Pauline Picard

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, May 9th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, during the last election campaign which led to the formation of this Parliament, our government colleagues travelled across the country waving their philosophy manual, better known as the red book. Making all kinds of promises in their speeches, our colleagues were particularly keen on promising all Quebecers and Canadians that a Liberal government would restore integrity to our political institutions-red book, chapter 6.

The essence of that promise was a formal commitment to giving our country a government that would be more transparent, a government that would not play cat and mouse with taxpayers, a government made up of people who would preach by example and give back to Canadians the confidence they had lost in their elected representatives. I heard the Prime Minister make that kind of statement in a formal tone that would leave absolutely no doubt in anybody's mind. I heard him say very convincingly that his government would clean up the way politics are played in our country and would stay away from all the questionable practices that we had grown accustomed to under the Conservative government.

Now, it seems to me that the Pearson airport privatization deal is a golden opportunity for the government to follow up on its election promises. The influence exerted by friends of the government in this deal gives the present government the chance to fulfil its commitments. If it does not seize this opportunity right now, does that mean that it will not keep the promises of integrity and transparency made during the election campaign? Why is the government refusing to get to the bottom of this matter? If we have any respect for taxpayers, we have to tell them how their money is spent, who makes the decisions and in whose interest. If we do not agree, and rightly so, on a matter such as the Pearson Airport deal, we have to say why we do not. If we fear that there have been some shady dealings, we should not avoid the subject.

On the contrary, we have to face up to it so that leniency does not resurface in the future and we do not fall into the same traps. Quebecers and Canadians have the right to know about this, not just a small part of it, from a government that refuses to talk about it and is quick to evade its responsibilities by trying to ram through Bill C-22. We have to get right to the bottom of this matter through a genuine commission of inquiry and leave it to the House to determine, after the inquiry, whether compensation is appropriate or not.

I am rising in this House to tell you so because, as members of Parliament, we have to denounce the actions of some members of the political class of this country. More particularly, we have to denounce the quasi-incestuous practices that are part of the culture of persons who daily try to influence government decisions.

Using every lever at their disposal, from childhood friendships to favours done, right through electoral organizing and political party financing, these persons contribute to trade public interest for private good and, sadly, contribute to relegate the role of duly elected Parliamentarians to a position of secondary importance. I rise therefore in this House with this bitter aftertaste left by Bill C-22, by the nebulous aspect of the Pearson Airport privatization matter that seems to involve lobbyists, politicians, former officials and friends of the government.

The investigation into the Pearson airport issue should not be restricted to the debate on Bill C-22. The government is making a mistake by refusing to go to the bottom of this issue. By simply repressing the whole matter and granting under clause 10 generous compensation payments that it wants to set as it pleases behind closed doors and without consultation with parliamentarians, is the government revealing the real truth to the Canadian people and the Quebec people, a truth which is quite different from what we read in the red book about a code of ethics and lobbyists? Have the powerful lobbyists that hound the government already managed to change its mind? I hope not. The government is faced here with a perfect situation where it can demonstrate its good will, propose a new way of dealing with government business, and restore in the population a minimum of trust for the political class.

At a time when all surveys and opinion polls indicate that people mistrust and have little respect for their political leaders, should we not face the old demons that dwell in the back rooms of government and give the people what it wants, that is openness and the simple, plain truth? The Pearson airport issue is the perfect opportunity for that exercise, and I am sure that with a free vote, all members would act acording to their

conscience and lean towards openness, parliamentary legitimacy and restriction of ambitions.

It is the government's duty to launch a public inquiry into the privatization of the Pearson airport. If it refuses to do so, it will be remiss in its duty, it will break its electoral commitments and pardon the ways of the Conservatives in order to better follow them. Quite clearly, the only thing that will have changed is a few of the people at the trough.

I would like to give you a little bit of background, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Nixon wrote in his report that the Pearson airport privatization is an obvious example of political manipulating, improprieties and manoeuvering. Whence the importance, if we have nothing to hide or to protect, of fully examining this matter so that it can serve as an example and ensure that such a situation does not happen again.

