I'll certainly take that as a compliment. I don't feel like I'm on the B-team.
If I could compliment the committee members on their ties and scarves they're wearing for prostate cancer today, I would have dressed up my uniform with one, but I think the sergeant-major would have had another thing to say about that.
Mr. Chair, thank you for inviting me here this afternoon. I am pleased to be here with you today to talk about my experience in Afghanistan.
During my last appearance, we talked about our efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan forces—meaning the Afghan police and army. Since that time, I have held the position of chief of staff of land operations. I am the officer who manages the army's business on a daily basis. It is important for me to say that because, although I work in the heart of our Canadian Forces, I am not involved in the Afghanistan file at this time.
I thought I would cut to the chase and speak directly to the issue of detainees from my time as commander of Task Force Kandahar from 14 May 2008 until 19 February 2009.
Let me state up front that I made certain that my commanding officers and my headquarters clearly understood that from my point of view there were three principal risks of strategic failure. When I speak of strategic failure, l'm talking about matters that if left unaddressed could very well result in defeat. I share these three risks with you cognizant of General Leslie's words to me prior to departing for Kandahar, when he said, and I quote: "Denis, you won't win this war in nine months, but you can certainly lose it.” We did neither.
So with respect to those three strategic risks, first and foremost, large friendly force casualties--and by that I mean Canadian and U.S. casualties, because I did have U.S. soldiers under command--would be seen as a point of strategic failure. That doesn't mean that we avoided the fight by sitting inside our forward operating bases--quite the contrary. It does mean that mitigating tactics needed to be disseminated and practised conscientiously, such as those to counter the ever present improvised explosive devices. Nevertheless, we were at war, and during my command tour the mission suffered 25 who were killed in action and numerous wounded. There isn't a day that passes that I don't think of the real soldiers behind those numbers.
Second were civilian casualties. These are often referred to, antiseptically, as collateral damage. Obviously civilian casualties are to be avoided by relying on the considerable discipline and judgment of our Canadian soldiers--discipline and judgment that they apply day in and day out in Kandahar. Here, too, we were not without incidents, due to the complex nature of the environment. It saddened me deeply to learn of the deaths of innocents in Kandahar province. In each of these circumstances the incidents resulting in civilian deaths were investigated by the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service in concert with the Afghan National Police. Bereaved family members were always handled with respect.
The third strategic risk, and that of most interest to the committee today, is the matter of detainees. By the time I arrived in Kandahar as commander, the detainee process was a well-developed, mature system. The tactics, techniques, and procedures for the taking of detainees were well understood at the soldier level, and they were well rehearsed during our work-up training. There was, and is, a task force standing order that covers the handling and transfer of detainees. From the point of capture to their arrival at the detainee transfer facility in Kandahar airfield, the care and movement of detainees was handled in strict adherence with the standards required for prisoners of war under the third Geneva Convention.
I believe the procedure of interest to this committee is under what conditions detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, in this case the NDS or National Directorate of Security. Within my headquarters there was a committee entitled the commander's advisory group on detainees, which was made up of four Canadian Forces officers and one DFAIT officer. Those Canadian Forces officers were my chief of operations, chief of intelligence, Afghanistan detainee officer, and they were all advised by the task force legal officer. The DFAIT officer was my political adviser. They would see me, or my deputy if I was not in camp, in order to have the file reviewed and to determine if the detainee should be retained, released, or transferred within the next 24 hours. It was a daily process.
The decision to transfer to the NDS was based on whether or not I believed, first of all, that there was sufficient evidence to link the detainee to the insurgency. If the detainee was to be transferred, it would only occur if I was satisfied that, quote, "there are not substantial grounds for believing that there exists a real risk the detainee would be in danger of being subjected to torture or other forms of mistreatment if transferred".
This judgment was based on a review of current reports completed by the responsible DFAIT officer based at the PRT. You just heard from Cory Anderson on how that mechanism worked.
In my time there were no negative reports about the NDS facility in Kandahar City. In general, we tried to not hold on to detainees beyond 96 hours, and were sure to inform Canadian Expeditionary Force Command if that were the case. Nevertheless there were always exceptions.
We had two cases of detainees who were suffering from limited mental capacity. The challenge was to find someone responsible to take care of them, because neither of them met the test for transfer. In one case we found the man's family, and in the other case we asked the International Committee of the Red Cross to look after him.
If a detainee was wounded he was accorded the same medical care as our soldiers. If he was identified as an insurgent and was therefore an eventual transfer case, he remained in the transfer facility while he convalesced. In one case a detainee convalesced in our care for four months.
During my command tour we took a number of detainees, released three-quarters of them, and transferred about a quarter of them to the NDS. In each case I was convinced that the transfer occurred after appropriate due diligence had been exercised to ensure detainees were not entering a facility where they would be subject to abuse or torture.
I hope I have been able to answer your questions on the detainees. If not, I would be happy to answer any further questions you might have, keeping in mind that I left Kandahar 13 months ago.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
