Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for the break—well, question period, anyway.
Just to let you know, Mr. Chair, out of courtesy and assistance to our translators, I've given them some copies of the study and a few other things that I may be referring to, in order to make the translation easier. Bear with me. As I go through it, I will make sure I refer to the documents and the occasional pages to make it easier on the translators.
For those who have not been part of the discussion but are watching now, what we are doing in the finance committee is this: The government has proposed a budget implementation bill, as it's called. It amends a great many acts of Parliament, a number of which have nothing to do with the budget. Nonetheless, this is an omnibus budget bill. The government promised they would not bring in omnibus bills, and we are dealing with one.
What we have is a motion before us, and an amendment. The amendment to the main motion is what we're dealing with. The amendment to the main motion is MP Blaikie's amendment, which I think had a revision from MP Lawrence. It is asking that the Minister of Finance appear for two hours to defend the budget implementation bill. It's not unreasonable, but apparently it's a bit of a stretch for this committee, since the minister has frequently not responded to the committee's request to appear on various things.
Indeed, by my calculation, the minister has appeared in the House of Commons, as I mentioned earlier, five times since January. This budget bill, the budget implementation act, has a fiscal framework that spends $3.1 trillion over the next five years. In fact, the annual budget for the government will have almost doubled since it took office. In year five of this fiscal framework, it will be over half a trillion dollars. By my calculation, at five appearances, that's—let me get my math right—$100 billion per appearance by the minister. That's an hourly wage charged to the government taxpayers of Canada that is obviously something McKinsey would envy. I'm sure she's setting a new standard for them in the many new contracts they will get from this government.
For the sake of the translators, what we're talking about here is ministerial accountability and the parliamentary tradition in our Westminster system of parliamentary accountability. I've been enlightening the committee and those watching about an important academic study done on this issue, and I was citing the text of it before we went on break to go to question period. Just so the translators and the people watching know what document I'm referring to, it's the Australian Journal of Public Administration, volume 73, number 4.
Its summary reads:
This study examines the convention of individual ministerial responsibility for departmental actions in the four key Westminster countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The chain of ministerial responsibility traditionally began in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the public sector up to the minister, who is responsible to the parliament, which is responsible to the people. Many New Public Management reforms changed the roles and responsibilities of senior public servants, which arguably weakened the first link in the chain, despite being premised on increased public sector accountability. Various codes of conduct, guides, manuals, handbooks and legislation—
What they're referring to there, for example, in the current Liberal government, is a handbook—not law—that was issued when this government was elected, called “Open and Accountable Government 2015”. I'm not sure many of the ministers have actually read it, given their performance in the House and what it requires in parliamentary accountability.
The summary of this paper goes on to say:
—have attempted to codify and clarify politico-bureaucratic relationships. They have generally captured the complexity of executive accountability and better reflect the original convention, while emphasising the preeminent role of the prime minister in upholding individual ministerial responsibility.
When we left off, I had just finished the section on Canada, where it gets into the detailed analysis. Like every academic paper, it spends pages and pages outlining the academic process of doing the study. It first examines Australia, and then Canada. I had finished that off, but, just to give you a sense, New Zealand and the United Kingdom come next. I have to go through those. I think it's important for us to refresh, because we may have people watching who weren't privy to this insightful piece before we broke for question period. Perhaps I could begin with the section on Canada, at page 474.
By the way, it is written by Dr. Brenton and is entitled “Ministerial Accountability for Departmental Actions Across Westminster Parliamentary Democracies”. That section of this academic study begins like this:
Written guidance in the form of official documents or legislation is comparatively less extensive in Canada [that's relative, I guess, to Australia], with calls for a Cabinet Manual or something similar (see Russell 2010).
We should remember that this paper was written in 2015, just before the current government's “Open and Accountable Government” document came out. It goes on to say:
Accountable Government: A Guide for Ministers and Ministers of State “sets out core principles regarding the roles and responsibilities of Ministers...[including] the central tenet of ministerial responsibility, both individual and collective, as well as Ministers' relations with the Prime Minister and Cabinet, their portfolios and Parliament”. The current edition was issued in 2011 by the Privy Council Office, under Prime Minister Stephen Harper.
