Evidence of meeting #31 for Public Safety and National Security in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was nations.
2:30 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Miller Conservative Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON
Thank you.
Mr. Randall, I have a whole lot of points here that you touched on. One caught my attention; you mentioned cultural practices that make it hard for women to participate, I think you said.
2:30 p.m.
Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
To take leadership roles.
2:30 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Miller Conservative Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON
Leadership roles, that's right; I was trying to write while you were speaking.
Right after that you also mentioned promoting alternative values...?
2:30 p.m.
Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
The green paper refers to the need to promote alternatives to the radical vision. My question was, who will generate that alternative vision or those alternative values? I was expressing some concern about the sensitivity in Canadian society over testing people on their adherence, if you wish, to Canadian values, which has been a debate, as we know, for the last several months in Canadian politics and society. Will it be a top-down initiative in creating that alternative vision for potentially radicalized young people, or will this be developed at a community level? One can anticipate the kind of reaction that one would get from a top-down initiative in creating an alternative scenario or alternative vision.
2:35 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Miller Conservative Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON
I'm trying to wrap my head around how radicalization and having Canadian values, whether you live in Canada or intend to live in Canada, are necessarily connected. In some cases, yes, they will be, but would it not be fair to say not always—or most of the time not always?
2:35 p.m.
Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Oh, not always; I was simply drawing from the green paper itself, which argues that there is a need to create that alternative vision. I'm expressing the view that it's necessary to do so, but to do so with caution, and to be careful about from whence that vision derives.
2:35 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Miller Conservative Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON
Okay.
I want to move on to something else that I think is important, although all of it's important. You made the statement that you're uncomfortable that authorities may not be able to have the powers to carry out their mandate. You started off by speaking about the Privacy Commissioner's comments on this. He has quite a dislike for this. It's a concern of mine as well. Should Canadians have to expect that we may have to give up a little bit of our privacy in this different world that we live in, different from 10 or 15 years ago, in order for authorities to have the proper powers?
I would just like you to enlarge on that comment you made.
2:35 p.m.
Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
I can do so, but only very briefly. I think I was trying to suggest that, yes, there are times when some compromise of charter rights may be necessary. That relates to the question about whether the CSIS Act should be revised or not to make it absolutely consistent with the charter. I alluded to the issue of access to IP addresses and access to information through communications providers as well. Many countries in the world already provide their security agencies with that capacity.
I think we also know that the national security agency in the United States is able to collect any information that our security agency is, whether it's shared with us or not, internationally. So our privacy has, frankly, already been compromised.
2:35 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Miller Conservative Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON
You said you were very concerned with peace bonds. Could you enlarge a little bit on what you would like to see there that would be better?
2:35 p.m.
Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
I'm not comfortable with secret hearings. I'm not comfortable with the notion of witnesses, individuals who are charged with offences, who cannot be confronted by the witnesses who bring testimony against them. It's a basic principle of natural justice, is it not? I think we need, therefore, to have more faith in our judicial system in dealing with national security matters.
2:35 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
While you gentlemen put on your headphones, I'll start my questions in English and then go back to French.
Mr. Huebert, you talked about the importance of having to share information with our allies. While we recognize the importance of that, some of the concern comes from protecting Canadians and their rights in the hands of foreign entities, even when they're allies. For example, even with our American friends, the protection that exists for non-Americans is just not sufficient to guarantee that the information will always be as protected as we would like.
The other issue that comes up, in particular with Bill C-51, is one that we've been raising in the last couple of weeks. It pertains to information sharing with consular services, for example, between consular services and CSIS. This idea of a ministerial directive potentially opens the door to the use of information obtained under torture.
How do you reconcile the need to work with our allies, and the fact that we also want to make sure that Canadians have the protection that they won't necessarily be afforded in other legal jurisdictions?
2:35 p.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary
You've hit on what, for many of us, is one of the most challenging issues whenever we are dealing with information sharing with allies. We're not speaking of a hypothetical. We've seen instances where in fact we have had information gathered from the use of torture amongst allies. We have seen Canadians...in terms of some of the worst practices brought forward. Having said all of that, then we have this issue of balancing it against the ability to convince our allies to work with us, that we are trustworthy, that we can take the information.
Part of the difficulty—you can hear the hesitancy in my voice—is of course how far do we have to go to ensure that in fact we are able to protect, to avoid these types of circumstances that we know have happened? By the same token, how do we ensure that our allies, at the operational level we're working at, have the trust in Canadian abilities to work with them?
