safety regulators focus on ways to improve safety and prevent accidents from occurring.

Before drilling programs even are contemplated, before the relevant licences are issued in a potential area of exploration, the board undertakes a strategic environmental assessment of potential operations in that area. This initiative is over and above the requirements of both the Atlantic Accord legislation and the current federal environmental assessment legislation. The strategic environmental assessment for the Orphan Basin area was undertaken in 2003 and included solicitation of public comments on both the scoping document for the strategic environmental assessment at the outset of the process, as well as on a draft of the final report. The final report was posted on the board's website in November 2003 and is still available there today.

The strategic environmental assessment, while necessarily more of an overview nature than subsequent project-specific assessments, included a consideration of potential blowout risk and fate.

I'd like to describe for you now the regulatory approval process for drilling programs. As part of the planning process for a drilling program and before any authorization respecting the program is issued, an environmental assessment of the proposed program is conducted. This is conducted under both the federal Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and the accord legislation.

In the case of the Orphan Basin drilling program, the assessment was concluded in July 2006, prior to authorization of Chevron's first well in the area, the deepwater exploration well Great Barasway F-66. The documentation associated with this assessment, like all such board assessments, is publicly available, and the principal document still can be downloaded from the board's website.

The board's oversight of an offshore drilling program commences at the early planning stages, typically 18 months or more in advance of any proposed program. The operational review and approval of drilling programs is a two-tiered process that requires, firstly, an operations authorization, and secondly, an approval to drill a well for each one to be drilled as part of the drilling program.

Prior to receiving the operations authorization, a number of statutory obligations must have been met. The applicants must have completed the environmental assessment process required by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act as well as the Atlantic Accord Implementation Act. The operators must have obtained a certificate of fitness from an independent third-party certifying authority and a letter of compliance from Transport Canada for the drilling installation, and they must file a safety plan and an environmental protection plan and a contingency plan that includes an oil spill response plan. In addition, they must submit documentation respecting financial responsibility, and finally, they must provide a declaration of fitness attesting that the equipment and facilities to be used during the program are fit for purpose, that the operating procedures relating to them are appropriate, that the personnel employed are qualified and competent, and that the installation meets all necessary Canadian standards. Only after all of this documentation is presented to and approved by the board may an operator proceed with the application.

Drilling and well control are critical aspects of offshore operations and are addressed extensively in the regulatory framework. This involves review of the operator's well planning and technical capabilities in respect to well and casing design, well control measures, kick prevention and detection, establishment of severe-weather operating limits, a review of emergency disconnect requirements, and an assessment of the relief well drilling arrangements.

Emphasis is also placed on ensuring that all personnel have the requisite training in well control and blowout prevention. A review is conducted to ensure suitable redundancy of the blowout preventer control system in the event of any situation that could result in a disconnect from the well.

Oversight of these matters is achieved in a systematic manner through the board's safety assessment system, which includes review of the operator safety management system and confirmation that the operator has identified the hazards and the measures to be put in place to reduce the risk from those hazards to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.

Last but not least, the board's safety and environment professionals review the emergency response plans for the project in the event that an incident occurs despite the preventive measures in place. These plans include an oil spill response plan, which describes in detail the command structure the operator will put in place to respond to a spill event. It also describes the plan's relationship with other operators' and governments' plans and a description of spill response resources available at site in eastern Newfoundland, nationally, and internationally. Locally available resources include large containment and recovery systems—boom-and-skimmer systems—with fluid pumping capacities over 50,000 barrels per day each.

Detailed modelling of the potential fate of a spill at these locations using 40 years of weather data indicates that even if a large spill were to occur, it would be unlikely that oil would approach the Newfoundland and Labrador shoreline. Thus, scenes like those we see off the coast of Louisiana would not occur here. The impacts of a spill occurring this far from the Canadian coastline nevertheless would be serious and would require immediate response, but it would be a situation substantially different from what we are seeing in the United States today.

The second tier of the approval process involves a requirement to obtain an approval to drill a well, or an “ADW”, for each and every well drilled. The ADW must provide detailed information on the drilling program and well design, including the BOP equipment and the casing and cementing program as well as a geologic prognosis. This application is reviewed by a multi-disciplinary team within the board comprising engineers, technicians, geologists, geophysicists, and environmental specialists prior to the issuance of the ADW.

