Richard Marceau

[Monetary Union, May 7th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, an internal Bank of Canada document indicated that it does not in the least reject the idea of a form of monetary union between Canada and the United States. Moreover, Governor Dodge seems to be more open than his predecessor to this. The existence of this document, coupled with recent statements by Mr. Dodge, suggests that this government is talking out of both sides of its mouth.

My question is for the Deputy Prime Minister. Is the government not merely trying to conceal the fact that it has gone much further than it would like people to think in its consideration of a form of monetary union between Canada and the United States?

[Aboriginal Affairs, May 2nd, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I too am pleased to discuss the important announcement by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

In principle, the Bloc Quebecois supports any measure aimed at modernizing the archaic political system that has been imposed for over 100 years on aboriginal communities by the federal government.

The minister's initiative announced today is laudable, but one wonders about the government's real intentions. We must deplore, among other things, the quick and expeditious shelving of the voluminous report of the Erasmus-Dussault commission. That was a serious mistake and the Bloc Quebecois has always been very sensitive to the implementation of the commission's recommendations.

We also deplore the fact that, since 1999, the minister has not kept his promises on the reform of the Indian Act, including the sensitive issue of the matrimonial regime of women on reserves. Aboriginal women do not all enjoy the same rights. Those living off reserve enjoy the right to a fair splitting of the conjugal assets when their marriage fails. Unfortunately, that is not the case for women living on reserves.

The minister's initiative and his reassuring words must not have the effect of putting off indefinitely what first nations have been seeking for so long, such as the inherent right to self-government, aboriginal and treaty rights, and management powers over, among other things, land and natural resources.

The consultation process proposed by the minister also raises many major issues.

This strikes me as a desire to reinvent the wheel. Why launch this consultation process when it is scarcely five years since the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples tabled its report? This, hon. members will recall, was a commission that did a very thorough job and cost the Canadian taxpayer close to $50 million.

If the minister took the trouble to read that report with care, he would certainly find it to be a major source of inspiration, and time, energy and money would be saved. Also, there are many questions, and nebulous questions at that.

How can the aboriginal right to vote be addressed properly if the vital matter of the inherent right to self-government is not touched upon at all?

How will this consultation process impact upon the negotiations currently under way? Do they need to be suspended in order to avoid any type of interference? How long will this famous interim step, as the minister called it, last? Is the minister really assured of the support of the first nations for the consultation process?

It seems to me that the conclusions the minister wishes to reach consist in imposing the federal government's vision on the aboriginal people, as it has tended to do for a century, and on the provinces, as it has for several decades.

Finally, by transferring its powers relating to day to day administration to the first nations, is the central government not seeking to quietly dump onto those same first nations its fiduciary obligation, without providing them with the necessary resources indispensable to their viability, and particularly to their prosperity?

[Minister Of Intergovernmental Affairs, May 2nd, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, in a letter published in yesterday's La Presse , the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs said that even if Quebec were a nation in the French sense of the word, it was not necessary to recognize it formally in the Canadian constitution. He went on to add that the Canadian constitution did not even recognize the Canadian nation.

How can the minister not realize that the very existence of a constitution presupposed the existence of a Canadian nation in the eyes and minds of those who wrote it?

If we are to follow his logic, why does the federal government make such a point of calling Ottawa its national capital? Similarly, what are we to make of the holding of a national summit on sport? Should we have doubts about the contents of the National Archives of Canada or of the National Library? What is performed at the National Arts Centre? What is studied at the National Research Council? Worse yet, what is the role of the Department of National Defence?

If the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs wants to be consistent, what is he waiting for to ask his colleagues to stop referring to all—

[Supply, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to see the parliamentary secretary to the Minister for International Trade understand how the European Union operates. It is composed of sovereign states, independent states. This is a model partnership between sovereignty nations, one that we sovereignists on this side of the House are certainly prepared to look at, but not to copy word for word, comma for comma. This is a model of partnership between sovereign nations which, if explored in a less partisan manner and I will go further than that, if the other side of this House would just look at it, would be seen as the model for the future. We would see that independent and sovereign nations can work together far better than when a nation like Quebec feels constrained by an outmoded arrangement like the Canadian federation, which dates back to 1867.

[Supply, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I would remind the parliamentary secretary to the Minister for International Trade that his party has fewer seats from Quebec in this House than the Bloc Quebecois. Therefore, there is a huge problem in the premise of his question. That is my first point.

