Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

Thank you so much.

I'll go back to Mr. Shull.

How do the provisions in C-70 compare with legislative schemes enacted in other Five Eyes countries to counter foreign interference and influence?

[Tim McSorley, National Coordinator, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

Mr. Chair, thank you very much for the invitation to appear today to speak to Bill C-70.

I'm with the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, a Canadian coalition of 46 civil society organizations that works to defend civil liberties and human rights in the context of national security and anti-terrorism activities.

Bill C-70 has been presented as legislation to address the threat of foreign interference. We recognize the importance of addressing this issue, particularly as we've heard in instances where governments are threatening individuals or their close ones in order to repress their ability to exercise their fundamental rights or engage in democratic processes. However, the changes proposed by this legislation go much further.

If adopted, this bill would have wide-ranging impacts on Canada's national security, intelligence and criminal justice systems. As such, it would also have significant impacts on the lives and fundamental rights of people in Canada. For example, providing CSIS with new forms of warrants, granting it extraterritorial reach for foreign intelligence activities and allowing the service to disclose information to any person or entity in order to build resiliency could lead to increased surveillance, diminished privacy and racial, religious and political profiling.

Powerful new offences for actions taken secretly at the behest of foreign entities, including foreign governments and terrorist organizations, while necessary, are punishable up to life in prison. Those could infringe on freedom of expression and association and raise questions of proportionality in sentencing.

The bill would also transform how federal courts handle sensitive information that can be withheld from appellants or those seeking judicial review undermining due process in courts through the use of secret evidence.

A bill of such breadth requires in-depth study. We're very grateful for the work that committee members are doing and recognize the amount of time and effort being put into these hearings which, as was pointed out, are extending long today and throughout the week.

However, we're still deeply concerned with the hastiness with which this legislation is being considered. Introduced barely a month ago, with a foreign interference inquiry ongoing, it will have gone through committee study within a week. This is even faster than the rushed 2001 study of the first Anti-terrorism Act, which was in committee for a month.

We're grateful for today's invitation; however, we only found out about our appearance on Friday afternoon. Colleagues from other organizations who would have asked to appear or submitted written briefs have said they will be unable to do so on such short timelines, let alone develop specific amendments to suggest for Friday's deadline.

Rushing the parliamentary process, supported by a state of suspicion and ardent calls to protect national security, can lead to serious negative and long-lasting consequences. An expedited study also risks missing ways the bill could be improved to better address issues of foreign interference. We are therefore urging the committee to work with your colleagues in the House of Commons to extend your study of this very consequential bill.

Apart from the process of this study, we have some specific areas of concern.

First, modifications to CSIS's dataset regime are only tangentially related to foreign interference. Many of these changes relate to significant problems that the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency identified in a scathing report on the regime. The necessity and potential consequences of these changes remain unclear and should have been addressed during a statutory review of 2019's National Security Act. We would recommend removing these changes until such a review happens. I'd be happy to speak to this further during the discussion.

We're also concerned around the powers of disclosure in section 19 of the CSIS Act. While we understand the goal of ensuring appropriate information can be shared, journalists and NSIRA have raised serious questions about how CSIS has handled the disclosure of sensitive information in the past. Bill C-70 also grants CSIS significant new production order and warrant powers. The changes come after years of the courts admonishing CSIS for misleading them in their warrant applications. Warrant requirements exist to protect our rights. They shouldn't be lessened and especially not while CSIS's problems of breaches of duty of candour to the courts have not been resolved.

Bill C-70 also changes the Security of Information Act, including new indictable offences for the carrying out of any indictable offence, including relatively minor transgressions, if done for the benefit of a foreign entity. This, along with other new or modified offences, would be punishable by either life in prison or consecutive sentences that could amount to life in prison, provisions that are normally reserved for the worst forms of crimes and raise concerns of proportionality in sentencing.

Finally, we also have concerns about the new sabotage offences and the proposed foreign influence registry.

I will finish by commenting on changes to the Canada Evidence Act. Our coalition is fundamentally opposed to expanding the use of secret evidence in Canada's courts under the guise of protecting national security, national defence and international affairs. Introducing a standardized system for withholding information from those challenging government decisions that have significant impacts on their lives will normalize this process and is likely to facilitate the spread of the use of secret information further into our justice system.

Thank you. I'm looking forward to the discussion and questions.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Desk, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the members of the committee for the opportunity to share my thoughts and recommendations on Bill C-70.

