Evidence of meeting #50 for Science and Research in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was public.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

Nemer  Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada
Les Jacobs  Professor, Ontario Tech University, As an Individual
McCuaig-Johnston  Senior Fellow, Institute for Science, Society and Policy, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Sarra-Bournet  Associate Vice-President of Infrastructure Development and Quantum Strategy, Université de Sherbrooke

The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 50 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Science and Research. We are meeting today to commence our study on the risks and threats to Canadian science and research.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses as well as the members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic, and please mute yourself when you are not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

I would like to remind witnesses that committee members may ask questions in either French or English. If you will need interpretation, please take a moment now to prepare your earpiece and select the listening channel you need in advance to take full advantage of the time allotted for questions and answers.

All comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the raise hand function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can, and we appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

With that, I would like to welcome our four witnesses for today.

I would like to welcome Dr. Les Jacobs, professor, Ontario Tech University. We are also joined virtually by Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, senior fellow, institute for science, society and policy, University of Ottawa. We are joined in person by Dr. Mona Nemer, chief science adviser of Canada. We are also joined by the Université de Sherbrooke, represented by Christian Sarra-Bournet, associate vice-president of infrastructure development and quantum strategy, by video conference.

Welcome to all the witnesses. Thanks a lot for appearing before the committee.

All of you will have five minutes for your opening remarks, and then we will go into rounds of questioning by the members.

We will begin with Dr. Nemer.

Please go ahead. The floor is yours. You will have five minutes for your opening remarks.

Mona Nemer Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Honourable members, it's always a pleasure to be able to exchange with you.

Thank you for offering me the opportunity to contribute to your study on risks to science.

I welcome your examination of the risks and threats to Canadian science and research.

Canada invests billions annually in research and development. These investments have built a world-class science system that helps support our prosperity and national security. As geopolitical uncertainties rise, including in global trade, securing our sovereignty and socio-economic resilience becomes pressing.

We need to double down on safeguarding our research and research system and on turning our discoveries and intellectual property into scaled technologies. This means addressing threats to physical access, cybersecurity, supply chains and loss of talent. It means fostering a science culture that recognizes security risks and promotes basic research security hygiene so that safeguarding data and intellectual property become routine practices for our researchers and innovators.

Basic research security hygiene is not about creating another layer of complex rules or imposing a heavy security regime. It is about embedding sound everyday practices and fostering a culture that helps researchers recognize and manage risks related to their work and intellectual property. Today, those risks are being amplified by a shifting geopolitical landscape and by the rapid evolution of AI in science.

The work done to date in Canada—that is, encouraging researchers and supporting institutions to safeguard research, as well as assessing scientific collaboration in certain sensitive areas—is important to address risks that arise at the project and researcher levels.

Canada also needs to address risks arising at the science system level. This involves strategic interventions in priority sectors to prevent system failure—for instance, sovereign data and compute availability to enable safe and secure AI adoption; domestic space launch capability to support sovereign satellite applications; and secure production facilities for critical pharmaceuticals and biologics to enhance the resilience of the health and agri-food sectors.

Increasingly, people and system risks converge and, at times, even synergize. For example, what happens to intellectual property rights when AI agents are used as research collaborators trusted with propriety data? What if unpublished research data are leaked through commercial large language models? Clearly, researchers need training in the safe and effective use of AI, but secure and safe infrastructure and tools will need to be developed. From a science system perspective, AI sovereignty, from models to data, should be considered.

Safeguarding our research and intellectual property requires understanding risk at every level: the researcher, the individual project and the broader scientific system. This includes risks associated with not possessing or controlling critical capabilities and infrastructure. And, of course, it means recognizing how these risks interact and can compound one another.

Addressing these risks requires a shared strategic vision among the S and T areas that are critical for Canada's national security and sovereignty, in addition to cultural change in the research community. This is the collective responsibility of individuals, funders, institutions and governments.

Science is a part of our national identity—and, I would say, national security—and a safeguard for our future. Let's make sure we define it on our own terms, protect it and use it for the good of our country.

Protecting our scientific capacity, our collaborations and the integrity of research benefits us all.

The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid

Thank you.

We will now proceed to Dr. Jacobs for five minutes.

Please go ahead. The floor is yours.