Second, does he not understand that Quebecers never gave the government the mandate to negotiate on the international stage in areas outside its jurisdiction? Quebecers never gave it such a mandate.

Third, we can talk about details if he wants, I do not mind. I make the following suggestions. First, a Quebec-Canada or Canada-Quebec binational team should be established to defend Quebec's interests pending a yes on sovereignty, which will happen sooner than the member opposite may think.

I see him smile. We need not go to Mars to see examples of how federations work. I named two, Belgium and Germany. In both cases, the federated states were much more involved in areas under their jurisdiction on the international stage. So there is no point in trying to have us believe that Canada is a model for all federations.

We can also look at what is done in the European Union, where the various member countries work together before, during and after negotiations not only so they feel involved, but also so their interests are defended, protected and promoted rather aggressively.

There are different ways of doing this. We are willing to talk about it. In fact, this will also be part of the partnership discussions that will take place after Quebec achieves full independence.

[Supply, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I rise today to speak to the motion brought forward by my colleague from Joliette. One word could be used to summarize this motion, the word transparency.

When the issues at stake touch the everyday life of people, what they watch, what they listen to, what they read, what they eat, what they drink, what they use, it is important that people be informed of these issues by those they elected to represent them in this House. That is why this motion is important. I encourage all members of this honourable House to vote in favour of the motion.

I would like to take this opportunity to discuss another aspect of transparency: the role of legislatures, of the parliaments of federated states, such as that of Quebec.

In this House we are regularly told that Canada is one of the most decentralized federations, that it is a model for the world. We pat ourselves on the backs, yet often many, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and the Minister for International Trade in particular, are sorely mistaken.

Let us take a look at what is being done in other parts of the world, at examples of approaches that might differ a bit from what is applied here, and might be far more productive.

Let us take, for example, the European Union, an association of sovereign states. The ministers across the way often try to tell us that the European Union is a model because it is headed toward a federal system. It is not so. The European Union makes far more room for its member states in the discussion and in the negotiations leading to trade treaties.

The main article governing this is article 133 of the treaty on the European Union, which states that when the matters under negotiation fall wholly into areas under EU jurisdiction, it is the European Commission that negotiates on behalf of the EU. That said, all member states have given the commission that mandate. Thus, right from the start, the member states play a far greater role in determining the position of the union, unlike what is done here. Here the provinces are not even consulted, and they are barely kept informed. That is the first point.

Second, it is possible for countries, France being one example, to allow their national assembly a say. For example, even if the topics being discussed are the exclusive preserve of the European Union, the national assembly has given itself the authority, through a constitutional amendment passed by the French in 1992, to use the European position to give its point of view. This is an inquiry. It allows questions to be put to the European Commission so that national elected representatives are not left out of such important negotiations.

The third point I wish to make, still in connection with the European Union, is that increasingly international treaties do not concern trade exclusively.

For example, the treaty between the European Union and Israel, or the free trade agreement between the European Union and Mexico, include issues which are not the exclusive jurisdiction of Europe, with the result that member states must also ratify these treaties.

The European Union therefore ensures that, before its position is finalized, member states also have their say, including during the ratification process itself.

Members opposite say “The European Union is different. It is not a federation, even if that is the direction in which it is headed, other models should be considered”. Very well, I say, let us look at two other modern federations. Let us look at Germany, a powerful nation, a member of the G-7, like Canada, a federal state with a number of Länder.

When Germany, in the European context, must decide on a position and it falls within an area which comes predominantly under the jurisdiction of the Länder, the federated states of Germany, it is the Länder which determine Germany's position and, what is more, it is a representative of the Länder who sits down at the international negotiating table, on which are written the words “Allemagne-Germany-Deutschland”, and who negotiates on behalf of the federal state.

Federated states, in areas under their jurisdiction, will therefore negotiate in the place of the federal government, something not insignificant. We know very well, obviously, that the best way to be represented internationally is to be independent. In the meantime, however, they better not try to tell us that Canada is the most decentralized federation, because it is not true. We have seen this in the case of Germany.

There is another interesting example worth mentioning, that of Belgium, which applies what I would call a Belgian version of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. The Flemish or French communities or Brussels have external jurisdiction over their internal jurisdictions. In their respective areas, the federated states of Belgium, the federated communities of Belgium, speak for Belgium internationally.