I'll begin by sharing the premises that guided my analysis.

A strong and healthy democracy must be protected by three fundamental concepts: transparency, accountability and independence, free from interference, of dependants.

The debate over the threat of foreign interference has raged for nearly two years. What has emerged is the extent to which there was dysfunction, scheming and control games in the arena of foreign interference. Yes, we have been targeted by foreign powers, but their work was facilitated by actors in key positions in our government, past and present, who have facilitated and even taken advantage of the situation for their personal and partisan gain. To that effect, I bring your attention to a report that was just released by the parliamentary committee on national security, which again blames severely some elected officials for willingly and consciously collaborating with foreign states, hence the need to recall the three basic concepts for protecting our democratic system: transparency, accountability and independence, free from all interference from people in office.

Bill C-70 is an opportunity to correct these errors and manipulations in order to aim for a Kantian ideal of our system.

I have only had 48 hours to prepare my formal presentation, so I will quickly mention a few key points. My concerns are mainly related to the implementation of the proposed reforms.

First, I welcome the proposals to expand communication between the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and organizations other than the Prime Minister's Office.

Having said that, if we're going to talk about a real national security agenda, we must include the provinces and persuade the premiers to appoint national security advisers. They are already targeted by foreign agents and are completely unaware of it.

I welcome the efforts to clearly define criminal actions taken by agents acting for the benefit of foreign powers. However, I fear the execution of that because, to successfully contain the problem, the RCMP and CSIS will have to collaborate. Unfortunately, history tells us that, since its creation, CSIS, out of concern and due to formal instruction received a right at its outset—and I was there when it took place—not to testify ever in court or to prevent its going to court as much as possible, which has led to intentional obstruction of RCMP investigations. This happened in the files of Air India, Ahmed Ressam, Adil Charkaoui and Jeffrey Deslisle, to name only the few that are known publicly. So it is normal to fear that the system will reproduce the same deficient mechanisms.

In support of that apprehension, the director of CSIS, Monsieur Daniel Vigneault, testified before the commission of inquiry into foreign interference that he had, on two occasions, following a meeting with the Prime Minister, modified the reports to accommodate this last. This clearly demonstrates that our national security does not have the necessary and desired independence.

In that vein, I will remind committee members that prime ministers, from Mr. Mulroney to Mr. Trudeau, have all been briefed on the issue of foreign interference and have all chosen to ignore it for personal or political gain. This systemic problem is not new. Again, this is an issue of intelligence monitoring and accountability.

In the time I have left, I will continue with my analysis of the registry. The main purpose of the registry is to maintain the integrity of the system by keeping everyone transparent and accountable.

First of all, I note a lack of concordance between part 1 and part 4 of the bill. When we look at the new powers being devolved to CSIS—and even to the RCMP, in a certain perspective—they do not seem to work to maintain the efforts that will possibly be deployed by the new commissioner's office.

Second, the new position of commissioner must be independent and report to the House of Commons, not to the minister. As the Auditor General currently does, they should report directly to the House of Commons. Reporting to the minister will only replicate or perpetuate the existing problem.

Independence of the office of the commissioner must be also financial. The protection of our democracy must be protected from—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

That brings this panel to a close. Before we suspend for the next panel, members of the committee, the clerk distributed on Friday, May 31 a project budget for Bill C-70 in the amount of $53,250. Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt this budget?

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

While the United States is prosecuting people for the offences you mentioned, here we are still trying to establish a law.

Is Bill C-70 sufficient? Is there anything missing?

[Mehmet Tohti]

Yes.

It is really important to have a clear definition. The U.S. Senate introduced Bill S. 831 for what will be called the transnational repression policy act. That bill on transnational repression clearly defines what transnational repression is.

There are names and numbers for definitions of offences. Most of those definitions are amended as a result of consequential amendments. When you add one thing, the related bills need to be updated, consequently. For that reason, we need, as part of this important bill—Bill C-70—to clearly define what transnational repression is.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of the witnesses for joining us today as we take a deep dive into Bill C-70.

I want to start with Mr. Therchin and Mr. Tohti.

