Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our security intelligence representatives for joining us today.

I'd like to take a moment to thank you for your work, your proactive efforts in community engagement and your work with respect to Bill C-70, specifically on strengthening the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, something that hadn't been done in over 20 years. I want to thank you and the department for your efforts there.

I want to start by stating that prolonged operations by TikTok could allow foreign actors to exploit Canadian user data or spread disinformation. Is this an accurate statement in your mind, Director Rogers?

[Heath MacDonald, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses again.

Quickly, I just want to touch on Bill C-70, Canada's new Countering Foreign Interference Act, which came into effect last June. How will the measures in that bill enhance the ability of CBSA to leverage intelligence at the border?

[Daniel Rogers, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

I have a couple of points, and I'll try to make them fairly quickly.

My name is Daniel Rogers, and I am the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS. I am joined by my colleague Paul Lynd, the assistant deputy minister responsible for intelligence collection.

It is an honour to join you today and to have the opportunity to contribute to your important discussion on the winding up of TikTok Canada. Today, I hope to provide insights on CSIS's role plays in ensuring the protection of Canada's national security interests, the safety of Canadians and Canada's prosperity.

The Investment Canada Act, or ICA, which is administered by Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ensures that significant investments in Canada made by non-Canadians benefit Canada's economy. To this end, the act allows the government to review foreign investments to ensure they are not harmful to Canada's national security.

The act aims to strike a balance promoting economic prosperity and safeguarding Canada from foreign actors seeking to gain ownership or control of sensitive Canadian goods, technology, infrastructure or personal data for purposes that could be injurious to Canada's national security.

In accordance with its mandate, CSIS regularly screens ICA notifications for security concerns, and we work with ISED, Public Safety Canada and federal granting councils to inform the GC’s decisions. This work is essential, as Canada is the target of a number of adversarial state actors looking to advance their own national interests at our expense through their investment activities.

Social media platforms in particular are of interest to threat actors because of the data they generate and collect. They run surveys, collate datasets and request access to users’ personal data through terms and conditions, enabling access to photo albums, messages and contact lists, among other sensitive details. Although some of this data is benign in isolation, when collected and collated on scale, it can provide detailed patterns and insights on populations, public opinion, communities and individual social and professional networks.

Authoritarian states like the PRC use big data, including from the private sector, to carry out foreign interference activities. While government use of data in Canada is subject to ethical, legal and privacy considerations, authoritarian states are not subject to these limitations. Through its 2017 National Intelligence Law, the PRC compels PRC citizens and entities to co-operate with PRC intelligence agencies upon request, which includes providing all information to the state and its intelligence apparatus. This policy supports, and is reflective of, the PRC’s attempts to interfere in Canada and like-minded democracies. Canada and its allies must therefore exercise heightened caution when agreeing to share their data with platforms linked to the PRC.

The ICA review process, which includes CSIS input, determined that allowing TikTok Canada to continue operating would cause injury to Canada’s national security. Although the provisions of the ICA limit what I am able to disclose about specific cases, I would note that the CSIS and Government of Canada assessment was consistent with the March 2024 policy statement on foreign investment review in the interactive digital media sector. Specifically, assessments consider factors such as reach and audience, the nature and extent of an investor's ties to a foreign government, and whether a Canadian business is likely to be used as a vehicle by a foreign state to propagate disinformation or censor information in a manner inconsistent with Canadian rights and values.

Use of social media platforms also raises national security concerns when they act as a breeding ground for extremist ideologies and radicalize users. The increasing volume of violent rhetoric online raises our concern that consumers of this content are more likely to mobilize to violence. Youth in particular can be especially vulnerable to becoming radicalized online due to their more frequent use of social media.

CSIS continues to actively investigate, advise on, and disrupt national security threats. CSIS is also committed to building resilience through our modernized authorities under Bill C‑70.