To a large degree, the system works at its very best when you have the trust and the respect between the various officials. The problem we face on the outside is that, quite frankly, we're not able to evaluate what creates the best-case scenario and where in fact the problems arise. It's very difficult for me to say that here is a silver bullet that allows us to ensure that the Americans, the Brits, the Australians, and the Japanese are trusting our information and willing to work with us, but by the same token we are able to avoid some of these worst entities that in fact we know have occurred in that context.
I'm giving you a very unsatisfactory answer in saying that I don't have an answer. Once again, I think being aware of the fact that it is not a black and white situation is about the best I can offer, unfortunately.
2:40 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
Dr. Huebert, I want to address another point you brought up earlier.
There is the identification of new long-term threats and the fact they couldn't always be anticipated. Separatist groups in the United States were mentioned—
Are you okay with the translation?
2:40 p.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary
No, I'm sorry, the headphones aren't working.
2:40 p.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary
No, no. You can go ahead. If I hold it down, it works.
2:40 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
Great.
You mentioned groups in the United States.
It's good now? Okay.
I'll use the example of the War Measures Act invoked in Quebec, in 1970, or of Bill C-51.
If we're unable to identify threats because we're not aware of them beforehand, shouldn't we be worried that we'll cast too wide a net and people who may not have anything to do with the threats will be caught in that net? In 1970, in Quebec, a wide net was cast for the FLQ, but it resulted in the arrest of people who had done nothing wrong and who were simply militant sovereignists.
Isn't this situation a concern? How can we identify long-term threats without falling into this type of trap?
2:40 p.m.
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary
This is probably also one of the most difficult issues when we're thinking about it. For example, I think in the current situation, we're seeing a lot of concern about some of the extremists in terms of the environmentalist groups. We're hearing that the attacks that have occurred on several of the pipelines may have caused significant human damage, and environmental damage, ironically enough. By the same token, you do not want to do anything that in any way places those individuals who are concerned about environmental policy and take opposition to any government position to be included.
I think, to a very large degree, once again, it's the issue on the operational side of ensuring that the individual operators in this context are clear. In other words, I don't think, looking at our experience, it is protected by any specific writing where you sit down and say, “We'll do so much of this type of enforcement, this type of bringing in”; rather, it's a matter of ensuring that with the oversight....
This is the part that I think works very well within the proposed changes in terms of having parliamentary oversight. When the operators are doing their jobs and being properly funded, you do have an ability with parliamentary oversight. I agree with my what my colleagues have said. I'm much more comfortable with a parliamentary oversight. You have the ability to ensure that the net is not being cast too far. By the same token, there is not the sense of penalty among the operators that when they do cast it too wide, you don't have the opposite reaction where their hands are slapped and then they don't look. It's that balancing act that has to be continual.
2:40 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
Thank you.
My last question is for you, Dr. Randall.
You discussed concerns regarding the protection of privacy and the fact various organizations shouldn't be prevented from carrying out their work. Yet, we think organizations such as CSIS, for example, bear the burden of proof. They must show they need these powers. In the context of Bill C-51 and under other circumstances, the organizations failed to show the usefulness of having these powers. Some even argue that it's more a lack of resources that prevents the authorities from carrying out their work in the fight against terrorism.
To justify requesting such broad powers, don't you think they should show the usefulness of the powers in a more tangible way?
2:45 p.m.
Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
These are interesting questions and problems as well. Very broadly, to come back to what you were also asking a moment ago, there's always a danger of casting the net too broadly. I think the United States currently does that. I think that's a very serious problem. In terms of information sharing, we do not want to ever have another Maher Arar case. This was a problem of information sharing, as you know, between CSIS, the RCMP, and the United States. It's fine to share information with allies, but one has to be very careful about which information one is sharing with them.
As far as the other issues are concerned, as I said in my presentation, I'm increasingly.... You alluded to the 1970 situation in Quebec and Montreal, and you're absolutely correct. The net was cast very wide. I had friends who were detained in the course of that process. I suspect that David may well have experienced some of that as well.
But I think on the whole, coming back to the contemporary situation and the threat of domestic and international terrorism, Canada is not threatened to the same extent as a number of other countries and a number of other societies are. Therefore, I think there's a greater reason to be rational and careful—
2:45 p.m.
Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
I'm sorry. I'll stop there.