I was taking notes when you both made your opening statements, particularly with regard to the need for a definition of “transnational oppression”. I'm trying to figure out, when we come to a stage where we're considering amendments, where to best fit this in. This bill amends a number of different existing statutes and also creates a new one. However, I want to draw your attention to the fact that, in this bill, there are important amendments to the Security of Information Act. There are going to be new clauses to go after intimidation, threats or violence committed on behalf of a foreign entity. There are going to be amendments about committing an indictable offence on behalf of a foreign entity, about omitting the fact that you are working for a foreign entity, or about interfering in the political process on behalf of a foreign entity. A lot of these—in fact, all of them—have quite serious punishments associated with them.

If you want to submit a brief to this committee, that's great. We can get it later on. However, is there anything you want that is missing in those I covered? What are we missing? This seems to cover a lot of what you said in your opening statements. I want to make sure we're getting all of our bases covered.

I'll start with you, sir.

[Sherap Therchin]

Again, with colleagues from Hong Kong leading this discussion, one of the points raised in our discussion was the definition of proxies in the foreign influence registration act. If possible, that needs to be clearly defined.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our guests, Mr. Tohti, Mr. Therchin and Mr. Singh.

I'll start with you, Mr. Tohti, and then go to Mr. Therchin.

You have actively supported the creation of a foreign influence registry. Does the government's proposal in Bill C-70 meet your expectations?

[Balpreet Singh, Legal Counsel, World Sikh Organization of Canada]

Good afternoon. My name is Balpreet Singh. I serve as legal counsel for the World Sikh Organization of Canada, which is also known as the WSO.

The first week of June is a particularly sombre time for Sikhs, as we remember the 1984 Sikh genocide and the Indian government's brutal attack on the Darbar Sahib complex and approximately 70 other gurdwaras across Punjab. I mention the horrific acts of June 1984 to remind committee members of the price that Sikh community members have paid due to state-sponsored violence, foreign interference and surveillance, simply for practising our faith.

For the past 40 years, India has consistently sought to intimidate Sikhs in Canada and stifle Sikh advocacy for Khalistan, which is a sovereign state governed according to Sikh principles and values. This interference has included disinformation campaigns, visa denials, intimidation of family members and, as we know now, even assassinations. Discussing or promoting Khalistan is protected under freedom of expression and political discourse. Attempts to draw attention to ongoing Indian interference targeting Sikhs have fallen largely on deaf ears, as India constantly maligns Sikh activism as extremism and worse.

The Sikh community is currently at a pivotal moment in its history. In June 2023, Bhai Hardeep Singh Nijjar was assassinated while leaving the Guru Nanak gurdwara in Surrey, where he served as president. The community, including our own organization, the WSO, recognized that this was an assassination at the hands of the Indian state. This was later substantiated as information emerged of Indian plans to kill Sikh activists here in Canada and across the world.

This weekend, I met with two Sikhs who have been given duties to warn. They have been provided with no details on the source of the threat they face or any resources to protect themselves. In short, they feel that they are on their own and pretty much abandoned.

Foreign interference has had deadly consequences for Sikhs in Canada. We believe more needs to be done to counter foreign interference. In that respect, Bill C-70 is a step in the right direction.

I would like to highlight the ability of CSIS to now disclose security information to any person or entity, should CSIS deem it relevant. This will be a positive step. However, we are also concerned about whether foreign consular officials in Canada might also be considered an entity. Also, India regularly supplies false and misleading intelligence about Sikh activists in Canada. There would need to be some sort of controls to ensure that this isn't further disseminated.

We know that the framework for co-operation on countering terrorism and violent extremism between Canada and India is still active. We have grave concerns over intelligence sharing between Canada and India. Vigilance needs to be ensured, so that new powers created by this legislation are used to counter foreign interference and not turned around against communities here. India has falsely claimed that Khalistan activism in Canada is directed by foreign state actors. Could accusations like that trigger the provisions in this bill?

The sabotage provision being added to the Criminal Code makes it an offence to interfere “with access to an essential infrastructure...with the intent to”—and this is in (b)—“endanger the safety or security of the naval, army or air forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada”. Sikhs have often protested in front of Indian consulates and the embassy here in Ottawa. The Indian embassy staff includes a military, naval and air attaché. Last year, the Indian media falsely reported that the Indian embassy in Ottawa was targeted with “two grenades” by a Sikh protester—a story covered today in the Journal de Montréal. India's NIA, the National Investigation Agency, also filed charges against a Montreal-based Sikh based on these accusations. Could this new Criminal Code provision be used to stifle Sikh protests?