I know we can all agree he is one of Canada's greatest prime ministers.
Just to make sure we're clear, part of what we're trying to do is find Freeland. It's the “finding Freeland” effort. With only five appearances, this is as rare, I guess, as the dodo bird, or perhaps as rare as a DFO fisheries enforcement officer arresting poachers of elvers in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
This is about the code set out by one of Canada's best prime ministers, Stephen Harper:
Under Section I.1., “Individual Ministerial Responsibility” is firstly defined in terms of accountability to the prime minister, with the prime minister able to ask for a ministerial resignation.
That's something I don't think this Prime Minister has ever done. I don't think so. We've even had many instances of breaches of Canada's ethics act by ministers, but that apparently isn't good enough for a resignation. The report goes on to say, “Ministers are also accountable to Parliament”. That's why we're here today. We're talking about the Minister of Finance's accountability to Parliament, which seems to be a challenge in our “finding Freeland” effort. The paper goes on to say, “Ministers are also accountable to Parliament...for all areas of responsibility, whether they are assigned by statute or otherwise”. That's in section I.1 of Prime Minister Harper's guide for ministers.
According to this study:
The most detailed section is I.3. “Ministerial Accountability”. Ministers are required to be in parliament to answer questions on the discharge of their responsibilities and use of public monies, with political judgement resting with parliament.
That's our role: the political judgment that parliamentarians play in deciding whether or not what the government, the executive of our governing structure, puts forward in legislation and spending is acceptable to the people we represent. That's why ministers have to be held to account, not only in Parliament but also in committees.
The idea of answering questions, either in Parliament or in the committee, seems to be a challenge for the Minister of Finance, having not been here in the House more than five times since January, at $100 billion a day. I'm not sure where the Minister of Finance is in her outside time, but she is not answering questions there and has refused on at least three occasions when this committee asked her to come before the committee to answer questions.
I've actually never encountered that. I'm on the fisheries and industry committees, and I have encountered the Minister of Fisheries agreeing to appear before for two hours and then showing up at the meeting and saying, “I'm only going to show up for one.” I know we can't compel ministers to appear before a committee, but a courtesy to Parliament and parliamentarians, of which they are a part, would dictate that. The odd hour here and there from these very busy ministers could be spared for their accountability to democracy.
The study goes on to say:
However, the prime minister can reaffirm support or ask for a resignation. Consistent with the principle of responsible government, it is said that ministers are accountable to parliament for all organisations within their portfolio and the “proper functioning” of their department.
We've seen a lot of those issues in obfuscation and answers in question period. I misspoke. We don't get answers in question period. We get responses.
Even today, there was the issue of the public safety minister not informing the House of when the Prime Minister was informed that a member of Parliament was threatened by a foreign government because of his vote in Parliament. This government has known about this for two years, according to the leaked security memos that apparently went to the Privy Council Office. The chief of staff to the Prime Minister, as we know, said the Prime Minister reads everything he gets and he certainly reads everything from security.
While the Minister of Public Safety may not have known, perhaps he should ask the Prime Minister why the Prime Minister didn't inform him two years ago that this was going on. It's hard for the minister to be accountable to Parliament if the Prime Minister isn't sharing with him such critical information that goes to the root of our democracy.
The academic study here goes on to say this with regard to Canada:
However, reference is also made to “appropriate ministerial oversight”. Therefore, in relation to arm's-length bodies—
This is the RCMP or CSIS, in the case of the Minister of Public Safety, and the CDIC or, perhaps, the Bank of Canada, in reference to the Minister of Finance.
—“the Minister's engagement will be at a systemic level”.
Then it goes to quote directly from “A Guide for Ministers and Ministers of State” by Prime Minister Harper:
Ministerial accountability to Parliament does not mean that a Minister is presumed to have knowledge of every matter that occurs within his or her department or portfolio—
The executive makes it clear every day that they do not know everything that is going on within their department or portfolio.
—nor that the Minister is necessarily required to accept blame for every matter.
We certainly know they won't accept blame even for their own actions of giving friends and family direct contracts untendered, like the Minister of International Trade, or taking personal vacations at $9,000-a-night resorts in Jamaica, as the Prime Minister has done, or a $6,000-a-night hotel in London.
