Public Safety Committee on March 20th, 2018

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Ladies and gentlemen, can we come to order, please?

I'm going to go slightly out of order because I'm unable to stay here for the full two hours. You have in front of you the 11th report of the subcommittee and the proposed schedule that would accompany the report. I'm assuming that this should be without debate.

If it is without debate, I'll go back to our regular order, so if it is, I'd ask for a motion to pass the subcommittee's report. It is moved by Mr. Dubé and seconded by Mr. Fragiskatos. Those in favour? Those opposed?

(Motion agreed to)

Okay. That has passed. We'll go back to our orders. Thank you.

We have with us witnesses from Correctional Services Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency for meeting number 100, ladies and gentlemen.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Yes. I don't know whether there'll be dancing in the streets or any other form of celebrations.

Nevertheless, we are here to hear your testimony with respect to the use of ion mobility spectrometers by Correctional Services Canada. I'm assuming that Correctional Services Canada wishes to go first. We look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Coons.

[Superintendent Warren Coons, Director General, Preventive Security and Intelligence, Correctional Service of Canada]

Mr. Chair, I'd like to thank you and the honourable members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I am pleased to be joined by Rob Campney, deputy director of preventive security and intelligence at the Correctional Service of Canada. Rob is responsible for the administration of the ion scanner guidelines. As for me, as director general of preventive security and intelligence at the Correctional Service of Canada, I'm responsible for ensuring the integrity of intelligence operations, as well as the delivery of safe corrections through the identification and management of effective detection tools.

I'm grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee in order to discuss how we can ensure the safety and security of inmates and staff by preventing drugs and contraband from entering our institutions, while at the same time facilitating visits between inmates and their families, friends, and other sources of community support, which are so critical to inmate rehabilitation. It is my hope that we can provide you with information related to drug interdiction and some of the ongoing challenges in order to assist your study on this important subject.

To begin, I would like to provide the committee with background information on the broader issue of drug use within federal correctional institutions in Canada.

We are committed to ensuring that federal correctional institutions provide a safe and secure environment and serve as settings that contribute to inmate rehabilitation, the safety of staff and inmates, and the protection of the public. In an effort to ensure this, preventing the introduction of contraband and reducing the use of illicit substances by offenders in our correctional institutions are among our highest priorities. As the committee is no doubt aware, illicit drugs are not compatible with a secure environment, nor are they conducive to the safe reintegration of offenders into our community. Drug use is a contributing factor to criminal behaviour and to the spread of infectious diseases.

As I'm certain you're also aware, the number of deaths related to opioids has significantly increased within the Canadian population. Based on the Public Health Agency of Canada's national report on opioid-related deaths, the number of apparent deaths involving fentanyl opioids doubled from January to March of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016. Thus, a top priority for the Correctional Service of Canada is to stop these highly toxic substances from being introduced into the institutions across our country.

We continue to work closely with partners, police agencies, and communities to stop unauthorized items, including drugs, from entering our institutions. Nonetheless, substance abuse amongst the offender population is a serious problem. Approximately 75% of offenders have some problem with alcohol or drugs when they are admitted into federal institutions, with a sizable proportion of this group abusing more than one drug at a time.

To tackle this issue, we have implemented a drug strategy that addresses this challenge on four fronts: detection, enforcement, deterrence, and treatment. Our strategy emphasizes a more strategic use of existing interdiction tools; an awareness program to inform staff, contractors, and visitors about the repercussions of smuggling drugs into penitentiaries; increased monitoring of those individuals potentially involved in the drug trade; increased disciplinary measures; and, a broadening of inmate awareness of substance abuse programs.

To speak more specifically about the detection element of our approach, the focus is on reducing the supply of illicit drugs through measures such as cell searches, searches of buildings and grounds, physical searches of offenders, regular monitoring of offender activity, random urinalysis testing, and the non-intrusive searching of all visitors entering institutions.

Amongst these detection tools, the ion mobility spectrometry—IMS—devices, otherwise known as ion scanners, are considered valuable tools to assist staff in identifying visitors who have possibly been in contact with different substances or narcotics. Currently it's the only known tool that can identify possible contact with a particular substance and allow for analysis results within seconds.

