Bill C-59 (Historical)

National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Yes, Minister, of course.

With the announcement that was made, I believe the threat disruption powers that were first conferred by what was then Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament are one tool that CSIS may use in that event, and even with CSE's role will obviously significantly change once Bill C-59 gets royal assent. They have a large role to play in the election interference piece as well.

What happens for the whole-of-government approach if and when Bill C-59 gets royal assent, just with regard to the elections?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

On that note, going to the elections interference piece raised by my colleague, what I wonder about is that some of the powers that are being used or potentially will be used by CSIS and others in the plan that was put forward by you and your colleagues are going to change if and when Bill C-59 finally gets adopted.

I asked the same question of Scott Jones when he was here on our cybersecurity study. Does that mean you're then bringing everything back to the drawing board in the event that Bill C-59 gets adopted, since some of the powers that are being used aren't even clearly defined or will change under the new legislation when it gets royal assent? I'm thinking of threat disruption as an example.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

I think you would need to be constantly alert to the issue of national security architecture, accountability and lines of reporting to make sure that you're not in any way compromising the ability of the organizations to do their jobs or compromising the capacity to be accountable to Canadians through the appropriate parliamentary or governmental authorities.

When Bill C-59 is ultimately approved, as I hope it will be, by the Senate and becomes law, the legislation governing CSE will be a new stand-alone bill, rather than an add-on to another piece of legislation.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Minister and all the officials, thank you for being here.

I want to ask about the $3.8 million that goes to CSE, because in the debate on Bill C-59, there's been this question that keeps coming back, which is that CSE is an organization that exists under the National Defence Act, as you know. Given that a lot of these umbrella organizations are being created and that money is now coming from your department to fund them, do we arrive at a point where the government envisages changing whose authority is over that department?

Minister, with all due respect to your colleague Minister Sajjan, you seem to be taking the lead on a lot of the issues that CSE works on. I'm wondering if there ever is a concern that, when the legislative, budgetary and parliamentary agenda is being led by one minister and authorizations by another, it starts to get a little muddled in terms of the responsibilities.

Is there ever any thought over rejigging how that works within cabinet?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

I consider both Bill C-71 and Bill C-59 to be vital pieces of legislation that need to receive the appropriate parliamentary attention as quickly as possible. I want to thank this committee for dealing with both of those items of legislation in a very thorough way. There was no compromise on your scrutiny. You examined the issues very carefully. You made a number of recommendations for changes in the legislation and sent them back to the House in a timely way. I thank this committee for that work. Now, both of those issues are before the Senate.

I have had the opportunity to speak with a number of senators about the very heavy agenda that is before them, including Bill C-71 and Bill C-59. They do seem to be optimistic that in the time they have available between now and the summer they will be able to deal with the legislation in a full and final way.

I share the belief that this legislation is vital. It contains very important measures, such as the extensive background checks that you referred to in Bill C-71, which I believe has received support across all party lines.

In Bill C-59, issues that you mentioned included the ability of CSIS to deal properly with bulk datasets, the new authorities that are provided to the Communications Security Establishment, as well as the creation of a new national security and intelligence review agency to get out of these silos for reviewing our security intelligence organizations and to have one review agency that has full jurisdiction to examine any issue in any department or agency of the Government of Canada and follow the evidence wherever it may go.

There's a lot more to the legislation than that, but those are really critical innovations in the law, and it is important for the legislation to receive careful and timely consideration. The communications that I have heard from the Senate would lead me to believe that they are working diligently on the issues before them and are confident that they will be able to discharge their parliamentary duties in a timely way, and I look forward to that.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thanks, Chair.

Minister, it's always great to have you here, along with your very able officials. Thank you for taking the time to join us this afternoon.

On Friday, media reported that the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence had delayed consideration of crucial government legislation on national security, as well as firearms, in order to hold meetings on the number of ministers who had held the Veterans Affairs portfolio.

