Public Safety Committee on May 26th, 2026

[Murray Rankin]

The issue Mr. Smith just raised about compensation came up, and it's reflected in the bill as regards non-core providers explicitly. “Appropriate” compensation are the words used. With regard to the core providers, it's left open. That's something that might well be considered.

I've said elsewhere that metadata wasn't the subject of a great deal of our concern. Data preservation was obviously an important feature, but we didn't delve into that in great detail.

Those would be the two that come to mind.

[Rhonda Kirkland, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

It's interesting that you bring that up, because those are some of the things we've had the most questions and testimony on in this committee. There's a reason for that. When there's not enough information, we have more questions. I appreciate your bringing that up.

I know you said elsewhere that the one-year retention period was never brought up. I think that's what concerns Canadians the most, because we're not talking about just the bad guys' metadata. We're talking about everyone's metadata.

Can you comment on that at all, or do you want to comment on that at all?

[Murray Rankin]

I know the committee understands well the difference between content and metadata, with metadata being about access to when and where a call took place, who was on it and so on. In the past and, I guess, currently, the retention period for metadata has varied dramatically, so I think it's interesting and important that we put our hands around a time frame—the bill calls for up to one year now—because we had a very uneven playing field. The police told me in these consultations how difficult that was to navigate with different police forces.

I think Canadians need to understand that this has been done in Australia, where it's up to two years; in the United Kingdom, where it's up to one year; in France, where it's up to one year; in Belgium, where it's up to one year; and in Sweden, where it's up to 10 months. There's no specifically correct number, but I think the complex investigations contemplated by modern policing are going to require that the data be held for a reasonable amount of time. I don't know if it's one year or 10 months, but it is a certain length of time.

[Rhonda Kirkland, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Thank you. That answers my question.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you.

I'm sorry, Ms. Kirkland. Time is up.

[Rhonda Kirkland, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

See. This is exactly what I mean. I need more time with you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

We always love to hear from you.

Now, we'll hear from MP Acan for another six minutes, please.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

I have no preamble. I promise. Time is essential.

Thank you very much for coming today, Deputy Chief Nick Milinovich. It's good to see you here.

My question is going to start with an earlier comment by MP Baber. He said law enforcement already has the ability to seek a search warrant and ask Google to comply with requests for information, and he asked whether that was correct.

Could you please explain the issues that law enforcement is currently facing?

[D/Chief Nick Milinovich]

I'm happy to have some of that conversation, but we would have to be here much longer than six minutes in order for me to do that.

The reality is that if we look at the legislation surrounding lawful access, the last time there was a substantial update was prior to the development of Google. If you imagine us operating right now, very simply put, we are delayed in our ability to secure information. We are not as effective as we could be, and we are certainly not as effective as some of the other Five Eyes countries are. We are hamstrung by outdated legislation, and it needs to evolve.

It is virtually the foundation of every complex investigation we complete. Normally, it begins with a production order and may result in a number of other different judicial authorizations, but we're receiving them slower than we should and not with the level of detail that we should have in order to accomplish the roles we've been provided. It's a difficult spot to be in.

I'll give you an example. If we were to watch an extortion happen in Peel, and the investigators go out, do their investigation and identify a corner store that captured that extortion on video, with the person speaking on a cellular telephone, we may write a production order for that tower site. The results of that production order, in some jurisdictions, could take up to 30, 45 or 50 days. In that time, we've lost evidence. We've lost the opportunity to prevent additional crimes. It doesn't happen all the time, but that's one of the big issues that we are dealing with.

There's an opportunity to be more effective and more efficient in our investigations through enhancements to the legislation surrounding lawful access.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

I learned that Canadian governments have been trying to pass lawful access legislation since the late 1990s. It's been more than 25 years. It's a long time. It means that lawful access has been studied here for hours and hours over the last 25 years. Bill C-22 has also undergone hours of consultations, and it is supported by a charter statement outlining how it impacts charter rights, especially those in section 8.

From a policing perspective, would you say Bill C-22 does not interfere with section 8? Do tools such as the confirmation of service demand respect those rights?

[D/Chief Nick Milinovich]

It's difficult to comment on every single scenario, but from my perspective, as it sits, Bill C-22 is charter-compliant. If it wasn't, I wouldn't be here asking for its endorsement. Outside of the charter and judicial oversight and consideration, there are a variety of other avenues where its authenticity and congruence with privacy interests will be tested. I anticipate that's going to happen.

Going back to your original point, the early 1990s—before Google and before the iPhone was developed—was the last time we had any significant legislation. That is why I'm here on behalf of my organization, on bended knee, asking for help to protect our community.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Deputy Chief, you have worked on lawful access in past legislation and have been in policing for a very long time. Would you say holding metadata for up to a year, as worded in the legislation—up to 12 months—is reasonable for complex investigations?

I'm aware that tech companies often delete subscriber data in a shorter time frame.

[D/Chief Nick Milinovich]

That's a great question.