I would like to emphasize that ion scanners are only one aspect of a much broader approach that seeks to reduce both the demand for and the supply of illicit drugs that may enter the federal institutions. To be sure, the Correctional Service of Canada's approach to illicit drugs is as much aimed at reducing the demand for drugs through treatment, support, and intervention as it is aimed at reducing supply through detection and enforcement.

At the same time, we recognize the critical importance of family visits for offenders and the benefits of family and community support to an offender's rehabilitative process. We know that the development and maintenance of family and community ties help prepare offenders for safe reintegration into the community.

To facilitate these relationships, our organization has implemented both general institutional visits and the private family visiting program within its federal institutions. The objective of these programs is to encourage inmates to develop and maintain family and community ties that will assist them in becoming law-abiding citizens.

For the safety of offenders and staff, all visitors wishing to enter an institution are subjected to a search, which may be conducted using a variety of detection tools. These include ion scanners, metal detectors, X-ray machines, drug dog teams, and visual inspection. In determining which tools to use, we must balance the equipment's effectiveness, cost, and intrusiveness to visitors. Ion scanners allow for a non-intrusive search option, which can be supplemented with other more intrusive techniques as required. If the ion scanners demonstrate a positive result, we then conduct an assessment of risk to determine the most effective means by which we can safely manage a visit. Only in the rarest of cases is a visitor denied access.

To give you an idea of the frequency of positive test results and the next steps undertaken, our internal review of available incident reports reveals that in 2017 approximately 128,000 visits occurred across the country. Less than 1% of the time, the ion scan tests returned a positive result. In approximately two-thirds of these cases, the outcome of a threat risk assessment was to facilitate a visit by applying additional measures designed to be less restrictive than requesting the visitor to leave. For example, options such as a designated seating visit, a non-contact visit, or a supervised visit would have been employed to accommodate these visits. In some instances, the visit proceeded without any additional restriction.

In other words, across the country, CSC facilitated a visit for over 99% of the visitors who entered our institutions. Nevertheless, we are aware of the concerns raised by family members, as well as the Office of the Correctional Investigator, relating to the reliability of ion scanners.

Of course, there are advantages and disadvantages to each detection method. No method is perfect or all-encompassing. As an organization, we always seek opportunities to improve our policies and the tools of our front-line staff. As such, CSC has recently completed a review of the use and reliability of ion scanners, as well as policies related to the application of non-intrusive tools. The review confirmed the validity and value of ion scanners and allowed us to identify areas requiring enhancement.

To ensure our staff's effective use of the ion scanners, a security bulletin was issued in October of 2017 to remind and instruct staff on their usage. I want to reiterate that our organization is focused on fostering an environment that best contributes to effective rehabilitation and ensures the safety and security of inmates, visitors, and our staff. Equipment such as ion scanners, albeit very important, is but one means of detection among many to achieve this goal.

Our organization encourages visits from family and friends and wholly understands their benefit. We know that the vast majority of visitors are not attempting to introduce drugs into our institution. The detection methods we employ enable us to mitigate the risks associated with the smuggling of drugs and other contraband during visits and consequently creates the necessary preconditions for safe visits in the least disruptive manner possible. This ultimately serves to facilitate meaningful contact between inmates and their sources of community support.

Having said that, our organization will continuously refine our processes to deliver the best public safety results for Canadians. We will therefore look forward to this committee's findings from this study.

With that, I want to thank the members of this committee once again for the opportunity to appear before you today. We welcome your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Coons.

Mr. Prasad.

[Johny Prasad, Director, Program Compliance and Outreach, Programs Branch, Canada Border Services Agency]

Thank you, Chair, and good morning, members of the committee.

My name is Johny Prasad. I'm the director of program compliance and outreach at the Canada Border Services Agency. I'm responsible for the agency's protection program. I am pleased to be here and to assist the committee with its study of the use of the ion mobility spectrometers, also known as ion scanners, along with my colleague Dr. Phil Lightfoot, acting director general of the science and engineering directorate. Phil is responsible for all technical aspects of the detection technology used by the agency.

