Public Safety Committee on April 7th, 2022

[Dr. Paul Goode]

There has been some evidence from surveys coming out of Russia that his approval rating has increased. This is probably to be expected. However, if you were to dive into it very closely, there's been a lot of debate over what that means.

I'll say, from my own evaluation, that the one thing that's been striking is that while his approval has increased, people don't trust him. This discrepancy between trust and approval is not what we observed in 2014. That should give us cause to stop and think about whether these indications of approval are simply a momentary “rally around the flag” effect that one would expect during any military campaign or whether they genuinely reflect support. I would argue it's more the former than the latter.

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

Thank you for that.

Next, I'd like to address a quick question to Dr. Lajeunesse. If I butchered your last name, I apologize.

In your opening remarks, you mentioned there's no such thing as Arctic security; there are sub-regions that must be viewed differently. Could you expand on that?

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse]

I think far too often we look at Arctic security through a single lens. We examine, for instance, the proliferation of Russian military bases and missile infrastructure in Siberia and we extrapolate that to mean a threat to the North American Arctic. We have to look at Arctic regions somewhat in isolation. The security and defence threat to the North American Arctic is so very different from, for instance, the Scandinavian Arctic.

We will produce much better policy if we have a much clearer eye as to what those threats are, where they are present and where they're not.

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

Thank you for that.

My last bit of remaining time I'll pass over to Mr. Lloyd.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll go back to Professor Goode.

On my final question on Russian propaganda finding fertile ground in Canada in relation to the spectre of the Ukrainian far right, can you provide examples of where you've seen this happen in Canada in the last couple of years?

[Dr. Paul Goode]

Having arrived in Canada only last year, I'm not sure I can give you that kind of perspective. However, I have heard reports from colleagues who have been here and said that they have seen it mainly manifesting through social media, especially through YouTube channels.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

This fear that.... I just saw an election result in which the Russian far right got less than 3% of the vote, I believe. I've seen some figures on the far left in Canada kind of parroting Russian lines about fascists in Ukraine. Can you elaborate more on that in the rest of my time?

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

I'm sorry, Mr. Lloyd. We're out of time.

Mr. Zuberi, we'll go to you for the last four minutes for this round with this panel. Begin whenever you're ready.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. I would like to focus on Dr. Goode.

Your testimony is very fascinating and interesting. I'd like to dive into something we haven't yet addressed, which is harassment and intimidation.

Through different parliamentary committees, I've heard of harassment and intimidation by other countries. When it comes to Russia, is there harassment and intimidation of people on Canadian soil from those linked to the Russian government? I'm thinking about people who are dissenting or who disagree with the government.

Can you elaborate on that, if it's happening?

[Dr. Paul Goode]

It does happen. It does not happen directly at the hand of state actors, but usually by way of proxies. This is something that is fairly commonly done, especially on social media. You have cut-out accounts—people who advance the Russian state's narratives—and they will specifically aim to attack those who are, for instance, promoting anti-war messages, or derail and drive away what might otherwise be productive social conversations about these kinds of issues.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Do you find that this pressure is effective on legitimate dissenting conversation?

[Dr. Paul Goode]

It is effective in the sense that it derails the ability to treat dissent as dissent as opposed to simply making it appear to be, “Oh, well, they're just separate sides of a single issue. Who's possibly to know what the actual sort of truth is?” In this sense, it contributes to a post-truth kind of nihilism rather than facilitating dissent.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

What do you think we should do to counter that inappropriate pressure being applied on individuals?

[Dr. Paul Goode]

I think it's a difficult topic, and if we're talking about the ways that this most commonly happens through social media, then we need to look very closely at the ways that social media platforms patrol and implement their moderation policies. Too often it's that [Technical difficulty—Editor] or under-sourced in such a way that this sort of thing happens rampantly without any sort of attention.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

This kind of segues into something else I want to go into, which is recognizing disinformation. You said that we should, instead of playing whack-a-mole.... Obviously there are some egregious instances. For example, the Russian embassy recently tweeted about the massacre in Bucha. They tweeted out some misinformation around that. That needed to be taken down, and it was taken down, to my knowledge.

What role is there for civil society and government to help educate Canadians around recognizing disinformation? Can you give some examples of how we can do that more effectively?