In 1987, when the federal government announced a new management policy for Canadian airports, it did so mainly to involve local authorities in airport affairs and sites development. Such was the case for Vancouver and Montreal, among others, where non-profit organizations manage airport installations. In Toronto, however, things were quite different. Is it because Pearson Airport was Canada's most profitable airport? In this era of sacro-sanct economic liberalism, why let the government manage a profitable facility when there are so many that are not profitable within its reach?

Far from protecting the public interest, the transaction occurred right in the middle of an election campaign to the benefit of the only two bidders, two former competitors now united to make a profit. Paxport Inc., whose bid was selected by the government without any financial analysis, could not get enough money to complete the transaction for terminals 1 and 2. Paxport Inc. joined with Claridge Inc., which already controlled terminal 3, through the Pearson Development Corporation. This alliance was sealed in the T1 T2 Limited Partnership. And there you have it. Pearson Airport, a very profitable airport, was completely privatized in the hands of the same group.

We in the Official Opposition are not attempting to launch a witch hunt or to bring back the rules of the Grand Inquisition. We simply want to get right to the bottom of the issue and regulate certain types of questionable practices that have no place in our parliamentary system.

When we analyse the disturbing facts referred to in the Nixon Report, we cannot just forget about this issue, as the government is doing with Bill C-22.

In his report, Mr. Nixon refers to political manipulation, which is a serious observation. Are we going to keep moving in that direction and give the minister, under section 10, a blank cheque for the payment of compensations as he sees fit to do? The Nixon report shows that lobbyists in the financial community really tried to take us all for a ride, taxpayers of Quebec and Canada, in that project. Are we going to help them do it again?

No, Mr. Speaker, the taxpayers have already paid too much and moreover, they must know why. Therefore, we must reject Bill C-22 and quickly set up a royal commission of inquiry.

[Multiple Sclerosis, May 5th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour for me to announce in this House the official launching of the carnation campaign for multiple sclerosis, which will take place next weekend.

Multiple sclerosis is the most common neurological disease among young adults in Canada; it is estimated that over 50,000 Canadians and Quebecers have this disease, for which there is no treatment so far. We must also mention that Canada has one of the highest rates of multiple sclerosis of any country in the world. Given the seriousness of the situation, the Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada hopes to raise $2 million in its national carnation campaign.

I am therefore pleased to join the Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada in asking hon. members and all Quebecers and Canadians to support this worthy cause.

[English]

[Reproductive Technologies, May 4th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, does the minister realize that the government's slowness in acting to regulate and control new reproductive technologies proves that this issue is not a priority for the government, despite the minister's statement in Geneva, and that its inaction will have a major impact on ethics and research?

[Reproductive Technologies, May 4th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Justice.

Yesterday at the annual meeting of the World Health Organization in Geneva, the Minister of Health said that the misuse of reproductive technologies like cloning and genetic engineering to choose a child's sex must stop.

Does the Minister of Justice agree with his colleague, the Minister of Health, who at that prestigious forum emphasized the importance of criminalizing some reproductive technologies such as genetic engineering and cloning?

[Prescription Drugs, April 28th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, in the next few minutes, I intend to share my comments and concerns about the motion tabled by the hon. member for Regina-Lumsden, who is asking the House to repeal the Patent Act Amendment Act passed by the House in 1993 and better known as C-91.

I must tell you right away that I strongly oppose this motion and I will now explain to my hon. colleagues the reasons behind my position.

To understand all the elements of this debate, we must go back to the past to see what the situation was like in Canada before Bill C-91 and its predecessor, C-22, were passed in 1993 and 1987 respectively.

In 1960, a royal inquiry commission found that drug prices in Canada were too high and recommended establishing a procedure to issue compulsory licences to import and sell patented pharmaceutical products. That is what Canada did in 1969.

This reform led to the creation of a number of pharmaceutical businesses which, after obtaining the compulsory licences, produced and sold generic drugs at lower prices than brand-name drugs. Although the purpose of the reform, namely to control and reduce drug prices, was achieved, it also had a very negative impact. Research in the Canadian pharmaceutical sector dropped dramatically.