The Prime Minister, I believe, has gone off to London for the very important event of the swearing in of the king and his investiture as our sovereign. I wonder if he's staying in the Holiday Inn in London, or whether he's gone back to having a requirement to have a butler and a chef in his suite, and a piano so he can sign Bohemian Rhapsody again.
The report goes on to quote directly from Prime Minister Harper's guide for ministers on ministerial accountability, which is what this motion is about. It says:
It does require that the Minister attend to all matters in Parliament—
That's a revelation. Other ministers have clearly done it in the past, but it's a little tough when you show up five days since January, as the “finding Freeland” effort continues.
—that concern any organizations for which he or she is responsible, including responding to questions.
What a unique idea, in our Westminster system, that a minister would have to respond to questions from the opposition to be held accountable in Parliament to the people who are elected to represent our communities across the country. But it's pretty hard to do that when the minister has refused to come on three occasions to the finance committee to answer and be accountable for the financial things that she is responsible for. This baffles me.
This is a friendly group. I don't see it as an acrimonious committee. I have been on some committees.... I can think of the heritage committee last year, where I went on Bill C-11. That wasn't exactly a collegial committee at the time, but this one seems very.... I don't know why the Minister of Finance would be so intimidated by the members of this committee as to not be willing to come and answer questions—but she can only answer that if she comes.
The report continues to quote from the Harper guide:
It further requires that the Minister take appropriate corrective action to address any problems that may have arisen, consistent with the Minister's role with respect to the organization in question (3).
It's very clear that for a long time, at least during Conservative governments, we held them accountable. We even had ministers resign for their expenses. But apparently that doesn't happen in this government, because it comes from the top. The Prime Minister sets the tone on accountability. When the Prime Minister is found guilty three times of ethics violations and doesn't resign or recognize that he has caused a problem and is entitled to his entitlements, he sets the tone for his management team, the cabinet; all they have to do is make mistakes and apologize and everything's okay. That's not in the traditions of the Westminster system, as we'll find out here in the next section of this report, which talks about New Zealand.
It says here “While lacking a formal written constitution”. Some members and people watching may not know that New Zealand doesn't have a constitution. As a parliamentary democracy, it is like Britain. It doesn't have a constitution. It relies on case law and common law and goes back to the Magna Carta for its precedents and how it does things.
The article says about New Zealand:
While lacking a formal written constitution, the Cabinet Manual is self-described as “an authoritative guide to central government decision making for Ministers, their offices and those working within government”, as well as “a primary source of information on New Zealand's constitutional arrangements”. It is endorsed by each new government, with the current version updated in 2008.
This was in 2015.
Section 3 of the Manual deals with “Ministers of the Crown and the State Sector”. In terms of roles and responsibilities:
They quote directly from this manual:
Ministers decide both the direction and the priorities for their departments. They should not be involved in their departments' day-to-day operations. In general terms, Ministers are responsible for determining and promoting policy, defending policy decisions, and answering in the House on both policy and operational matters (3.5).
You see, New Zealand has it right. They have it right, as the Harper government did—it's part of accountability and ministerial responsibility to answer in Parliament. In our country, Parliament means the House of Commons, the Senate of Canada, and all parliamentary committees in both Houses, to be held accountable. To not come at the courteous and very friendly invitation of this committee—three times by the minister for $100-billion-a day work—Minister Freeland, in the “finding Freeland” effort here, is not even following the traditions in other Westminster parliamentary systems.
Point 3.21 refers to “Individual ministerial responsibility for departmental actions”:
It quotes again directly from the manual from New Zealand:
Ministers are accountable to the House for ensuring that the departments for which they are responsible carry out their functions properly and efficiently. On occasion, a Minister may be required to account for the actions of a department when errors are made—
That's quite a bit by this government.
—even when the Minister had no knowledge of, or involvement in, those actions. The question of subsequent action in relation to individual public servants may be a matter for the State Services Commissioner—
Obviously, this is a title or role that's different in New Zealand as we have no such role.
—(in the case of chief executives), or for chief executives if any action to be taken involves members of their staff.