[Dr. Paul Goode]

Deutsche Welle had a very interesting video that they put out recently. In it, they analyzed various disinformation and fake claims and then explained how they could go through them using available open-source intelligence and how individuals can determine for themselves whether or not this is useful or reliable information. I think it can be extremely empowering to show people that they have the tools to be able to—

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

In the very few moments that are left, do you think disinformation is going to be an increasing problem in the future?

[Dr. Paul Goode]

Yes, I think this is a feature of an increasingly interconnected society.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much. That completes the second round of questioning.

On the committee's behalf, I would like to thank the witnesses for their very important, valuable insights in a complex and ever-moving situation for our country. We appreciate your generosity with your time.

We will now, colleagues, take a five-minute suspension and prepare for the second panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

I call this meeting back to order.

With us this second hour, by video conference, is Dr. Andrea Charron, director and associate professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, and Marcus Kolga, senior fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions.

Welcome to all.

I now invite Dr. Charron to make an opening statement of up to five minutes. You can start whenever you're ready.

[Dr. Andrea Charron, Director and Associate Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

My remarks are prefaced on the assumption that Russia is a persistent threat and that we need to think about North America's security posture, not simply Canada's. Since 1938, a threat to either the U.S. or Canada is a threat to the other, and they are indivisible with respect to Russia. Likewise, the individual requirements of both states cannot be separated.

I will speak to my research area of expertise, which is continental defence, but there are wider implications. Part of the continental defence relationship is binational, as embodied in NORAD's functional responsibility for aerospace and maritime warning and aerospace control. The remaining parts to continental defence are bilateral and include civilian agencies, private companies and citizens.

We have the makings of a dangerous and reinforcing feedback loop, assuming the status quo. Russia has come to believe it can exploit our continental defence vulnerabilities, thus emboldening it to undertake a regional challenge by threatening actions to deter an overseas response. North America recognizes its vulnerability, as well as those vital to overseas allies, and is unwilling to respond effectively, being forced to fall back on deterrence by punishment, which we cannot allow to happen. This in turn further emboldens Russia to undertake further challenges, which raises doubts among overseas allies that the U.S. can defend North America, let alone other allies. In essence, it is the situation we face now with Russia and Ukraine.

We have been warned for nearly a decade by successive NORAD and USNORTHCOM commanders that North America has multiple simultaneous challenges and that threats emanate from multiple domains and axes. Russia is an acute threat to North America, while China is the longer-term peer challenger to the U.S.'s waning hegemony. To be defended is no longer the exclusive purview of the Canadian and U.S. militaries, but requires whole-of-government and whole-of-population efforts.

North America has four priorities. First is deterrence, especially by denial. Second are kinetic and non-kinetic defeat options, the latter being most likely. Third is readiness and fourth is resilience.

Meanwhile, our adversaries have two strategies with respect to North America. First is bombarding us with cyber-disinformation and disruptive attacks, and second is using an anti-access area denial strategy to deny the U.S. and allies freedom of movement around the world and increasingly in all domains.

The U.S. and NATO allies have depended on deterrence by punishment for decades. It is the idea that we promise a cost so high to adversaries that they wouldn't dare attack us. Dependence on punishment alone risks uncontrollable escalation and narrows our response options considerably.

The focus needs to shift to deterrence by denial, which means taking advantage of the fact that we have allies and partners. We need to ensure that North America and our allies have all-domain awareness, are resilient to a variety of attacks, especially below the threshold of use of force, and ensure that attacks are identified and addressed quickly to prevent escalation. In other words, we need to change Russia's calculus to strip away the benefits of attacks on North America, rather than focusing solely on increasing the costs.

Deterrence by denial means North America needs to ensure there are no command seams that can be exploited or, conversely, that constrain us. We need particular capabilities, especially sensors for radar's digital transformation, and the means to create common operating pictures that can be shared efficiently and appropriately. We need to integrate data and information from all domains, working with a range of allies and partners, including with civilian agencies and private companies.

My analysis counsels the importance of modernizing continental defence, with a primary focus on NORAD and deterrence by denial. It is vital that the structural changes to the North American deterrence posture are made to alter adversarial perceptions so that North America cannot be held hostage. Beyond the need to modernize NORAD's early warning and defence control capabilities is the need for both countries to rethink fundamentally what it means to defend the continent. It is a whole-of-society effort, not simply a military-only endeavour.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

I will now invite Dr. Kolga to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Go ahead whenever you're ready.

[Marcus Kolga, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me to speak with you today.