Dr. Stephanie Carvin, an expert in national security at Carleton University, tweeted on Friday with regard to the delay, and this is her tweet:

Not great, @SenateCA. You came to work late and you need to get the job done and pass #C59. Failure to do so will mean @NoFlyListKids will go years without redress, CSIS will not have a legal basis to store datasets crucial for ops and CSE will not have powers to protect Canada.

Are you concerned about Bill C-59, our national security legislation, as well as Bill C-71, which included really important protections for survivors of intimate partner violence, being delayed in the Senate?

[Scott Jones]

We're using whatever tool is the appropriate one at the time. If Bill C-59 is passed by the Senate, gains royal assent and comes into force, then we would re-evaluate how we approach these problems, given those new—

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Just really quickly, with the 15 seconds I have left, would that structure and who's taking the lead look different if Bill C-59 receives royal assent today?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I wanted to quickly touch on the cyberwarfare piece with Bill C-59, for example, and CSE having the active cyber capabilities. My understanding is that there is not really any clarity in international law. Some would argue that when you attack a country's sovereignty.... Is data a part of sovereignty? I think that's the uncertainty we're at now.

There's a risk of escalation, but does it go both ways? Even with the announcement today, for example, on fighting foreign interference, if there's any kind of disruption that's being done proactively or pre-emptively, is there a risk there that we might antagonize while trying to protect ourselves if there's no action from a foreign state actor prior to whatever action our agencies are taking?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

A year or so ago, this committee was tasked with doing a study on Bill C-59, which was a national security bill. In the testimonies we heard from Retired General Michael Day who reported to the committee that he has zero confidence in Canada's readiness to deal with emerging threats like artificial intelligence used in cyber-attacks and quantum computing that could hack through regular security regimens now in a matter of seconds.

With that in mind, how is the RCMP getting ready for that or how are you helping other agencies in the industry prepare for that emerging threat that's occurring right now?

Customs Act

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to the motion dealing with the Senate's amendments to Bill C-21.

The story of Bill C-21 is long and highly problematic, not to say sordid. I will read some excerpts, but first I would like to say that I am naturally in favour of the Senate's amendment. I will explain why.

The story of Bill C-21 is an interesting one, because it was a bill tabled almost three years ago.

It is unfortunate. I am thinking in particular of the No Fly List Kids, a group well known to members of this house. It is a group of parents who have children on the no-fly list who are false positives, because they share a name with an individual on this list who has been flagged.

The reason I raise this issue is that when these parents originally came to Parliament Hill and asked the government to respect commitments that had been made to fix this issue, they were told by the government, and the Minister of Public Safety more specifically, that they would have to lobby the Minister of Finance, because it needed money to the redress system. They did that. They talked to the Minister of Finance. It was fantastic. The money was announced in the last budget. It was a non-partisan effort I was proud to be part of.

Then what happened? We heard that Bill C-59 needed to be adopted, an omnibus piece of legislation dealing with a whole slew of national security elements, one chapter of which, in a bill hundreds of pages long, dealt with the no-fly list. Conveniently, we were saying that the bill needed to be facilitated at the time the bill arrived in the Senate, and it was being held up there.

How does this connect to Bill C-21? Allow me to explain. The Minister of Public Safety's press secretary made one thing clear to the media: the money is there, and Bill C-59 must be passed.

As the months passed, Bill C-21, which was introduced in the House nearly three years ago, also got held up in the Senate. A month or two ago, at the same time the parents of the no-fly list kids were lobbying the Senate to quickly pass Bill C-59 and fix this horrible problem, the same spokesperson for the Minister of Public Safety said that Bill C-21 also needed to be passed more quickly. After three years, and one year in the Senate, the bill finally passed.

I do not want to cast doubt on anyone's good faith, but there is a problem, because I see nothing in Bill C-21 to address this scourge, which has been around for too long and makes life hard for these parents whenever they take their kids to the airport. This debate gives me the opportunity to say this to the House, because even though these parents are a non-partisan group, I am a partisan politician, and so I have no qualms about criticizing the government for trying to exploit this problem to rush its legislative agenda through. If it had done its work properly, the bill would not have gotten held up in the Senate the way it has.