The drilling and production guidelines in place speak to all critical matters in relation to well barriers, blowout prevention, and well control, including BOP stacks, casing, and cementing matters as well as detailed requirements and expectations pertaining to the termination of wells. These guidelines reflect high standards and modern thinking with respect to drilling, cementing, and well control matters.

Mr. Chair and committee members, Chevron Canada Limited has been issued an approval to drill a well for the Lona O-55 well after having met all the regulatory requirements under the drilling and production regulations and associated board guidelines.

Chevron's safety plan identifies all hazards, including a blowout, and describes how these hazards will be managed. Its safety plan describes the use of appropriate equipment, proper procedures, and competent personnel to undertake safe drilling operations.

Chevron is using the Stena Carron drillship, which is a state-of-the-art, sixth-generation, harsh-environment drillship. The BOP can be activated from the drill floor using either of two hydraulic control systems. This redundancy helps ensure that the well can be shut in by the drilling crew.

The vessel also has three backup systems capable of activating the BOP and shutting in the well should the need arise to do so. It has an acoustic system, an ROV intervention capability, and an auto-mode function, which automatically activates the BOP and shuts in the well when the signal is lost.

Prior to starting operations on the Lona O-55 exploration well, the Stena Carron was contracted out to ConocoPhillips in the Laurentian Basin, off the southern coast of Newfoundland and Labrador. The ConocoPhillips East Wolverine G-37 well was also a deepwater exploration well, in nearly 1,900 metres of water. It was successfully drilled to total depth, logged, and then terminated.

The Lona O-55 well was spudded on May 10, 2010. The BOP was fully pressure- and function-tested, including its backup activation systems, and was run in preparation for it to be run on riser and installed on the wellhead. Chevron continues to conduct drilling operations as per the ADW, and the well should be completed in early September, if the schedule is maintained.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is prudent practice for a regulator to conduct an internal review following an incident like the one in the Gulf of Mexico to determine if more can be done from an oversight perspective to address concerns about the risks of offshore drilling. In light of the situation unfolding in the Gulf of Mexico and heightened public concern over drilling operations currently under way in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore area, the board has taken the following measures for overseeing well operations at Chevron's Lona O-55 well. These measures are in addition to requirements contained in the drilling and production regulations and associated guidelines.

A team has been established within the board to provide regulatory oversight of Chevron's operations. This team comprises the chief safety officer, the chief conservation officer, members of the board's management team, and selected senior staff with extensive experience in the regulatory oversight of drilling programs. Chevron is expected to ensure the timely posting of daily reports, seven days a week, so that up-to-date information is always available to this team. Chevron is required to meet with the board's oversight team every two weeks to review everything associated with the well. The board's chief safety officer will chair these meetings.

Chevron is required to provide the board's well operations engineer with copies of the field reports prepared in respect to the following: testing of the blowout preventer stack; function testing of the acoustic control system; function testing of the remotely operated vehicle intervention capability; and function testing of the auto-mode function system, together with an assessment of the readiness of the ROV system, in terms of equipment, procedures, and spare parts.

Chevron is expected to monitor developments at the Deepwater Horizon incident site and provide periodic assessments on the impact of any lessons learned from that situation to operations at Lona O-55, particularly any lessons learned with respect to well operations, BOP equipment, or spill response readiness.

The frequency of audits and inspections on board the Stena Carron will be approximately every three to four weeks. Normally these are conducted on offshore operators every three to four months.

Prior to penetrating any of the drilling targets, Chevron must hold an operations timeout to review and verify, to the satisfaction of the chief safety officer and the chief conservation officer, that all appropriate equipment, systems, and procedures are in place to allow operations to proceed safely and without polluting the environment.

Prior to penetrating any of these targets, Chevron should assure itself and the board that all personnel and equipment for spill response, which are identified in its oil spill contingency plan, are available for rapid deployment.

Chevron must also make arrangements for a representative of the board to be on board the Stena Carron to observe the cementing operations of the last casing string set prior to entering any target zones. The observer will also be present to witness the BOP testing, well control drills, and the results of the pressure test of the cementing job. In the case of the BOP testing, a representative of the certifying authority will also be present.

In due course, Chevron must provide, for review and assessment by the board's oversight team, a copy of the proposed well termination program, to be issued to field personnel for implementation. Chevron must also make necessary arrangements for a representative of the board to be on board the Stena Carron to observe the well termination program.