These are three examples that indicate Canada is truly a 19th century federal model. It is not a modern federation. In a world increasingly open, increasingly, permit me this tautology, globalized, it is unacceptable that Canada's federated states are not consulted properly, not informed properly and involved in the process before, during and after negotiations.

We think it would have been far better, first, to put in place a very formal process to consult with the provinces in order to define Canada's position; second, to ensure that Quebec is part of the binational negotiation team with the federal government; and third, if a much more interesting model were to be used, to ensure that in provincial areas of jurisdiction, Quebec and any other province interested to do so, because there could be some, although I do not think there are any, but there could be, may have a say and speak out for their own interests.

It only makes sense since, at some point in time, the legislation for the implementation of this treaty will have to be passed. It will be possible for a province to say “We differ; we do not want this treaty to be implemented”. Common sense would dictate that federated states, the provinces, for instance, be allowed to negotiate on their own behalf within their sphere of jurisdiction, so that, later on, they would be able to say “We negotiated this ourselves; we have no qualms about putting an implementation bill to a vote”.

First, we have to realize how important it is to support this motion, because it deals with transparency. Second, we need to stress how much this notion of transparency is misunderstood or ignored by the government. We have to ensure that federated states, and Quebec in particular, with clear cut positions to defend, have their say in the process before, during and after the negotiations.

Members may agree with me that this will have to be done while Quebecers prepare to make the decision that will allow their interests to be protected and promoted at the international level like they deserve to be, that is while they prepare to decide to build their own country.

[Education, March 28th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, it is often said that what is clearly thought out is clearly expressed. I will say clearly that the Bloc Quebecois opposes the motion by the member for Surrey—Centre.

The motion concerns jurisdiction that, as the member for Laval West mentioned, is strictly provincial. It is of no concern to the federal government.

The simple fact of discussing in this House an area that is not a matter of federal jurisdiction would usually lead to the dismissal of this motion.

It is rather odd to see a party such as the Canadian Alliance, which claims to advocate decentralization, especially when it is in Quebec and is campaigning there or presenting its politics, come here and present such a motion before the House. This goes to show that unfortunately what is said is not always honoured.

I understand very well that the motion is not intended to give power as such to the government, but at the same time the wording of it implies an intent to give the federal government a role in an area that is absolutely not in its jurisdiction, which all governments of Quebec, regardless of their colour, political opinion or tendency, sovereignist or federalist, have defended tooth and nail.

It is important to note that the government of Quebec has always objected to the Council of Ministers of Education contributing in any way at all to unifying or standardizing education in Canada. This has been a constant for years, indeed decades.

This position is part of the Quebec government's perception of the Council of Ministers of Education in Canada, as simply a consultative body and nothing more.

By way of example, the government of Quebec did not take part in the consortium project of the Council of Ministers of Education intended to establish a common framework for the development of school curriculum in science. Likewise, it does not take part in the council's consortium on expectations of post-secondary education.

The motion of the member for Surrey—Centre has a number of aspects to it. It deals with the mobility of students linked to recognition of professional titles, the qualifications of new immigrants and Canadian citizens and of the worth of diplomas, if we can put it that way.

First, it is necessary to point out that the recognition of academic credentials and of the requirements for obtaining them comes under the authority not of Quebec's department of education but of the Office des professions et des ordres professionnels. Members will therefore agree that this makes the issue rather difficult to examine.

As for student mobility, the government of Quebec is more than favourable to this principle. Indeed it has made a substantial effort to improve it.

Furthermore, in 1995 Quebec's department of education reached an agreement with its Canadian colleagues with respect to a pan-Canadian protocol on the transferability of university credits. As members know, the purpose of this initiative was to encourage the recognition by post-secondary educational institutions of first and second year university courses taken in other institutions in Canada. This also includes the second year of pre-university college studies in Quebec, also known as CEGEP.

The Bloc Quebecois therefore finds it impossible to support the motion moved by the member for Surrey Central, essentially for the reasons having to do with federal interference in one of the key areas of provincial jurisdiction.

Similarly, in my view and that of the Bloc Quebecois, it is exceedingly regrettable that the member for Surrey Central is giving such strong thought to introducing pan-Canadian standards in this area of jurisdiction which in our opinion should reflect the reality of the various provinces, including the distinctive nature of the Quebec people.

[Supply, March 19th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today on behalf of the Bloc Quebecois to speak to the motion as unanimously amended by the House.