The Canada Border Services Agency, or CBSA, ensures Canada's security and prosperity by managing the access of people and goods to and from Canada. Every year, millions of travellers, commercial containers, and conveyances enter the country.

Our approach to risk management is tiered. The process begins with advance commercial or passenger information being screened in our national targeting centre for potential threats. These threats range in nature and include explosive materials, prohibited food, plants, and animals, and illicit narcotics, which requires the CBSA to perform examinations of shipments and travellers prior to entering the country.

Having the right equipment and techniques is another key element in protecting the safety and security of Canadians without unduly slowing the flow of people and goods crossing the border. Border services officers are our best resource at ports of entry across Canada, and they are highly trained in examination methods. In addition to experience and knowledge, officers use a variety of technologies and tools, including X-ray devices, detector dogs, radiation detection, and trace detection equipment such as ion scanners. The CBSA uses enhanced risk-based compliance and interacts with travellers, shipments, and conveyances differently, based on the level of risk.

With respect to ion scanners specifically, the CBSA has an inventory of 125 ion scan devices, which are strategically deployed to support operations as needed at ports of entry across Canada. CBSA officers are trained on the use and care of these devices, which can be used at any port of entry in the land, air, marine, and postal modes as a form of non-intrusive examination. The devices are programmed to detect the presence of both narcotics and explosives by swabbing a surface and testing the swabs. A positive ion scan provides an officer with an indication that the item has recently come into contact with the product indicated on the alarm and may influence a decision to examine goods or interview the person.

Detection equipment is not infallible. An ion scan can on occasion provide a false positive or false negative; however, these specific test results are not used to determine admissibility. Depending on the situation at hand, the officer will employ additional investigative techniques to make an informed decision. For example, the officer can use advance information in addition to other tools such as X-ray machines, density scanners, and detector dogs to proceed with the examination process.

To conclude, the results of an ion scan alone do not form the sole basis of an officer's determination, but will trigger further investigation. The agency uses a complete suite of state-of-the-art tools that complement each other and contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of examinations as a whole.

I would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have with regard to the CBSA's use of detection technologies. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Prasad.

Ms. Damoff, please, for seven minutes.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you to both organizations for being here. For the CBSA, I know that you probably wondered why you were being called here to talk about the ion scanners.

As you know, we did have a group here who had concerns about the use of the scanners. When I visited the Edmonton Institution, they actually scanned me, and when I spoke to the staff, they said that if the person doing it is trained properly, it's more effective than not.

For Corrections in particular, what kind of training is the staff given prior to using these scanners? Also, what kind of follow-up is done at individual institutions in terms of the use of the ion scanner, and what procedures are followed after a visitor is scanned?

[Rob Campney, Deputy Director, Preventive Security and Intelligence, Correctional Service of Canada]

You asked me a three-part question, so I'll have to get you to repeat the last two afterwards. I just want to make sure I understand them.

In terms of training for the ion scan use, Smiths Detection provides Correctional Service of Canada staff with “train the trainer” training, which is certified by Smiths Detection. Our trainers then go out and train our front-line staff who use the ion scan. It's a minimum requirement for all operators of the ion scan to be trained by our trained trainers. Once the training, which is mandatory, is completed, they're trained in the use of the X-ray machine. We also have staff trained in the use of detector dogs and in conducting urinalysis. All staff doing these tests are qualified to use the tool and interpret the results. This ensures a consistent national approach across the country in all of our institutions.

In terms of training for the ion scanners, CSC has commissioner's directive 566-8-2. These are the technical requirements for the use of the ion scan. This CD provides clear instructions on the scanner's use and operation, which the trained staff must follow. Briefly, the staff must perform a daily test to ensure that the machine is optimized, functioning properly, and provides a pass before they start to evaluate any visitors coming into the institution.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

I have limited time here.