This new authority recognizes that protecting Canada's national security is a shared endeavour that includes partnering with all levels of government, Canadian communities, academia, the private sector, and others. We are committed to co‑operating with these groups in the national interest, including through increased sharing of detailed threat information.

I will conclude by noting that while CSIS cannot publicly comment on our specific operational activities or investigations, I welcome this opportunity to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

That's good to know. We have taken some legislative steps in the Parliament of Canada with Bill C-70, which will hopefully fix that problem for CSIS in the future.

That leads me to my next question.

I referenced the legislative changes we've put into place that bring the CSIS Act and the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act up to speed to counter the threat. Looking back, is there anything you wish could have been done differently with these allegations? What kinds of safeguards would you like to see put in place to make sure that political parties and their internal mechanisms are not being affected by foreign interference?

[Peter Madou, Assistant Deputy Minister, Operational Intelligence and Assessment Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, Madam Chair and members of the committee.

My name is Peter Madou and I am the Assistant Deputy Minister of Operational Intelligence and Assessment Requirements at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

I would first like to thank the committee for inviting CSIS to appear on this very important issue.

CSIS takes all threats of violence very seriously and continues to monitor, investigate and mitigate threats against the 2SLGBTQIA+ community in Canada on a priority basis.

Violent extremism continues to pose a significant and growing threat to Canada's national security. While only a small number of Canadians are actually willing to engage in serious violence in support of their gender and identity driven views, their actions continue to have devastating real world consequences, as we saw in Waterloo just last year.

The increase in violent extremist activity is felt acutely within the 2SLGBTQIA+ and other marginalized communities, as they can be the target of threats emanating from both ideologically and religiously motivated violent extremists. The anti-gender movement, which rejects the 2SLGBTQIA+ community, is a national security issue when associated with extremists who exercise gender identity-driven violence as a result of personal beliefs stemming from misogyny, homophobia, transphobia, religious interpretations, conspiracy theories or a generalized fear of socio-cultural change.

It is important to note that while violent rhetoric itself does not equate to or necessarily lead to violence, the ecosystem of violent rhetoric within the anti-gender movement, compounded with other extreme worldviews, can lead to serious violence.

Exposure to entities espousing anti-gender extremist rhetoric could inspire and encourage serious violence against the 2SLGBTQIA+ community and its allies. Violent actors may also be inspired by real-world events, like the University of Waterloo attack, to carry out their own extremist violence, sometimes with little to no warning.

Anti-2SLGBTQIA+ rhetoric is also spreading widely through social media and online forums among violent extremists, increasing the risk of extremist violence against the community and its allies as well as the risk of vulnerable youth being radicalized on online platforms.

To counter these threats and protect public safety, CSIS continues to vigorously investigate and disrupt the threat activities of violent extremists in collaboration with foreign and domestic security intelligence and law enforcement partners. Where appropriate, CSIS leverages the full extent of its authorities to mitigate threats of gender identity-driven violence.

CSIS is also committed to building resiliency and increasing public awareness of these threats, including through modernized authorities granted to CSIS under Bill C‑70. CSIS' new resiliency disclosure authority recognizes that protecting Canada's national security is a shared endeavour that includes partnering with all levels of government, Canadian communities and the private sector. CSIS is actively using this new tool and is committed in its efforts to bridge across sectors and find ways to cooperate in the national interest. This includes increased sharing of relevant threat information to a wider range of recipients to protect national security.

However, more work needs to be done to ensure that all persons in Canada feel safe to express themselves and their identities without threats of violence. Canadians must work together to prevent radicalization at its root by combatting misinformation and disinformation, slowing the spread of violent content and hateful rhetoric, and fostering cohesion between Canadian communities.

I will conclude by noting that while CSIS cannot publicly comment on its operational activities or ongoing investigations, I welcome this opportunity for a frank and transparent discussion on the threats to Canada's 2SLGBTQIA+ communities.

I am happy to answer your questions.

Thank you, Chair.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Chair, thank you.