Every year parliament approves more than $4 billion in funding for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for a broad range of programs and services in aboriginal communities. This money is intended for such things as capital investment, primary and secondary education, social services, housing, health services and economic development projects. These services and programs are, in most cases, administered directly by first nations.

In his April 1999 report, the auditor general indicated that allegations of improper financial administration had been made to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. In fact many people are concerned about the effectiveness of the existing standards for first nations accountability vis-à-vis federal funding.

Following allegations of financial mismanagement on certain reserves, some politicians urged the federal government to put in place more transparent financial agreements with first nations and to improve accountability mechanisms with respect to aboriginal communities' use of federal funds.

Despite the controversy, the extent of the financial difficulties of first nations communities is not really known. In his 1999 report, the auditor general said that approximately one-third of the 630 first nations communities were experiencing some degree of financial difficulty. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development indicated that the majority of aboriginal communities were managing their finances well and that only a few, 4%, were being managed by a third party because of serious financial problems.

Politically, however, the requirement that first nations communities be financially accountable to their members seems to be generating increasing controversy. Two general concerns are emerging: first, to whom are first nations accountable, and, second, are the existing accountability standards good enough?

The Bloc Quebecois recognizes that accountability is an essential component of sound management. All administrative bodies must ultimately be responsible and accountable to those whom they represent. In other words, they must be accountable for their decisions.

Aboriginal peoples have a responsibility to their members to use all the funds allocated to them by the department of Indian affairs in the most effective and efficient manner. Similarly, the department must be able to show Canadians, through the minister and the Auditor General of Canada, that all the funds allocated to aboriginal communities are used properly while allowing them to achieve strategically targeted objectives.

In the past, specific programs defined by the federal government were funded for a relatively short period, often on an annual basis. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the annual levels of funding of these programs, it was difficult for aboriginals to establish long term community development programs and to gradually build their infrastructures. That uncertainty also had the effect of restricting the ability of aboriginal people to strategically pool their resources and concentrate them in important areas such as the creation of long term jobs because resources were strictly allocated to a series of patchwork and separate programs.

More recently, financial transfer agreements have provided greater flexibility to aboriginal people, allowing them to manage their own affairs, including when it comes to setting their own priorities.

This transfer of responsibilities to the aboriginal communities must not, however, mean that the government abdicates its responsibilities. It is still the responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to ensure that the programs it finances produce the planned results, with commitment of the appropriate funds.

It is true that there is considerable risk of failure when complex programs are transferred to communities that have had decades of total dependency on the federal government. That is why the federal government and the aboriginal people must share responsibility for the effective administration of transferred programs.

The auditor general has stated in his report that the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development had not put enough effort into helping native communities prepare to administer transferred programs. He said repeatedly that the department must be answerable to parliament and to the public, like all other federal institutions.

Regardless of program transfer, the department still has a duty to account for the way federal funds are being used and to ensure that acceptable results are obtained. Through its fiduciary obligations, the government must retain the ability to audit aboriginal financial statements and provide tools for correcting situations of mismanagement. This control by the federal government is essential.

In several of the auditor general's reports during the 1990s comments were made on the aboriginal peoples' obligation to be accountable for the public funds received. The 1990 report indicated that the department's funding mechanisms did not include a satisfactory reporting method.

This had significant ramifications, in particular making it impossible to know with any certainty whether funds had been spent for the intended purpose, were likely to attain the expected results and had been spent as efficiently as possible. In his November 1996 report, the auditor general pointed out ongoing shortcomings relating to the implementation of funding agreements.

In this report, the auditor general pointed out that the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs had a number of options at its disposal to encourage first nations to meet the standards agreed on, including the inclusion of specific terms in modes of funding, periodic and official supervision of financial performance and program implementation, the use of critical threshold indicators and the implementation of remedial action plans as a consequence. He added that these measures were useful but that it was not always apparent they had been successfully implemented.

In response to this report by the auditor general, the department of Indian affairs adopted three principles in 1996 with respect to accountability. They involved transparency, disclosure and corrective measures. In addition, it decided it would strengthen the band councils' requirement to be accountable to their community.

That year, the department even wrote to the chiefs and band councils to have those receiving federal funds examine their accounting and management systems and develop a plan of action to correct discrepancies. It also informed first nations that these systems would have to be evaluated in the future in the case of all funding agreements.

