Evidence of meeting #17 for Public Safety and National Security in the 39th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Jim Judd  Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Ward Elcock  Former Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)

9 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Garry Breitkreuz

I'd like to call this meeting to order.

This is the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. This is meeting number 17, and we are meeting pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) on a study of the report of the commission of inquiry on the events relating to Maher Arar.

Our witnesses today are from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Mr. Jim Judd, the director, and Ward Elcock, the former director. We would like to welcome you, gentlemen, to our committee. We look forward to the information that you will convey to us.

The usual practice of this committee is to allow you to have an opening statement of whatever length, usually ten minutes. If you need a little more time, that's not a problem. Then we'll begin with questions from the official opposition and move around to the government.

Thank you very much. If you're ready to begin, we await your statement.

9 a.m.

Jim Judd Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you for inviting me to appear today to provide you with the perspective of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on the report of Justice O'Connor on the case of Mr. Maher Arar.

As you know, Justice O'Connor did not find any evidence that my organization, or indeed Canadian officials, participated or acquiesced in the decision to detain Mr. Arar or to remove him to Syria. More specifically, Justice O'Connor found no evidence that my organization shared any information about Mr. Arar with the United States prior to his detention in New York and subsequent deportation to Syria. Those findings are consistent with those of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in its review of the service's involvement in Mr. Arar's case.

I would note as well that while some of the recommendations in Mr. Justice O'Connor's report refer to the service and our institutional practices and policies, they do so in the broader context of departments and agencies involved in national security. In fact, there are a number of very positive comments in his report regarding the policies and practices of CSIS generally. However, despite these central findings of Mr. Justice O'Connor in respect of our role in this manner, there were several criticisms of the service and some other issues that I would like to address this morning.

While there is little if anything to add to the findings of the report, I believe it is important for the committee to understand how we are responding to the report and for us to provide some background on our activities in this case. Before I do so, I should say that I very much regret the ordeal Mr. Arar and his family were subjected to as a result of his deportation to Syria.

Number one, Justice O'Connor found that CSIS did not do an adequate reliability assessment as to other information received from Syria that was likely the product of torture.

Justice O'Connor made it clear in his report that intelligence-sharing with foreign partners is essential for CSIS to collect information related to threats to Canada. We are very much aware that this can present a challenge for us in dealing with countries with poor human rights records. It is an unfortunate reality that many terrorist threats to the security of Canada originate in or have connections with countries that have poor human rights records. That is one of the reasons why the CSIS Act requires that two ministers approve any foreign liaison arrangement we might propose.

In considering any such arrangement, ministerial directives to the service and our own policy require us to specifically “address the human rights record of the country including any possible abuses by the security or intelligence organizations”. Moreover, any such arrangement will only be considered where contact is required to protect the security of Canada. We have an obligation to ensure that everything possible is done to identify threats before they materialize on our shores, and we must therefore make use of all available sources of intelligence, but always subject to reasonable safeguards.

This is obviously a difficult issue. We have arrangements with organizations and countries where there is suspicion of torture, and there are times when certain restrictions are placed on any interactions with those services. As Justice O'Connor himself observed in his report:

Decisions about how to interact with a country with a poor human rights record...can be very difficult and do not lend themselves to simple or prescriptive rules.

It is never a simple matter to determine whether information received from a foreign government with a poor human rights record was obtained as a result of torture. It does not necessarily follow, because a country has a poor human rights record, that any information received from it was the product of torture. Moreover, our normal practice with respect to the receipt of information of any kind is to seek corroboration of it from other sources prior to coming to any determination on it.

Our information exchanges with foreign organizations are reviewed annually by the Security Intelligence Review Committee to ensure that we comply with ministerial directives in our own policies, and in some instances the committee has made recommendations, a number of which have been implemented by the service.

For example, in its report on Mr. Arar, SIRC made a number of recommendations, re-stated by Justice O'Connor, regarding the need to amend CSIS's operational policies governing information-sharing and cooperation to ensure that we take into account the human rights records of foreign countries. These recommendations have already been implemented by the service.

As Minister Day noted during his appearance before this committee, we have also developed a new caveat to accompany information we share with foreign agencies. It seeks assurance that any Canadian citizen detained by a foreign government

...will be fairly treated within the accepted norms of international conventions, that he is accorded due process under law and afforded access to Canadian diplomatic personnel if requested.

Justice O'Connor also recommended that the Department of Foreign Affairs share its assessments on the human rights records of other countries to ensure a uniform appreciation of the situation in these countries. We agree with the recommendation and will be working with the Department of Foreign Affairs to ensure its implementation.

