Thank you for the question.
I'll stay in English and try to answer by looking at this from the angle of foreign signals intelligence.
When we collect information, you're quite right that given the nature of how communications work, we may come across information related to a Canadian. Let me use a tangible example. We're looking at known bad guy X in country Y. This bad guy X is in line with an intelligence priority of the government. It stands to reason that they're a bad person wanting to do bad things that are an affront to national security. We're collecting against this person.
Now this person, unbeknownst to us, could phone you. When we collect that, we need to understand that the resulting call becomes a private communication. The Criminal Code is very clear that it is against the law to collect a private communication.
We have ministerial authorizations that cover the various activities that we use to collect information and that allow us to keep that information, if indeed it is of national security or intelligence interest. As you pointed out, we are to delete it immediately if it doesn't. If the phone call is to you and it's talking about something that is not related to national security, we are to delete it. We annotate that. We delete it immediately, and that is reviewed by our commissioner to make sure we delete these things on an annual basis.
If indeed it has a national security interest, then we keep it, but even in keeping it, we write a report that talks about the conversation you may have had, possibly about blowing up something somewhere that is of interest to Canada. We would still protect your identity in that report, by using a generic term to render your identity illegible.
Then it comes time for information sharing. Where does our report go? Obviously there are domestic agencies within the national security apparatus here in Canada—CSIS, RCMP, and others—that have an interest in reading the report. Now they may have a legal mandate to know the identity of that Canadian, so there are procedures in place to disclose that information to them.
Similarly, when we're writing reports, some of the information is obviously shared with foreign partners, and there are other things that govern that exchange of information. Again, though, if they wanted the disclosure of that information, they would have to show us why it was imperative for them to get that information.
Of course, we're bound by other things. We have a ministerial directive, for example, which was recently reissued by our minister, related to information sharing that may lead to the risk of mistreatment. We do an analysis of what our partners want that information for and what they are going to be using it for, and we do a risk analysis to make sure it isn't going to be leading to mistreatment. There's a calculus that happens before any information is shared.