Finally, the board is confident that it administers a robust safety and environmental protection regime. Operators here work in a harsh environment, which demands diligence on their part to reduce risks to as low as is reasonably practicable. It is our role as a regulator to oversee their program, a role to which all of us at the board are dedicated.

Thank you very much for your attention.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you very much, Mr. Ruelokke, for your presentation.

We'll get to questions and comments after all three presentations.

We'll go directly to the next presentation from the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board. I believe Ms. Dalton will make the presentation.

Go ahead, please, for about seven or eight minutes.

[Diana Dalton, Chair, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board]

Thank you for the opportunity for our board to provide information on the state of emergency response assets available and the adequacy of the current regulations governing this industry as they pertain to Nova Scotia. I won't repeat, but we are a similar board to the Newfoundland board, same type of legislation and responsibilities.

The Cohasset-Panuke project operated from 1992 to 1999, producing a total of 45.5 million barrels of light oil. When it began production in 1992, it became Canada's first offshore oil project. Our board regulates petroleum activities that total in the area of some 45.5 million hectares. During the life of that Cohasset-Panuke project there were no significant spills or well control incidents.

The Sable offshore energy project is the only currently operating project. It involves production of natural gas from five separate fields in shallow water approximately 225 kilometres off the east coast of Nova Scotia. Production began in December of 1999, and is expected to continue well into this decade. Development of additional past discoveries and any new discoveries could extend that project life. It is producing approximately 350 million cubic feet of natural gas, brought ashore via a subsea pipeline to a processing plant in Goldboro, Nova Scotia.

Now under development is EnCana's Deep Panuke offshore gas development, which involves the production of natural gas from an offshore field approximately 250 kilometres southeast of Halifax in shallow water, the gas to be transported to shore to Goldboro via a subsea pipeline.

Today you've asked us to talk about the regulatory regime, so rather than repeat what Mr. Ruelokke has said, I'll add some other things that both boards do.

Our regulatory regime is permissive in nature, meaning that any work activity to be conducted in the offshore area must first be authorized by our board. To obtain an authorization to conduct a particular work activity, an application must be submitted by the holder of the licence. There are a number of attendant elements, including a demonstration of financial responsibility, safety, environmental protection, resource conservation, industrial benefits, certification, declarations, and operating licences, as more detailed in Mr. Ruelokke's presentation.

The health and safety of offshore workers and the protection of the environment is paramount to our board. By regulation, an application for any authorization of drilling or production operations must be accompanied by safety plans, an environmental protection plan, and also by contingency plans and emergency response procedures. These plans must demonstrate that an operator has a robust safety and environmental management system in place and must clearly demonstrate that the operator has properly identified the health, safety, and environmental hazards associated with the proposed work activities. Training of the offshore workers is paramount. I should add that in our offshore, both in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia—I think Max would agree with me—we have a safety culture that is second to none.

The operator must also demonstrate that the associated risks have been evaluated and can be mitigated and managed. Drilling and production activities proposed in the offshore area trigger a requirement under CEAA to conduct the environmental assessment. The board is a federal authority under this act and follows the environmental assessment requirements in the CEA Act. Environmental assessments must also be in compliance with the Species at Risk Act to ensure the protection of listed species that may be affected by offshore areas. These environmental assessments must be completed and a determination made that the project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects before the board would issue an authorization for a proposed work or activity.

Specific to drilling and production installations, such facilities must also have a valid certificate of fitness issued by a government-recognized independent certifying authority before that installation can be used to conduct any activity in the offshore area. In addition to verifying compliance with regulations and with detailed scope of work that is approved by the board's chief safety officer, the certifying authority reviews and approves the maintenance, inspection, and testing programs, and the operations manual for installation.

In accordance with our act, the board, prior to issuing that authorization, considers safety by reviewing, in consultation with its chief safety officer, the system as a whole, as well as its components.

With regard to evidence of financial responsibility, the operator must submit to the board documentation that evidences the required proof of financial capacity. No authorization will be issued until that evidence is satisfactory to the board.

Activities authorized by the board are subject to ongoing monitoring programs that evaluate operator compliance with health, safety, and environmental requirements. Operators must submit a variety of reports to the board providing information on the status of their work programs and to confirm compliance with regulatory requirements.