With that point made, I want to address more specifically the amendments from the Senate. I am pleased to see that the Senate has improved on an amendment I presented at the public safety committee that was supported by all colleagues. My amendment was to actually prescribe a retention period for the data Bill C-21 would deal with at the border.

Just to give the background on this, the New Democrats opposed Bill C-21, despite some things in the media I read in June saying that the bill quietly passed in the House. No, we opposed this bill, and we raised some serious concerns about it at committee.

One of the concerns raised by the Privacy Commissioner was the fact that we would be collecting entry and exit data at the border and sharing with the Americans “tombstone“ data, as the Minister of Public Safety morbidly calls it. That data is concerning, because what we are seeing in the national security field, and CBSA is no exception, is a larger net being cast over the type of data we collect. The minister listed a bunch of laudable goals for collecting data dealing with kidnapped children in, for example, horrible custody cases, dealing with human trafficking and cracking down on people who are abusing EI and the OAS system. We will get back to that in a moment.

These goals, certainly on paper, sound laudable. However, that should not diminish the privacy concerns being raised, particularly with respect to the current administration we see in the U.S. collecting this type of information. What civil society tells us about these issues is that there is a web of inference. In this large net being cast in the national security field, data that might seem innocuous, collected for legitimate purposes, can be easily shared with other agencies through this information-sharing regime for a variety of objectives that might not necessarily be the intent of the legislation.

In that context, we heard the concerns that the Privacy Commissioner raised about the data retention period, which was essentially unlimited. The amendment I presented set a time limit of 15 years and was based on a recommendation from the commissioner himself. I read in the media that civil society felt that period was too long. I understand their concerns, but ultimately, we relied on the Privacy Commissioner's expertise.

After my amendment was adopted and the bill was passed by the House, in spite of the NDP's opposition, the Senate heard testimony from the Privacy Commissioner. He pointed out that the wording of the amendment as adopted could be interpreted to mean a minimum of 15 years rather than what we actually intended, which was a maximum of 15 years. He himself said that this might not have been the committee's intent.

The Senate therefore made a correction and improved an amendment that I was pleased to present. I was also pleased to have the support of the other parties on the committee. Obviously, we support the Senate amendment.

The amendment put forward by the government today also supports that amendment. Accordingly, although we oppose the bill, we do support today's motion to adopt the Senate's amendment.

I want to take a moment to address this. I raised some of the concerns at the time on Bill C-21. Earlier I enumerated some of the things the minister said. However, there is another piece, and that is the issue of OAS and EI.

We had the appropriate ministry representatives at committee. They talked about all the great savings they were going to see and about the abuse of the EI and OAS systems. I find it fundamentally offensive to talk about savings in systems and programs that are there to help the most vulnerable in our society. The officials at committee even acknowledged that they believe in the good faith of the people who are claiming EI and receiving OAS.

Here is the problem. I will refer to some news articles that appeared in June of this year. For example, the Canadian Snowbird Association talked about its concern about the kind of information, or lack thereof, being shared, the personal information being shared, in an effort to potentially crack down on supposed abuses. For example, a situation as innocuous as people overstaying a day in a condo they own in the U.S. could mean that they would have their OAS payments or other government programs docked when they came back to Canada, in some cases. On the flip side, with the IRS in the U.S., people are being turned away at the border when they try to return to the U.S. to visit friends or family or to stay in a secondary residence they might have there. Certainly, there are concerns being raised.

I want to open some parentheses here and say that the NDP certainly understands and agrees that we do not want to see these systems abused, because essentially that would mean money is being stolen from those who actually need it. However, we also have to understand that when we are talking about information-sharing in an effort to crack down, I think there need to be more robust parameters in place with respect to how we are communicating with those individuals who could be affected.

