Bill C-59 (Historical)

National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

Report Stage

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address Bill C-83. As we know, it is a bill that symbolizes the current government's approach to leadership in this country. It is an approach of ignoring the concerns of many, providing little in the way of moral leadership and transparency, and putting the safety of Canadians at risk for the benefit of political gain.

I have said many times in this place that it is and should be the top priority of the House to put the safety of Canadians first, ahead of any other issues or politics. With the bill, the House would fail to meet that expectation.

To paraphrase my NDP colleague from Beloeil—Chambly, I can think of no time when a bill has come before Parliament where there are no witnesses who support the legislation. That is exactly what happened with Bill C-83. The minister claimed the bill would end administrative segregation. The witnesses who refuted the bill included prisoner advocacy groups, civil liberties groups, former wardens, professors, correctional unions, the correctional investigator and a senator. The overriding sentiment was that the legislation lacked the detail and information needed to back up such a claim by the minister.

The minister claimed the bill responded to issues raised by the courts that segregation caused the death of two inmates. However, the facts are clear in these two unfortunate deaths that they were the result of operational and management failures in both circumstances.

The minister claimed safety and security of staff were the top priorities. However, correctional workers and former inmates testified that segregation is essential to managing violent and volatile inmates, and that the bill would create more risk to staff.

Civil liberties groups called the bill unconstitutional and said it would make things worse rather than better. They noted the bill lacked external oversight, a check against the authorities of Correctional Service Canada. The minister actually acknowledged this lack of oversight existed.

Senator Pate testified before the committee and indicated that Bill C-83 was a bad piece of legislation. The senator dismantled the minister's claims as to how the bill would end segregation. In a visit to a Nova Scotia Prison, Senator Pate noted that it had renamed the segregation unit, the “intensive intervention unit”. The minister will claim otherwise, of course. However, I will take the testimony of a senator and her eyewitness account over the minister's promise, especially given the minister's repeated track record of misleading Parliament and Canadians.

Perhaps the only accomplishment by the minister with respect to the bill is that he brought together the NDP, the Green Party and the Conservatives, who all oppose the legislation.

I would like to note the unexpected and very valuable contribution of written testimony from Mr. Glen Brown, someone who knows the system well. Mr. Brown is a highly experienced former warden and deputy warden, who now teaches criminal justice and criminology at Simon Fraser University and Langara College.

As someone once responsible for segregation units, he notes that the Ashley Smith and Edward Snowshoe cases were more about mismanagement of behavioural issues and neglect. These issues are not legislative problems. They are management, training and accountability issues. When in segregation, inmates should receive bolstered communication on current risks and mental health issues. They should have increased contact with officers and staff, and they should have an increased potential for services. All this should bring greater attention to an offender's rehabilitation plan.

Mr. Brown wrote:

The strength of a functioning administrative segregation process is that it should bolster all of those things: oversight is strengthened; case management should be more active; information sharing should be more robust; referral for clinical service should be prioritized and case management intervention to develop plans should be urgent.

After noting that science and research has shown that properly managed segregation units do not cause short- or long-term harm, Mr. Brown noted, “To respond to current circumstances with sweeping legislative reform is only to react ideologically, and to ignore science and evidence.”

On the minister's grand solution to segregation, which is to rename segregation units to “structured intervention units”, Mr. Brown noted that Bill C-83 described SIUs in such broad and vague language that the consequences of implementation were very uncertain, that the details were unknown and the details were the key. The current layout of many segregation units did not facilitate socialization and programming. The emphasis on programming suggested longer-term stays in SIUs, weeks or maybe months. SIUs would not be suitable for short-term management of volatile inmates, such as those under the influence. There was the inability to have specialized staff for particular subpopulations in a prison. Finally, he noted that given the current layout of many prisons, a wing may need to be deemed a structured intervention unit, meaning up to 96 inmates may be subject to 20 hours a day of confinement where before it would be only 16.

To be clear, someone who is an expert and has worked for years in prisons with segregation says that he cannot discern the minister's plan. Moreover, he says that prisons often lack the infrastructure, are inappropriate to what is needed and could have the opposite effect to what the minister claims.

Perhaps the only potential value in the legislation could come from an external review mechanism of segregation, because it could provide Canadians with greater confidence in offender management. The minister, however, told the committee that we did not have the authority to do this, an order the Liberal MPs on the committee followed, while the opposition members put forward mechanisms to provide such oversight, which were soundly rejected.

When we pushed the Liberals at committee to amend the worst parts of the legislation and pointed to the glaring issues raised by the many expert witnesses, we were told that Liberal MPs were voting with “faith in the minister”.

The role of committees is not to provide support and faith to a minister. It is to conduct detailed examinations on challenging issues, to hear from experts and impacted Canadians, to examine programs, spending and legislation to determine if it will meet the needs of Canadians or, at the very least, what the minister claims it will meet. On this, our committee has failed.

