Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by thanking the member for Vancouver East for introducing Bill C‑233, an act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, as part of Private Members' Business.
I have heard many comments about this bill from people in my riding of Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester. It is clear that Canadians are deeply concerned about our country's role in global security and the responsible export of military equipment. The debate surrounding this bill touches on core Canadian values: our commitment to democracy, human rights, responsible trade and our contribution to making the world a safer place. These are not abstract ideals, but the very foundations of our foreign policy.
No one here disagrees with this bill in principle. Canada must maintain strong export controls to prevent the misuse of weapons. However, Bill C-233 rests upon a false premise.
Canada has one of the world's strongest export control regimes in the world and has updated it over the years accordingly. That is why Canada joined the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019 and updated our laws to ensure full compliance through Bill C-47, a bill that many members, including the member for Vancouver East, should remember well.
Canada's export control system aims to limit the illicit arms trade by preventing weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals or groups that foment conflict, and to reduce human suffering around the world. Oversight is essential, but it must be balanced and practical. While Bill C‑233 means well, its overly broad scope would create obstacles for Canadian businesses, slow trade and limit Canada's ability to respond effectively to global challenges.
When we debated Bill C‑47, we discussed many of the measures in the bill before us today that concern exemptions. What was true then remains true today in terms of the need to include these measures in our system. In short, the proposals in Bill C‑233 would disrupt a balance that we are able to achieve through existing legislation, regulations and policies.
Let me explain further. The world is changing. Conflicts are evolving and new threats are emerging. Canada must stay agile and ready to respond.
Canada's export control regime was built to keep pace with this changing world. Our risk-managed framework provides the tools needed to act swiftly, doing so, for example, by adding items to the export control list to prevent sensitive technologies from being misused.
Decisions on export permits are taken carefully after a rigorous process that involves a range of experts from across government. This includes evaluating permit applications against the criteria drawn from the Arms Trade Treaty and embedded in Canadian law through the Export and Import Permits Act.
Our system is flexible, but that flexibility does not mean that we are cutting corners. We have a carefully designed risk management framework that balances our national security, international obligations and defence partnerships with the commercial ties that support economic growth in Canada. Our process is designed to take into account intelligence, diplomatic information and human rights considerations. We work closely with Canada's missions abroad, our allies and partners, to make informed decisions that reflect the realities on the ground.
As parliamentarians and Canadians are aware, Canada has suspended or revoked permits when credible evidence of misuse has emerged. Any violations of the Export and Import Permits Act are taken extremely seriously. Those who are found to have breached the law face consequences, including fines, seizures and criminal prosecutions. That is how we help to protect lives and uphold our values. We will always work to do so.
Bill C-233 would hinder our ability to continue with this risk-based approach in three significant ways.
First, Bill C-233 seeks to create a statutory definition of arms that could potentially include items that are not weapons at all, such as navigation systems, software and even basic mechanical parts. The bill's proposed definition could have Canada needlessly regulating thousands of products, from nuts and bolts to steel and aluminum. This would put Canada out of step with allies, whose focus is rightly on high-risk technologies and high-risk destinations. Further, this would overwhelm our export control system, require staggering increases in government resources, slow legitimate trade and hurt Canada's reputation and Canadian businesses, especially small and medium-sized manufacturers, which rely on predictable rules.
Second, this bill seeks to prescribe how export applications are assessed by adding new mandatory requirements for governments to certify the end use of items purchased by private companies in their countries. Not only does this go well beyond what is required by the Arms Trade Treaty, but it would be virtually impossible to implement. Most countries simply do not issue official end-use certificates to private entities. Canada would have neither the authority nor the influence to enforce this provision, and imposing it would only block legitimate exports, including potentially those destined for our allies in Ukraine.
What is more, Canada already conducts thorough end-use and destination risk assessments. End use is verified using a variety of reliable methods. These may include end-use certificates issued by a government when it imports items itself, or other assurances provided by reputable private parties for private exports.
Canada assesses destination countries based on factors such as the strength of their export control systems and the risk of diversion, consistent with how our allies operate. The proposed addition to our assessment criteria would not make the world a safer place. Rather, it would hurt Canadian businesses and their customers, including the Canadian Armed Forces and our NATO allies at a time when we need them most, and undermine Canada's role as a trusted partner.
Third, Bill C-233 would impose costs and burdens on ordinary Canadians. Like many of our allies, Canada uses expedited licensing in specific circumstances for lower-risk military and dual-use items to countries with similarly robust approaches to export controls. This is a standard international practice that enables defence trade to move quickly and securely without compromising oversight and the agility it requires in a rapidly divided world, at a time when we are trying to increase our defence capacity, not decrease it.
This bill would disrupt the balance we have worked so hard to achieve. It proposes restrictions that would increase costs for both the government and Canadian businesses, without improving the quality of decisions. This bill would end the current system that allows most military goods and technology to be exported to the United States without the need for individual permits, which would harm an important trade and defence relationship.
In fact, this bill goes beyond what it claims to do in this area. It would cancel all existing export permits, including long-standing general export and brokering permits. This means that Canadian companies, many of which have already undergone rigorous review, would be forced to start from scratch and re-apply for permits, affecting hard-working Canadian companies that already have very limited resources.
As a result, I wish to inform the House that we are unable to support this bill as it stands, but I think it is important to thank the member for Vancouver East for bringing it before the House.