Another concern I have obviously has to do with the employment insurance system. I am sure my colleague from Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot and my colleague from Churchill—I apologize, but I forget her riding's full name, which is long—can attest to how badly the EI system needs to be improved.

We are talking about the spring gap, the notorious 15 weeks, the problems that still have not been solved despite the government's rhetoric. What does the government do? It sends officials from the department in question to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security so they can boast about all the money being saved by sharing additional information on travellers with the Americans.

I do not mean any disrespect to our interpreters, but I am going to repeat what I said earlier in English. I completely understand that the government wants to stop the abuse of the system and make sure that the money is going to the right recipients. At the same time, I also understand that priorities seem to be a problem for this government.

It is funny that I talked about the no-fly list at the beginning of my speech. The minister was bragging about the fact that very few identifiers are shared in the system that Bill C-21 is proposing. He talked about basic information and said that that information appears on page 2 of the passport. This creates another problem, because when there are not enough identifiers, it can be very difficult to identify an individual in the context of a government program, the Canada Revenue Agency, and so on.

I need to look no further than in my own family. My younger brother's spouse has a twin sister with the same first initial, but a different social insurance number. They have the same surname, the same birth date and the same first initial, but a different SIN. What happens? They have to fight on a regular basis to have their identity recognized when undergoing a credit or background check. They have all kinds of problems with the CRA, government programs and banks. In short, they have had problems in the past. Unfortunately for them, they will continue to have these problems throughout their lives. Still, I hope they will not.

I am pointing this out because having only a few identifiers, as the minister reassures us, can create problems. For example, someone receiving EI who has not travelled to the United States, but who shares the same name and date of birth with another person who has, could be incorrectly identified by the department, which is not even the same one that receives the information. The Canada Border Services Agency receives the information, which it then passes on to the Department of Employment. As members, we work often enough with government agencies to know that mistakes can be made along the way. I say this with all due respect for our great public service.

Those mistakes are even more troubling for a variety of reasons. First, I specifically asked those representatives in committee about EI, OAS and other payments. I asked them what they would do if there was a mistake, or what if people had their EI cut off because they were told they had gone to the U.S., but they had not. The response I got, if people can believe it, was that they would need to take it up with CBSA.

What happens with CBSA? It is the only national security agency in the country that does not have a dedicated oversight body. Is that not convenient? That is extremely problematic and a far from satisfying response when the most vulnerable, who desperately need EI benefits, are cut off all because of a mistake was made in an effort to share even more information with the U.S., at its request. This whole system stems from that.

Moreover, I pointed out that there was a complaint system built into the law, but CBSA needed the proper oversight. The minister has promised that time and again over the last three years, since he has responsibility for this portfolio, and it has not happened.

Bill C-59, for example, would result in the biggest overhaul to our national security in the last 30 years. Despite all the reassurances about the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the new oversight body, colloquially called the super-SIRC, would only deal with CBSA in the specific context of national security. CBSA is always deals with national security at our borders. However, the question could be posed whether it is an issue of national security when people have their EI cut off because of information collected by CBSA. That question remains unanswered. The fact that it is unanswered is exactly why we have a problem, among other things, with Bill C-51.

I want to raise one last point. Representatives of the Akwesasne First Nation came to both to the House committee and the Senate committee. The community lies across border. Representatives explained to us that they had children who were born in upstate New York and then lived in Canada. They had folks who sometimes worked in the U.S. Sometimes they needed to start in Canada, go through the U.S. and come back to Canada just for the commute home because of the geography of their location. I am pleased to hear they can cross those borders, because those borders should not be imposed on them as the first peoples of this land.

They already deal with certain difficulties, based on the information CBSA shares with appropriate ministries for different government benefits, with receiving the benefits to which they are entitled. Therefore, we can imagine that under a regime like that proposed in Bill C-21, those problems could be exacerbated. Unfortunately, there is no special dispensation for folks like that in the legislation, and that is also a concern.