At the conclusion of committee debate on Bill C-83, my Conservative colleagues and I put our views on the record. We indicated that the committee failed in its role to review the legislation and ensure that it could make informed decisions. We also said that we believed the minister withheld information from committee that was clearly available to him at the time, namely the cost and how it would be used and implemented in the bill, which most witnesses said was essential to knowing if the bill would be useful. For the minister, it seemed more important that he withhold his plan from the committee. Half a billion dollars connected to a bill, where and how the money will be used is essential to know if the bill will work. We still do not have a plan necessarily for that money.

What was the response to the overwhelming criticism and skepticism of the bill? Government MPs stated that they were “making a leap of faith” and putting their trust in the minister. What was accomplished by the committee in reviewing this legislation? In my opinion, next to nothing. The Liberal members rejected amendments on how the money would be used. They rejected a requirement to publish the standards of the new SIUs. They rejected limits to reclassifying prisons. They rejected having the minister provide us with how he would implement this new plan.

On this legislation, the Liberals have turned their backs on Canadians. We are to trust the minister who has an extensive track record of misleading Canadians on things like the disastrous India trip, Bill C-59 and Bill C-71, failure to provide funding for police to tackle gangs, and I could go on.

We as a House can do better. We must do better. We can all rise to a higher level. Personally, I feel this committee failed its constituents, its communities and its country. Bill C-83 is yet another example of the many failures of the Liberal government.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I have a minute left, Minister.

One of my colleagues, Ms. Dabrusin, asked about CBSA oversight. It feels like it's been three years now that Mr. Goodale has been telling us over and over that it's coming, so maybe we'll get a bill that we can adopt before the election.

Glibness aside, I do want to address this issue. I don't know if you could comment on this, or if this is for Minister Goodale. He did mention that the new review body created in Bill C-59 would look into issues relating to national security. However, many of the issues that have come forward, especially in the media, that such a body could look at—in particular, allegations of harassment in the workplace and things of that nature, or even some of the security issues that have been raised—could be looked at by a more specific mechanism that doesn't necessarily fall under....

There's some debate about whether everything the CBSA does, as a national security body, falls under that committee. Can you comment on that specifically? What's being done to address some of those issues in the workplace and some of those security screening issues, for example, that oversight and review could help us address?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

The legislation is in the process of being drafted, and we intend to present it at the earliest opportunity. The functions of the CBSA that touch on national security are covered by Bill C-59, just as any other department or agency of the Government of Canada that deals with security or intelligence issues is covered by C-59.

However, where you're dealing with individual officer complaints or concerns about specific functions or situations, you will need a separate instrument. That's what we're drafting now, and we will present it as rapidly as we can. It's very much in progress.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

In those two cases, the commissioner and SIRC have very extensive powers to know everything that those two agencies do, the CSE and CSIS. They have very well-established relationships where the agencies report to the review agencies. If the review agency wants any information, under the law they have complete access to all of that information. The problem is that they work in silos. SIRC can look at CSIS, and nothing else. The commissioner can look at CSE, and nothing else.

The new NSIRA, the national security and intelligence review agency created by Bill C-59, will be a comprehensive review agency with the legal authority to look at the security and intelligence operations of any agency or department of the Government of Canada.

Apart from the couple I've mentioned, there are at least 17 different departments and agencies of the Government of Canada that have some security or intelligence function—for example, CBSA, the Privy Council Office, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Transport and so forth. NSIRA will be able to look at all of that, without limitation.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

One thing that Bill C-59 does with respect to the threat reduction measures is to create a very clear procedural, as well as legal and constitutional, frame that will ensure more transparency and more accountability. Exactly how the powers can be used is laid out now more explicitly in legislation than ever before.

The one major criticism of the old Bill C-51 was that the way those powers were worded in the old law implied that you could somehow exercise those powers in violation of the charter. We have clarified in the law explicitly that it is not the case, and that indeed, if and when those powers are ever exercised, they must be exercised in a manner consistent with the charter, not in violation of the charter.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Yes, Minister, of course.

With the announcement that was made, I believe the threat disruption powers that were first conferred by what was then Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament are one tool that CSIS may use in that event, and even with CSE's role will obviously significantly change once Bill C-59 gets royal assent. They have a large role to play in the election interference piece as well.

What happens for the whole-of-government approach if and when Bill C-59 gets royal assent, just with regard to the elections?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

On that note, going to the elections interference piece raised by my colleague, what I wonder about is that some of the powers that are being used or potentially will be used by CSIS and others in the plan that was put forward by you and your colleagues are going to change if and when Bill C-59 finally gets adopted.