In his follow up report of 1999, the auditor general looked primarily at the way the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs had implemented his 1996 recommendations.

The report included the following points, among others. The department of Indian affairs was to establish a better relationship between the level of flexibility of the modes of funding and the desire and ability of the first nations to assume responsibility for the billions of dollars the department paid out to them every year. The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs failed to take the appropriate measures to ensure proper resolution of allegations of impropriety and complaints and disputes concerning the modes of funding. Corrective measures—resolution mechanisms—had to be improved as elements of reporting.

In response to the recommendations made by the auditor general in his 1999 report, departmental officials informed the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development that a national data-bank had been established to collect complaints of inappropriate conduct and examine any emerging tendency in that regard. In addition to this national register, each regional office of the department now has access to a co-ordinator responsible for allegations and complaints. Moreover, a national co-ordinator develops standards, policies and guidelines on appropriate corrective measures.

On May 15, 2000, in response to requests by politicians and members of the public demanding the disclosure of more financial information, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development wrote to the first nations to require that audits include the salaries, fees and travelling expenses of elected officials and leaders. Any first nation not complying with these requirements would stop getting discretionary funds and funds earmarked for non-essential services.

At one time, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was directly managing the delivery of these numerous programs in aboriginal communities. Later on, in order to break the cycle of dependence of aboriginal communities on the federal government, the latter began to sign financial agreements with the communities. These agreements were very specific and detailed as to what had to be done, how and what expenses were eligible for refund.

In 1983 the Special Committee on Indian Self-Government released its report, known as the Penner report. In that report, the committee severely criticized the financial agreements for leaving very little decision making power to the first nations to apply programs and funds according to their specific capabilities and needs. It was suggested that agreements be signed, which would have more to do with what had to be done than with how it should be done.

Over the years, funding arrangements have evolved to take into account the relationship that exists between the Government of Canada and aboriginal peoples. One of the major features of that relationship is the government's official policy announced in 1995 recognizing the inherent right to self-government, a right that had long been claimed by aboriginal peoples.

In response to the 1996 report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, in the document entitled “Gathering Strength—Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan”, also undertook to implement a new financial relationship with aboriginal peoples and to develop stable funding mechanisms which would encourage the accountability and self-sufficiency of aboriginal communities.

Now, contribution agreements are the primary mechanism through which first nations receive funding. These agreements set out spending conditions, including standards of service to communities, and accountability and performance objectives.

At the present time, first nations are managing 85% of the program budget of Department of Indian and Northern Affairs directly. The department is responsible for the nature, type and enforcement of funding mechanisms. It is therefore responsible for demonstrating to parliamentarians and to the aboriginal peoples who receive the funding that the most appropriate funding mechanisms have been used.

The Bloc Quebecois understands that self-government consists in giving aboriginal peoples authority for managing their own affairs, and making them accountable accordingly. We have absolutely no interest in covering up aboriginal mismanagement, but first nations must be given the opportunity and the means to attain a reasonable level of effectiveness.

The Bloc Quebecois is also aware of the existing shortcomings in accountability. However, the Bloc Quebecois feels that the solution to these problems lies not in requiring separate accountability for aboriginal communities, as the Canadian Alliance called for at the very beginning of the debate, but in establishing a better link between the degree of flexibility necessary in funding mechanisms and the desire and ability of aboriginal peoples to assume responsibility for government funding.

What we are proposing is that the federal government implement all the recommendations made by the Auditor General of Canada; that it improve the management and follow up of financial transfers, and that it develop guidelines for the management of these programs in consultation with aboriginal peoples. Finally, we suggest that the government and the various first nations in Canada to give serious thought to the creation of a position of auditor general for first nations.

[Minister Of Intergovernmental Affairs, March 16th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, yesterday's edition of the Toronto Globe and Mail contained a letter by the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. In his missive, the minister said clearly that Quebec is a nation.

Should the minister not admit now clearly that, despite his fine words and hollow rhetoric, he is unable to get his arrogant and centralizing government to accept this fact, which he himself accepts, the fact that Quebec is a nation?

[Supply, March 15th, 2001]

Madam Speaker, I know I have very little time. It is unfortunate because I would have liked to dwell on the subject.

Indeed, I do think that in political life, as in day to day life or the life of nations, we are our own best advocates. For example, I never saw Canada ask Washington to represent Canadian interests in the international arena. Of course I would prefer that Quebec be represented by Quebec and not by Ottawa.