Public Safety Committee on Oct. 5th, 2026

[Marcus Powlowski, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Rainy River, ON]

Similarly, with friends and associates, in the old days it probably used to be easy. You worked for the CIA, you came from Des Moines and when you started hanging out with a bunch of Russians, people started to ask questions.

Nowadays, we know people from every country in the world. I have a thousand names on my phone, and some of them may have criminal records, for all I know. Some of them may have extreme views. Nowadays we have so many contacts. How and what do you do to look at your circle of friends to see whether you happen to hang out with a lot of people from ISIS, for example? What practically can you do to screen through the vast number of contacts to see if there's something of concern?

[Adam Hatfield]

The basis of the directive on security screening is reliability as a person: honesty, trustworthiness, integrity and loyalty to Canada. It covers anything that raises doubt about whether you're an honest and reliable person. Are you inclined to lie? Are you inclined to shade things in your favour? Do you have attachments to foreign nations? Is there reason to believe that when making a decision, you might prioritize another nation over Canada?

Anything that raises doubt is brought forward to the individual, and the security screening official has a conversation with them. Out of that determination, a decision is made by the department: Do we trust this person to be reliable and loyal? Sometimes it is a no, but usually it is a yes.

[Marcus Powlowski, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Rainy River, ON]

You said something about whether that person has an allegiance to Canada or might have an allegiance to some other entity that exceeds it. How would you know that? In my circle of friends, if I happen to hang around with a lot of Chinese people, does that make it questionable whether my allegiance is to Canada or to China?

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Answer quickly, please.

[Adam Hatfield]

The directive is not a one-and-done process. Ongoing continuous assurance of individuals is important as well. The security screening process is a point in time, but security monitoring and insider risk management is an ongoing process.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, MP Powlowski.

Mrs. DeBellefeuille, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Hatfield, do employees who work for multiple departments have a single human resources file or multiple human resources files?

Is there a central file for all public service employees and agency staff or does each department have its own human resources file?

[Adam Hatfield]

When it comes to human resources files, I'm no expert.

Also, if we look at the breadth of the public service, there are departments that are within the core public administration and subject to Treasury Board as the employer. There are separate employers, agencies such as CSIS or the Communications Security Establishment. If you go even a little broader, there are Crown corporations—

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

I'm sorry to interrupt. I'll explain what I'm trying to understand.

If there is a central file on an employee who undergoes a fairly thorough evaluation, is the result of that search or investigation transferred from one department to another? Is it reported to Treasury Board?

When someone has a track record as a good employee or a bad employee, is that information shared among departments and agencies, or is everything handled in isolation?

[Richard Bilodeau]

Do you want me to jump in on this, Adam?

For example, Madame DeBellefeuille....

I'm sorry, I started answering in English.

There are files—in the case of our performance evaluations, for example—that are centralized in a government software system. So they are accessible.

I believe Ms. Kirkland asked a question earlier about working in isolation. There is always room for improvement in information sharing among departments—whether it concerns human resources or security—in order to facilitate hiring or security decisions—

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

When you talk about improvement, am I to understand that, basically, there is currently no centralized process for sharing information?

[Richard Bilodeau]

There is a process, but we can still wonder if there is room to make it more efficient and faster. That is one of the questions that arises and that could be examined.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

At Global Affairs Canada, when the person in question left to join NATO, normally, there should have been awareness of that person's behaviour and the complaint filed against them. That's what we can't understand. I think it will remain a mystery until we see the results of the investigation. However, this seems so major to us, Mr. Bilodeau, that we don't understand how this person was able to reach NATO.

[Richard Bilodeau]

Unfortunately, I can't give you an answer on that case, but Mr. Hatfield—

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

I'm sorry, Mr. Bilodeau and Mr. Hatfield, but the two and a half minutes are up.

Mr. Caputo, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to ask the two RCMP assistant commissioners a question.

I'll start with a quote from a Global News story on May 21. It says, “The RCMP will not unilaterally make public or share the contents of an MOU with a third party without the concurrence of the other party”. That's a quote from a Ms. Percival. It continues, “As such, the RCMP is not releasing the contents of the MOU at this time.” Is that still the RCMP position?

[A/Commr Don Halina]

I'm not a specialist on the MOU. I can get that information, and I can endeavour to get that back to the committee.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

What I would specifically like that information to answer is this: Does that remain the RCMP position? If not, when did it change?

I'm going to read another quote. This is directly from the minister, and it's from May 28, a week later. The minister said, “To answer your question with a yes or no, no, the Chinese government does not tell us or dictate to us or veto any release of these documents.”

I'll be very direct, the RCMP statement is at odds with what the minister said. I think Canadians have a right to know the truth without any word salad or anything like that. If we could get a very direct quote within the next week from the RCMP, please, that would be very helpful.

I'll move on here.

[A/Commr Don Halina]

I have a point for clarification: You're looking for the RCMP policy as it relates to MOUs—

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

I mean this MOU in particular. Does the May 21 quote still stand? Does that remain the RCMP position? If it doesn't, when did it change?

Let's move on here. I'll be very candid. This isn't meant to be disparaging or anything like that, but we walked in an hour and 45 minutes ago, and I don't feel like we have any further answers on something that is a very serious matter.

I will ask this: What level of security clearance did Ms. Zhang require for the NATO position?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Thank you, Mr. Caputo, for the question.

As we mentioned earlier today, according to the Privacy Act, we are unable to answer questions specifically related to individuals who have asked for or have renewed a security clearance. I did share with Ms. DeBellefeuille that the norm for NATO is a secret clearance.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

I'm sorry to interrupt you.

I will be very direct. What about somebody in that role? What security clearance do they require? I don't mean for Ms. Zhang, but for a NATO intern, what is the security clearance level?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Thank you for the question.

As I mentioned to Madame DeBellefeuille, the norm at NATO is a NATO secret clearance, but it depends on the position and it depends on the role at NATO. That is done by the sponsoring department—in this case Global Affairs.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

The security clearance is at least a secret level. It can go to that enhanced level. Is that correct?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

In every instance, as my colleagues have described, a security clearance requirement is determined by the employer, based on the duties and functions of the position the employee will fill.