I asked the same question of Scott Jones when he was here on our cybersecurity study. Does that mean you're then bringing everything back to the drawing board in the event that Bill C-59 gets adopted, since some of the powers that are being used aren't even clearly defined or will change under the new legislation when it gets royal assent? I'm thinking of threat disruption as an example.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

I think you would need to be constantly alert to the issue of national security architecture, accountability and lines of reporting to make sure that you're not in any way compromising the ability of the organizations to do their jobs or compromising the capacity to be accountable to Canadians through the appropriate parliamentary or governmental authorities.

When Bill C-59 is ultimately approved, as I hope it will be, by the Senate and becomes law, the legislation governing CSE will be a new stand-alone bill, rather than an add-on to another piece of legislation.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Minister and all the officials, thank you for being here.

I want to ask about the $3.8 million that goes to CSE, because in the debate on Bill C-59, there's been this question that keeps coming back, which is that CSE is an organization that exists under the National Defence Act, as you know. Given that a lot of these umbrella organizations are being created and that money is now coming from your department to fund them, do we arrive at a point where the government envisages changing whose authority is over that department?

Minister, with all due respect to your colleague Minister Sajjan, you seem to be taking the lead on a lot of the issues that CSE works on. I'm wondering if there ever is a concern that, when the legislative, budgetary and parliamentary agenda is being led by one minister and authorizations by another, it starts to get a little muddled in terms of the responsibilities.

Is there ever any thought over rejigging how that works within cabinet?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

I consider both Bill C-71 and Bill C-59 to be vital pieces of legislation that need to receive the appropriate parliamentary attention as quickly as possible. I want to thank this committee for dealing with both of those items of legislation in a very thorough way. There was no compromise on your scrutiny. You examined the issues very carefully. You made a number of recommendations for changes in the legislation and sent them back to the House in a timely way. I thank this committee for that work. Now, both of those issues are before the Senate.

I have had the opportunity to speak with a number of senators about the very heavy agenda that is before them, including Bill C-71 and Bill C-59. They do seem to be optimistic that in the time they have available between now and the summer they will be able to deal with the legislation in a full and final way.

I share the belief that this legislation is vital. It contains very important measures, such as the extensive background checks that you referred to in Bill C-71, which I believe has received support across all party lines.

In Bill C-59, issues that you mentioned included the ability of CSIS to deal properly with bulk datasets, the new authorities that are provided to the Communications Security Establishment, as well as the creation of a new national security and intelligence review agency to get out of these silos for reviewing our security intelligence organizations and to have one review agency that has full jurisdiction to examine any issue in any department or agency of the Government of Canada and follow the evidence wherever it may go.

There's a lot more to the legislation than that, but those are really critical innovations in the law, and it is important for the legislation to receive careful and timely consideration. The communications that I have heard from the Senate would lead me to believe that they are working diligently on the issues before them and are confident that they will be able to discharge their parliamentary duties in a timely way, and I look forward to that.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thanks, Chair.

Minister, it's always great to have you here, along with your very able officials. Thank you for taking the time to join us this afternoon.

On Friday, media reported that the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence had delayed consideration of crucial government legislation on national security, as well as firearms, in order to hold meetings on the number of ministers who had held the Veterans Affairs portfolio.

Dr. Stephanie Carvin, an expert in national security at Carleton University, tweeted on Friday with regard to the delay, and this is her tweet:

Not great, @SenateCA. You came to work late and you need to get the job done and pass #C59. Failure to do so will mean @NoFlyListKids will go years without redress, CSIS will not have a legal basis to store datasets crucial for ops and CSE will not have powers to protect Canada.

Are you concerned about Bill C-59, our national security legislation, as well as Bill C-71, which included really important protections for survivors of intimate partner violence, being delayed in the Senate?

[Scott Jones]

We're using whatever tool is the appropriate one at the time. If Bill C-59 is passed by the Senate, gains royal assent and comes into force, then we would re-evaluate how we approach these problems, given those new—

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Just really quickly, with the 15 seconds I have left, would that structure and who's taking the lead look different if Bill C-59 receives royal assent today?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I wanted to quickly touch on the cyberwarfare piece with Bill C-59, for example, and CSE having the active cyber capabilities. My understanding is that there is not really any clarity in international law. Some would argue that when you attack a country's sovereignty.... Is data a part of sovereignty? I think that's the uncertainty we're at now.

There's a risk of escalation, but does it go both ways? Even with the announcement today, for example, on fighting foreign interference, if there's any kind of disruption that's being done proactively or pre-emptively, is there a risk there that we might antagonize while trying to protect ourselves if there's no action from a foreign state actor prior to whatever action our agencies are taking?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

A year or so ago, this committee was tasked with doing a study on Bill C-59, which was a national security bill. In the testimonies we heard from Retired General Michael Day who reported to the committee that he has zero confidence in Canada's readiness to deal with emerging threats like artificial intelligence used in cyber-attacks and quantum computing that could hack through regular security regimens now in a matter of seconds.

With that in mind, how is the RCMP getting ready for that or how are you helping other agencies in the industry prepare for that emerging threat that's occurring right now?