With the short amount of time I have left, I'd like to highlight the reference to international relations between countries in Bill C-70.

We're concerned that this language and provision could go against the overall purpose of the legislation. Judges are given discretion to not release records following a trial if they believe that doing so “would be injurious to international relations or national defence or national security”. Additionally, subsection 82.31(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act gives the minister the ability to intervene if they believe that matters could damage international relations.

The reason foreign interference against Sikhs has gone unchecked for the past 40 years is the desire of successive Canadian governments to increase trade relations with India. This has been at the expense of the Sikh community. A report by Sam Cooper in The Bureau revealed that “CSIS planned a major intervention in 2017” to dismantle “Indian intelligence networks in Vancouver that were monitoring and targeting the Sikh community”. According to this report, this operation was obstructed by the government, citing potential repercussions for Canada-India relations.

Canada needs new tools to counter foreign interference, no doubt. However, our organization and the Sikh community fear that the international relations clause may be used as an excuse to ignore ongoing interference by India against Sikhs in Canada and might even create tools that would persecute Canadian Sikh activists.

That's my time.

I look forward to the questions you might have.

[Mehmet Tohti, Executive Director, Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project]

Thank you, Chair and distinguished members.

I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify today about the critical and pressing issue that we have been advocating on for nearly decades: countering foreign interference. As a fervent advocate for the Uyghur people and against the Chinese Communist Party's ongoing genocide, I can say that foreign interference by the Chinese state has had a marked impact on my personal life here in Canada.

Chinese repressive and innovative efforts to silence dissidents have attempted to shackle my activism and intimidate me into retreating from speaking out about the devastation of my family, friends and community. I have received numerous times threatening phone calls from the state police directly and messages about the most wild things being said about my loved ones. I'm a Canadian, and my rights to exercise free speech and freedom of assembly are attempted to be curtailed by the Chinese government all the time.

Bill C-70 is a heartening response by the Canadian government to my community's experience of transnational repression. Bill C-70 is a significant step forward in addressing foreign interference and protecting Canadian citizens from transnational repression. We talk about transnational repression because, on a personal level, we do not experience interference. We experience repression by the hijacking of our family members just for our speaking up in Canada. For that reason, both Tibetans and Uyghurs use the term “transnational repression”.

As a human rights defender, I do believe that the broader application and the coverage of certain acts of transnational repression against human rights activists afforded by the proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will allow for greater protection of the full and uninhibited exercise of our democratic rights in Canada. The proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will foster a joint strength among us Canadians to effectively counter threats to the security of Canada and safeguard the diaspora communities in Canada and abroad.

The expansion of information disclosure to anyone, not just a public official, if deemed to be essential in the public interest, will allow for enhanced bureaucratic transparency. Enhancing CSIS's ability to carry out its important functions serves to strengthen Canadians' trust in the agency and its capacity to detect, prevent and respond to threats from foreign agents, including those from China.

Necessarily, Bill C-70's emphasis on international co-operation underpins a crucial and powerful tactic in countering the global reach of authoritarian regimes such as China.

I applaud the proposed creation of a foreign influence transparency registry, which will enhance the effectiveness of protecting vulnerable diaspora communities, and the proposed appointment of a commissioner of foreign influence transparency; however, I am a little bit concerned about the absence in Bill C-70 of proposing the addition of specific foreign interference offences to the Criminal Code, nor does it propose that refugee espionage, online harassment or digital violence be criminalized. Further, given the limited amendments to the Criminal Code, there are deficient means for the victims of foreign interference to seek redress for the impacts of transnational oppression.

It is crucial that the government go beyond interference that activists carry out in relation to certain political and government processes in all aspects of Bill C-70. The Chinese government's reach extends far beyond attempts at directly interfering with Canadian institutions. My experience of transnational oppression is unrelated to political or governmental process, yet it is an assault on my democratic rights, warranting protection as much as upholding the integrity of our democratic process.

Crucially, addressing foreign interference must take a victim-centric approach. Chinese transnational oppression and interference in Canada pose a significant threat to the Uyghur communities and the Canadian values of freedom and democracy. With the introduction of Bill C-70, Canada is making a strong statement against those oppressive tactics. It is imperative that we remain vigilant, stand in solidarity with those affected and take concrete steps to counter these challenges.

Thank you.

[Sherap Therchin, Executive Director, Canada Tibet Committee]

Thank you, Chair and committee members.