Board staff regularly conduct health, safety, and environmental compliance audits and inspections at the offshore work sites. I should add that there is always follow-up to any of the issues they find.

Operators are required to report all spills and other specified hazardous incidents that occur in their work locations. In each case, the board ensures the operator takes appropriate action to determine the causes of the spills or incidents and to prevent the recurrence. In more serious cases, the board will conduct its own independent investigation.

The board has established compliance and enforcement policies to address regulatory non-compliance. Under this policy, the board will seek voluntary compliance from the operator, but other possible actions may include issuance of orders, directives or notices, suspension or revocation of approvals and authorizations, and, lastly, prosecution.

The regulations we enforce are written and promulgated by the two governments. A key element of that under which we operate is a set of comprehensive guidelines that our board issues to aid operators in understanding and interpreting how they may achieve regulatory compliance.

With the promulgation of the new drilling and production regulations in December of last year, the CNSOPB, along with the Newfoundland board and the National Energy Board, issued a set of four guideline documents in association with these new regulations. These guidelines address requirements for the submission of details with respect to well control and cementing programs for drilling program approvals and, furthermore, for the submission of safety plans and environmental protection plans.

The board's focus in its review of applications is to ensure operators have taken any necessary steps to prevent hazardous incidents and spills. Should a major accident, spill, or uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons occur during an authorized activity, the board would lead the government response.

The exception to this would be in the case of a rupture of an export pipeline, in which case the response would then be jointly led by our board and the NEB. The operator would be fully accountable and responsible for attending to any spill and for any damages.

Our board has an emergency response plan that will be activated during a significant spill event. Depending upon the significance of the spill and the operator's response, the board's roles range from monitoring operator activities, giving direction to the operator, or, in the most severe cases, actually managing the spill response.

The regulatory requirements in place require a very high level of training and demonstrated competency for the offshore workforce. This includes well control certification and emergency response training, combined with regular drills and exercises. These standards are in keeping with or exceed the highest of international standards.

I should mention that over the weekend I spoke with the CEO of Survival Systems Limited, located in Dartmouth, which is considered to be one of the best training centres in the world for all of this. They do training for the Spanish and French navies, Australia's homeland security, and our own navy.

In fact, in Canada alone, I note on their website, 11 individuals have testified that they survived actual helicopter ditchings because of the training they received at Survival Systems. Their CEO has extended to this committee an invitation to visit that facility so you can see for yourself the extremely vigilant standard for the training of the offshore workers.

In the unlikely event that relief well operational plans must be executed, the contingency plans referred to earlier must provide details of how they would secure the necessary equipment to undertake those operations.

Some of the natural gas fields in offshore Nova Scotia do contain some light hydrocarbon liquids called condensate. Should a release occur from one of these fields, there would be a plume dispersed down current from the source over the duration of the release. However, given the properties of the condensate, the resultant surface sheen would have a thickness that would be measured in microns. Its overall size would be limited, given that it would rapidly dissipate through evaporation and through dispersion within the upper water column.

All operators have a contract with an environmental response organization, such as Eastern Canada Response Corporation, to provide additional resources and expertise as and when necessary in responding to a spill. Transport Canada can also provide aerial surveillance services.

The board would also coordinate with the regional environmental emergencies team, REET, which is chaired by Environment Canada, to provide expert advice. REET members include Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Canadian Wildlife Service, and many other departments, provincial governments, and aboriginal groups where appropriate.

In closing, the board is of the opinion that the regulatory regime that is in place provides for a high level of safety and environmental protection. The board is vigilant in its administration of its mandate and holds all operators accountable to meet the expected standards. We are keen to learn from the unfortunate accident in the Gulf of Mexico, and, like others, we will apply learnings that come out of that investigation.

Thank you for this opportunity.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Ms. Dalton, for your presentation.

The final presentation today is by video conference from Scotland. From Stena Drilling, we have Stuart Greer, rig manager, Stena Carron; and John Banks, operations manager.

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being with us this morning. Go ahead with your presentation, please.

[Stuart Greer]

We're going to make a presentation. I'm able to put it up on your screen, actually, so you can see some of the graphics.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I'd like to make a brief presentation on the Stena Carron and Stena Drilling safety management system. I'd like to talk a little bit about the vessel class and go into how we bridge our procedures with the operator of business, in this case Chevron Canada.