Number two, Mr. Justice O'Connor noted that CSIS and the RCMP were not supportive of an initiative by the Department of Foreign Affairs to send the letter to Syrian authorities to convey the message that Canada spoke with one voice in seeking Mr. Arar's release.

As you may know, officials from my organization were questioned on this issue extensively, both in public and in camera. There was reluctance in CSIS to proceed with the proposed letter—to be “endorsed” by the then Solicitor General—and there was among others one reservation in this regard; that is, the service's longstanding policy to neither confirm nor deny that any given individual is or is not a subject of investigation. As you know, the Solicitor General of the day expressed before this committee his own reservations about signing such a letter at that time.

Mr. Justice O'Connor has recommended that a single, coherent government approach and coordination be developed to deal with Canadian detainees in foreign countries. We accept that recommendation and will be working with Foreign Affairs and other government agencies to implement it.

Number three, Mr. Justice O'Connor was critical of both the process and the impact of the claims made by the government to protect national security confidences. While he was critical, Mr. Justice O'Connor conceded that the overall process worked well and did not prevent him from arriving at his findings in this matter.

By way of clarification for members of this committee, our organization has traditionally sought to maintain national security confidentiality in a number of areas. These include, among others: whether or not an individual is or is not under investigation by the service; the identification of individual foreign agencies with whom we have any relationship; the identification of human sources used in CSIS investigations; the identification of CSIS personnel involved in covert operations; and specific investigatory techniques used by the service in its investigations.

There are a number of reasons for this approach, including provisions in our own legislation, the Privacy Act, operational security and effectiveness, the personal safety of our employees, and others. And as you know, the issue of national security confidence claims related to this report is now before the courts.

Fourth, Mr. Justice O'Connor was very critical of the anonymous and damaging leaks that were made during his inquiry. When classified government information appeared in the public domain, CSIS conducted its own internal investigations and also participated in investigations convened by the Privy Council Office on several occasions. Mr. Justice O'Connor was unable to identify the culprits, and I understand that the RCMP's criminal investigation remains ongoing. However, none of the investigations conducted to date has suggested that CSIS personnel caused any unauthorized disclosure of information.

Let me conclude by saying that I and the service take the findings and recommendations of Justice O'Connor's report very seriously. We are, and will be, adjusting our policies in some areas in response to the report and we'll be working with other federal organizations to ensure the effective development of responses to other recommendations in that report.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy now to take any questions that members of the committee may have.

9:10 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Garry Breitkreuz

Thank you, Mr. Judd.

We will now begin our round of questioning, beginning with the official opposition. Mr. Holland, please, for seven minutes.

9:10 a.m.

Liberal

Mark Holland Liberal Ajax—Pickering, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, thank you to both gentlemen for appearing before the committee.

I am going to start off by saying that Justice O'Connor in his report did indicate a number of different ways in which CSIS did make, in his opinion, errors that potentially undermined efforts to bring Maher Arar back as well as potentially contributing to the decision made by the United States to send Maher Arar to Syria.

I would ask you at the outset, because it wasn't in your opening, if you are going to be apologizing today to Maher Arar for any role that CSIS might have had.

9:10 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

As you know, in my opening statement I certainly expressed my regret for the ordeal that both he and his family endured as a consequence of this. More broadly, as our minister stated before the committee and as was reiterated by another member of the government yesterday, the broader issue of an apology by the government is under consideration in the context of the negotiations with Mr. Arar and his counsel on an overall settlement.

9:15 a.m.

Liberal

Mark Holland Liberal Ajax—Pickering, ON

Then you won't be apologizing.

9:15 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

As I said, sir, I very much regret what happened to Mr. Arar, but the broader issue of an apology is one that is now before the government in the context of the overall compensation negotiations with Mr. Arar.

9:15 a.m.

Liberal

Mark Holland Liberal Ajax—Pickering, ON

I would just point out that Commissioner Zaccardelli did, and I understand that the minister hasn't. This committee has taken a position that the minister should.

Perhaps I could move on to the issue of one voice. In May and June 2003 both the RCMP and CSIS, as you mentioned in your opening statement, resisted a united call for the release of Maher Arar. This was cited by Justice O'Connor as playing a role in undermining efforts to have Maher Arar returned to Canada, and what the former Solicitor General had stated to us was that part of his reason for not doing that was the advice that he was getting from CSIS and the RCMP.

