Thank you.
The time is up.
Evidence of meeting #50 for Science and Research in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was public.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid
We will now start our next round, with MP Baldinelli for five minutes.
Please go ahead.
Conservative
Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Quickly, I want to follow up on one of my colleague's questions.
Ms. McCuaig-Johnston, you spoke earlier about some of your concerns about some of the research here in Canada. Do you believe Canada's research ecosystem is at risk or under threat from foreign interests?
Senior Fellow, Institute for Science, Society and Policy, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
I think it's targeted by foreign interests, and I think there's been a tremendous amount of progress to protect it.
Having said that, I'm very concerned about the workarounds some professors are using. When I say that, I'm using.... For example, Chinese companies, like Huawei, advise professors that they don't need to be concerned about the screening of their research. They can just set up a separate company and work with Huawei—Huawei will help them do that—and they can use their students working through that separate company. I am somewhat concerned about the amount of movement between Huawei and professorships or people teaching at universities. It seems to be a pretty fluid situation.
The reason for my concern—and I've seen this over many years, going back to when I was helping China develop its R and D capacity, when I was in the government—is that it's a one-way street. Our researchers, for the most part, do not speak Mandarin or read Mandarin characters. The Chinese, as I indicated, have an indigenous innovation policy that is all about acquiring technology and science from abroad.
It's a culture. It's like a vacuum's sucking sound, and we need to protect ourselves from that.
Conservative
Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON
To build on some of your earlier comments, in your opening remarks you talked about research system controls. You believed they were robust, but now you're talking about some of the issues, or the workarounds, as you say.
Would you also have concerns with regard to the vetting processes that are in place, the time they take and the economic constraints that have been placed on government agencies to undertake these vetting processes so that by the time they take place, some incidents could have occurred?
I'd like to get your thoughts on that.
Senior Fellow, Institute for Science, Society and Policy, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
The national security strategy talks about stronger enforcement tools and strengthening national security information sharing with research institutions. There's been a lot of sharing. A lot of universities have taken these things on board and have really made them, as Dr. Nemer said, part of their sound practices in managing risks.
Others haven't, and that's unfair. It means it's not a level playing field among the universities when some universities play fast and loose with relationships with companies like BGI and its own genomic research. That's a very sensitive area. They take the genomic data—not personal information, like names and addresses—of a person and they send it to China to be processed. That's going on now.
Conservative
Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON
If I could just follow up, given the government's expenditure control restraint program that's in place, seeking expenditure reductions for government departments, I worry, also, in terms of the vetting process.
For example, there's the case of Dennis Lu that was here in the media over the summertime. This goes back 20 years when CSIS first went to Natural Resources Canada and expressed some concerns then. One gentleman who was in security at NRC talked about the issues where there were severe, I would say, resource constraints in terms of their ability to conduct anything more than traditional risk investigations at that point in time.
That should be a concern to all of us. If this has been taking place over a great period of time and with some of the procedures that are in place, does that not give you pause for concern?
Senior Fellow, Institute for Science, Society and Policy, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
At that period of time there was a big focus on anti-terrorism, so CSIS was diverted into that. I think we have a renewed appreciation now of the importance of research security. I think the NRCan, and the Hydro-Québec case as well, show that it's actually our IT people who identified these lapses, where you'd get data being sent to China overnight or on the weekend from government labs.
Conservative
Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON
That's who it was with. He was with the IT department at Natural Resources Canada when those concerns were identified.
Senior Fellow, Institute for Science, Society and Policy, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Exactly. Those people deserve a tremendous amount of credit for what they're doing.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid
Thank you.
We will proceed to MP Rana for five minutes.
Please go ahead.
Liberal
Aslam Rana Liberal Hamilton Centre, ON
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Dr. Nemer, the Government of Canada-universities working group has been meeting since 2018. From where you sit, what has that ongoing contact between the government and the universities made possible, that set of rules, which on its own it couldn't?
Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada
Yes, that's actually a great question, because you need to have the theoretical and the practical at the same time.
Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada
The more constraints we put on researchers, the more runaround they're going to do.
I think that our—and it's been said—system has worked out really nicely, because from the get-go there was a mutual understanding, number one, of what we were trying to achieve, and then number two, of what was feasible without putting undue pressure on the researcher.
