Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you for inviting me to appear today to provide you with the perspective of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on the report of Justice O'Connor on the case of Mr. Maher Arar.
As you know, Justice O'Connor did not find any evidence that my organization, or indeed Canadian officials, participated or acquiesced in the decision to detain Mr. Arar or to remove him to Syria. More specifically, Justice O'Connor found no evidence that my organization shared any information about Mr. Arar with the United States prior to his detention in New York and subsequent deportation to Syria. Those findings are consistent with those of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in its review of the service's involvement in Mr. Arar's case.
I would note as well that while some of the recommendations in Mr. Justice O'Connor's report refer to the service and our institutional practices and policies, they do so in the broader context of departments and agencies involved in national security. In fact, there are a number of very positive comments in his report regarding the policies and practices of CSIS generally. However, despite these central findings of Mr. Justice O'Connor in respect of our role in this manner, there were several criticisms of the service and some other issues that I would like to address this morning.
While there is little if anything to add to the findings of the report, I believe it is important for the committee to understand how we are responding to the report and for us to provide some background on our activities in this case. Before I do so, I should say that I very much regret the ordeal Mr. Arar and his family were subjected to as a result of his deportation to Syria.
Number one, Justice O'Connor found that CSIS did not do an adequate reliability assessment as to other information received from Syria that was likely the product of torture.
Justice O'Connor made it clear in his report that intelligence-sharing with foreign partners is essential for CSIS to collect information related to threats to Canada. We are very much aware that this can present a challenge for us in dealing with countries with poor human rights records. It is an unfortunate reality that many terrorist threats to the security of Canada originate in or have connections with countries that have poor human rights records. That is one of the reasons why the CSIS Act requires that two ministers approve any foreign liaison arrangement we might propose.
In considering any such arrangement, ministerial directives to the service and our own policy require us to specifically “address the human rights record of the country including any possible abuses by the security or intelligence organizations”. Moreover, any such arrangement will only be considered where contact is required to protect the security of Canada. We have an obligation to ensure that everything possible is done to identify threats before they materialize on our shores, and we must therefore make use of all available sources of intelligence, but always subject to reasonable safeguards.
This is obviously a difficult issue. We have arrangements with organizations and countries where there is suspicion of torture, and there are times when certain restrictions are placed on any interactions with those services. As Justice O'Connor himself observed in his report:
Decisions about how to interact with a country with a poor human rights record...can be very difficult and do not lend themselves to simple or prescriptive rules.
It is never a simple matter to determine whether information received from a foreign government with a poor human rights record was obtained as a result of torture. It does not necessarily follow, because a country has a poor human rights record, that any information received from it was the product of torture. Moreover, our normal practice with respect to the receipt of information of any kind is to seek corroboration of it from other sources prior to coming to any determination on it.
Our information exchanges with foreign organizations are reviewed annually by the Security Intelligence Review Committee to ensure that we comply with ministerial directives in our own policies, and in some instances the committee has made recommendations, a number of which have been implemented by the service.
For example, in its report on Mr. Arar, SIRC made a number of recommendations, re-stated by Justice O'Connor, regarding the need to amend CSIS's operational policies governing information-sharing and cooperation to ensure that we take into account the human rights records of foreign countries. These recommendations have already been implemented by the service.
As Minister Day noted during his appearance before this committee, we have also developed a new caveat to accompany information we share with foreign agencies. It seeks assurance that any Canadian citizen detained by a foreign government
...will be fairly treated within the accepted norms of international conventions, that he is accorded due process under law and afforded access to Canadian diplomatic personnel if requested.
Justice O'Connor also recommended that the Department of Foreign Affairs share its assessments on the human rights records of other countries to ensure a uniform appreciation of the situation in these countries. We agree with the recommendation and will be working with the Department of Foreign Affairs to ensure its implementation.
Number two, Mr. Justice O'Connor noted that CSIS and the RCMP were not supportive of an initiative by the Department of Foreign Affairs to send the letter to Syrian authorities to convey the message that Canada spoke with one voice in seeking Mr. Arar's release.
As you may know, officials from my organization were questioned on this issue extensively, both in public and in camera. There was reluctance in CSIS to proceed with the proposed letter—to be “endorsed” by the then Solicitor General—and there was among others one reservation in this regard; that is, the service's longstanding policy to neither confirm nor deny that any given individual is or is not a subject of investigation. As you know, the Solicitor General of the day expressed before this committee his own reservations about signing such a letter at that time.
Mr. Justice O'Connor has recommended that a single, coherent government approach and coordination be developed to deal with Canadian detainees in foreign countries. We accept that recommendation and will be working with Foreign Affairs and other government agencies to implement it.
Number three, Mr. Justice O'Connor was critical of both the process and the impact of the claims made by the government to protect national security confidences. While he was critical, Mr. Justice O'Connor conceded that the overall process worked well and did not prevent him from arriving at his findings in this matter.
By way of clarification for members of this committee, our organization has traditionally sought to maintain national security confidentiality in a number of areas. These include, among others: whether or not an individual is or is not under investigation by the service; the identification of individual foreign agencies with whom we have any relationship; the identification of human sources used in CSIS investigations; the identification of CSIS personnel involved in covert operations; and specific investigatory techniques used by the service in its investigations.
There are a number of reasons for this approach, including provisions in our own legislation, the Privacy Act, operational security and effectiveness, the personal safety of our employees, and others. And as you know, the issue of national security confidence claims related to this report is now before the courts.
Fourth, Mr. Justice O'Connor was very critical of the anonymous and damaging leaks that were made during his inquiry. When classified government information appeared in the public domain, CSIS conducted its own internal investigations and also participated in investigations convened by the Privy Council Office on several occasions. Mr. Justice O'Connor was unable to identify the culprits, and I understand that the RCMP's criminal investigation remains ongoing. However, none of the investigations conducted to date has suggested that CSIS personnel caused any unauthorized disclosure of information.
Let me conclude by saying that I and the service take the findings and recommendations of Justice O'Connor's report very seriously. We are, and will be, adjusting our policies in some areas in response to the report and we'll be working with other federal organizations to ensure the effective development of responses to other recommendations in that report.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy now to take any questions that members of the committee may have.