To promote research and the growth of the pharmaceutical industry, the federal government created the Eastman Commission in 1984. In its report made public the following year, the commission proposed a major reform which was approved by the government and led to C-22, an Act to amend the Patent Act.

This reform had an ambitious goal: to stop the exodus of Canadian researchers to the U.S., convince pharmaceutical companies to invest more money in research, and put Canada back on the list of industrialized countries where high-tech medical research is done.

Now that we know the background, we understand better the various elements and the reasons that led to this trench war still being fought between generic-drug manufacturers and innovative companies. After supporting the former for over 25 years, the government lived up to the challenge of helping innovative and research companies while ensuring that drug prices remain under control.

We can identify three real consequences of this reform. First, innovative companies made a public promise to increase significantly their investments in pharmaceutical research. These companies kept their word. So these two pieces of legislation resulted in the biggest research and development expansion program ever undertaken in the medical research sector in recent history.

Before 1987, brand-name drug makers spent only 3.5 to 4.5 per cent of their sales revenues on research and development activities. After C-22 was passed, the ratio of research and development spending increased to 6.1 per cent in 1988 and to 9.7 per cent in 1991. The latest figures available, for 1993, show a ratio of 9.9 per cent.

We see that investment on research and development has practically doubled since the two bills were passed, from less than $100 million to more than $400 million invested in medical research, within less than seven years.

Just on this point, we can see that these two laws were a success, but we must hope that drug makers will continue and raise R and D spending to over 10 per cent of sales, to come closer to American innovative companies that invest 14.2 per cent in R and D and their British counterparts, who invest up to 20 per cent.

A second major consequence of this reform was to maintain the price of patented drugs. That was the biggest concern of opponents of C-22 and C-91. Even today, we see in this House that it is still this aspect that seems to give the greatest concern to opponents of this reform.

We must admit that drug prices account for much of the health spending of various governments. An aging population, greater consumption of health care and increasingly sophisticated research affect the kind and amount of drugs consumed and the funds allocated for drugs.

To avoid sudden increases in patented drug prices, the prices review board was created with the mandate, which it still has, of ensuring that innovative companies do not jack up above their actual value the price of patented drugs leaving the factory. The board must therefore take into account the price of drugs sold in other countries, the price of other medication in the same therapeutic category and other factors to determine whether the drug price is excessive. The Minster of Industry and the provincial ministers have the right to intervene at the board's hearings.

From 1987 to 1992, the price of patent drugs increased at an annual average rate of 2.9 per cent, compared to 4.2 per cent for the consumer price index. Since 1988, the price increase has remained lower for patent drugs than for drugs as a whole. We must therefore conclude that the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, with the added power delegated to it by Bill C-91, was able to fulfil its role and prevent undue price increases for patent drugs.

The third consequence of the reform is mainly the result of Bill C-91, which is the legislation we are now being asked to revoke. Yet, this consequence, which I would call global realignment, is absolutely normal and was unavoidable. In these days of trade liberalization and free trade zones, Canada must provide its industries and its economy with a legislative framework that will allow them to be competitive at the international level. The two acts were passed with that objective in mind.

It is interesting to make a comparison with other industrialized countries. While, as a rule, patents for drugs are granted for 20 years, some countries have gone even farther by extending that 20-year period so as to absorb the marketing period, which can sometimes be up to ten or twelve years. This is the case with the EEC which, since June of 1992, may grant a five-year extension, depending on the length of the marketing period, so as to guarantee exclusivity to patent holders for 15 years.

Japan and Australia have also granted extensions of five and four years. It is in Canada's interest, given its limited market, to ensure that intellectual property laws are governed by GATT proposals. Indeed, the primary objective of Bill C-91 was to align the Canadian legislation on intellectual property of patent drugs with the laws and regulations in effect elsewhere in the world.