It became a gold standard, I have to say, and in many ways, it has allowed us, in our international collaborations with the European Union, with Horizon Europe, to have access to calls on sensitive technologies, because we could provide the assurance that our research security and standards were excellent.
Liberal
Aslam Rana Liberal Hamilton Centre, ON
Thank you.
Canadian science depends on international collaboration. The vast majority of it is the open work we want more of. How do we make sure early-career researchers and international students still see Canada as a welcoming place to do science while we take these risks seriously?
Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada
I think we can walk and chew gum. We may have to tighten certain security.
I just want to remind us all that even in the United States.... Actually, in the United States, 80% of the research, including the dual use, happens in universities without any extra security. They have told us this. Where it becomes important is when we start the applications, when we start into the later technology levels.
Our institutions can still welcome international people and be a safe place. I think we have to accept that in certain areas we may not want collaborations at all or really restricted ones. We may also have to accept that in certain areas we're not going to have international students, but I would say that these would be very minor areas right now.
I would also add that right now Canada is very positively viewed in the world. I would invite us all to take advantage of it and welcome the most talent that we can.
Liberal
Aslam Rana Liberal Hamilton Centre, ON
Thank you very much.
How does the office of the chief science adviser work with researchers and institutions to balance open science with legitimate security considerations?
Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada
Thank you again for this question.
Earlier in the day, I was at an international meeting at the University of Ottawa on open science. Research security actually goes hand in hand with open science. If you don't have research security, anybody can play with your data and can manipulate the data so that the data is not worth much. It's in the best interest of open science to have research security.
Open science, including the UNESCO guidelines and including our own guidelines here in Canada, has exceptions where things will not be made open, where we will not talk about them and where we will not publish them. They can go hand in hand. It's not a problem at all.
Liberal
Aslam Rana Liberal Hamilton Centre, ON
What additional measures or investments would most strengthen Canada's ability to protect sensitive research and intellectual property?
Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada
Again, this is an excellent question.
For intellectual property, I think we have to appreciate that protecting intellectual property costs money. A lot of it comes from either small companies or universities. They simply don't have the resources to do this because it's not a one-shot deal. Every year, you have to maintain the patent. I think this is a very important area to look into what, practically, we need to do.
In the other area, I would say—we heard from some of our colleagues—that the reason researchers collaborate is often that they need either another technology or more money. If we just make sure that we're funding the researcher appropriately, there is less of an impetus for them to be going left and right. Also, in terms of international collaboration, we can also provide funds for them to collaborate with specific partners.
I'll stop there.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid
We will now proceed to MP Blanchette-Joncas for two and a half minutes.
Bloc
Maxime Blanchette-Joncas Bloc Rimouski-Neigette—Mitis—Matapédia—Les Basques, QC
Mr. Sarra‑Bournet, can you tell us what you believe is currently the main vulnerability that could allow a foreign actor to gain access, for example, to the strategic expertise being developed in Quebec or at the Institut quantique at Université de Sherbrooke?
Associate Vice-President of Infrastructure Development and Quantum Strategy, Université de Sherbrooke
I think the main flaw or vulnerability is something we often hear about. I'm sorry to say this, but it's money. More specifically, in our sector, the quantum sector, we in Canada successfully create many spinoff companies from universities. It's incredible how many such companies there are. Thanks to the expertise found in universities, we're still able to create start-ups and spinoffs. I believe there's sufficient investment capital available for pre-seed and seed funding. However, the real problem inevitably lies in growth capital.
What we're seeing in our ecosystem are companies that reach the growth or capital-raising phase and have to look abroad. That's where the vulnerability lies, because if they don’t have the capital to grow here, it can lead to a brain drain or the loss of intellectual property. There are, however, some very clear examples right here already. Nord Quantique, for example, was approached by U.S. states that offered it direct investments without taking an equity stake. We need to address this to ensure that we have growth capital for this type of company.
Thanks to hard work, the excellence of research at our Canadian universities, and our ability to create these companies, we rank second in the world in terms of the number of start-ups per capita in the quantum field, but it is really in terms of growth capital that we are vulnerable.