What kind of monitoring do you do of the scanning to see how many false positives you're getting in each institute? I seem to remember the statistic that 18% of the people who came in were denied entry. Do you follow up to see what kinds of results you're getting with the ion scanner? What follow-up is there if there's a false positive? Is there any kind of data collected within CSC?

[Supt Warren Coons]

First of all, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, in 99% of the cases there evidently are no positive tests on the ion scan. Whatever positive tests there are, they will represent slightly less than 1% of the visitors who come into our institutions. Those are 2017 statistics. They were derived from the threat risk assessments conducted across the organization every time somebody hits positive—either when a detector dog handler detects something on a visitor or when there's a positive result on the ion scan.

From that information, in terms of the number of false positives, it becomes one of a number of items or elements that we consider when it's time for us to conduct our threat assessment.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Can I just interrupt you? You said that 99% were fine.

[Supt Warren Coons]

Correct.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

The corrections investigator said that around 25% showed a positive hit on the ion scanner. Is that different?

[Supt Warren Coons]

Well, I'm going by 2017 statistics. As a result of the request to CSC to review our ion scan program, we manually went through the statistics and gathered them for the period of 2017.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

You're saying it went from 25% to 1%?

[Supt Warren Coons]

I can't speak to the 25% number. I can only speak to the statistics that I have available to me, which are 2017 statistics. They indicate that 99% of the time, people do not hit positive. We know that for 2017, 99% of the people did not hit positive on the ion scan.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Okay.

I have only a minute and a half left, so I'll turn to CBSA for a moment.

How do you use the ion scanners for drugs when people get taken away for testing? I'm just wondering if you can explain the procedure, if you're allowed to, that you use with the ion scanners.

[Johny Prasad]

Sure. I'll give you the generic process in a secondary environment.

Let's say it's at the airport. An individual who's travelling is sent, based on indicators, to secondary for an examination. Sometimes they're sent to secondary just for paperwork, to pay their duties and taxes. In this case, let's say the indicators say there's non-compliance. During the process of the examination, the officer will use non-intrusive tools before they go to a more intrusive search. If they started with the X-ray, they'll also use the ion scan device. They can use density meters. They can use a number of tools to help build those indicators before they move to more progressive or intrusive examinations.

To your question about the ion scan and how they use it, the officer who is trained will take the swab, make sure the swab is clean, and swab an area, perhaps a suitcase. They will then take the swab back to the machine and reinsert it to check for a reading.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Do they swab people?

[Johny Prasad]

Our officers only swab the goods.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Mr. Motz, please, for seven minutes.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to both groups for being here today.

For Correctional Services Canada and the CBSA, do you have general concerns with regard to the use of ion scanners and what you do?

[Supt Warren Coons]

I would say that you have to treat them as one component of several elements of consideration when visitors come into the institution. Based on the findings we've uncovered, there are clearly cases where the ion scan hits positively, there's an interview conducted as part of the TRA process, and from that we have individuals who admit in some cases to having used cocaine or another substance very recently. In other cases, they talk about narcotics that are in their car in the visitors' area, and as a result of a search of their car, which is on CSC premises, we are able to seize narcotics. We have other individuals who hit positively who talk about a prescription they have for OxyContin, for instance, in which case they're let in.

It's all part of a threat risk assessment process, but what we do know, for instance, is that when we seize fentanyl, not necessarily from visitors.... Fentanyl is obviously one of the most important priorities that we're working on right now. When we seize fentanyl from cells and test not necessarily the product itself, but items around the product, as per the recommendations of the manufacturer, and the tests are positive for fentanyl, we have had a number of cases where we've sent the narcotics to Health Canada, which has confirmed that it is in fact fentanyl. In other words, it's confirming the validity of the results that we're finding on our ion scans at the institutional level.

As long as we take the ion scan result from visitors at the front entrance for what it is, which is one element of the entire threat risk assessment process, we feel that it's a valuable tool. Again, it's not perfect, and there isn't one silver bullet that we have. It's just part of a bigger package.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

If I'm hearing you correctly, then, sir, you have basically zero concerns with its use. It's a tool. It's a tool, not the tool, which you use to try to limit the contraband that enters a penitentiary.