Doctor Les Jacobs Professor, Ontario Tech University, As an Individual

Good afternoon.

I'm Les Jacobs. I'm vice-president of research and innovation at Ontario Tech University, which is located on the east side of the greater Toronto area, and has a student population of about 15,000. It's predominantly a STEM-focused university.

Thank you for the invitation to speak about current risks and threats to Canadian university science and technology research. My focus here in these opening remarks is on the university research enterprise, but I'm happy to say a bit more about academic programming in the question period. Likewise, I won't say much in these initial remarks about Ontario Tech, but again, I can do so in the question period.

Although I could raise a number of different issues today—and I note that there's the in-camera session after this on AI—I want to highlight specifically the decline in trust and confidence in universities among the Canadian public. I don't think I need to stress to the members of this committee how important that public trust and confidence is to the success of our university research ecosystem, yet at this particular moment, the public trust and confidence in Canadian universities is at an all-time low, putting at risk the ability to build on so many of the tremendous gains made by our scientists and researchers in the past decade.

In a sense, I'm highlighting that this sort of historically low public trust and confidence in public institutions in a democratic society such as ours is not simply a risk or threat, but indeed a meta-risk—one of a different order.

Last week, the Law Society of Ontario conferred on me an honorary doctorate of law for my career contributions to rule of law, human rights and access to justice in Canada and internationally. In my acceptance address at the call to the bar convocation for new lawyers at Roy Thomson Hall, I noted that there's an important parallel between the historically low public trust and confidence in universities and the correspondingly historically low public trust and confidence in the courts and the justice system.

In the case of the courts and justice system, too many members of the Canadian public doubt that the legal system is fair or helps them when they have everyday legal problems. My advice to the new generation of lawyers joining the Ontario bar last week, building on my own research and policy work for many years, was that they exercise their voices and agency in the legal profession by creating a client-centred, problem-oriented justice system that builds trust and confidence among Canadians.

Here, I'll shift to saying a bit more about what we need to do to renew and build greater public trust and confidence among Canadians in the university research enterprise and the federal agencies that are integral to its success.

There are four important pillars I'd highlight. The record of Canadian universities is strong on three of the four.

First, the research enterprise should be seen by the Canadian public as oriented toward solving problems that have some visibility in their lives. This may require discovery research, curiosity-driven research, mission research or applied research. Really, I'm sort of agnostic on that. Some of these problems may be technical and scientific, but others may require social innovation to address issues such as homelessness, youth mental health or the social licence of nuclear energy facilities or AI data centres.

The second pillar is that the university research enterprise today must be grounded in partnerships with diverse industries, NGOs, community organizations, federal and municipal governments and, of course, the broader public sector and international organizations. These partners are often our best ambassadors for university research and its value.

The third pillar is that graduate students need to be highly visible in our research programs, with training and learning integral to how these programs are carried out. It's notable that we have post-docs present today, which illustrates the importance of that exercise. Over the past two years, we've seen from the Government of Canada historic new investments in graduate students, through the tri-council and Mitacs.

The fourth pillar, which I think is the neglected one, is to integrate at scale undergraduate students into the university research enterprise. This would provide them with unique learning opportunities and engagements with research partners. It's on this fourth pillar that I think we fall short, especially compared to some other countries, such as the technical universities in Germany and the Netherlands.

If members of the public have direct engagement with universities as students, parents or other family members, it is most frequently through our undergraduate students. There are about 1.5 million undergraduate students in Canada. For a large number of these members of the public, university research is a black box—distant and unknown.

If we want to build greater public trust and confidence in the university research enterprise, providing opportunities for more undergraduate students seems key. This is how we tell a large part of the public about the value and importance of university research in science and technology. However, we invest surprisingly little, directly, in funded research opportunities.

The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid

Can you wind up, please? Your time is up.

Dr. Les Jacobs

Yes, I am winding up.

The flagship program USRA only trains about 3,500 students a year. Mitacs matches that, roughly.

Why invest now? Declining public trust and confidence in our universities among Canadians brings, in my view, a new level of urgency. Scale undergraduate student involvement in university research to address that crisis.

The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid

Thank you. Maybe you can get to other points when we go to the rounds of questioning, as your time is up.

