Hi. I want to thank you very much, first of all, for having me here. I think this is a wonderful initiative. I don't envy you your task, but I do appreciate that you're undertaking it.
Thank you. It's truly an honour to be here with you today.
I'll do my best to keep this under 10 minutes. The first thing for me, the hardest thing, was coming up with a topic to discuss here today. I come to this both as an academic in law but also having spent almost 10 years in government, both in Foreign Affairs and the Department of Justice. A number of the issues in the green paper are fairly close to me, having seen both intelligence and evidence and having dealt with listing procedures and terrorist financing.
Let me discuss what I think are the two critical issues that will have to be dealt with in this round of hopefully what amounts to changes to the legislation and approach in Canada. This will be from a lawyer's point of view, because that's what I am.
The first is Bill C-51’s unprecedented grant of authority for CSIS to move beyond its traditional role as an information-gathering and analysis agency to one that's authorized to conduct disruptive activities, including specific authority for charter-infringing and unlawful activities.
The second, to take a contrary position to what I understand you heard earlier, is the desperate need for better review and oversight—I'll be a stickler about the difference between those two—of Canada’s national security bureaucracy. I say this based on my experience as a lawyer and policy adviser within Ottawa’s civil service as much or more so than I do as an academic. Too often the effectiveness of our bureaucracy is limited by the fact that decisions are made within the bureaucracy and information is passed up to ministers and reviewed, if at all, in departmental silos. Cross-cutting issues can evade cross-cutting review and oversight, and frankly they can evade cross-cutting solutions.
Let me be clear that review and oversight are not solely about protecting against possible abuses or correcting mistakes, though this is obviously very important. Sometimes human rights and security can be mutually reinforcing rather than a tug-of-war. Review and oversight are desperately needed to improve the coordination and effectiveness of our institutions in responding to national security threats.
In this regard, parliamentary review of national security matters of the type that's now been proposed is a crucial first step and gets us in line with our Five Eyes allies, but it alone isn't sufficient. Internal review of national security operations that stretches government-wide is needed. Greater formalized central coordination—I'm talking about oversight here—or the possibility thereof, for example in the hands of the NSA, is also needed.
With that in mind, I want to spend the remainder of my talk on the first element that I mentioned, Bill C-51’s amendment to the CSIS Act to grant the department disruptive powers. In particular, I'm going to focus on three troublesome aspects of this new disruptive power: first, the authority to breach the charter; second, the authority to conduct unlawful activities; and third, what I see as, in practice, the limited opportunity for an independent party, particularly the courts, to review the legality of CSIS’s behaviour.
To be very clear from the outset, I don't necessarily take issue here with the objective of the new disruptive powers nor with the specific determination that CSIS must have such powers. To my mind, we the public simply don't have enough information to make a determination on that ground. As a result, my concerns will relate more to the scope of the grant of power as it was legislated.
I'll move to the first aspect, the authority to breach the charter. This is perhaps the most clear-cut of the issues, to my mind. CSIS’s new authority to breach any charter provision so long as it obtains a warrant is fairly clearly unconstitutional. No other body in Canada can obtain prior authorization to breach the charter, let alone any section of the charter. Such authority is completely unique and is found nowhere else in Canadian legislation for very good reason; as I said, it's probably unconstitutional.
This authority has been compared to a couple of provisions that I understand have come up, one being the section 8 warrant procedures and the other section 9, arbitrary detention. I'm going to argue that these are very different animals.
Let us be clear that when police have a warrant judicially authorized, it's done to confirm the reasonableness of the proposed search and seizure; quite the opposite of authorizing a charter breach, in the normal circumstances with police, the normal warrant process confirms that police are indeed acting legally and in compliance with the charter. It was brought up earlier what reasonableness might mean. Well, it is actually really clear in law and fairly easy to determine. That is, you have reasonable grounds to make the case out of sufficient evidence, you go to a judge, and the judge confirms that for you.