The study goes on to say, on page 475:
A series of “Accountability documents” help to monitor departmental performance, including one-year performance information, statements of intent for at least the next three years, an output plan—
There's a novel idea. An output plan is required in New Zealand for ministers and their accountability. I think all we get is input plans. There are input plans of spending, input plans of intent, input plans of good wishes and fairy dust, but not much in the way of output. The measurement of success of this government is how much you spend, not how much you produce.
I don't think many of these ministers would survive very well in the private sector, except maybe Navdeep Bains, who left. He's done well for himself. Navdeep Bains was the minister of industry responsible for bringing down cellphone prices. When he left, we had the highest cellphone prices in the world. In fact, you'll be shocked to learn that when the minister of industry, Navdeep Bains, who was responsible for cellphone rates when we had the highest rates.... Every minister in Canada has a two-year cooling off period. Before the ink was dry on his cooling off period in January of this year, Navdeep Bains decided to negotiate with Rogers Communications to be in charge of their government relations. Can you believe that? Minister Bains, in his accountability, who feather-bedded the telecoms to have the highest prices in the world, went to work for Rogers.
Let me tell you about Rogers. They have the highest cellphone rates in the world. It's not just in Canada, but in the world. It's not shocking to me that the minister in charge of the highest cellphone prices in the world, after his two-year cooling off period, would be rewarded by Rogers with a cushy job in charge of government relations. It's the very same company he was responsible for regulating and allowed to become the most expensive cellphone company in the world.
Where was I? The study continues: “Crucially, responsibility for financial performance is vested solely in the minister”. Financial performance? Why, just in the fall, this minister, in her economic statement on the budget of the finances of this country, projected—this is something they hadn't said in quite a while; in fact, they hadn't said it since the 2015 election—a balanced budget. I think it was by 2027-28, a four- or five-year mandate. That was just in the fall. If the minister had shown up here at the finance committee subsequent to that, she could have been questioned, as Westminster parliamentary tradition requires, on the financial performance of that.
We know the financial performance of that. In this document, in the budget implementation act that we're talking about, there is no balanced budget projected in the next five years. In fact, it goes a long way out before it's even considered. In fact, this budget, in the five-year framework, adds $130 billion to Canada's national debt.
I know that people watching and the members of Parliament here were all listening intently when I led off the debate for the official opposition in the House of Commons on this bill, the budget implementation act. You'll recall that I went through the sins of the father and now the sins of the son. When you take the combined financial performance of the father, former prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and the son, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the total addition to Canada's national debt between those two members of the same family is $1.1 trillion.
It would be enormously helpful for the Minister of Finance, in this “finding Freeland” exercise, to be able to come here and explain to us why she thinks that a balanced budget in the fall no longer can be balanced, and why it is a prudent fiscal thing—for all of us and all of Canada—for the Trudeau tradition to continue adding $1.1 trillion. This government has never met a target that it has set, financially. It's blown the doors off, financially, with bigger debts than it ever has before.
One of the most interesting things is that, in order to meet that $1.1 trillion or to add only $130 billion to the national debt in the next five years, this government has to not introduce or spend one dollar more on anything new in the rest of its mandate. I don't think the odds of that are very strong. We see a lot of betting commercials now during the NHL playoffs, and I'd like to see some of those companies place a bet on the likelihood.... Vegas will do bets on anything. I'd like to see Vegas do the odds on this government's meeting any of the targets in this budget plan. I wouldn't take that bet. I'll tell you, though, that if you put $1 down, it would probably make you a gazillionaire if the government actually did it once, by the odds that you would get. Maybe that's what's going on here. Maybe the Minister of Finance, in trying to understand this, is trying to understand her own numbers and figure out how this government put Canada in such a mess.
On New Zealand—and we're coming up to the United Kingdom, the mother of all Parliaments—the report goes on to say, “Crucially, responsibility for financial performance is vested solely in the minister”. Well, it's hard to do that if you're mysteriously not attending committee. I wish we could compel her more. I know we can subpoena witnesses in committees, but I doubt that...although it would be great if MP Blaikie and the other opposition parties would agree, because I suspect that's the only way you're going to get the Minister of Finance here for two precious hours.
What does that work out to, two precious hours of her time? Let's see. Well, it's five days at $100 billion a day to show up in Parliament on her spending. What does that work out to? My colleague, Marty Morantz, could work on that.