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today on the important matter of countering foreign interference. I would like to thank everyone involved for taking this matter seriously and for the detailed process to develop countering measures.

I would like to focus my presentation on part 1 of Bill C-70 with reference to the review of the bill by Sarah Teich and Hannah Taylor. While the review finds many of the amendments encouraging, it points to a limitation, which is that Bill C-70 does not propose the addition of a definition of “transnational repression” to any pieces of legislation that the bill proposes to amend or enact.

Defining transnational repression is essential to recognize and address the specific tactics used by foreign states to silence dissent among diaspora communities. This repression can take various forms, including harassment, surveillance, threats, coercion and physical violence. Authoritarian states, such as the People's Republic of China, routinely use these tactics to control dissent and opposition beyond their borders.

The PRC's transnational repression is a well-documented phenomenon affecting several groups, including the Tibetan diaspora. The Chinese Communist Party employs various methods to exert control and suppress Tibetan activism and identity worldwide.

I'd like to describe some of the key tactics here.

One is surveillance and intimidation. The CCP gathers personal information on exiled Tibetans through cyber-attacks and spyware and by questioning relatives in Tibet. This information is used to intimidate and coerce Tibetans abroad, often through direct threats or by harming their families back home.

Two is coercion by proxy. The Chinese authorities frequently threaten or harm relatives of exiled Tibetans in Tibet to exert control over the diaspora. This method ensures that exiled activists are silenced or forced to conform to the CCP's demands out of fear for their loved ones.

Three is infiltration and disinformation. The CCP infiltrates the Tibetan diaspora communities and organizations, using spies and co-opted individuals to sow distrust, spread disinformation and undermine solidarity networks. These activities severely disrupt the community's ability to organize and advocate for Tibetan rights.

Four is economic and social coercion. Tibetan exiles often face economic and social pressure from the CCP, including blackmail and efforts to sabotage their livelihoods. Such tactics aim to destabilize the diaspora and reduce its capacity to support the Tibetan cause.

There is a need for a clear definition in Bill C-70. Incorporating a clear definition of transnational repression in Bill C-70 would enhance Canada's ability to combat such foreign interference effectively. It would provide a legal basis for identifying and prosecuting transnational repression activities, thereby protecting diaspora communities from foreign state harassment and coercion.

With this, I'd like to offer some recommendations for Bill C-70.

Recommendation one is to define “transnational repression”: Include a comprehensive definition of transnational repression that encompasses all forms of extraterritorial control and coercion used by foreign states against diaspora communities.

Recommendation two is to enhance surveillance and prosecution mechanisms: Strengthen provisions within the CSIS Act and the Criminal Code to allow for robust monitoring and prosecution of transnational repression activities, ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable.

Recommendation three is to support victims and communities: Establish mechanisms, including specialized funds, to support and protect diaspora communities, providing resources and assistance to those affected by transnational repression.

Finally, recommendation four is international co-operation: Foster international collaboration to address transnational repression, working with allies to develop coordinated responses and share best practices.

In conclusion, defining transnational repression in Bill C-70 is a crucial step towards effectively countering the PRC's tactics against the Tibetan diaspora and other affected communities. By recognizing and addressing these activities, Canada can better protect the rights and freedoms of all its residents, ensuring a safe and supportive environment for those fleeing authoritarian oppression.

Thank you.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Well, I think there's been excellent testimony today about the need for a culture shift, not only because of Bill C-70 but also, I think, because of the world we live in and the threats we face.

Mr. Kempa, in a number of recent articles, you discussed the serious problem that foreign interference represents, particularly in local nominations. Of course, there's a minority government under way right now. Lots of nominations are under way and will continue to be under way.

To what extent do you think Bill C-70 will protect the legitimacy of upcoming nominations in the next election?

[Heath MacDonald, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Thank you, Chair.

Dr. Burton, I want to touch base on the transparency issue that you addressed in your preamble, possibly relevant to foreign governments and individuals. What's missing or what should we be doing to enhance that level of transparency in Bill C-70, or is it appropriate as it is?

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

Thank you for that. Hopefully, a lot of it works in the good way and not the poorly way.

Mr. Burton, I had a whole bunch of questions here specifically on Bill C-70, but you've mentioned a few things that I need to get a little more clarification on or it's going to bother me for a while.

You mentioned that some of your colleagues have left to join other entities. You mentioned specifically China. Could you give me some examples? What do you mean by that?