Stena Carron is a dual-mast, dynamically positioned, harsh-environment, ultra-deepwater drillship.

Can you confirm that you can see this presentation?

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Yes.

[Stuart Greer]

Okay.

The Stena Carron is number two in a series of three Drillmax series vessels. These are state-of-the-art, sixth-generation, ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned drillships designed and certified for year-round worldwide operations in ultra-deepwater.

The latest-generation drillship is able to operate in harsh environment areas, such as the Norwegian and Barents seas, down to minus 20 degrees Celsius, including operation in the Barents Sea's extreme winter conditions.

These vessels are designed for high efficiency and safety, providing the optimum layout for exploration, appraisal, and development drilling; batch drilling and multiple well clusters; well testing; and completions.

On the principal characteristics of the vessel, I won't go through all of these, but the overall length is 228 metres, 42 metres moulded breadth, 19 metres moulded depth, displacement 96,000 metric tonnes, and approximately--

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Excuse me, Mr. Greer. We have a point of order at committee here. Would you hold on for a few seconds?

Madame Brunelle.

[Paule Brunelle, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Mr. Chair, I would like to draw your attention to the presentation that is in English only. Out of respect for the witnesses—I see they have taken you by surprise, you did not think it would come like that—since they are from Scotland, which is really far, we will let it go. But we would like to have this presentation in French, please. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you very much for your consideration, Madame Brunelle. It's very much appreciated.

[Stuart Greer]

I'd like to apologize for that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Go ahead and continue with your presentation, please, Mr. Greer.

[Stuart Greer]

Yes.

The vessel has an approximately 15,000-metric-tonne variable deck load and a maximum transit speed of 12 knots.

The classification class by DNV is a 1A1 ship-shaped drilling unit, drill “N” classification, which means all the drilling equipment actually comes under the classification society, not just the main equipment.

In terms of water depth, it's capable of operating in a maximum of 10,000 feet of water. For dynamic positions, she has a Kongsberg Simrad dynamic positioning system, complying with class notation DNV Dynpos-AUTRO NMD, or Norwegian Maritime Directorate, class 3. This system controls the vessel's position and heading using the vessel's azimuth thruster pods.

In terms of station keeping, again, as I've mentioned, the DP system is rated DNV class 3; such a loss of position should not occur from any single failure, including a completely burned fire subdivision or flooded watertight compartment.

The vessel has installed the Kongsberg Simrad dynamic positioning system. This system controls the vessel position heading using the vessel's azimuth thrusters. It can be done in a variety of modes, including manual and automatic. Manual thrusters can be selected at the panels; however, the automatic function requires at least one reference unit in use.

The SDP system is computerized for automatic positioning and heading control of a vessel. To control the vessel's head, the DP control system uses data from three gyrocompasses, with at least one position reference system--for example, the differential global positioning system or hydroacoustics. This enables the DP control system to position the vessel at all times. This is how the vessel maintains station.

Set points for heading and position are specified by the operator, that's the DP operator, and then processed by the DP control system, to provide control signals to the vessel's thruster and main propeller systems.

The DP system always allocates optimum thrust to whichever propulsion units are in use. Deviations from the desired heading or position are automatically detected and appropriate adjustments are made by the system.

Power management, obviously part of the DP system, is designed to ensure that sufficient power is available at all times. To accomplish this, the power management system control system will perform the following functions.

It will monitor the condition of each diesel engine generator set, and start up or shut down specific generator sets in response to alarm conditions, barometers measured and monitored by the system.

It controls the load-sharing of the generator sets online and monitors the load situation of the power grid. It initiates starting and recommends stopping of engine generator sets as required to maintain sufficient power to the electrically driven equipment. This is accomplished whilst at the same time not allowing unnecessarily high amounts of power to be connected to the grid.

The power management system provides a system of anti-blackout protection, provides blackout restart of the power system in the event of a total system loss, and at all times maintains sufficient power for the operation of the ship thrusters to maintain the vessel's position as a priority.

Moving on to the Stena Carron management system and HSE case, the Stena Carron currently operates under an approved HSE case, which is aimed at three main constituencies. That is the employees and contractors, customers, and regulators.