The fact is that before Bill C-91 became law, Canada was the only industrialized country which did not treat drugs like any other invention. There is no doubt that in 1993, when it decided to abolish the compulsory licence program for pharmaceutical products and harmonize its policy on intellectual property with the rules governing its major competitors on the international scene, Canada gave itself one of the best tools to get the investments it needs.

The motion asks us to repeal the 1993 act, better known as Bill C-91, to make patent drugs more affordable. Clearly, the provisions contained in the federal act can ensure the protection of consumers against price increases for prescription drugs, while at the same time promoting research and development, as well as the creation of highly skilled jobs.

The protection provided by Canada to pharmaceutical patents before Bill C-91 became law kept product manufacturers from being competitive. While Canadian companies had a seven-year protection, their American and European competitors were being granted exclusivity for 14 years.

Canada and Quebec cannot overlook the favourable conditions offered by our foreign competitors.

I think I have shown that Bill C-91 also provides an adjustment mechanism in this era of freer trade. This legislation enables Canada to adjust and to harmonize its laws and regulations with the international agreements to which it is a party. Bill C-91 was the outcome of a reform which has had positive and desirable consequences on the economy of Quebec and Canada, and this is why I firmly oppose this motion.

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 27th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to denounce the doings of some politicians in this country. More particularly, I intend to denounce the almost incestuous practices which are part of the culture of some people who try every day to influence government decisions, using all the means at their disposal, from childhood friendships to services rendered, including election organizing and political party financing.

These people try to change the normal course of events, to trade the public interest for private gain and, sadly, to relegate to the background parliamentarians' role as their constituents' elected representatives. I therefore speak on this bitter taste left by Bill C-22, the uncertainties surrounding the privatization of Pearson Airport in which lobbyists, politicians, former senior civil servants and friends of the government seem to be involved.

The Pearson Airport issue is worth considering, beyond Bill C-22. The government is wrong in refusing to clear up the whole matter. By simply clamping a lid on it while clause 10 would pay generous compensation set in secret and at its discretion, without consulting parliamentarians, the government is showing the people of Quebec and Canada its true colours, while its red book talked about a code of ethics for lobbying.

Has the powerful lobby around it made the government change its mind? If not, as I hope, the government has the ideal issue before it to show its good will, to set a new path in the conduct of affairs of state and to give back to our fellow citizens a minimum of trust in their political leaders.

At a time when polls and all opinion surveys agree that the people mistrust and doubt their political leaders and hold them in low esteem, is it not worth confronting the old demons which haunt the halls and corridors of government and giving the people what they want: honesty, openness and the plain simple truth? The Pearson Airport issue is perfect for this exercise and I am convinced that, in a free vote, parliamentarians would listen to their conscience and go for transparency, legitimacy and restraint.

The government has the duty to hold a public inquiry on the privatization of that airport. By refusing to do so and not following the suggestion made by the Bloc Quebecois, the government would not fulfil its responsibilities; it would renege on its election promises, and it would in fact endorse methods used by Conservatives. The government would merely replace a few beneficiaries.

As Mr. Nixon mentioned in his report, the privatization of Pearson Airport is an obvious example of political interference, irregularities and maneuvering. This is why, if the government has nothing to hide or to protect, the issue must be thoroughly examined and must stand as an example to ensure that such a situation does not occur again.

In 1987, when the federal government implemented a new management policy regarding Canadian airports, it did so mainly to involve local authorities in the development of airport sites. This was the case for Vancouver and Montreal, among others, where non-profit corporations manage airport facilities. In Toronto, the situation was very different, perhaps because Pearson Airport was the most profitable in Canada. In a context of freer trade, which is a sacred cow, the thinking goes like this: Why should the government keep a profitable venture when it can look after so many non-profitable ones?

Far from promoting public interest, the transaction took place in the midst of an election campaign, for the benefit of the only two bidders, former competitors now united to reap the profits. Paxport Inc., whose bid had been approved by the government without any prior financial analysis, was not able to come up with the funds necessary to conclude the transaction involving terminals 1 and 2. Paxport joins forces with Claridge Inc., which already controls terminal 3 via Pearson Development Corporation.

