As I mentioned in my comments, when I became minister I was given the specific mandate to look at whether additional oversight was required for the RCMP in its role as it related to national security. I took that challenge up, and as we worked through how we might go about determining what additional oversight might be required, it became apparent that the best person to offer us advice, in all likelihood, would be Mr. Justice O'Connor, because he would have worked through a specific example, potentially, where oversight might have been lacking. We thought it made an awful lot of sense not only to give Mr. Justice O'Connor the factual Arar inquiry but then, flowing from it and in more general terms, tap his expert knowledge concerning what additional oversight was required.
It's quite clear, although we don't have his second report, that he will recommend an independent oversight mechanism of some sort. We looked at.... For example, the public complaints commission exists, but my own view is that as presently constituted, with its present mandate, it has neither really the mandate nor the resources to do what is required by way of additional oversight as it relates to RCMP activities in the area of national security. So whether you increase its mandate and give it more resources or whether you create an independent body.... I think it's pretty clear that Mr. Justice O'Connor talks about an independent review body. I presume he means not the public complaints commission but some additional body.
Consider SIRC. I think SIRC has worked generally well for CSIS, and SIRC is an aggressive body that takes its mandate seriously, that is well resourced to do what it does, and I think has developed substantial credibility, not only here but abroad, in terms of providing oversight for the activities of CSIS. I would think, based on what I've read of O'Connor so far—he talks about an independent review mechanism—that's probably the way he is going to go, although we all await that.
I would agree with it. In the area of national security, as he says, the lines blur a little bit, as hard as one tries to prevent it from happening. The lines blur between what is intelligence-gathering and what is traditional criminal investigation and law enforcement.
Consequently, an oversight mechanism in relation to those activities that are fairly described as being of a nature concerning national security makes sense for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Leave the public complaints commission to deal with oversight and review, as it relates to traditional criminal investigations and law enforcement; create an additional body, in all likelihood, for oversight as it relates to national security.