The said HSE case demonstrates the effective risk management of the drillship to the stakeholders through documentation of the following.

Stena Drilling operates with an effective management system that includes the identification and management of hazards to the health and safety of people and harm to the environment.

The Stena Carron is a high-specification vessel, and the vessel, with its critical equipment, has been designed, built, and maintained in accordance with good industry practice.

Stena Drilling operates the Stena Carron with a clear understanding of the risks from major accident hazards based on the application of formal risk assessment techniques.

Moving on to the Stena Drilling management system, this provides a formal set of policies, procedures, and processes required for planning and execution of its business processes: promote the Stena care, innovation, and performance values; improve health, safety, and environmental performance; provide key management-of-risk tools; enhance business processes and productivity; demonstrate procedural compliance; document control to clients, third parties, and other regulatory authorities; and be formally controlled and auditable.

In terms of main documents within the management system, we have policies, principle documents, guidance documents, forms, procedures, and process maps.

The management system itself has a hierarchy. We have level one, which is our corporate. This level includes the quality manuals, Stena policies and values, and organograms done by the managing director.

Moving down through the various levels, we have the support processes at level two. This level incorporates all the main departments that support the organization. That's HSE operations, engineering, HR, accounts payable, purchasing, IT, commercial, etc.

Moving down to regional, this level includes all regional-specific procedures and documents that may be required to operate within that region or country, and do not apply as a level two worldwide.

Moving on to level four, that's at the rig vessel level--

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Excuse me, Mr. Greer. I'll just interrupt your presentation for a minute. We have another point of order at the committee.

Go ahead, Mr. Cullen.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

I apologize to the witness for interrupting.

Very briefly, Mr. Chair, my concern is that we have only 15 minutes left. Some of our witnesses have travelled from far, and at this pace we're only going to have a few minutes each to ask them questions. Often in the questioning we can get some more information out.

I don't know what to say; our next panel is four witnesses, and this is challenging, or frustrating I suppose, as a committee member. We've prepared a lot to try to drill into this, so to speak.

[A voice]

No pun intended.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

No, none.

I'm just concerned about the time.

I hand it back to you, but it's worrisome that with 15 minutes left, we'll just get what we get.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Mr. Cullen.

Continue, Mr. Greer, but please wrap up your presentation as quickly as possible. Thank you.

[Stuart Greer]

Okay. It's not much longer.

At level five, we have rig-specific work methods. This level includes procedures specific to the rig vessel--short, detailed instructions.

I'll go quickly through the main safety tools: risk assessment; “toolbox talks”; lifting plans; a safe behaviour program that's actively used on the vessel; permit to work; isolation; safe entry procedures; Stena golden rules of safety; and STOP, which is a very commonly used monitoring and reporting system within the industry.

There's a very important bridging between Chevron and Stena management systems. The purpose of the bridging document that exists is to identify and document areas of shared responsibilities and/or activities in which Chevron Canada and Stena Drilling shall be jointly involved during the execution of the contract while working in Newfoundland. All operations on board the Stena Carron will be implemented in accordance with Stena's management system.

Areas of shared responsibilities and/or activities are considered to be where one party's employees' assets or reputations may be at risk from the other party's activities. Each company is deemed to be in control of its own HSE management system and shall be accountable for the management of HSE risks arising from its own activities.

The bridging document has been developed through consultation between Chevron Canada and Stena Drilling, and has been agreed upon by both companies' senior management. The bridging arrangements have been communicated to all personnel involved in or affected by the activities.

Key areas covered in the bridging document include policy objectives; purpose; scope; organization; communications and reporting lines; roles and responsibilities; and safety standards and procedures, including risk assessment, loss of possession contingency planning, permit to work, personal protective equipment, occupational health and hygiene, waste management, emergency response, process, spill management, well control and blowout contingency, medical...[Technical difficulty--Editor]...emergency response drills. Incident investigation reporting, management of change, and key management system documents are also referred to in the bridging document.

That concludes the presentation from Stena Drilling in Aberdeen.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you very much, Mr. Greer, for the presentation.

We now have about 13 minutes for questions. With four parties, we're going to have to go with about three minutes per party.

Go ahead, Mr. Regan.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

Maybe, Mr. Chairman, in future we should explain that instead of a question and answer period with the witnesses, we'll have a period with a question and an answer.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Yes.