We will now proceed to Ms. McCuaig-Johnston.

Please go ahead. You will have five minutes for your opening remarks.

Margaret McCuaig-Johnston Senior Fellow, Institute for Science, Society and Policy, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm very sorry that I can't be there with you in person.

I was privileged to work in the Canadian public service for 37 years, primarily in science and technology policy, programs and funding. In my last position before I retired in 2012, I was the executive vice-president of NSERC.

I joined the Institute for Science, Society and Policy at the University of Ottawa 14 years ago as a senior fellow, where I've been writing about China's innovation system. I started seeing a lot of problems as Xi Jinping introduced an indigenous innovation policy focused on taking western technologies and making them Chinese: the integration of military and civilian technology development, China's technologies in the Arctic, the number of Chinese military professors in Canadian universities and the many problems Canadian technology companies were having with their joint ventures in China.

Some of these risks posed real problems for Canadian universities, as well as to the Canadian government from a policy perspective. In 2020, I was very happy to see that NSERC had developed a very user-friendly checklist for professors as to how they could protect themselves from having their intellectual property taken in China.

Still, there were a lot of things going under the radar. I credit Bob Fife and Steve Chase for uncovering these, such as a machine learning lab at York University funded by iFlytek. The leaders of the lab were from China's National University of Defense Technology under the Central Military Commission. iFlytek is the company that uses voice recognition technology on the Uyghurs. All Uyghurs have to record their voices on iFlytek equipment in different modulations so the police know who is talking on the phone in any conversation. Queen's University had funding from iFlytek too.

Mr. Fife and Mr. Chase did another story when the University of Alberta signed an MOU to be a strategic partner with HKAI Lab. HKAI Lab is funded by Alibaba and SenseTime, a Beijing-based AI company blacklisted by the U.S. government for its surveillance role in the repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. They also did a story about Huawei selling its 5G equipment secretly to Telus at suppressed prices before the government made the decision whether to allow Huawei into our 5G systems. Telus went ahead and installed it anyway, explaining, “You didn't tell us not to do it.”

All these stories contributed directly to a government announcement in 2021 that there would be a new national security screening for NSERC projects. Two-thirds of the first projects in the screening were turned back. This was extended to CIHR and SSHRC as a tri-agency initiative. Understandably, many researchers did not want their own projects to be derailed. They appreciated funding from China for their work. Ultimately, most projects were not derailed. The system works as it should.

In 2023, Mr. Fife and Mr. Chase broke the story that there were more than 50 Canadian universities partnering with the National University of Defense Technology, the premier technology R and D feed to the People's Liberation Army. Again, the government responded quickly and developed a list of universities and institutes in China, Russia and Iran that would be off base to Canadian researchers with federal funding.

The government's quick action in each case has given our country a research security system that I've often called the gold standard for the world. We can't pull it back now that we have a strategic partnership. I agree with everything Mona Nemer just said. Just yesterday, the U.S. banned imports from BGI Genomics because its technology is made by Uyghur forced labour. BGI and Huawei have not given up their Canadian footprint. They have a presence on and beyond campuses. A few professors have even boasted about how they've gotten around the rules.

This is a complex problem that must be addressed, and I look forward to talking about it today.

Thank you.

The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid

Thank you.

Our last witness is Mr. Sarra-Bournet.

Please go ahead. You will have five minutes for your opening remarks. The floor is yours.

Christian Sarra-Bournet Associate Vice-President of Infrastructure Development and Quantum Strategy, Université de Sherbrooke

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to contribute to this study on the risks and threats facing Canadian science and research.

My name is Christian Sarra‑Bournet, and I am associate vice-president for infrastructure development and quantum strategy at the Université de Sherbrooke.

First, I would like to say a few words about the Université de Sherbrooke. As one of Canada's 15 largest research-intensive universities, we are known for our partnership-based approach. We are also internationally recognized for our quantum ecosystem and our strengths in biomedical research. These two areas are strategically important to Canada, both economically and in terms of certain applications related to national security.

This is one of the reasons why research security is of such direct importance to us. In our view, it is an essential part of safeguarding people, knowledge, infrastructure and Canada's capacity for innovation. However, research security measures must be implemented in a targeted and proportionate manner, with due regard for academic freedom, scientific collaboration and openness, which are the very foundations of university research.