Colleagues, thank you for joining us. I hope that you were kind and gentle to the senior officials who were here before me. I hope that the same spirit of kindness continues for the next hour.

Mr. Chair, let me begin by congratulating you on assuming the chair of this important committee. I wish you a successful stewardship of this committee.

Teasing aside, I want to thank my colleagues, the officials. It's quite a collection of horsepower from the Public Safety portfolio. I'm glad that they were able to be here at 11 o'clock.

As you know, Mr. Chair, I was in a cabinet meeting that's still ongoing, and I will sadly excuse myself at one o'clock sharp because, as you know, the leaders of the opposition are meeting with the Prime Minister to talk about borders and border security and are meeting with President-elect Trump on Friday, and I was asked to provide an update. If you see me excuse myself, it will be for that reason.

It's also a moment to mention Dan Rogers and Joanne Blanchard. Joanne has assumed the chair of the National Parole Board, and Dan is the director of CSIS. It's my first time with them before this committee, and I think that they'll serve Canadians in an outstanding way. I'm happy to be here with them.

Back in March, I appeared before the committee to discuss my mandate. We talked about the work the government had done to apprehend criminals attempting to smuggle drugs and weapons into the country, as well as efforts to combat auto theft. We talked about foreign interference and the need to bring forward and pass legislation giving the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, the modern tools it needs to protect Canada. Since then, Canada's law enforcement agencies have done some excellent work.

Over the past two years, the Canada Border Services Agency, or CBSA, has intercepted more than 13 tonnes of illegal drugs at land border crossings across the country. In 2023, the CBSA seized more than 900 prohibited firearms and over 27,000 weapons. In June 2024, law enforcement agencies across the country took part in a nationwide operation to crack down on the manufacturing and trafficking of ghost guns. They seized approximately 440 traditional and 3‑D‑printed firearms, as well as fifty-two 3‑D printers.

As well, as colleagues will know, in October of this year, federal RCMP forces in British Columbia took down the largest, most sophisticated drug lab in Canada. This is the excellent work that the RCMP, with their partners, do in every corner of our country every day. The combined fentanyl and precursors seized at this facility alone would have amounted to 95 million potentially lethal doses of fentanyl entering our communities or being exported abroad.

On the auto theft front—something that this committee has leaned into—the Canada Border Services Agency has intercepted more than 2,000 stolen vehicles in rail yards and ports to date this year alone, already exceeding last year's work, but we recognize that there is, obviously, more good work to be done. Early trends for 2024 show a 17% reduction in auto theft, but we still recognize that these figures remain stubbornly high.

Additionally, in October of this year, the RCMP took the unprecedented step of releasing findings with respect to involvement of agents of the Government of India in serious criminal activity on Canadian soil. Due to that announcement and subsequent actions taken by the government and law enforcement agencies, to quote the commissioner of the RCMP—it's kind of awkward to quote him when he's sitting at the table, but this will flatter him—there has been a “significant reduction” to the public safety threat posed.

Additionally, in the supplementary estimates before you, Mr. Chair, our government is investing $16 million to support the RCMP's foreign interference-related criminal investigations. Those same estimates show that CSIS's budget is increasing by more than $53 million this year. While detailed breakdowns of CSIS expenditures are, understandably, classified, I can say that the tools available to CSIS have been strengthened and modernized with the passage of Bill C-70, and I thank colleagues on this committee for the good work that we did together in that regard.

This crucial funding will ensure CSIS can continue to keep Canadians safe from such threats as violent extremism and foreign interference. CSIS's budget will have increased 48% compared to 10 years ago. Under our government's stewardship, the RCMP will be receiving 101% more funding to do the important work they do for Canadians in this same period. These investments and the results that are being achieved, I think, should attest to everyone the collective concern all of us have around public safety.

Last year the government proposed a $637-million increase in the budgets of our public safety department and portfolio agencies. This year it's over $2 billion. Investments found in these supplementary estimates will combat auto theft, advance the work that the government and partner agencies are doing to combat foreign interference, provide increased police presence and investigative work to those experiencing violent hate and continue to keep communities safe across the country.