This merger produces T1 T2 Partnership. And there you have it! Pearson, which is a very profitable airport, is completely privatized for the benefit of a single group. The financial details of the deal are kept secret, but when reviewed by Robert Nixon and other Ontario investigators, they do not seem to be compatible with public policy. How many millions of dollars are we

talking about? We have to know in order to determine how much we are ready to pay to show our appreciation to government supporters. It is in the best interest of Canadians to know these things, because it is their money the government is squandering and wasting away on such schemes.

It is also in the interest of the public to find out who took part in those deals and how they managed to come up with such irregular and intricate deals. This information will only come out of an in-depth inquiry, which the government must set up.

Right now, we only know who the lead actors in the Pearson deal were and notice that they all are closely linked either to the Conservative Party or the Liberal Party. For instance, Claridge Properties Inc., belongs to Charles Bronfman, who is well-known for his ties to the Liberal Party of Canada. Senator Léo Kolber sat on the board of directors of Claridge when the deal was signed and, during the election campaign, he held a party at $1,000 a plate, which Mr. Bronfman and the current Prime Minister, among others, attended.

Herb Metcalf, a lobbyist for Claridge, is a former political organizer for Mr. Chrétien, while Ramsey Withers, deputy minister of Transport at the time of the request for proposals process concerning Terminal 3, is another lobbyist well-known for his close ties to the current prime minister.

At Claridge, to strike a balance between red and blue, there were also Conservative lobbyists involved in this deal: Pat MacAdam, a college friend of Brian Mulroney, Bill Fox, former press secretary to and personal friend of Brian Mulroney, and finally Harry Near, a long-time party activist.

Paxport Inc. also has some Conservative friends even though it reportedly also maintains close ties with the Liberal Party of Canada. There is Don Matthew, former chairman of Brian Mulroney's leadership campaign, former chairman of the Conservative Party and of the party's fund-raising campaign. Another former chief of staff of Brian Mulroney, Fred Doucet, acted as a Conservative lobbyist for Paxport while the consortium with Claridge was being planned. Other lobbyists, like Bill Neville, Hugh Riopelle and John Legate, are all known to have easy access to Brian Mulroney Cabinet members.

Given this information and all the disturbing matters raised in the Nixon report, the government simply cannot brush aside this issue, as it is trying to do with Bill C-22.

In his report, Mr. Nixon talks about political manipulation, which is a serious allegation. Will we encourage this by handing to the minister, under the cover of section 10, a blank cheque for the payment of compensations as he sees fit? The Nixon Report indicates that financiers and lobbyists tried to put one over on us, the taxpayers of Canada and of Quebec, with this project. Will we help them to con us even more?

The answer is no, and I will conclude with this. Taxpayers have already paid too much, and they need to know why. Thus, we must reject Bill C-22 and soon proceed with a royal commission of inquiry.

[Health Care, April 27th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I personally met with the minister. I wrote to her. I asked her a question in the House yesterday. I ask her the same question again today: When will BioVac have its approval? When? Is that clear?

[Health Care, April 27th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Health. After 22 months of waiting, BioVac has still not received approval for its BCG cancer vaccine, while Connaught of Toronto obtained such approval after only a 14-month wait. I reminded the minister yesterday that her department was applying a double standard.

My question is this: Now that she has had the time to do the necessary checks, can the minister tell us when BioVac will receive its authorization?

[Biovac, April 26th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out that I already put this question to the minister in the lobby, but that I am still waiting for an answer. I wish she would explain why the double standards, one for BioVac which, after 22 months, is still waiting for an answer from the department, and one for Connaught which got a license for its vaccine after 14 months.

[Biovac, April 26th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Health. On June 8, 1992, the BioVac company of Quebec submitted an application for the licensing of its BCG-cancer vaccine. After 22 months, this application is still pending. Connaught submitted an application for a similar vaccine on March 2, 1989, and a license was issued after 14 months. This delay in the licensing process is causing serious prejudice to BioVac which stands to lose important contracts.

Could the minister tell us what is delaying unduly the licensing of the Biovac BCG-cancer vaccine?