Given the fact that he neither had a criminal record nor was the object of a criminal investigation, given the fact that certainly even a Google search would have found that he was most certainly facing human rights abuses in Syria, why was this effort to speak with one voice, this effort of the foreign affairs department, rejected? I know you said that you didn't want to characterize, to take a position, but this was somebody who didn't have a criminal record and certainly was facing human rights abuses abroad.

9:15 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

Having read the transcript of the former Solicitor General's appearance before this committee, I believe he said that over and above the advice that he had received from both CSIS and the RCMP, he himself had misgivings for various reasons on signing off on such an approach, which related in part, I believe, to the issue of whether or not it was appropriate for the Solicitor General to be party to such a document where the foreign minister would speak on behalf of Canada in a representation to a foreign government, and also because there may have been an issue as to whether or not Mr. Arar was still a person of interest in an investigation.

9:15 a.m.

Liberal

Mark Holland Liberal Ajax—Pickering, ON

It's your position then that you disagree with Justice O'Connor in his assertion that not speaking with one united voice calling for Maher Arar to be returned undermined efforts to return him. It is your opinion that Justice O'Connor was wrong in saying that, and you feel you acted properly in that instance.

9:15 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

I'm not disputing Mr. Justice O'Connor's conclusions. I'm just trying to explain to you the circumstances at the time that led to the advice being rendered to the Solicitor General at that moment.

9:15 a.m.

Liberal

Mark Holland Liberal Ajax—Pickering, ON

The other item that I want to come to is the reliability assessment. The individual who conducted the reliability assessment for CSIS, with respect to the intelligence being gotten by the Syrian government, had no experience in torture. Therefore it led to this information being given credibility and the belief that this information was not given under duress.

The first question is why? In Justice O'Connor's report it is very clearly stated that if a proper assessment had been done by somebody with experience in torture—in fact, it wouldn't have taken a lot of work to find out that torture happened in Syria—we would have been able to dispute that information and may have been able to get Maher Arar back sooner. Why was this assessment not done by somebody who had experience in torture?

9:15 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

The assessment was done at the time by the individual who had responsibility for the issue at the time. Whether that individual did or did not have the record of expertise is something that certainly Justice O'Connor has commented on. I can't provide you with a ready explanation as to why that individual did not have that level of experience.

9:20 a.m.

Liberal

Mark Holland Liberal Ajax—Pickering, ON

In retrospect, do you think it would have been important that the individual making that reliability assessment would have had experience in torture? Or do you disagree with Justice O'Connor on that?

9:20 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

It's always a very difficult issue, as I tried to point out in my opening comments. One cannot necessarily presuppose that information received from a country with a poor human rights record is necessarily a product of torture.

Over and above that, though, again as I tried to point out in my opening comments, we have adjusted our policies and our operational practices in terms of dealing with information. I would say it would be unlikely that this would happen today.

9:20 a.m.

Liberal

Mark Holland Liberal Ajax—Pickering, ON

With respect to communication between CSIS and the RCMP, there was certainly discussion about the fact that information from CSIS flowed to the RCMP and then made its way, in selective ways, to U.S. authorities, and in large part, according to Justice O'Connor, that information contributed to Maher Arar being sent to Syria. As you saw these leaks occurring, as you saw CSIS information being sent to the United States—information that you said you didn't release but the RCMP did—what discussions did you have with the RCMP? What did you try to do to stop this? Or did you not have a problem with the RCMP releasing information that you were giving to them?

9:20 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Garry Breitkreuz

That will have to be your final question, Mr. Holland.

9:20 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

As a practical matter, I wasn't the director of CSIS at the time. Perhaps Mr. Elcock could answer.

9:20 a.m.

Ward Elcock Former Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)

Mr. Chairman, with respect to that issue, we reminded the RCMP on a number of occasions throughout their investigation that caveats applied to our information. We were unaware of what information they were or were not sharing.

9:20 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Garry Breitkreuz

Mr. Ménard, for seven minutes, please.

9:20 a.m.

Bloc

Serge Ménard Bloc Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Judd.

I certainly understand that in order to deal with the terrorist threat facing the world today, your organization must work closely with other agencies doing the same work in democratic countries. That is the case, is it not?

9:20 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

That's correct.

9:20 a.m.

Bloc

Serge Ménard Bloc Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC

Do you in fact have close relations with US authorities?

9:20 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Jim Judd

We have relationships of some kind or another with a number of foreign agencies. As I tried to state in my opening comments, we do not identify specifically which agencies we have contacts with for various reasons, including the generally accepted principle in international dealings of this sort that information is protected.

9:20 a.m.

Bloc

Serge Ménard Bloc Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC

I understand that very well, but it would be quite unthinkable that you would not have relations with the American authorities.