Our government will continue making responsible investments to keep our country safe.

I hope we can count on the support of all parliamentarians and members of this committee to get the votes in the supplementary estimates before you passed quickly.

I don't think it will surprise you that I'm very excited about the opportunity to answer questions from colleagues. It's something I look forward to. I was counting the days until I'd have this opportunity. It was like, “How many shopping days left before Christmas?” You can't imagine, Mr. Chair, how happy I am to be here with you this morning.

[Daniel Rogers, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you for the question. I'm happy to answer.

You're right that the bulk of the funding is for increasing intelligence capacity and mitigating security risks. I will say that it's not directly tied to the new legislation, but that will certainly help our ability to implement it.

An increase to our intelligence capacity means we will have better visibility for intelligence threats, which we can then share through resilience disclosures. This is something Bill C-70 affords us the ability to do. It also means that new tools in Bill C‑70 will be implemented through this. We have new production orders and mechanisms that allow us to seek information. Some of this capacity will be directed towards things like the ability to use technology and digital tools to assist in our intelligence. Those authorities interrelate.

We will see an overall increase linked to Bill C-70 but not directly tied to it.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of the officials who are joining us at the committee today.

I'd like to start with Mr. Rogers and the service.

I've taken a look at the detailed breakdown of what you are asking for in these supplementary estimates. I can see that the lion's share of the funding you are requesting is to “mitigate security risks” and “enhance intelligence capabilities”.

What I would like to know is how much of this funding is related to the new legislative authorities the Parliament of Canada granted CSIS through Bill C-70. I just want to get a sense of how that legislation is being operationalized and how these costs relate to that.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

You had some suggestions. You talked about how we need to greatly expand the counter-intelligence capabilities of the RCMP and CSIS and really maximize the new tools that we have, such as Bill C-70.

Just turning to the political realm, we know that India and other countries have a desire to influence our politics. Outside of the things I just mentioned, what do you think political parties should be doing? Are there any recommendations that you want our committee to focus on?

[Aaron Shull, Managing Director and General Counsel, Centre for International Governance Innovation]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, vice-chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to address the critical issue of foreign interference and criminal activities in Canada, specifically by agents of the Government of India.

To me, this issue strikes at the heart of our national sovereignty and public safety and, indeed, the integrity of our democracy. In my remarks today, I want to help clarify what happened, why it happened and what I think you can do about it.

Number one is what happened. The assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in June 2023 was a flashpoint in uncovering the extent of foreign interference activities conducted by agents of the Government of India. Through investigations led by the RCMP and supported by CSIS, it became evident that these actions are part of a broader pattern of transnational repression. Indian diplomatic officials in Canada have been implicated in coordinating intelligence-gathering efforts and collaborating with criminal networks to intimidate and harm Canadian citizens.

The methods include espionage, whereby Indian officials gather intelligence on individuals within the Indo-Canadian community using diplomatic channels and coerced proxies, and criminal facilitation, whereby organized crime groups such as the Lawrence Bishnoi gang have been directed to carry out acts of violence, including assassination plots, intimidation campaigns and disinformation campaigns. Indian narratives have sought to polarize communities in Canada, labelling lawful advocacy for Sikh rights as extremism while amplifying propaganda through diaspora-targeted media.

This interference, however, is not isolated. Believe me, it reflects a deliberate strategy to suppress dissent and manipulate Canadian political and social systems to align with India's interests. Despite multiple diplomatic meetings and law enforcement interventions, the problem has persisted, underscoring the need for a stronger and more coordinated response.

Number two is why it happened. India perceives segments of the Canadian Sikh diaspora, particularly those advocating for Khalistan independence, as a direct threat to its national security and territorial integrity. This perception has driven the Indian government to conflate lawful political advocacy with violent extremism, resulting in a systematic campaign of surveillance, intimidation and violence targeting individuals and communities in Canada. India's actions are fuelled by its long-standing internal conflicts and an aggressive foreign policy aimed at silencing dissent abroad.