Allow me to illustrate this reality through our experience in the field of quantum science and technology. As you know, quantum technologies are among the sensitive research areas Canada has identified. The government has also imposed export controls on certain quantum computing technologies because of their strategic importance to national security and their economic potential, which is measured in the trillions of dollars. Thanks to decades of sustained investment in fundamental research, talent development and innovation, Canada now occupies an enviable position in this sector. We are now home to one of the world's top five quantum hubs, and according to Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, approximately 100 companies are active in the quantum sector across the country.

Today, quantum technology is at a pivotal moment. International investment is growing rapidly, and advances in research and development are remarkable, yet several scientific and technological hurdles remain. Future breakthroughs will depend on fundamental research, the international exchange of knowledge and the ability of Canadian researchers and companies to collaborate with the best partners around the world.

Universities therefore have a critical role to play. However, we must proceed with clear-eyed realism. We know that Canadian knowledge and expertise are highly sought after. The key question, then, is how can we foster international scientific collaboration and attract top talent while also protecting our strategic interests?

First, Canada must remain open to international research collaboration. In an ever-changing geopolitical landscape, trusted partnerships must be strengthened and diversified. The answer is not to close ourselves off from the world and hope to win the innovation race in isolation. On the contrary, Canada should deepen its collaboration with trusted partners, particularly in Europe, through initiatives such as Horizon Europe, and by participating in major international scientific projects. At the same time, these collaborations must be supported by robust risk assessment processes, effective safeguards and the flexibility to respond to a changing landscape. Protecting research does not mean isolating it.

Second, to ensure technological sovereignty, Canada must have the confidence to pursue its goals. In strategic sectors such as science and technology, even though we are currently in the middle of the pack, there is a genuine risk of being left behind. Our objective should be to build on our existing strengths in research and development, working together with our industrial partners and the government, to develop a genuine quantum industry. This means supporting the growth of Canadian companies, retaining top talent, investing in critical infrastructure and strengthening complete value chains here, particularly in the Eastern Townships. It also means adopting intellectual property strategies that reflect the unique realities of quantum science and technology and making investments that match our ambitions. In short, we must ensure that discoveries made in Canada benefit Canadians first and foremost.

Third, we must ensure that researchers and institutions have the means to make informed decisions. The research security component of the research support fund has enabled the Université de Sherbrooke and other universities to develop robust institutional strategies and to support the implementation of federal guidelines. This funding is essential. However, current funding levels cover only a portion of the actual costs incurred by institutions. We therefore recommend that the federal government adjust this support to reflect evolving needs and expand access to it in order to strengthen the security and resilience of the entire Canadian research ecosystem. We also support initiatives that promote the exchange of information, the sharing of best practice and the reduction of duplication between institutions.

Allow me to conclude with a few observations on research and development projects related to national security. Universities such as the Université de Sherbrooke fully recognize the unique challenges associated with these projects. Establishing secure research environments goes far beyond standard research security measures. In particular, these environments require security clearances, suitable facilities, specialized equipment and rigorous compliance processes. If universities are to participate fully in these strategically important projects, it is essential that the additional costs associated with these requirements be adequately recognized and funded through the relevant research agreements and programs.

To conclude, I would say that research security is a collective responsibility. To succeed, Canada will need to combine vigilance, collaboration, innovation and sustained investment.

We must protect the strengths that underpin our success while preserving the openness that has made our research ecosystem one of the finest in the world. The Université de Sherbrooke remains committed to working with the federal government and partners across the research community to develop a framework that is effective, coherent and conducive to scientific excellence.

Thank you.

The Chair Liberal Salma Zahid

Thank you.

With that, we will now start our first round of questioning of six minutes each. We will begin with MP Baldinelli.

Please go ahead. You will have six minutes.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.

Ms. Nemer, it's wonderful to have you join us once again. Thank you for always being available when this committee requests.

Today, we're beginning a new study on the risks and threats to Canadian science and research. We know how important science and research is to Canada's economic growth and prosperity. It's at the core of everything we do to advance our lives and to improve life and our living standards. I think you said it best, research is part of our national identity and national security. That's why it's also at risk and facing threats from foreign espionage and foreign interference from foreign states who want to try to infiltrate our research system, copy what we do and steal Canadian talent and IP to the benefit of foreign state interests over Canada's state interests.