I tend to agree with Mr. Rankin. There has to be a timeline. We need to require people to keep that metadata to a certain level, because it's not as though a crime happens and we immediately arrive at the opportunity to collect this stuff. Crimes, and particularly more serious ones, don't have a statute of limitations. We're not talking about theft from a grocery store. We're talking about child exploitation or transnational crime, and that information can become incredibly valuable to the investigative community and policing.

Of course, I understand people's concerns about it in terms of a private citizen who commits no crimes. I understand that, but the reality is that nobody is going to look at their metadata, because they aren't doing anything wrong from the policing perspective. When you're a criminal and you're targeting our communities, it's the longer the better for us.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Can you simplify it? Could you highlight how this data can be used to quickly resolve a case related to extortion or, as you said, child sexual exploitation?

[D/Chief Nick Milinovich]

Imagine the parallel. Everybody's familiar with physical forensics. That's something that's well accepted. We've all seen CSI. I think most people understand it. You can leave a trail behind at a crime scene that can be collected by the police and held in perpetuity.

We've made a number of arrests decades after a crime has occurred because we've been able to collect that information and hold it. Digital evidence is very similar to that. It's a footprint. It is as important to contemporary policing and public safety as forensics is to us.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

I believe my time is over.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

You are correct.

Let me move to Madame DeBellefeuille for six minutes, please.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

First, Mr. Rankin, I want to thank you for speaking French, because I don't know whether my anglophone colleagues would have tolerated that 80% of the testimony not be in their official language. It's very difficult to concentrate and understand everything when listening to interpretation. So thank you very much. It was a long statement, so I wanted to thank you.

My question is for you, Mr. Smith. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce noted that Bill C‑22 raises concerns and creates unpredictability because it's unclear who will be covered, due to the lack of definitions, which will be specified by regulation.

You seem to share this concern. Do you think some sectors or suppliers should be excluded? I'll give you the examples of Interac or Desjardins, whose representatives told us they should be excluded. Do you think we should specify in advance which sectors are excluded from the definition of primary suppliers, while still leaving the government some regulatory leeway, even as we try to narrow the range of primary suppliers?

Do you think specifying primary suppliers or setting out exclusions, for example, could be a reasonable solution?

[Eric Smith]

Thank you for the question. I'll be speaking in English.

We represent the telecommunications industry. It's well understood that telecommunications providers will be considered core providers. We haven't really turned our attention to how other sectors would fall under that category versus electronic service providers. We know we will be covered, and that's really been the focus of our attention to this bill.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

It will be covered in both parts. Do you agree with it being in part 1 and part 2 of the bill?

[Eric Smith]

We have concerns about the bill itself, but in terms of your question about who should be covered by the bill, we understand that we will be covered by part 1 and part 2.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Mr. Rankin, you've led the consultations. If I recall correctly, you told us from the outset that you had the privilege, I think it's fair to say, of being the first chair of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

Personally, I think the agency is a great idea. It's great to have it, and I believe in the work it does. The government has decided to make drastic cuts to the agency. It has clipped its wings by reducing its ability to investigate and lead more extensive investigations. The agency's budget was cut by 15%, or $2.5 million out of a $17 million budget. That's a pretty significant cut.

You chose not to invite Justice Deschamps, the current chair of the agency, to the round table. She told us she hadn't been invited to appear. I must tell you that this came as quite a surprise.

When she appeared before the committee, she recommended that amendments be made to the bill. At the Bloc Québécois, we will be presenting and supporting these amendments. I think the government is well aware of our position on this issue. Justice Deschamps told us that it would be important for her and for the agency, and especially to reassure Canadians, that the agency be notified in real time, as is the case for the intelligence commissioner. This would allow the agency to document decisions rather than having to rely on a retrospective investigation. We estimate that the agency would be informed about a year and a half after the interventions. I find these amendments very reasonable, especially since they wouldn't cause any delays, because she doesn't have access to the decisions.

During his appearance, the minister told us that granting this authority would slow down the process. The intelligence commissioner, former Justice Noël, told us that he did not share that view, that there would be no delays and that, in his view, it was entirely normal for her to be notified in real time.

What is your opinion on the matter, Mr. Rankin?

[Murray Rankin]

First, I'd like to thank you for your comments about my French. I really appreciate that, but if I may, I'll answer your question in English. I spent many years in British Columbia, and my French is a bit rusty.

I'm going to try to answer your excellent question in English.

Madam Justice Deschamps is somebody who succeeded me and is doing an excellent job at NSIRA. I am aware of the budget cuts, and I share your deep concern about them.

On the issue of the role for NSIRA, however, I point out that it is a body that does after-the-fact reviews. It has no current mandate, as contemplated in Bill C-22, for an oversight role. However, the intelligence commissioner has that role of reviewing ministerial orders. The commissioner already has an oversight role.

I don't think NSIRA, in my judgment, is set up for that kind of role. What I do think would be helpful is if NSICOP and NSIRA were asked to review later—not on a case-by-case basis, as I think you're contemplating, but overall—how the system is working. I think that would be very valuable.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

I understand your—

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Mrs. Bellefeuille, unfortunately your time is up.

Mr. Caputo, you now have the floor for five minutes.