Number three is what I think you can do about it. First, expand CSIS and RCMP resources for counterintelligence operations targeting Indian proxies and agents. Under this, I think you should look at strengthening the threat reduction measures, or TRMs as they're referred to, to disrupt foreign intelligence networks and prevent imminent threats.

Second, use legislative and policy measures. Leverage the new tools under Bill C-70, such as production orders and cross-border information collection, to enhance investigations. Continue statutory reviews of intelligence legislation to make sure you're keeping pace with evolving threats and have flexibility in addressing emerging tactics.

Third is community protection and public outreach. I've heard other witnesses talk about the duty to warn. I think you need to maintain timely, transparent warnings for individuals facing credible threats, while also pairing these with robust protective measures, including law enforcement support and safety planning. There would be nothing quite like getting a notice that you are being targeted for assassination from a foreign state actor without anything else other than the warning. Build resilience within affected diaspora communities through education, direct engagement, public awareness campaigns and ensuring trust in Canadian institutions. Look at addressing the disinformation campaigns by countering narratives spread by Indian state media through coordinated efforts with the Department of Canadian Heritage and the CRTC.

The fourth area is diplomatic and multilateral efforts, so coordinating through coalitions like the Five Eyes and bilateral diplomatic channels. You need to make clear that violations of sovereignty through interference and violence will prompt significant consequences, and you can't just say it—you have to do it. You have to raise the cost.

The fifth area is a new idea that I don't think anyone else will have said. We should look at using speaking indictments. What I mean by that is that Canada should follow examples of jurisdictions like the United States in using speaking indictments to address and expose foreign interference.

A speaking indictment is more than a legal document. It's a public accountability tool. It details the evidence behind the criminal charges. It outlines the methods and actors involved and explains the broader context of foreign interference. It creates a clear narrative for the public. It names specific actors, including diplomats, proxies and criminal networks in an indictment, and it publicizes the risks and consequences of engaging in these activities.

As an example, in the United States, the Vikas Yadav superseding indictment effectively exposed the methods and coordination of foreign operations. In Canada, a similar tool could be used to detail India's role in directing and facilitating acts of violence, coercion and disinformation through both state and non-state actors. That superseding indictment read like a spy novel, but no one took issue with it. When it was an indictment, it did exactly what it was supposed to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Democratic Institutions

[Jenica Atwin, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indigenous Services]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the paramount issue of combatting foreign interference in our democratic institutions. I certainly take this matter very seriously. I have respect for the House, and I wish the member would demonstrate the same. The allegations referenced here are misleading and defamatory, and he is simply peddling misinformation.

On this side of the House, the Prime Minister and ministers of the Crown have security clearances and have been vetted by national security. That is more than I can say for the Leader of the Opposition, who the member opposite is sitting closer and closer to. That is why I would like to turn my attention to what matters, which is what the government is doing on foreign interference.

In September 2023, the government announced the establishment of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal processes and democratic processes following extensive consultations with all recognized parties in the House of Commons. All parties agreed to the terms of reference and the appointment of the commissioner, Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, a judge of the Court of Appeal of Quebec. The commissioner is mandated to examine and assess interference from China, Russia and other foreign state or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of and any impacts on the 2019 and 2021 federal general elections at the national and electoral district levels.

As members of the House know, the commissioner's interim report was delivered on May 3, 2024. Some of the key findings from this initial report were that foreign interference did not affect the overall outcomes of the 2019 and 2021 elections, and the administration of these elections were sound. Foreign interference did not undermine the integrity of Canada's electoral system.

The commission's initial report did not make any recommendations for the government or other stakeholders. These will be included in the commission's final report. The government looks forward to reviewing the final report and any recommendations the commissioner may have for better protecting federal democratic processes from foreign interference. These will help inform future measures. In the meantime, the government continues its work to counter the evolving threat of foreign interference in Canada's democratic institutions.