It was rather timely today that the Prime Minister announced a plan for a stronger Canada, the first national security strategy in over 20 years. Surprisingly, it's only 13 pages long. In fact, the Prime Minister's press release is only four pages. It's nearly one-third the length of the entire strategy. The word “science” does not appear in that strategy document, not once. Does that concern you?

3:55 p.m.

Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada

Mona Nemer

It really doesn't concern me, and I'll tell you why. This is because it is understood that in every one of these boxes, science and technology—because we can put them both together—is assumed there. When we talk about pharmaceuticals, biotech, food security, critical minerals and energy—you name it—it's assumed that it's there.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON

Including the research component...?

3:55 p.m.

Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada

Mona Nemer

That's the challenge.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON

It's the Canadian research component.

3:55 p.m.

Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada

Mona Nemer

Yes, that is the challenge of making sure that we're looking at the entire pipeline from the discovery.... If we want to be sovereign, it has to be our technologies and our IP that is produced in Canada.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON

I fully agree.

3:55 p.m.

Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada

Mona Nemer

We have to make sure, in the implementation of the strategy, that this is not lost on anyone.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON

Given your role as chief science adviser for Canada, did the Government of Canada consult your office for input and feedback on this strategy document?

3:55 p.m.

Chief Science Advisor of Canada, Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada

Mona Nemer

It was not for the entire strategy, but for some of the boxes—yes. I've been quite involved on the pharmaceutical side. I've spoken about the importance of food security. Yes, I can say that I have been consulted.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON

Again, thank you for being here.

I'm going to go to Ms. McCuaig-Johnston.

Thank you for appearing before our committee once again.

I want to go back to some of the testimony that you provided to us in April 2026. You mentioned that any firm or individual in China must spy for Beijing if requested. Does this policy extend to Chinese nationals living abroad or in other countries like Canada?

3:55 p.m.

Senior Fellow, Institute for Science, Society and Policy, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Margaret McCuaig-Johnston

That's not an exactly clear question.

You're referring to the National Intelligence Law, section 7. For Chinese nationals in Canada, who are not Canadian, yes, it would certainly extend to them. For those who are Canadian, the Chinese state tries to, in a very friendly way, court them to help the motherland. Very often that's where you see things like information being diverted to Beijing or research security compromised. It may be a Chinese-Canadian who is just trying to help the motherland.

I've seen this kind of thing happen where the Chinese officials and the science counsellor at the embassy are very genteel, very gracious people and are lovely to deal with. This is one of their tasks: to get Chinese nationals living in Canada to help them out.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

Tony Baldinelli Conservative Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON

Would that be one of the reasons that...? If we go back to the Globe and Mail article, it details Claire Zhang as the Canadian intern charged with espionage at NATO headquarters in Belgium last April. In an article in The Globe and Mail, you're quoted as saying that it is possible that Ms. Zhang, who had “been in numerous and increasingly responsible positions already, did not get the screening depth that she might otherwise have had.” You went on to say, the article states, that since the Prime Minister took office, Canada's security agencies “have been spread thin with budget cuts and many demands to screen new employees into sensitive positions”.

Is it a failure of our security screening processes in addition to some of these Chinese government laws that exist and take advantage of situations in place in Canada?

4 p.m.

Senior Fellow, Institute for Science, Society and Policy, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Margaret McCuaig-Johnston

It's a combination of those two things. Actually, I have the national security strategy in front of me. Right at the end, it talks about the importance of screening, so they've taken that on board for sure. It also goes to the point that Dr. Nemer made about the need to double down on securing our research.

There's a tactic that the Chinese use, which is to move into increasingly central and strategic positions in any organization. You can see it over time once you look at it retrospectively. We had the case of Haiyan Zhang back in the early 2000s. I knew her when she was a journalist at Xinhua. She ended up at Industry Canada and then in the cabinet room. I saw her in the cabinet room. I thought, holy, what's she doing there? It turns out she'd gotten a job in the Privy Council Office. She was fired from there when CSIS did the full workup on her and realized she shouldn't have been there at all.

These security clearances and screenings are really important.