In conclusion, I am glad I was able to reiterate the reasons for which the NDP opposes Bill C-21. We understand the desire to improve the flow at the border, work with our allies, and ensure that nobody abuses our social programs. However, we believe that Bill C-21 allows for yet more information sharing, despite inadequate protection for citizens' rights and privacy.

We should all be particularly concerned about the fact that Bill C-21 is the first stage of what could become a more extensive information sharing regime in the coming years. The Prime Minister and the U.S. President committed to enhancing border co-operation, but this is not going to make things better. This is about fingerprinting people, searching cell phones, and possibly even having our officers and theirs work in the same space. That came up during talks between the U.S. President and the Prime Minister.

All of these plans are still in their very early stages, and I do not want anyone telling me I am getting worked up and scared, but we have every reason to be concerned, especially considering how the current U.S. President behaves and how we protect our citizens at the border and on our own soil when they need social programs they are entitled to.

The bill's intentions are honourable, but the execution is poor. We support the Senate's amendment, but we still oppose Bill C-21.

[Karen McCrimmon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Lib.]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise in support of the legislative amendment to Bill C-21 that has been proposed by our hon. colleagues. The legislative amendment we are debating today is reflective of similar concerns expressed by the House in its consideration of the bill, namely that the personal information collected under Bill C-21 be retained for a period of 15 years. The Senate, in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, has provided additional wording to ensure that the Canada Border Services Agency would only be authorized to retain the data it collects for a period of not more than 15 years.

Privacy protection is part of the very design of the entry-exit initiative. For one, agreements would have to be established with the CBSA and other government departments for the sharing of information. Included here are requirements for the completion of privacy impact assessments to identify exactly how collected information would be used, as well as the measures taken to protect privacy before the new system becomes operational.

Importantly, when Canada's Privacy Commissioner appeared before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, the parliamentary committee that examined this bill, he noted that, “...there are important public policy objectives that this initiative is trying to address and that the personal information in question is not particularly sensitive. ” In the Senate, the Privacy Commissioner further expressed his general satisfaction with the bill and the extent to which his office had been consulted throughout the process.

Our government understands the need to provide Canadians reassurance that information-sharing initiatives have proper safeguards and review. Through Bill C-59 Canadians have seen that the government is serious about ensuring effective review of Canada's security agencies. We would be more than meeting the expectations of Canadians with this new degree of legislative review, and importantly, this scrutiny would align us with our Five Eyes counterparts that already have such measures in place. The entry-exit initiative has broad public policy benefits, as the Privacy Commissioner acknowledged. Bill C-21 would benefit Canada in many ways, the most important being that it would enhance the security and effectiveness of the Canada-U.S. border and in so doing, increase the safety of our citizens.

Let me first remind the House how information is exchanged today. Canada currently collects basic biographic information on people coming into Canada, such as who they are, where they are from and how long they are staying. This information helps our officials identify and respond to potential threats. However, when it comes to those leaving the country, we collect information on only a small subset of these people, meaning that at any given moment we have an important information gap. While we know who enters Canada, we do not have a full picture of who is leaving.

The main problem with this information gap is that we might miss the exit from our country of individuals escaping justice or seeking to join radical groups abroad, or of known high-risk travellers and their goods, such as human or drug smugglers or exporters of illicit goods.

With this in mind, I will review briefly what Bill C-21 would do. When someone enters the U.S. from Canada at a land border crossing, basic entry information such as name, date of birth, citizenship, passport number and time and place of entry, the kind of information that is already collected from everyone entering the U.S., would be transmitted from the U.S. to the CBSA. In this way, the record of a person's entry into the U.S. would become a record of the person's exit from Canada and vice versa.

This would be new. Currently, at land ports of entry the U.S. and Canada exchange exit information on only a subset of people, including third-country nationals, non-U.S. or Canadian citizens; permanent residents of Canada who are not U.S. citizens; and lawful permanent residents of the U.S. who are not Canadian citizens.

