Science and Research Committee on May 4th, 2026

[Edoardo De Martin]

Yes.

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

Thank you, MP Noormohamed.

With that, we will go to MP Blanchette-Joncas for six minutes.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski—La Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'd like to welcome the witnesses who are with us today.

My first set of questions will be for Mr. Shimooka.

A paper published by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute says that Canada's defence industrial strategy is backward. Instead of starting with the actual needs of the Canadian Armed Forces, it seems to start with industrial and economic objectives.

Do you agree with this assessment?

[Richard Shimooka]

Essentially, yes. I think the fact that we don't have a current national security strategy—one may be promulgated later this year—creates an issue in identifying the real areas of Canadian Armed Forces' needs capabilities. If we're looking forward to some of these defence risks, whether they be in the Asia-Pacific or elsewhere, it's an essential element.

I would make a comparison with, let's say, the United States or the United Kingdom, where you have a really effective ecosystem to identify the threat and the responses to it, and then outline the capabilities. If you look at their defence industrial strategies, like the 2024 one that the Biden administration put out or the one the United Kingdom did last year, they make the linkage right from that top document all the way down, whereas in Canada, we promulgated a DIS that identified some areas, but really isn't linked to the real capabilities that are required.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski—La Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Shimooka.

Is the government confusing a defence industrial strategy with an economic benefits strategy?

[Richard Shimooka]

I would argue yes. If you look at the current, ongoing procurement of a new submarine to replace the Victoria class, as an example, a large portion of the focus of that program has been on the industrial technical benefits that Canada can accrue from that program. In contrast, if you look at an ally, let's say Australia, for example, which has many submarine programs like the AUKUS program or the one before it, the attack class, they were very much focused on not having a 100% ITB return. They were actually looking at what the developmental areas were that they could bring into the country from this procurement and leverage their future defence capabilities from that. That's part and parcel of a lot of the better-run countries internationally in this area.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski—La Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

If we don't start with the basic needs or the necessary military capabilities, do we risk announcing benefits without providing the capabilities that the Canadian Armed Forces actually need?

[Richard Shimooka]

In terms of the way the procurement system works, where it's really an amalgam of these different interests, you will generally get a system that the Canadian Armed Forces can utilize, but it's often...I wouldn't call it suboptimal, but it's certainly not maybe the most ideal capability in that sense. I would point to the fixed-wing search and rescue program, where we have an aircraft that may be just entering service now or is about to enter service. This is seven years over the time when we actually got our first delivery in, because it wasn't the ideal aircraft. A big portion of why it was selected was that the industrial offsets were seen to be better from the competitor who won.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski—La Matapédia, QC]

In your opinion, is a 10% target for defence procurement from Canadian companies credible if we haven't first defined what capabilities Canada absolutely must develop on its own?

[Richard Shimooka]

I think we have to be careful as well. I believe in the last panel you asked a question about Bombardier aircraft and about the potential to procure a maritime patrol aircraft.

Just to develop the P-8 in the United States it would basically cost just as much as it did for Canada to actually procure the aircraft. There are certainly areas where a manufacturer like Bombardier has an advantage, and we should look to those. However, that really requires a careful understanding of, what the requirements are, how much it costs, and then making judgment on it as to whether it is an area we should put our money in, what the benefit of it would be, and what potential there is to market it in Canada or elsewhere.

I think because of the lack of capacity within the department and a lot of other factors, it's not an area where we do really well but where we really should do well, given the objectives of the government to increase domestic defence production.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski—La Matapédia, QC]

Mr. Shimooka, thank you for allowing me to follow up on the Bombardier issue.

An investment of $10.4 billion is no small matter. We didn't even issue a call for tenders to allow a Canadian company to submit a proposal. We immediately chose the American company.

What are your thoughts on that?

Doesn't this case illustrate the tension between buying quickly abroad and developing a domestic industrial capacity that we're unable to define?

[Richard Shimooka]

If you think about the cost to develop it, there are many other capabilities that Bombardier could provide that I think would be more cost-effective. There are certain areas where, if you look at the opportunity to get onto the P-8 program, that made sense in that iteration. If you think about something like airborne early warning, which is a program that is upcoming for the Royal Canadian Air Force and will likely incur a significant development cost on the government's expenditure, I think those are the areas you want to focus on. I would call those areas quick wins, areas where we can just get the capability quickly from a foreign producer.

