Public Safety Committee on Feb. 5th, 2026

[Andre Arbour]

There are definite risks with this language. In part, it's a cumulative effect. We already have a requirement that the use of this authority needs to be reasonable in relation to the gravity of the threat. That already specifies that the use of the power needs to be commensurate with the level of the threat, so it can't be used for no good reason or for trivial reasons or anything like that, given the nature of the power itself.

The word “systemic” is not defined or is not a technical term that is familiar. Given that the phrase “telecommunications system” is existing language, which this is a novel variant of, it appears that it could imply that only an attack on the entire system is what the power could be used for. An attack on an individual service provider could still affect millions of Canadians.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Technically speaking, if a threat is detected that has the potential to become a systemic threat but currently impacts only one network, does the inclusion of the word “systemic” force the government to wait for the damage to spread before it has the legal authority to intervene?

[Andre Arbour]

It's possible. We don't know how this term would be interpreted. Given the other guardrails on the use of the power, there is a very real risk that it would be interpreted in such a way that only something on the scale of the entire system would be a threat that we could target with it.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

My last question is from a policy perspective. How would the ambiguity of the term “systemic” impact the speed of a response during a cyber-attack or cyber-emergency if government lawyers have to first determine whether a threat meets this high threshold before an order can be issued?

[Andre Arbour]

Certainly, these types of things add a non-trivial delay to how we work through things. With this level of ambiguity, it's difficult for me to predict how much time the lawyers would need in order to work through this in an individual context, and it would depend on the nature of the threat. However, it could impose a non-trivial delay before the government is comfortable to act.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, Ms. Acan.

Mr. Caputo, you have the floor.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

What about if “or” was added, so it would read “serious or systemic”? In that case, either one could be satisfied. How would that compare with G-1.2, for instance?

[Andre Arbour]

If the “or” were to be added, that would remove the issue with “systemic”, because the government could act with respect to a “serious” threat. It would make the language potentially a little redundant, given the reasonable grounds clause, but that would likely be manageable.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

I'm not sure if my colleagues would consider it a friendly amendment to change the comma to “or”.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Mr. Ramsay, you have the floor.

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Could there be any confusion when you say “serious threat” for something that potentially can become very important and have huge consequences but at the time is not that serious? Could it be interpreted that this is not serious so we can't do anything about it at that point in time? It's relating to the potential of becoming huge, necessary and important.

[Andre Arbour]

It's unlikely that it would be an issue. Given the nature of the power we're talking about in terms of the suspension or disconnection of service, in plain language, it would be used only for a serious issue. Otherwise, there are less intrusive means that could be used, most likely.

The main issue when we looked at this is that it's a bit odd in its drafting given the other parts of the bill. As I mentioned, it's a bit odd to put this in when there's already the reasonable grounds proportionality consideration, because that's already all we need to tell you—that you could use it only for a serious threat. When we engage with the lawyers, sometimes they frown and are concerned about that. Other than some potentially awkward drafting, we didn't identify major concerns with the word “serious”.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, everyone.

Are there any other interventions?

In that case, is CPC‑11—

[Michelle Legault, Legislative Clerk]

Is there a subamendment?

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Mr. Caputo, if you wish to propose a subamendment, someone else must move it on your behalf.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

I had suggested a subamendment, but perhaps I can just speak directly with Madame DeBellefeuille. I'm not sure whether she would be open to the subamendment. If it's not going to be voted on with a yes, there's no point in dealing with it.

My sense is that this is going to be rejected on division, so I won't put forward a subamendment. The amendment can be rejected with a vote on division, please.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

You want to submit....

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

I don't want to put a subamendment on the floor, because it will just be rejected.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Understood. Thank you for the clarification.

Is CPC-11 adopted?

(Amendment negatived on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])

Is CPC-12 being moved?

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

I will move CPC-12 to clarify—and I believe this may have been raised by the officials—that an order under section 15 of the act cannot be used against an individual. Again, it's to add precision to the language.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Are there any interventions?

Is CPC-12 adopted?

(Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

This brings us to NDP‑4, which is deemed to be moved.

Ms. Kwan, you have the floor.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The rationale behind NDP-4 is that, despite the bill's stated objective of strengthening cybersecurity in Canada, many experts and civil society groups have noted that it would create broad powers that can be used to undermine Canada's cybersecurity. Proposed subsection 15.2(2) in Bill C-8 could be used to issue orders that weaken the encryption standards in telecommunications networks. Currently, the government could use Bill C-8 to compel telecommunications providers in Canada to install back doors inside of Canada's networks, including lawful access-related capabilities.

This amendment would add an interpretive clause to proposed subsection 15.2(2) that is intended to limit the government from demanding that telecommunications providers enable invasive activities, doing so by balancing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of Canada's networks. This amendment was, in fact, recommended in the joint civil society Senate submission on Bill C-26.

I know this is the same amendment as CPC-13 and CPC-14. Hopefully it will pass.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, Madam Kwan.

Indeed, NDP-4 and CPC-14 are identical. To my knowledge and understanding, CPC-13 and NDP-4 are not the same. We will now debate and eventually vote on NDP-4, but we will not thereafter turn to CPC-14, it being an identical amendment.

We have heard MP Kwan. Are there any interventions on that amendment?

Madam Acan.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

While the term “confidentiality, integrity or availability” sounds protective, it is, in my opinion, dangerously overbroad in the technical sense. The term “availability”, specifically, is a major issue. If the government orders a company to replace faulty or vulnerable equipment, that process might temporarily take a system off-line, which technically impacts the availability. These amendments could be used to legally block the government from requiring the removal of high-risk equipment, such as from Huawei, or from fixing legitimate security flaws because the act of fixing them causes a temporary disruption.

My questions will be for the experts and are technical.

If the government identifies a piece of hardware in our network that has been compromised by a foreign actor or others, it's immediately replaced. Would the inclusion of the legal ban on impacting availability prevent us from acting if the replacement process requires a temporary service outage?