I've worked very closely with the Russian pro-democracy and human rights movements for nearly 20 years. I also led the civil society campaign for Magnitsky human rights sanctioning legislation. I've also been monitoring and writing about Russian threats, including information and cognitive warfare, for the past 15 years.

You've already heard much about Russian disinformation, but I'd like to look more specifically at the Russian cognitive warfare targeting Canada and our allies and the threat of Vladimir Putin's militarization and resource imperialism in the Arctic. I'd be happy to answer questions about the war in Ukraine, Putin's broader objectives, sanctions and influence operations as well.

Russian information warfare is not a new phenomenon. The Soviets became expert at it during the Cold War. Vladimir Putin, who is a product of the KGB, restored cognitive warfare 20 years ago as a primary tool to repress his own people, undermine western democracies and erode cohesion within the NATO alliance.

While some may still doubt the threat that Russian cognitive warfare poses to Canada, there is irrefutable evidence of it. Canada's national intelligence and security committee of Parliament has repeatedly warned about this persistent and growing threat in its annual reports.

Putin's objectives in terms of cognitive warfare are mostly agnostic of any mainstream ideology, but it does align with his support for both far-left and far-right groups. As we've heard, Russian information warfare targets socially sensitive issues in order to polarize us. Once those issues are identified, they are amplified by a complex Russian information laundromat that includes the weaponization of information through Russian state media and a constellation of proxy groups and platforms, including right here in Canada, that regurgitate this information. It is then further amplified by Canadian extremist groups on both the far left and far right.

The objective of Russian information and cognitive warfare is to undermine and subvert our democracy through polarization. We saw the impact this can have during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. We also saw this during the COVID pandemic; I warned in March 2020 that the Russian government would exploit the pandemic with anti-lockdown and anti-vaccination narratives. Those anti-lockdown movements were injected with anti-government narratives. During the Ottawa trucker protest, we observed Russian state media exploiting the protests and the protesters to legitimize and amplify fringe voices within it who advocated for the violent overthrow of our democratically elected government.

The Ukrainian conflict has seen an intensification of Russian information operations around the world. Among Putin's many false claims to justify his barbaric invasion is that Ukraine is a nation run by Nazis and that the Ukrainian nation needs to be eliminated. That same Nazi narrative has targeted Canadians of Ukrainian heritage, including Canadian elected officials—Liberals and Conservatives—who support Ukraine. This is intended to delegitimize their status and voices as Canadian citizens and promote hate towards them.

Our research has demonstrated that Russian disinformation has directly targeted Canadian elected officials, including Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, as well as our geopolitical interests over the past years. This includes narratives—which are tailored for both the far right and the far left—that are intended to exploit and intensify negative emotional reactions to sensitive issues like residential schools, the environment and anti-LGBTQ issues.

NATO and the Arctic have also been targeted. In the Arctic, Russia has engaged in a rapid militarization over the past decade. This includes underwater nuclear super-weapons and torpedoes that glide undetected underneath the ice to irradiate our Arctic coastlines. Dozens of nuclear icebreakers, airfields and specialized Arctic warfare bases have been established. The new high-tech Nagurskoye long-range bomber airfield is as close to Canada as Winnipeg is to Ottawa.

Last year, Russia claimed all of the resources underneath the Arctic sea—all of them—right up to Canada's 200-mile economic exclusive zone. Indeed, Russia's official 2035 Arctic strategy calls for aggressive Arctic resource expansion and warns about a potential conflict in the Arctic. It orders the continuous militarization of the Arctic.

In conclusion, Canada failed to take the threat of Russia seriously in 2007 in Estonia, in 2008 in Georgia, in 2014 in Crimea and Donbas, in Syria in 2015, in the United States in 2016, and now in Ukraine, Mali and Africa. Let's not make the same dangerous mistake with the Arctic and Canadian democracy.

I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

The questions begin now.

Mr. Van Popta, you can lead off the questioning with a six-minute block whenever you are ready.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to our witnesses for being with us here today.

I'm going to start with Mr. Kolga.

You commented on military buildup by Russia in the north. I've read in various sources that Russia is reopening some of its Arctic bases that were used in the Cold War. I wonder if you can comment on that. Compare and contrast that with Canada's and America's military capabilities in the north.

I ask that question in the context of evidence from Professor Lajeunesse earlier today. He said the biggest threat to North America is not that we will be invaded. I think he used the term “avenue of approach”. I'm assuming that's missiles coming over the north heading to the south. He said that when it comes to an invasion, Europe should be more worried than North America is. Perhaps you can comment on that.