With this bill, the data collected would be expanded to include all people exiting Canada by land.

The bill would allow a similar situation for a person leaving Canada by air. When someone enters the U.S. by air, his or her basic information would need to be provided to the CBSA. This information would be transmitted from the airlines to the CBSA so that the agency has information on everyone exiting Canada by air.

The benefits of this expansion of data pertaining to individuals exiting the country are many. For example, it would help our officials to respond quickly, and sometimes pre-emptively, to the outbound movement of known high-risk travellers and goods. It would identify individuals who do not leave Canada at the end of their authorized period of stay. It would verify whether applicants for permanent residency or citizenship have complied with residency requirements and would deliver faster client services for permanent residency and citizenship applications. It would allow us to respond more effectively in time-sensitive situations, such as amber alerts. It would allow us to stop using valuable immigration enforcement resources to find people who have already left Canada. It would allow us to provide reliable information in support of those making admissibility decisions and those carrying active investigations related to national security; law enforcement; or immigration, citizenship or travel document fraud. It would allow us to better interdict the illegal export of controlled, regulated or prohibited goods from Canada.

All told, the entry-exit initiative is another example of how Canada is keeping pace with the rest of the world and living up to its emerging position as a leader in border management.

In closing, I would like to say a few words about the CBSA and how Bill C-21 would help its officers better carry out their important work.

As all members know, the CBSA plays a key role in protecting Canada's physical and economic security by detecting threats at the border. Operating 24-7 in a risk-management environment, the agency relies heavily on information, including data on who is coming, who is going and when.

Currently, border officers know who is coming into Canada but do not know who has left. This is a blind spot that could prevent officers from tracking potentially dangerous Canadians as they head overseas, such as human traffickers.

Without a doubt, for all Canadians, the men and women of the CBSA need to have the proper basic tools, and that includes information, to deliver on their mandate of maximizing our safety and security.

For this, and a host of other reasons, I encourage all hon. members to join me in supporting this amendment and this important bill.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

We continue to make progress. Bill C-59 is further through the process now. It's in front of the Senate, and I'm hopeful that the Senate will be able to deal with Bill C-59 in the weeks and months immediately ahead.

Bill C-21 is also in the Senate. It's also making progress. We need those two pieces of legislation passed to give us the legal authority to make the changes. Once they're passed, there will be certain regulations that will need to be developed and promulgated under the two pieces of legislation.

The good news is that from Mr. Morneau's budget, we have the money in place that will allow us to build the new information system that will be required to correct this long-standing problem. It's a problem that's 10 years old. I want to fix it as fast as I can, but I do have to go through the necessary legal steps in the right order to get the legal authority and to get the regulations adopted.

We have the money now, and CBSA will be building the new system, which will be a government-controlled system and an interactive system. Once a person who has been red-flagged as a security issue has been cleared, they'll get a clearance number, and on all their subsequent encounters with the system they'll be able to enter that clearance number and automatically be cleared without going through the difficulty they're experiencing now.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

I know that we'll be looking forward to that.

The other thing—and I don't have a whole lot of time left to me—is that I also saw that there was money put towards enhancing the passenger protect program. There have been people in my community and people whom I have met who form part of the “no-fly kids”. The last time you were here, I believe, or one of the times you were here, we talked about the timelines based on the changes that were brought about in Bill C-59 to improve the passenger protect system. Do you have a sense of where we're at on timing at this stage?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Okay, very good.

You talk about Bill C-59. You mentioned that, I believe, in your opening remarks. Now, from what I see in the estimates—and I've heard conversations and seen documents—$100 million will be added to the administrative costs for CSIS and CSE and other national security agencies. If we're taking money and we're going to be spending it on administrative issues, then the actual operational end of national security is not going to be dealt with. There's going to be a pullback from there. Is that what I'm seeing and hearing and understanding in these documents?