Since the commissioner was appointed, the government has taken a number of steps. In September 2023, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons that there were credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen in British Columbia. In October 2023, the government issued a second public statement on a probable Chinese government's “spamouflage” disinformation campaign targeting dozens of Canadian parliamentarians and issued letters to those parliamentarians who were targeted.

In December 2023, Canada joined the United Kingdom's attribution of malicious cyber activity in Russia that targeted U.K. politics and democratic processes. In January 2024, early preparations for the critical election incident public protocol panel began with individual briefings to panel members. Also in January 2024, the government published and shared a tool kit to resist disinformation and foreign interference and “Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants”.

In March 2024, the government introduced Bill C-65 which proposes amendments to the Canada Elections Act, including measures to further strengthen federal electoral processes against foreign interference. This bill has passed second reading in the House and is currently being studied in committee. In June 2024, unclassified briefings on foreign interference were provided to members of Parliament. On June 20, 2024, Bill C-70, the Countering Foreign Interference Act, received royal assent.

The Government of Canada has taken a range of measures to address the evolving threat of foreign interference in Canada's democratic processes. We look forward to reviewing any recommendations that Commissioner Hogue may have in her final report. In the meantime, the government continues to take steps to protect Canada's democracy.

[Michel Bédard]

I will echo the words of the clerk in saying that this is often a political issue. When the political will is there, the legislative process can be used very quickly. We saw an example of that with Bill C‑70.

When it comes to House of Commons resources and the programs and services put in place, the relevant authority is often the Board of Internal Economy. I can assure you that, even though there may be prescribed timelines, it's relatively faster to go through the Board of Internal Economy than to go through the entire legislative process.

I would say that every situation is different and that measures have to be taken on a case-by-case basis.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to ask a question of both of you. I'll start with you, Mr. Moninder Singh.

The Parliament of Canada came together in quite a rapid fashion in the summer to pass Bill C-70, which updated a lot of our laws, including bringing the CSIS Act up to speed to operate in a digital world. There were also some significant amendments to the security of information act to really provide a lot more legislative flexibility in targeting clandestine foreign interference operations. I know from CBC News, from some of their sources, they have reported that India's clandestine operations remain largely in place and that it may be some time before we dismantle those.

When you've seen what Canada's Parliament has done and the fact that there is now this attention on the Indian government, are you optimistic that we are on a path toward finally confronting this? Do you remain optimistic, given all of your personal experiences?

[Nathalie Drouin]

It's true that any attempts at foreign interference need to be taken seriously. It's been said that the last elections were fair and free from the consequences of foreign interference.

As parliamentarians, you introduced Bill C‑70, which was a step in—

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

On the whole subject of foreign interference, I've heard it in my couple of years at this committee: We know the Iranian diaspora would have something to say about the Government of Iran. I've heard from the Tibetan community about what the People's Republic of China is engaged in. Now, of course, we're hearing the South Asian community with respect to the Government of India.

In my riding, I have a large South Asian population as well. The historic Paldi Sikh Temple is in my riding of Cowichan—Malahat—Langford. I think, to an earlier point, the attention on the Government of India is validating what many in that community have known for quite some time now.

I think my questions will be for both Director Rogers and Commissioner Duheme.

I don't doubt for a second that the men and women in your respective agencies are going to work every day and treating this with utmost seriousness. As a parliamentarian, it's also my job to hold to account, and I can't escape the fact that the most recent NSICOP report labelled Canada as a “low-risk, high reward” environment in which our foreign adversaries are able to operate.

I know that sources have reported to CBC News that the clandestine Indian network is still largely in place. You might see some elements of that disappear and go more quiet.

Maybe we'll start with you, Director Rogers. How do we flip those terms around? With the passage of Bill C-70, do you feel confident that we're now on a path towards making Canada a high-risk, low-reward environment in which to operate for our foreign adversaries?