To put it another way, the process is meant to ensure the prevention of charter breaches in the first place, not to authorize future breaches. The same is true of section 9 of the charter, on arbitrary detention. You get an arrest warrant. The warrant process is there to ensure that the detention will not be arbitrary; it is not to authorize a future arbitrary detention.
Moreover, this normal process only applies to section 8—and as I said, section 9—because the section 8 right is qualified by the term “unreasonable”, and again, section 9, by the term “arbitrarily”. Yet CSIS is nevertheless empowered to request authorization for a breach of any section of the charter.
The other argument I've heard is that section 1 of the charter provides for “reasonable limits” to charter rights—which it does—so the CSIS warrant process is really no different from this. However, section 1 requires that the government legislate, first, specifically and clearly when introducing legislation that might breach the charter. It's then incumbent on the government to articulate the specific objective, its scope, and its limitations. An open-ended invitation to judges to undertake this legislative process ex parte, so with only government lawyers present, and in camera, so in private, to determine when and how state actions might infringe the charter is, once again, a very different animal. My suggestion would thus be to remove from the CSIS Act the authority to breach the charter.
I'll move to my second concern, the unlawful activities. Under its new disruptive powers, CSIS is authorized to conduct unlawful activities. Such a power in this case is not without precedent: the Criminal Code does authorize police in certain situations to conduct unlawful activities, mostly undercover operations. Yet again there are striking differences in practice, even if the wording sounds similar as between the two provisions.
First, police power is constrained by about four pages of legislation in the Criminal Code, including specific limitations on the type of unlawful activity such as the loss of or serious damage to property, and the requirement to file a specific report on the unlawful activity as well as detailed annual reports on unlawful activities. The CSIS Act does not offer anything close to the same protection, does not require any reporting, and does not limit the scope of what unlawful activity might be in the same way that the Criminal Code does.
Although I'm not convinced one way or the other that there needs to be authority for CSIS to engage in unlawful activity, if CSIS makes to you a specific and compelling case that such authority to conduct unlawful actions should remain in the CSIS Act, then many of the protections and limitations that apply to the police under the Criminal Code should be introduced to the CSIS Act as well.
That brings me to the third difference between the exercise of police powers and the exercise of CSIS's disruptive powers. When police act, they act with the goal of making an arrest. The result is that the situation goes to court, and police warrants and the exercise of police power is challenged by the defence and reviewed by the courts. If there's a mistake, it can be appealed. In other words, if there are defects with the police actions or the warrants, or the issuance or authorization of the warrants, then the courts are available to review and correct the behaviour. This is why we have judicial review.
CSIS is in a very different situation. Even if their actions do become known, by their own admission and given their mandate, CSIS activities are highly unlikely to form part of a criminal prosecution and thus unlikely to be challenged in the same way as police activities. The idea is for one to be public, the other to be secret. As excellent a job as SIRC does, it is not an adequate substitute for layers of judicial oversight and adversarial challenge, particularly in these circumstances.
Again, there's a solution available, or at least a partial one. That is, a so-called special advocate—and this would be taken from the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act—responsible for providing a challenge function to CSIS requests, should be specifically built into the CSIS Act. The idea would be to compensate for the fact that CSIS warrants are a different animal from police warrants in that they're unlikely to be challenged by a defence lawyer at a criminal trial, they're unlikely to be reviewed by a court, and the subsequent implementation of a warrant by CSIS is unlikely ever to be reviewed by a court or made public. That is to say, as soon as the warrant process has been done, there is no oversight of the CSIS activity to ensure their subsequent activity complies with the original warrant.
With these inherent differences in mind, the special advocate would need authority not just to challenge the warrant, but to follow up on CSIS action to ensure the subsequent compliance with the terms of the judicial warrant, and, where abuse or a mistake is suspected, request subsequent judicial review. Again, to be really clear here, my primary concern is an innocent mistake or misunderstanding, either by the warrant-authorizing judge or in the execution of the warrant. Where matters are serious, where rights are affected, and the pressure of national security is great, innocent mistakes will be made. That's okay: but we need an opportunity to review them.
Thank you very much.
I'll listen to your questions in English or French, but I'll answer in English.