Madam Speaker, the intrepid member for Jonquière just joked that I should have said no myself. I am going to run out of time for my speech.
On July 6, 2013, 47 people died as a result of a train derailment involving 72 tank cars carrying crude oil. This tragic event reminds us of the significant risks associated with this activity. The industry needs to be better regulated. With regard to this tragedy, I would like to refer to the work of Anne-Marie Saint-Cerny, author of the book Mégantic: une tragédie annoncée, published by Écosociété.
Ms. Saint-Cerny began her investigation by looking at the journey of William Ackman, the owner of Canadian Pacific, or CP, at the time. Mr. Ackman took over the railway company on May 17, 2012, as shareholders were outraged at their total return of 19%, while competitors got a return of 56% to 117%. Ackman hired Hunter Harrison, a former CEO of CN, Canadian National.
To increase profits, Harrison presented a four-point plan: increase the convoy, increase the speed, reduce maintenance and reduce the number of employees. Convoys would be five times heavier and longer, with a length far exceeding one kilometre. They would be 15% faster and 4,500 positions would be eliminated within six months. Saint-Cerny tells us that Harrison profited from the phenomenal increase in the transportation of petroleum products, which increased from 500 tank cars to 140,000 in 2013, with the use of block trains, that is long convoys of black oil tankers, the famous DOT-111 tank cars, which were obsolete and condemned by all safety agencies in the U.S. and in Canada.
Block trains reduce travel time by going directly from their point of origin to the destination, without stopping to load or unload cargo for various clients. To increase profitability, CP subcontracts its convoys to Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway, or MMA, whose network represents the shortest line between Montreal and the Irving refinery in Saint John, New Brunswick.
Ackman and Harrison do not care that MMA has the worst accident record in North America. On the contrary, they have nothing but admiration for its owner, Edward Burkhardt, who privatized railroads in New Zealand and Estonia. They admire him above all because he is the man behind the notorious one-person crew practice, which was a determining factor in the Mégantic disaster.
Harrison can brag that he really delivered the goods. As Saint-Cerny reports, 10 months after he started working for CP and two months before the tragedy, the company announced its largest profits in its 132-year history. Of the 25 largest listed companies in Canada, CP posted the best return to shareholders in 10 months, with a return of 26%. In 2016, Harrison was the highest-paid CEO in Canada.
Anne-Marie Saint-Cerny's other target is the federal government. She quotes the mission statement of the department responsible for railways, which says, “Transport Canada develops safety regulations and standards, or in the case of railways, it facilitates the development of rules by the rail industry”. She also pointed out that Transport Canada recognized, at the time, that the primary responsibility for safe operations rests with the industry. The quoted report then states that Transport Canada “can order the development of a rule or the amendment of an existing rule”. The real issue is when it says that the Railway Association of Canada, “in consultation with its member railways, would then draft the rule.”
In addition to writing its own rules, the company self-monitors and has its own policy for protecting assets the company administers or owns.
The Conservative transportation minister at the time, John Baird, who was responsible for this delegation of power, ensured Transport Canada's discretion by rendering the organization useless. While there were once 7,000 people overseeing transport safety in Canada, there were only 43 inspection positions at the time of the tragedy.
The title of Saint-Cerny's book, which can be translated as “Mégantic: a tragedy foretold”, says it all. The risk of such a tragedy happening was very high, both because of corporate greed and Ottawa's complacency. This summer will mark 10 years since the tragedy. It will be 10 years since 47 people lost their lives for bigger profits. It will be 10 years since hundreds of lives were changed forever because of Ottawa's lax attitude. It will be 10 years since the downtown core of this community was razed to the ground.
In 10 years, have things really changed? I would say that things evolve very slowly in Ottawa. Ten years later, we have Bill C‑33. It does not solve everything, but it is another step in the right direction. Obviously, we will vote in favour of the principle of the bill.
Furthermore, the Auditor General's recent audits, the Railway Safety Act review of 2018 and the studies done by the Standing Committee on Transport describe safety concerns with freight transportation. The bill responds to several recommendations of these reports, and we believe that many measures it contains will help improve railway safety.
In fact, during the 2017-18 review of the Railway Safety Act, I submitted a brief that pointed out some shortcomings. For example, I pointed out the following:
Gone are the days when trains essentially transported minerals, logs, grain or containers. This must be acknowledged....the current legal and regulatory framework is not suited to the sharp increase in the transportation of dangerous goods.
During its investigation of the Lac-Mégantic tragedy, the Transportation Safety Board revealed a number of serious deficiencies, both at the railway company and at Transport Canada: worn-out rail lines; fragile cars that were not suitable for carrying crude oil and that should have been decommissioned a long time ago; inadequate information on the content of the cars, making it very difficult for emergency services to do their work; a lack of coordination with local authorities; too few inspections; a lack of inspectors; a lack of follow-up; and too much confidence in the railway company's ability to police itself.
At the heart of the problem is the very architecture of the act and the self-regulatory regime it provides for. Protecting the public is the primary responsibility of the state. It cannot be passed down to a private company, which finds itself in a conflict of interest because lowering its costs means more profits.
It is not up to a private company to propose the security procedures it should be subject to or to verify whether it is in compliance. The act must be overhauled to ensure that the government fulfills the responsibilities it should never have delegated.
Here is another suggestion I made:
Rather than a simple update, your committee should recommend that the government propose, within the next two years, a complete overhaul of the Railway Safety Act, so as to put an end to the system of self-regulation by companies, and ensure that the government itself is responsible for establishing safety plans, ensuring compliance with them, and providing the internal human resources needed to fulfill these responsibilities.
This overhaul of the act should include a review of certain aspects of the Canada Transportation Act, even though the government committee's 2016 report did not propose any measures in that regard.
That was five years ago, but I am glad the government is finally moving in this direction. I also stressed the importance of better informing local authorities, in real time, of the arrival on their territory of rail convoys carrying hazardous materials. Some efforts have been made to that effect. Another point I raised was the need to reduce train speeds in densely populated areas, regardless of the size of the town, and to provide better support to municipalities in their emergency response.
On April 29 in Lac-Mégantic, there was a screening of the four-part documentary series Lac‑Mégantic. At that event, Gilbert Carette and Robert Bellefleur, members of the Coalition des citoyens et organismes engagés pour la sécurité ferroviaire de Lac‑Mégantic, recalled that years before July 6, 2013, residents spoke out against the industry, which was letting longer and heavier poorly maintained convoys carrying more crude oil, propane and other chemicals travel on worn rails. They said it was a conflict of interest that the safety inspections were being carried out by the companies themselves and approved by their own authorities.
Mr. Carette and Mr. Bellefleur are still calling for a public inquiry. While waiting for some light to be shed on this incident, while waiting for major changes to be made and for these problems to be corrected, we have here tonight Bill C‑33, which is a step in the right direction to prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again.