If you think about a country like France, they really focus on domestic development of their capabilities. They bought aircraft from Boeing or others for stuff like airborne early warning or tankers and whatnot. Even they will look to foreign suppliers to meet some demands. Then they focus on other areas that they identify as being the actual capabilities that the domestic industrial base can best develop and produce.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

Thank you. Time is up for MP Blanchette-Joncas.

We will start our second round with MP Mahal for five minutes.

[Jagsharan Singh Mahal, Conservative, Edmonton Southeast, AB]

Madam Chair, just for clarification, will we have a round three as well?

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

Yes.

[Jagsharan Singh Mahal, Conservative, Edmonton Southeast, AB]

Thank you.

Thank you to all the witnesses who are present for this testimony.

I would like to start with Mr. Shimooka.

In May 2019 the Macdonald-Laurier Institute published a report you authored entitled “The Catastrophe: Assessing the Damage from Canada’s Fighter Replacement Fiasco”. In it you note that the “current Liberal government’s partisan handling of the fighter replacement file brings new levels of unethical incompetence to this dismal history”.

Seven years have passed. What would you say now? Has it gotten worse? Has it been better? What is it now?

[Richard Shimooka]

At the time I wrote that came after the aborted Super Hornet purchase and other mishandling of the file.

The fact that we selected this capability in 2022 or 2023 and have started to procure the systems is certainly a positive step. If you interview individuals from the air force, they are undertaking this transition currently. Somewhat understandably, the comments of the Trump administration about Canadian sovereignty and other aspects have caused significant dislocation in our bilateral relationship, but not a pause. It has brought this program under some level of increased review. As I watch how it is progressing currently, the air force is still acquiring aircraft. They've continued the purchases because of the way the U.S. system is required to procure them, but I don't know how well this uncertainty helps or how much longer it can go on.

It's certainly better than it was in 2019 when I wrote that article, but at this time, there are still serious questions. This is affecting, to some degree, the ability to get these aircraft.

[Jagsharan Singh Mahal, Conservative, Edmonton Southeast, AB]

I think I got my answer. Thank you.

You have also warned that a mixed fighter fleet would have dangerous consequences for Canada's defence and physical condition.

Can you explain why maintaining multiple fighter platforms creates those risks in terms of cost, training and operational effectiveness?

[Richard Shimooka]

Essentially, we know how many pilots or sustainment individuals operate the fighter fleet at one time. It's quite limited because of 30 years of neglect of the Canadian Armed Forces. As a result, the ability for them to scale up the purchase of two fleets is just not possible. We were already seeing in many other areas, as with the MQ-9 UAV program and the P-8 program, real challenges for the air force's transition to the next generation, because they just don't have the crews. It is really difficult to imagine, even on the personnel side, how we could transition to a second fleet.

I will also say that, for the second option, Gripen and others.... Think about the integration challenges in a NORAD environment, the secure systems, the cryptological aspects of it, etc. This makes it really challenging. The cost of integrating that specific fighter, or even many other NATO aircraft, would make this prohibitively expensive and not add any positive capability development whatsoever.

[Jagsharan Singh Mahal, Conservative, Edmonton Southeast, AB]

I see.

Madam Chair, I will cede my remaining time to MP Ho.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

You have one minute and five seconds.

[Vincent Ho, Conservative, Richmond Hill South, ON]

My question is for Mr. Shimooka.

Over the past year, the Liberal government has announced multiple new defence bureaucracies, each with its own mandate to hire new, overpaid, Liberal-tied bureaucrats. For example, the Defence Investment Agency CEO stands to make up to $900,000 per year.

Based on your research, does creating more bureaucracies actually improve Canada's ability to deliver military capability, or does it risk further fragmentation?

[Richard Shimooka]

I think fragmentation is a real danger.

Going back to the previous point about personnel capacity, that capacity of key subject matter experts who understand these defence capabilities, and who have security clearances and technical knowledge, is quite limited because we haven't invested in this area. If you are further bifurcating those individuals into smaller groups like BOREALIS and all that, it has the challenge to diminuate the ability to get many of these systems into service. That is a real challenge because it's difficult to generate them quickly.

It will take many decades to get back to where we were.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

Thank you.

We will proceed to MP Eyolfson for five minutes.